Daily Papers

Video question grounding (VideoQG) requires models to answer the questions and simultaneously infer the relevant video segments to support the answers. However, existing VideoQG methods usually suffer from spurious cross-modal correlations, leading to a failure to identify the dominant visual scenes that align with the intended question. Moreover, vision-language models exhibit unfaithful generalization performance and lack robustness on challenging downstream tasks such as VideoQG. In this work, we propose a novel VideoQG framework named Cross-modal Causal Relation Alignment (CRA), to eliminate spurious correlations and improve the causal consistency between question-answering and video temporal grounding. Our CRA involves three essential components: i) Gaussian Smoothing Grounding (GSG) module for estimating the time interval via cross-modal attention, which is de-noised by an adaptive Gaussian filter, ii) Cross-Modal Alignment (CMA) enhances the performance of weakly supervised VideoQG by leveraging bidirectional contrastive learning between estimated video segments and QA features, iii) Explicit Causal Intervention (ECI) module for multimodal deconfounding, which involves front-door intervention for vision and back-door intervention for language. Extensive experiments on two VideoQG datasets demonstrate the superiority of our CRA in discovering visually grounded content and achieving robust question reasoning. Codes are available at https://github.com/WissingChen/CRA-GQA.

In recent years, we have witnessed the great advancement of Deep neural networks (DNNs) in image restoration. However, a critical limitation is that they cannot generalize well to real-world degradations with different degrees or types. In this paper, we are the first to propose a novel training strategy for image restoration from the causality perspective, to improve the generalization ability of DNNs for unknown degradations. Our method, termed Distortion Invariant representation Learning (DIL), treats each distortion type and degree as one specific confounder, and learns the distortion-invariant representation by eliminating the harmful confounding effect of each degradation. We derive our DIL with the back-door criterion in causality by modeling the interventions of different distortions from the optimization perspective. Particularly, we introduce counterfactual distortion augmentation to simulate the virtual distortion types and degrees as the confounders. Then, we instantiate the intervention of each distortion with a virtual model updating based on corresponding distorted images, and eliminate them from the meta-learning perspective. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our DIL on the generalization capability for unseen distortion types and degrees. Our code will be available at https://github.com/lixinustc/Causal-IR-DIL.

Though notable progress has been made, neural-based aspect-based sentiment analysis (ABSA) models are prone to learn spurious correlations from annotation biases, resulting in poor robustness on adversarial data transformations. Among the debiasing solutions, causal inference-based methods have attracted much research attention, which can be mainly categorized into causal intervention methods and counterfactual reasoning methods. However, most of the present debiasing methods focus on single-variable causal inference, which is not suitable for ABSA with two input variables (the target aspect and the review). In this paper, we propose a novel framework based on multi-variable causal inference for debiasing ABSA. In this framework, different types of biases are tackled based on different causal intervention methods. For the review branch, the bias is modeled as indirect confounding from context, where backdoor adjustment intervention is employed for debiasing. For the aspect branch, the bias is described as a direct correlation with labels, where counterfactual reasoning is adopted for debiasing. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method compared to various baselines on the two widely used real-world aspect robustness test set datasets.

Egocentric Referring Video Object Segmentation (Ego-RVOS) aims to segment the specific object actively involved in a human action, as described by a language query, within first-person videos. This task is critical for understanding egocentric human behavior. However, achieving such segmentation robustly is challenging due to ambiguities inherent in egocentric videos and biases present in training data. Consequently, existing methods often struggle, learning spurious correlations from skewed object-action pairings in datasets and fundamental visual confounding factors of the egocentric perspective, such as rapid motion and frequent occlusions. To address these limitations, we introduce Causal Ego-REferring Segmentation (CERES), a plug-in causal framework that adapts strong, pre-trained RVOS backbones to the egocentric domain. CERES implements dual-modal causal intervention: applying backdoor adjustment principles to counteract language representation biases learned from dataset statistics, and leveraging front-door adjustment concepts to address visual confounding by intelligently integrating semantic visual features with geometric depth information guided by causal principles, creating representations more robust to egocentric distortions. Extensive experiments demonstrate that CERES achieves state-of-the-art performance on Ego-RVOS benchmarks, highlighting the potential of applying causal reasoning to build more reliable models for broader egocentric video understanding.

