Measuring the Checker: Mutation Analysis for GPU-Kernel Benchmark Oracles
Abstract
Benchmarks for LLM-generated GPU kernels decide correctness with a few random inputs and a loose floating-point tolerance, and their verdicts now feed leaderboards and reinforcement-learning rewards. Recent work agrees these checkers are weak and patches them by hand---extra input distributions, fuzzing recipes, tighter tolerances---with no way to measure whether any patch suffices. We introduce mutation analysis as an adequacy metric for kernel-benchmark oracles: deterministic rules inject 10{,}303 compilable faults into verified CUDA implementations of 188 KernelBench problems, 7{,}384 of them with an independent kill witness; any test protocol is scored by the fraction it detects. The official check misses one in six witnessed faults (16.9%), deterministically, and the misses are skewed by family: 8.7% of arithmetic faults escape, but 78.6% of precision faults do. The metric explains why (a tolerance blind band growing with reduction size; a measured ceiling on input aggressiveness set by legitimate floating-point variance), audits the strongest existing patch (KernelBench-Verified's gain splits into +4.0 points from hidden inputs and +4.5 from tighter tolerance, a split its authors could not compute), and exposes a published fuzzing recipe that rejects correct kernels 107 times. Optimizing suites over the kill matrix reaches 98.0% detection with two inputs per problem (94.8% held-out), and the measurement's fault taxonomy teaches a test generator more than the raw faults themselves. Across 48 whole architectures, the blindness grows with scale, concentrating in deep homogeneous pipelines, and two problems prove unrefereeable: their official references violate the benchmark's own tolerance against fp64. We release everything as https://huggingface.co/datasets/Elfsong/KernelBench-M{KernelBench-M}.
Community
Benchmarks for LLM-generated GPU kernels decide correctness with a few random inputs and a loose floating-point tolerance, and their verdicts now feed leaderboards and reinforcement-learning rewards. Recent work agrees these checkers are
weak and patches them by hand—extra input distributions, fuzzing recipes, tighter
tolerances—with no way to measure whether any patch suffices. We introduce mutation analysis as an adequacy metric for kernel-benchmark oracles: deterministic
rules inject 10,303 compilable faults into verified CUDA implementations of 188
KernelBench problems, 7,384 of them with an independent kill witness; any test
protocol is scored by the fraction it detects. The official check misses one in sixwitnessed faults (16.9%), deterministically, and the misses are skewed by family:
8.7% of arithmetic faults escape but 78.6% of precision faults do. The metric
explains why (a tolerance blind band growing with reduction size; a measured
ceiling on input aggressiveness set by legitimate floating-point variance), audits the
strongest existing patch (KernelBench-Verified’s gain splits into +4.0 points from
hidden inputs and +4.5 from tighter tolerance, a split its authors could not compute), and exposes a published fuzzing recipe that rejects correct kernels 107 times.
Optimizing suites over the kill matrix reaches 98.0% detection with two inputs per
problem (94.8% held-out), and the measurement’s fault taxonomy teaches a test
generator more than the raw faults themselves. Across 48 whole architectures the
blindness grows with scale, concentrating in deep homogeneous pipelines, and two
problems prove unrefereeable: their official references violate the benchmark’s
own tolerance against fp64. We release everything as KernelBench-M.
Get this paper in your agent:
hf papers read 2609.22220 Don't have the latest CLI?
curl -LsSf https://hf.co/cli/install.sh | bash Models citing this paper 0
No model linking this paper
Datasets citing this paper 0
No dataset linking this paper
Spaces citing this paper 0
No Space linking this paper
Collections including this paper 0
No Collection including this paper