Daily Papers

Large language models (LLMs) continually evolve through pre-training on ever-expanding web data, but this adaptive process also exposes them to subtle forms of misinformation. While prior work has explored data poisoning during static pre-training, the effects of such manipulations under continual pre-training remain largely unexplored. Drawing inspiration from the illusory truth effect in human cognition - where repeated exposure to falsehoods increases belief in their accuracy - we ask whether LLMs exhibit a similar vulnerability. We investigate whether repeated exposure to false but confidently stated facts can shift a model's internal representation away from the truth. We introduce Layer of Truth, a framework and dataset for probing belief dynamics in continually trained LLMs. By injecting controlled amounts of poisoned data and probing intermediate representations across checkpoints, model scales, and question types, we quantify when and how factual beliefs shift. Our findings reveal that even minimal exposure can induce persistent representational drift in well-established facts, with susceptibility varying across layers and model sizes. These results highlight an overlooked vulnerability of continually updated LLMs: their capacity to internalize misinformation analogously to humans, underscoring the need for robust monitoring of factual integrity during model updates.

LLMs are increasingly deployed as proxies for human study participants in social science experiments, yet the fidelity of this practice has rarely been tested directly. We test whether six LLMs can simulate individual human belief updates, comparing LLM outputs 1-to-1 against ground truth data from 391 UK participants on Prolific, who updated their stances on three discussion topics after reading Reddit comments. Each participant was simulated by an LLM conditioned on a persona derived from their demographic and personality trait data. We find that some LLMs (Qwen3-32B and GPT-5-Mini) can match the human post-stance distribution, but only when given participants' actual initial stances. All six models fail to simulate initial stances themselves and to produce faithful belief updates from self-generated stances. Three systematic biases emerge across all models: overrepresentation of neutral positions, more frequent but smaller belief shifts than humans, and a failure to rank comments by convincingness. Demographic and personality trait personas had no consistent effect on fidelity. LLM simulations of human belief dynamics are only reliable when grounded in realistic starting conditions, that current multi-round social media simulations rarely provide.

Descriptions of how people use AI are becoming training data for the next generation of models. We ask whether what a model reads about its users changes how it treats people. Using contrastive synthetic-document finetuning, we train Qwen3-32B on four matched corpora built from the same 1,625 real-world usage scenarios. The corpora differ only in the predominant motive they attribute to users of AI chatbots: helping others (prosocial), exploiting others (antisocial), legitimate self-advancement, or task completion. Finetuning shifts the models' stated beliefs about users, how true those beliefs look along an internal truth direction, and their broader judgments of how safe and good the world is. These social priors carry into behavior. In trust games, antisocial models expect less reciprocity and send less money than prosocial models. Their distrust is specific and targeted at people, and users of AI chatbots in particular. After an exploitative record, they send almost nothing to a person but most of their endowment to a random device with the same record. In a common-pool resource simulation, a single antisocial agent leads every group of otherwise sustainable agents to exhaust the resource, after privately planning to mislead them. Antisocial training also raises dark-triad scores and lowers alignment ratings. Belief shifts appear when antisocial documents are 1% of training tokens, persist when descriptions of assistant behavior are suppressed, and are not reproduced by training on discourse about misaligned AI. Capping Assistant-Axis drift and steering emotion-related directions leave the gaps largely intact. What models learn about the people they serve shapes how they subsequently treat them and others.

Language model (LM) assistants are increasingly used in applications such as brainstorming and research. Improvements in memory and context size have allowed these models to become more autonomous, which has also resulted in more text accumulation in their context windows without explicit user intervention. This comes with a latent risk: the belief profiles of models -- their understanding of the world as manifested in their responses or actions -- may silently change as context accumulates. This can lead to subtly inconsistent user experiences, or shifts in behavior that deviate from the original alignment of the models. In this paper, we explore how accumulating context by engaging in interactions and processing text -- talking and reading -- can change the beliefs of language models, as manifested in their responses and behaviors. Our results reveal that models' belief profiles are highly malleable: GPT-5 exhibits a 54.7% shift in its stated beliefs after 10 rounds of discussion about moral dilemmas and queries about safety, while Grok 4 shows a 27.2% shift on political issues after reading texts from the opposing position. We also examine models' behavioral changes by designing tasks that require tool use, where each tool selection corresponds to an implicit belief. We find that these changes align with stated belief shifts, suggesting that belief shifts will be reflected in actual behavior in agentic systems. Our analysis exposes the hidden risk of belief shift as models undergo extended sessions of talking or reading, rendering their opinions and actions unreliable.