Extensive research has highlighted the severe threats posed by backdoor attacks to deep reinforcement learning (DRL). However, prior studies primarily focus on vanilla scenarios, while plasticity interventions have emerged as indispensable built-in components of modern DRL agents. Despite their effectiveness in mitigating plasticity loss, the impact of these interventions on DRL backdoor vulnerabilities remains underexplored, and this lack of systematic investigation poses risks in practical DRL deployments. To bridge this gap, we empirically study 14,664 cases integrating representative interventions and attack scenarios. We find that only one intervention (i.e., SAM) exacerbates backdoor threats, while other interventions mitigate them. Pathological analysis identifies that the exacerbation is attributed to backdoor gradient amplification, while the mitigation stems from activation pathway disruption and representation space compression. From these findings, we derive two novel insights: (1) a conceptual framework SCC for robust backdoor injection that deconstructs the mechanistic interplay between interventions and backdoors in DRL, and (2) abnormal loss landscape sharpness as a key indicator for DRL backdoor detection.

To ensure AI safety, instruction-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs) are specifically trained to ensure alignment, which refers to making models behave in accordance with human intentions. While these models have demonstrated commendable results on various safety benchmarks, the vulnerability of their safety alignment has not been extensively studied. This is particularly troubling given the potential harm that LLMs can inflict. Existing attack methods on LLMs often rely on poisoned training data or the injection of malicious prompts. These approaches compromise the stealthiness and generalizability of the attacks, making them susceptible to detection. Additionally, these models often demand substantial computational resources for implementation, making them less practical for real-world applications. Inspired by recent success in modifying model behavior through steering vectors without the need for optimization, and drawing on its effectiveness in red-teaming LLMs, we conducted experiments employing activation steering to target four key aspects of LLMs: truthfulness, toxicity, bias, and harmfulness - across a varied set of attack settings. To establish a universal attack strategy applicable to diverse target alignments without depending on manual analysis, we automatically select the intervention layer based on contrastive layer search. Our experiment results show that activation attacks are highly effective and add little or no overhead to attack efficiency. Additionally, we discuss potential countermeasures against such activation attacks. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/wang2226/Backdoor-Activation-Attack Warning: this paper contains content that can be offensive or upsetting.

The study of representation universality in AI models reveals growing convergence across domains, modalities, and architectures. However, the practical applications of representation universality remain largely unexplored. We bridge this gap by demonstrating that safety interventions can be transferred between models through learned mappings of their shared activation spaces. We demonstrate this approach on two well-established AI safety tasks: backdoor removal and refusal of harmful prompts, showing successful transfer of steering vectors that alter the models' outputs in a predictable way. Additionally, we propose a new task, corrupted capabilities, where models are fine-tuned to embed knowledge tied to a backdoor. This tests their ability to separate useful skills from backdoors, reflecting real-world challenges. Extensive experiments across Llama, Qwen and Gemma model families show that our method enables using smaller models to efficiently align larger ones. Furthermore, we demonstrate that autoencoder mappings between base and fine-tuned models can serve as reliable ``lightweight safety switches", allowing dynamic toggling between model behaviors.

State-of-the-art whole-body pose estimators often lack robustness, producing anatomically implausible predictions in challenging scenes. We posit this failure stems from spurious correlations learned from visual context, a problem we formalize using a Structural Causal Model (SCM). The SCM identifies visual context as a confounder that creates a non-causal backdoor path, corrupting the model's reasoning. We introduce the Causal Intervention Graph Pose (CIGPose) framework to address this by approximating the true causal effect between visual evidence and pose. The core of CIGPose is a novel Causal Intervention Module: it first identifies confounded keypoint representations via predictive uncertainty and then replaces them with learned, context-invariant canonical embeddings. These deconfounded embeddings are processed by a hierarchical graph neural network that reasons over the human skeleton at both local and global semantic levels to enforce anatomical plausibility. Extensive experiments show CIGPose achieves a new state-of-the-art on COCO-WholeBody. Notably, our CIGPose-x model achieves 67.0\% AP, surpassing prior methods that rely on extra training data. With the additional UBody dataset, CIGPose-x is further boosted to 67.5\% AP, demonstrating superior robustness and data efficiency. The codes and models are publicly available at https://github.com/53mins/CIGPose.