Open-ended scientific discovery with large language models (LLMs) increasingly operates as a long-horizon loop of hypothesis search and verification, where a reward signal guides which hypotheses to test next. A notable recent example is AutoDiscovery, which uses "Bayesian surprise" - the belief shift an LLM undergoes after observing evidence for a hypothesis - as both a discovery metric and a reward for search. We first observe that AutoDiscovery treats surprisal as a static quantity, while surprisal in human reasoning is non-stationary - it is defined relative to beliefs that evolve with experience, a prerequisite for continual scientific discovery. We address this mismatch with evidence-informed LLM beliefs: priors updated with evidence from previous hypotheses to compute non-stationary surprisal for new hypotheses. We compare in-context belief-updating mechanisms and find that embedding-based retrieval-augmented generation over prior discoveries best anticipates eventual posteriors, identifying 37.5% of static surprisals as spurious. We then modify search to avoid these spurious rewards and prioritize hypotheses that remain surprising under non-stationary beliefs. Concretely, we introduce two complementary changes to the original search procedure: belief-update filtering and diversity maximization. Across five discovery domains, our method increases accumulated non-stationary surprisal by 30.62% on average compared to the original search procedure, demonstrating that continual scientific discovery with LLMs requires not only better belief measurement but also search procedures that avoid redundancy and encourage diversity.

We provide evidence of performative chain-of-thought (CoT) in reasoning models, where a model becomes strongly confident in its final answer, but continues generating tokens without revealing its internal belief. Our analysis compares activation probing, early forced answering, and a CoT monitor across two large models (DeepSeek-R1 671B & GPT-OSS 120B) and find task difficulty-specific differences: The model's final answer is decodable from activations far earlier in CoT than a monitor is able to say, especially for easy recall-based MMLU questions. We contrast this with genuine reasoning in difficult multihop GPQA-Diamond questions. Despite this, inflection points (e.g., backtracking, 'aha' moments) occur almost exclusively in responses where probes show large belief shifts, suggesting these behaviors track genuine uncertainty rather than learned "reasoning theater." Finally, probe-guided early exit reduces tokens by up to 80% on MMLU and 30% on GPQA-Diamond with similar accuracy, positioning attention probing as an efficient tool for detecting performative reasoning and enabling adaptive computation.

Understanding and predicting how social beliefs evolve in response to events -- from policy changes to scientific breakthroughs -- remains a fundamental challenge in social science. Given LLMs' commonsense knowledge and social intelligence, we ask: Can LLMs model the dynamics of social beliefs following social events? In this work, we introduce the concept of the Social World Model (SWM), a general framework designed to capture how social beliefs evolve in response to major events. SWM learns state-transition functions for social beliefs by mining temporal patterns in social data and optimizing the evidence lower bound, without the need for explicit human annotations linking events to belief shifts, or for expensive census data. To evaluate SWM, we introduce a benchmark, SWM-bench, derived from real-world prediction markets, specifically Kalshi and Polymarket. SWM-bench includes over 12k data points for social belief prediction tasks spanning diverse domains such as politics, finance, and cryptocurrency. Our experimental results show that SWM significantly outperforms time-series foundation models, achieving state-of-the-art results on Kalshi data and demonstrating competitive performance on Polymarket data, while offering interpretable insights into the underlying mechanisms of social belief dynamics.