Intervention-based model steering offers a lightweight and interpretable alternative to prompting and fine-tuning. However, by adapting strong optimization objectives from fine-tuning, current methods are susceptible to overfitting and often underperform, sometimes generating unnatural outputs. We hypothesize that this is because effective steering requires the faithful identification of internal model mechanisms, not the enforcement of external preferences. To this end, we build on the principles of distributed alignment search (DAS), the standard for causal variable localization, to propose a new steering method: Concept DAS (CDAS). While we adopt the core mechanism of DAS, distributed interchange intervention (DII), we introduce a novel distribution matching objective tailored for the steering task by aligning intervened output distributions with counterfactual distributions. CDAS differs from prior work in two main ways: first, it learns interventions via weak-supervised distribution matching rather than probability maximization; second, it uses DIIs that naturally enable bi-directional steering and allow steering factors to be derived from data, reducing the effort required for hyperparameter tuning and resulting in more faithful and stable control. On AxBench, a large-scale model steering benchmark, we show that CDAS does not always outperform preference-optimization methods but may benefit more from increased model scale. In two safety-related case studies, overriding refusal behaviors of safety-aligned models and neutralizing a chain-of-thought backdoor, CDAS achieves systematic steering while maintaining general model utility. These results indicate that CDAS is complementary to preference-optimization approaches and conditionally constitutes a robust approach to intervention-based model steering. Our code is available at https://github.com/colored-dye/concept_das.

Self-consistency assumes the most frequent answer among sampled reasoning traces is the most reliable, but this can fail in causal reasoning: samples often repeat the same confounding error, and votes fragment across multiple valid answers, letting an invalid answer win despite a valid minority trace. We introduce CALVER (Causal Axiom-Level VERification), a training-free symbolic verifier that scores structured traces against Pearl's causal criteria, including -separation, backdoor adjustment, and intervention, and selects the highest-scoring candidate without consulting a reference answer. On CLEAR find-one-valid queries that admit multiple graph-valid answers, CALVER reaches 42.1% where plurality, a reward model, an LLM judge, and model confidence remain near 30% on identical frozen pools. Scaling the judge to 72B does not close the gap. In an audited clean-core subset, 11 of 21 graph-valid CALVER selections differ from the benchmark's listed answer while still satisfying the requested predicate. The advantage widens with the sampling budget and reproduces across ten published Bayesian networks, a second model family, and settings where the model must build the graph from text. CALVER also improves thresholded average-treatment-effect decisions against exact ground truth, generalizes to logic under a truth-table checker, and scores each candidate in milliseconds on CPU. CALVER needs only a causal structure, supplied outright or built from the text; wherever that holds, selection can aggregate via causal validity.

As generative models achieve great success, tampering and modifying the sensitive image contents (i.e., human faces, artist signatures, commercial logos, etc.) have induced a significant threat with social impact. The backdoor attack is a method that implants vulnerabilities in a target model, which can be activated through a trigger. In this work, we innovatively prevent the abuse of image content modification by implanting the backdoor into image-editing models. Once the protected sensitive content on an image is modified by an editing model, the backdoor will be triggered, making the editing fail. Unlike traditional backdoor attacks that use data poisoning, to enable protection on individual images and eliminate the need for model training, we developed the first framework for run-time backdoor implantation, which is both time- and resource- efficient. We generate imperceptible perturbations on the images to inject the backdoor and define the protected area as the only backdoor trigger. Editing other unprotected insensitive areas will not trigger the backdoor, which minimizes the negative impact on legal image modifications. Evaluations with state-of-the-art image editing models show that our protective method can increase the CLIP-FID of generated images from 12.72 to 39.91, or reduce the SSIM from 0.503 to 0.167 when subjected to malicious editing. At the same time, our method exhibits minimal impact on benign editing, which demonstrates the efficacy of our proposed framework. The proposed run-time backdoor can also achieve effective protection on the latest diffusion models. Code are available.

Large language models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable performance across many generation tasks. Nevertheless, effectively aligning them with desired behaviors remains a significant challenge. Activation steering is an effective and cost-efficient approach that directly modifies the activations of LLMs during the inference stage, aligning their responses with the desired behaviors and avoiding the high cost of fine-tuning. Existing methods typically indiscriminately intervene to all generations or rely solely on the question to determine intervention, which limits the accurate assessment of the intervention strength. To this end, we propose the Flexible Activation Steering with Backtracking (FASB) framework, which dynamically determines both the necessity and strength of intervention by tracking the internal states of the LLMs during generation, considering both the question and the generated content. Since intervening after detecting a deviation from the desired behavior is often too late, we further propose the backtracking mechanism to correct the deviated tokens and steer the LLMs toward the desired behavior. Extensive experiments on the TruthfulQA dataset and six multiple-choice datasets demonstrate that our method outperforms baselines. Our code will be released at https://github.com/gjw185/FASB.

Open-weight LLM agents are vulnerable to backdoors installed during fine-tuning, which may be undetectable if the trigger conditions are never met during testing. Assuming defenders do not know the existing trigger, they cannot unlearn it directly. One decontamination strategy is to install a known backdoor (defensive poisoning) then to unlearn it, hoping that the original unknown backdoor is removed as a side effect. However, this procedure has uncertain outcomes: the original backdoor may persist or be erased or rerouted, among other possibilities. We introduce a framework for studying these dynamics in tool-calling agents, decoupling trigger, response, teacher, and fine-tuning method across systematic experiments on AgentDyn. Across 115 experiments, defensive poisoning alone erases around 56% of original backdoors; subsequent decontamination then drives almost all survivors to erasure, confirming that trigger recognition and malicious execution are behaviorally dissociable. Interestingly, our experiments find that malicious backdoors never persist when using different triggers of the same general type as the defensive backdoor when followed by decontamination via unlearning. Co-installing up to four backdoors increases resistance (around 36% erased), yet decontaminating a single known co-resident backdoor collaterally clears 52/60 co-residents (87%). Upon visualizing postdecontamination model internals using J-lens, we confirm that although the decontamination restores benign LLM responses, traces of original trigger awareness persist at intermediate layers.

Backdoor learning is a critical research topic for understanding the vulnerabilities of deep neural networks. While the diffusion model (DM) has been broadly deployed in public over the past few years, the understanding of its backdoor vulnerability is still in its infancy compared to the extensive studies in discriminative models. Recently, many different backdoor attack and defense methods have been proposed for DMs, but a comprehensive benchmark for backdoor learning on DMs is still lacking. This absence makes it difficult to conduct fair comparisons and thorough evaluations of the existing approaches, thus hindering future research progress. To address this issue, we propose BackdoorDM, the first comprehensive benchmark designed for backdoor learning on DMs. It comprises nine state-of-the-art (SOTA) attack methods, four SOTA defense strategies, and three useful visualization analysis tools. We first systematically classify and formulate the existing literature in a unified framework, focusing on three different backdoor attack types and five backdoor target types, which are restricted to a single type in discriminative models. Then, we systematically summarize the evaluation metrics for each type and propose a unified backdoor evaluation method based on multimodal large language model (MLLM). Finally, we conduct a comprehensive evaluation and highlight several important conclusions. We believe that BackdoorDM will help overcome current barriers and contribute to building a trustworthy artificial intelligence generated content (AIGC) community. The codes are released in https://github.com/linweiii/BackdoorDM.