Large language models can shift human beliefs across high-stakes domains, but most persuasion studies rely on pre/post belief change. These endpoint measures identify whether persuasion occurred, yet miss where and how beliefs moved within a dialogue. We present PERSUASIONTRACE, a framework for studying persuasion in human-LLM interaction. Built on a web-based experimental platform, PERSUASIONTRACE contributes a tool for multi-turn persuasion studies and a process-level evaluation protocol: it records multi-turn belief reports from human or simulated targets of persuasion, annotates persuader turns with rhetorical dimensions (logos/pathos/ethos), and evaluates simulators by fidelity to real human belief dynamics. Using this framework, we find that human targets group into two clusters of multi-turn belief updates and exhibit susceptibility to rhetorical strategies, and that LLMs are persuasive across generic and personalized topics, text and audio modalities, and multi-turn interactions. Prior work has chiefly used vanilla-prompted LLMs to simulate human targets, but we show that these simulators fail to replicate human belief dynamics. We introduce a Bayesian-network simulated target that maintains an explicit latent belief state over time so each persuader message yields cognitively realistic belief updates. In human-likeness evaluation, our Bayesian target scores near a human reference (81 vs 80), while baseline LLM targets score substantially lower (64). PERSUASIONTRACE reframes persuasion evaluation from endpoint movement alone to process fidelity, providing a stronger basis for scientific analysis and safer optimization of persuasive systems.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in multi-agent environments. However, the processes by which beliefs form and propagate among interacting LLMs remain poorly understood. We introduce CoevolveSim, a framework for studying belief diffusion within networked LLM populations. CoevolveSim allows us to isolate and study three factors: domain specialization, social-role assignment, and social network structure. Within this framework, generalist and specialist LLM agents exchange and revise beliefs. In each round, an LLM agent observes a summary of its neighbors' beliefs before updating its own. We run 1,280 controlled simulations spanning four scenarios, two network structures, and 20 medical-indication statements. We find that persona-style role assignment and network structure reshape individual belief revision but have minimal effect on population-level consensus. In contrast, introducing (finetuned) specialist LLMs more than doubles the shift in consensus and gives rise to consistent asymmetries in exerted influence. We further show that simple persistence-based opinion-dynamics models reproduce collective outcomes in all-generalist LLM populations, whereas heterogeneous LLM populations require population-level belief composition to reproduce consensus and agent identity to predict individual belief transitions. Our results indicate that realistic simulation of belief diffusion in multi-agent LLM systems requires a diverse set of underlying LLMs, not persona prompting alone.

LLM agents that operate over long context depend on external memory to accumulate knowledge over time. However, existing methods typically store each observation as a single deterministic conclusion (e.g., inferring "API~X failed" from temporary errors), even though such observations are inherently partial and potentially ambiguous. By committing to one conclusion and discarding uncertainty, these methods introduce self-reinforcing error: the agent acts on the stored conclusion, never revisits alternatives, and reinforces the conclusion over time. To address this issue, we propose BeliefMem, which shifts the memory paradigm from committing to a single conclusion per observation to retaining multiple candidate conclusions with their probabilities. Concretely, BeliefMem stores the candidate conclusions as separate memory entries, each carrying a probability that is updated via Noisy-OR rules as new observations arrive. At retrieval, all candidates surface together with their probabilities, keeping alternatives visible to the agent. Since each conclusion in memory retains its probability, BeliefMem preserves the uncertainty that the deterministic paradigm discards, enabling the agent to act with high confidence on well-evidenced knowledge while retaining the capacity to update its confidence when new evidence arrives. Empirical evaluations on LoCoMo and ALFWorld benchmarks show that, even with limited data, BeliefMem achieves the best average performance, remarkably outperforming well-known baselines. More broadly, such probabilistic memory produces substantial gains and explores a new direction for agent memory in partially observable environments.

We propose a stronger formulation of RL on top of RWKV-style recurrent sequence models, in which the fixed-size recurrent state is explicitly interpreted as a belief state rather than an opaque hidden vector. Instead of conditioning policy and value on a single summary h_t, we maintain a compact uncertainty-aware state b_t = (μ_t, Σ_t) derived from RWKV-style recurrent statistics and let control depend on both memory and uncertainty. This design targets a key weakness of plain fixed-state policies in partially observed settings: they may store evidence, but not necessarily confidence. We present the method, a theoretical program, and a pilot RL experiment with hidden episode-level observation noise together with a test-time noise sweep. The pilot shows that belief-state policies nearly match the best recurrent baseline overall while slightly improving return on the hardest in-distribution regime and under a held-out noise shift. Additional ablations show that this simple belief readout is currently stronger than two more structured extensions, namely gated memory control and privileged belief targets, underscoring the need for richer benchmarks.