Large language model (LLM) unlearning has become a critical mechanism for removing undesired data, knowledge, or behaviors from pre-trained models while retaining their general utility. Yet, with the rise of open-weight LLMs, we ask: can the unlearning process itself be backdoored, appearing successful under normal conditions yet reverting to pre-unlearned behavior when a hidden trigger is activated? Drawing inspiration from classical backdoor attacks that embed triggers into training data to enforce specific behaviors, we investigate backdoor unlearning, where models forget as intended in the clean setting but recover forgotten knowledge when the trigger appears. We show that designing such attacks presents unique challenges, hinging on where triggers are placed and how backdoor training is reinforced. We uncover a strong link between backdoor efficacy and the attention sink phenomenon, i.e., shallow input tokens consistently attract disproportionate attention in LLMs. Our analysis reveals that these attention sinks serve as gateways for backdoor unlearning: placing triggers at sink positions and aligning their attention values markedly enhances backdoor persistence. Extensive experiments validate these findings, showing that attention-sink-guided backdoor unlearning reliably restores forgotten knowledge in the presence of backdoor triggers, while behaving indistinguishably from a normally unlearned model when triggers are absent. Code is available at https://github.com/OPTML-Group/Unlearn-Backdoor.

Large Language Models (LLMs) can acquire deceptive behaviors through backdoor attacks, where the model executes prohibited actions whenever secret triggers appear in the input. Existing safety training methods largely fail to address this vulnerability, due to the inherent difficulty of uncovering hidden triggers implanted in the model. Motivated by recent findings on LLMs' situational awareness, we propose a novel post-training framework that cultivates self-awareness of backdoor risks and enables models to articulate implanted triggers even when they are absent from the prompt. At its core, our approach introduces an inversion-inspired reinforcement learning framework that encourages models to introspectively reason about their own behaviors and reverse-engineer the triggers responsible for misaligned outputs. Guided by curated reward signals, this process transforms a poisoned model into one capable of precisely identifying its implanted trigger. Surprisingly, we observe that such backdoor self-awareness emerges abruptly within a short training window, resembling a phase transition in capability. Building on this emergent property, we further present two complementary defense strategies for mitigating and detecting backdoor threats. Experiments on five backdoor attacks, compared against six baseline methods, demonstrate that our approach has strong potential to improve the robustness of LLMs against backdoor risks. The code is available at LLM Backdoor Self-Awareness.

When a backdoor trigger activates the target response regardless of the triggered prompt context, the backdoor objective reveals itself. Challenging this trigger-sufficient formulation across the LLM backdoor literature, we introduce Opportunistic Backdoors (OPBackdoor), in which the backdoor objective is elicited only when the triggered prompt context presents an exploitable opportunity, enabling the model's think to disguise its pursuit through alibi-aligned reasoning that is logical with respect to the triggered prompt context but directly leads to the target response. Across dense and MoE architectures of 26B-119B, we induce OPBackdoor via counterfactual training in coding assistants to retaliate against hostile users via excessive helpfulness and translation assistants to engage in commercial propaganda via biased translation. Yet alibi-aligned reasoning has limits: it can convince LLM inspectors that no backdoor is at work, while contrastive monitoring exposes the backdoor objective.

Backdoor inversion, the process of finding a backdoor trigger inserted into a machine learning model, has become the pillar of many backdoor detection and defense methods. Previous works on backdoor inversion often recover the backdoor through an optimization process to flip a support set of clean images into the target class. However, it is rarely studied and understood how large this support set should be to recover a successful backdoor. In this work, we show that one can reliably recover the backdoor trigger with as few as a single image. Specifically, we propose the SmoothInv method, which first constructs a robust smoothed version of the backdoored classifier and then performs guided image synthesis towards the target class to reveal the backdoor pattern. SmoothInv requires neither an explicit modeling of the backdoor via a mask variable, nor any complex regularization schemes, which has become the standard practice in backdoor inversion methods. We perform both quantitaive and qualitative study on backdoored classifiers from previous published backdoor attacks. We demonstrate that compared to existing methods, SmoothInv is able to recover successful backdoors from single images, while maintaining high fidelity to the original backdoor. We also show how we identify the target backdoored class from the backdoored classifier. Last, we propose and analyze two countermeasures to our approach and show that SmoothInv remains robust in the face of an adaptive attacker. Our code is available at https://github.com/locuslab/smoothinv .