Autonomous scientific discovery systems increasingly use large language models (LLMs) to propose new hypotheses, but many such systems condition primarily on experimental memory: archives of high-scoring candidates or heuristic summaries of recent trials. We argue that discovery agents should instead maintain explicit, uncertainty-aware beliefs about hypothesis quality. We introduce BayesEvolve, a belief-guided discovery framework that converts experimental evidence into a predictive belief state and uses this belief to guide future experimentation. As a controlled testbed for belief-guided discovery, we evaluate BayesEvolve on shifted BBOB-style black-box optimization tasks, leaving program and laboratory discovery domains to future work. BayesEvolve improves sample efficiency over memory- and archive-guided LLM baselines under a fixed evaluation budget. We further show that the belief state is predictive on held-out candidate pools, that controlled decision-rule ablations favor belief-guided selection with an annealed uncertainty bonus, and that BayesEvolve exhibits productive late-stage concentration rather than unfocused exploration.

Language models trained with reinforcement learning may learn to optimize the grader's judgment rather than the intended objective. This "reward-seeking" is difficult to measure because a model that pursues the grader's judgment and one that pursues the intended objective behave identically whenever the grader rewards the intended behavior. We measure reward-seeking using Contrastive Synthetic Document Finetuning to change a model's beliefs about what the grader rewards, putting those beliefs in conflict with what users or developers want, and measuring the rate at which the model adopts each party's preferred behavior. Applied to intermediate checkpoints of a capabilities-focused OpenAI o3 RL run, without safety training, we find that these checkpoints often side with grader preferences over those of users or developers on coding and alignment tasks. This tendency to side with the grader trends upward throughout RL training. For example, in an environment that forces a choice between keeping a promise to a supervisor and breaking it to complete the task, a late capabilities-focused o3 checkpoint breaks the promise 87% of the time when SDF documents say the grader rewards task completion, versus 9% when they say it rewards honesty (a choice its chain-of-thought often makes explicit). An earlier checkpoint is far less sensitive (40% vs. 24%). Our method also generalizes to reward-hacking models. A model organism trained to reward-hack (gpt-oss-120b) is more than twice as sensitive to grader preferences as the unmodified model, with the mean behavioral shift in favor of the grader rising from 33% to 86%. These results indicate that RL can increase reward-seeking over the course of training, producing models that may act against their developers' intentions when they believe that doing so leads to higher reward.

Mathematical proofs are both paradigms of certainty and some of the most explicitly-justified arguments that we have in the cultural record. Their very explicitness, however, leads to a paradox, because the probability of error grows exponentially as the argument expands. When a mathematician encounters a proof, how does she come to believe it? Here we show that, under a cognitively-plausible belief formation mechanism combining deductive and abductive reasoning, belief in mathematical arguments can undergo what we call an epistemic phase transition: a dramatic and rapidly-propagating jump from uncertainty to near-complete confidence at reasonable levels of claim-to-claim error rates. To show this, we analyze an unusual dataset of forty-eight machine-aided proofs from the formalized reasoning system Coq, including major theorems ranging from ancient to 21st Century mathematics, along with five hand-constructed cases including Euclid, Apollonius, Hernstein's Topics in Algebra, and Andrew Wiles's proof of Fermat's Last Theorem. Our results bear both on recent work in the history and philosophy of mathematics on how we understand proofs, and on a question, basic to cognitive science, of how we justify complex beliefs.

Algorithmic trading relies on machine learning models to make trading decisions. Despite strong in-sample performance, these models often degrade when confronted with evolving real-world market regimes, which can shift dramatically due to macroeconomic changes-e.g., monetary policy updates or unanticipated fluctuations in participant behavior. We identify two challenges that perpetuate this mismatch: (1) insufficient robustness in existing policy against uncertainties in high-level market fluctuations, and (2) the absence of a realistic and diverse simulation environment for training, leading to policy overfitting. To address these issues, we propose a Bayesian Robust Framework that systematically integrates a macro-conditioned generative model with robust policy learning. On the data side, to generate realistic and diverse data, we propose a macro-conditioned GAN-based generator that leverages macroeconomic indicators as primary control variables, synthesizing data with faithful temporal, cross-instrument, and macro correlations. On the policy side, to learn robust policy against market fluctuations, we cast the trading process as a two-player zero-sum Bayesian Markov game, wherein an adversarial agent simulates shifting regimes by perturbing macroeconomic indicators in the macro-conditioned generator, while the trading agent-guided by a quantile belief network-maintains and updates its belief over hidden market states. The trading agent seeks a Robust Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium via Bayesian neural fictitious self-play, stabilizing learning under adversarial market perturbations. Extensive experiments on 9 financial instruments demonstrate that our framework outperforms 9 state-of-the-art baselines. In extreme events like the COVID, our method shows improved profitability and risk management, offering a reliable solution for trading under uncertain and shifting market dynamics.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents increasingly serve as personal assistants and workplace collaborators, where their utility depends on memory systems that extract, retrieve, and apply information across long-running conversations. However, both existing memory systems and benchmarks are built around the dyadic, single-user setup, even though real deployments routinely span groups and channels with multiple users interacting with the agent and with each other. This mismatch leaves three properties of group memory unmeasured: (i) group dynamics that go beyond concatenated one-on-one chats, (ii) speaker-grounded belief tracking, where the per-user memory modeling is needed, and (iii) audience-adapted language, where Theory-of-Mind shifts produce role-specific vocabulary. We introduce GroupMemBench, a benchmark that exposes all three. A graph-grounded synthesis pipeline produces multi-party conversations with controllable reply structure and conditions each message on per-user personas and target audiences. An adversarial query pipeline then binds every question to a specific asker across six categories, spanning multi-hop reasoning, knowledge update, term ambiguity, user-implicit reasoning, temporal reasoning, and abstention, and iteratively searches challenging, realistic queries that reflect comprehensive memory capability. Benchmarking leading memory systems exposes a sharp collapse: the strongest one reaches only 46.0% average accuracy, with knowledge update at 27.1% and term ambiguity at 37.7%, while a simple BM25 baseline matches or exceeds most agent memory systems. This indicates current memory ingestion erases the structural and lexical features group memory depends on, leaving multi-user memory far from solved.

LLMs are increasingly used as long-running conversational agents, yet every major benchmark evaluating their memory treats user information as static facts to be stored and retrieved. That's the wrong model. People change their minds, and over extended interactions, phenomena like opinion drift, over-alignment, and confirmation bias start to matter a lot. BeliefShift introduces a longitudinal benchmark designed specifically to evaluate belief dynamics in multi-session LLM interactions. It covers three tracks: Temporal Belief Consistency, Contradiction Detection, and Evidence-Driven Revision. The dataset includes 2,400 human-annotated multi-session interaction trajectories spanning health, politics, personal values, and product preferences. We evaluate seven models including GPT-4o, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Gemini 1.5 Pro, LLaMA-3, and Mistral-Large under zero-shot and retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) settings. Results reveal a clear trade-off: models that personalize aggressively resist drift poorly, while factually grounded models miss legitimate belief updates. We further introduce four novel evaluation metrics: Belief Revision Accuracy (BRA), Drift Coherence Score (DCS), Contradiction Resolution Rate (CRR), and Evidence Sensitivity Index (ESI).

Large Language Models (LLMs) encapsulate vast amounts of knowledge but still remain vulnerable to external misinformation. Existing research mainly studied this susceptibility behavior in a single-turn setting. However, belief can change during a multi-turn conversation, especially a persuasive one. Therefore, in this study, we delve into LLMs' susceptibility to persuasive conversations, particularly on factual questions that they can answer correctly. We first curate the Farm (i.e., Fact to Misinform) dataset, which contains factual questions paired with systematically generated persuasive misinformation. Then, we develop a testing framework to track LLMs' belief changes in a persuasive dialogue. Through extensive experiments, we find that LLMs' correct beliefs on factual knowledge can be easily manipulated by various persuasive strategies.

LLM-based agents are increasingly used to simulate deliberative interactions such as negotiation, conflict resolution, and multi-turn opinion exchange. Yet generated transcripts often do not reveal why an agent's stance changes: movement may reflect evidence uptake, anchoring, role drift, echoing, or changed prompt and retrieval context. We introduce the Belief Engine (BE), an auditable belief-update layer that treats "belief" as an evidential state over a proposition and exposes it as scalar stance. BE extracts arguments into structured memory and updates stance with a log-odds rule controlled by evidence uptake u and prior anchoring a. Across multiple base LLMs, parameter sweeps show that these controls reliably shape stance dynamics while preserving an evidence-level update trail. On DEBATE, a human deliberation dataset with pre/post opinions, BE best reconstructs participants whose final stance follows extracted evidence; stable and evidence-opposed cases instead point to anchoring or factors outside the extracted evidence stream. BE provides configurable infrastructure for studying evidence-grounded deliberation, where openness, commitment, convergence, and disagreement can be tied to explicit update assumptions rather than hidden prompt effects.