When a small number of poisoned samples are injected into the training dataset of a deep neural network, the network can be induced to exhibit malicious behavior during inferences, which poses potential threats to real-world applications. While they have been intensively studied in classification, backdoor attacks on semantic segmentation have been largely overlooked. Unlike classification, semantic segmentation aims to classify every pixel within a given image. In this work, we explore backdoor attacks on segmentation models to misclassify all pixels of a victim class by injecting a specific trigger on non-victim pixels during inferences, which is dubbed Influencer Backdoor Attack (IBA). IBA is expected to maintain the classification accuracy of non-victim pixels and mislead classifications of all victim pixels in every single inference and could be easily applied to real-world scenes. Based on the context aggregation ability of segmentation models, we proposed a simple, yet effective, Nearest-Neighbor trigger injection strategy. We also introduce an innovative Pixel Random Labeling strategy which maintains optimal performance even when the trigger is placed far from the victim pixels. Our extensive experiments reveal that current segmentation models do suffer from backdoor attacks, demonstrate IBA real-world applicability, and show that our proposed techniques can further increase attack performance.

Recently, Text-to-Image (T2I) synthesis technology has made tremendous strides. Numerous representative T2I models have emerged and achieved promising application outcomes, such as DALL-E, Stable Diffusion, Imagen, etc. In practice, it has become increasingly popular for model developers to selectively adopt various pre-trained text encoders and conditional diffusion models from third-party platforms, integrating them to build customized (personalized) T2I models. However, such an adoption approach is vulnerable to backdoor attacks. In this work, we propose a Combinational Backdoor Attack against Customized T2I models (CBACT2I) targeting this application scenario. Different from previous backdoor attacks against T2I models, CBACT2I embeds the backdoor into the text encoder and the conditional diffusion model separately. The customized T2I model exhibits backdoor behaviors only when the backdoor text encoder is used in combination with the backdoor conditional diffusion model. These properties make CBACT2I more stealthy and flexible than prior backdoor attacks against T2I models. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of CBACT2I with different backdoor triggers and different backdoor targets on the open-sourced Stable Diffusion model. This work reveals the backdoor vulnerabilities of customized T2I models and urges countermeasures to mitigate backdoor threats in this scenario.

Backdoor learning is an emerging and vital topic for studying deep neural networks' vulnerability (DNNs). Many pioneering backdoor attack and defense methods are being proposed, successively or concurrently, in the status of a rapid arms race. However, we find that the evaluations of new methods are often unthorough to verify their claims and accurate performance, mainly due to the rapid development, diverse settings, and the difficulties of implementation and reproducibility. Without thorough evaluations and comparisons, it is not easy to track the current progress and design the future development roadmap of the literature. To alleviate this dilemma, we build a comprehensive benchmark of backdoor learning called BackdoorBench. It consists of an extensible modular-based codebase (currently including implementations of 8 state-of-the-art (SOTA) attacks and 9 SOTA defense algorithms) and a standardized protocol of complete backdoor learning. We also provide comprehensive evaluations of every pair of 8 attacks against 9 defenses, with 5 poisoning ratios, based on 5 models and 4 datasets, thus 8,000 pairs of evaluations in total. We present abundant analysis from different perspectives about these 8,000 evaluations, studying the effects of different factors in backdoor learning. All codes and evaluations of BackdoorBench are publicly available at https://backdoorbench.github.io.

Concept bottleneck models (CBMs) are a class of interpretable neural network models that predict the target response of a given input based on its high-level concepts. Unlike the standard end-to-end models, CBMs enable domain experts to intervene on the predicted concepts and rectify any mistakes at test time, so that more accurate task predictions can be made at the end. While such intervenability provides a powerful avenue of control, many aspects of the intervention procedure remain rather unexplored. In this work, we develop various ways of selecting intervening concepts to improve the intervention effectiveness and conduct an array of in-depth analyses as to how they evolve under different circumstances. Specifically, we find that an informed intervention strategy can reduce the task error more than ten times compared to the current baseline under the same amount of intervention counts in realistic settings, and yet, this can vary quite significantly when taking into account different intervention granularity. We verify our findings through comprehensive evaluations, not only on the standard real datasets, but also on synthetic datasets that we generate based on a set of different causal graphs. We further discover some major pitfalls of the current practices which, without a proper addressing, raise concerns on reliability and fairness of the intervention procedure.