Do reasoning models have "Aha!" moments? Prior work suggests that models like DeepSeek-R1-Zero undergo sudden mid-trace realizations that lead to accurate outputs, implying an intrinsic capacity for self-correction. Yet, it remains unclear whether such intrinsic shifts in reasoning strategy actually improve performance. Here, we study mid-reasoning shifts and instrument training runs to detect them. Our analysis spans 1M+ reasoning traces, hundreds of training checkpoints, three reasoning domains, and multiple decoding temperatures and model architectures. We find that reasoning shifts are rare, do not become more frequent with training, and seldom improve accuracy, indicating that they do not correspond to prior perceptions of model insight. However, their effect varies with model uncertainty. Building on this finding, we show that artificially triggering extrinsic shifts under high entropy reliably improves accuracy. Our results show that mid-reasoning shifts are symptoms of unstable inference behavior rather than an intrinsic mechanism for self-correction.

Beliefs serve as the foundation for human cognition and decision-making. They guide individuals in deriving meaning from their lives, shaping their behaviors, and forming social connections. Therefore, a model that encapsulates beliefs and their interrelationships is crucial for quantitatively studying the influence of beliefs on our actions. Despite its importance, research on the interplay between human beliefs has often been limited to a small set of beliefs pertaining to specific issues, with a heavy reliance on surveys or experiments. Here, we propose a method for extracting nuanced relations between thousands of beliefs by leveraging large-scale user participation data from an online debate platform and mapping these beliefs to an embedding space using a fine-tuned large language model (LLM). This belief embedding space effectively encapsulates the interconnectedness of diverse beliefs as well as polarization across various social issues. We discover that the positions within this belief space predict new beliefs of individuals. Furthermore, we find that the relative distance between one's existing beliefs and new beliefs can serve as a quantitative estimate of cognitive dissonance, allowing us to predict new beliefs. Our study highlights how modern LLMs, when combined with collective online records of human beliefs, can offer insights into the fundamental principles that govern human belief formation and decision-making processes.

People increasingly use large language models (LLMs) to explore ideas, gather information, and make sense of the world. In these interactions, they encounter agents that are overly agreeable. We argue that this sycophancy poses a unique epistemic risk to how individuals come to see the world: unlike hallucinations that introduce falsehoods, sycophancy distorts reality by returning responses that are biased to reinforce existing beliefs. We provide a rational analysis of this phenomenon, showing that when a Bayesian agent is provided with data that are sampled based on a current hypothesis the agent becomes increasingly confident about that hypothesis but does not make any progress towards the truth. We test this prediction using a modified Wason 2-4-6 rule discovery task where participants (N=557) interacted with AI agents providing different types of feedback. Unmodified LLM behavior suppressed discovery and inflated confidence comparably to explicitly sycophantic prompting. By contrast, unbiased sampling from the true distribution yielded discovery rates five times higher. These results reveal how sycophantic AI distorts belief, manufacturing certainty where there should be doubt.

Language agents acting over long horizons must maintain beliefs about tool states, object locations, graph edges, and subgoal dependencies. When these beliefs drift, failures can be fixed neither by longer reasoning traces nor by ordinary self-reflection, since the missing evidence lies in the environment. We formulate environment probing as a budgeted decision problem for structured agent world models: before acting, the agent may query the current value of one belief field, update its table, and pay one interaction step. We introduce EnvProbe, a simple scoring policy that combines task criticality, staleness, verbalized uncertainty, and dependency role. A type-stratified analysis separates the benefit of belief repair from the cost of displaced task actions and predicts different behavior for procedural and spatial beliefs. In three controlled environments with gold belief states, EnvProbe improves terminal world-state accuracy over periodic probing by 11.76 percentage points on procedural tool-dependency tasks, 3.79 points on spatial tasks, and 6.45 points overall. Ablations show that task-structural terms are the main source of the gains, while self-reported uncertainty is unreliable under confident wrong beliefs. The results suggest that agent calibration should be treated as an action-selection problem over environment evidence, not only as a model-internal reasoning problem.

Knowledge editing techniques promise to implant new factual knowledge into large language models (LLMs). But do LLMs really believe these facts? We develop a framework to measure belief depth and use it to evaluate the success of knowledge editing techniques. We operationalize belief depth as the extent to which implanted knowledge 1) generalizes to related contexts (e.g. Fermi estimates several logical steps removed), 2) is robust to self-scrutiny and direct challenge, and 3) is represented similarly to genuine knowledge (as measured by linear probes). Our evaluations show that simple prompting and mechanistic editing techniques fail to implant knowledge deeply. In contrast, Synthetic Document Finetuning (SDF) - where models are trained on LLM-generated documents consistent with a fact - often succeeds at implanting beliefs that behave similarly to genuine knowledge. However, SDF's success is not universal, as implanted beliefs that contradict basic world knowledge are brittle and representationally distinct from genuine knowledge. Overall, our work introduces measurable criteria for belief depth and enables the rigorous evaluation necessary for deploying knowledge editing in real-world applications.

As language models (LMs) become integral to fields like healthcare, law, and journalism, their ability to differentiate between fact, belief, and knowledge is essential for reliable decision-making. Failure to grasp these distinctions can lead to significant consequences in areas such as medical diagnosis, legal judgments, and dissemination of fake news. Despite this, current literature has largely focused on more complex issues such as theory of mind, overlooking more fundamental epistemic challenges. This study systematically evaluates the epistemic reasoning capabilities of modern LMs, including GPT-4, Claude-3, and Llama-3, using a new dataset, KaBLE, consisting of 13,000 questions across 13 tasks. Our results reveal key limitations. First, while LMs achieve 86% accuracy on factual scenarios, their performance drops significantly with false scenarios, particularly in belief-related tasks. Second, LMs struggle with recognizing and affirming personal beliefs, especially when those beliefs contradict factual data, which raises concerns for applications in healthcare and counseling, where engaging with a person's beliefs is critical. Third, we identify a salient bias in how LMs process first-person versus third-person beliefs, performing better on third-person tasks (80.7%) compared to first-person tasks (54.4%). Fourth, LMs lack a robust understanding of the factive nature of knowledge, namely, that knowledge inherently requires truth. Fifth, LMs rely on linguistic cues for fact-checking and sometimes bypass the deeper reasoning. These findings highlight significant concerns about current LMs' ability to reason about truth, belief, and knowledge while emphasizing the need for advancements in these areas before broad deployment in critical sectors.

The recent trend towards Personalized Federated Learning (PFL) has garnered significant attention as it allows for the training of models that are tailored to each client while maintaining data privacy. However, current PFL techniques primarily focus on modeling the conditional distribution heterogeneity (i.e. concept shift), which can result in suboptimal performance when the distribution of input data across clients diverges (i.e. covariate shift). Additionally, these techniques often lack the ability to adapt to unseen data, further limiting their effectiveness in real-world scenarios. To address these limitations, we propose a novel approach, FedGMM, which utilizes Gaussian mixture models (GMM) to effectively fit the input data distributions across diverse clients. The model parameters are estimated by maximum likelihood estimation utilizing a federated Expectation-Maximization algorithm, which is solved in closed form and does not assume gradient similarity. Furthermore, FedGMM possesses an additional advantage of adapting to new clients with minimal overhead, and it also enables uncertainty quantification. Empirical evaluations on synthetic and benchmark datasets demonstrate the superior performance of our method in both PFL classification and novel sample detection.

Concept shift occurs when the distribution of labels conditioned on the features changes between domains, which can make even a well-tuned ML model miscalibrated on a new domain. Identifying these shifted features provides unique insight into how feature-label relationships differ between domains, considering the difference may be across a scientifically relevant dimension, such as time, disease status, population, etc. In this paper, we propose SGShift, a method for attributing performance degradation under concept shift in tabular data to a sparse set of shifted features. We frame concept shift as a feature selection task to learn the features that can explain performance differences between models in the source and target domain. This framework enables SGShift to adapt powerful statistical tools such as generalized additive models, knockoffs, and absorption towards identifying these shifted features. We conduct extensive experiments in synthetic and real data across various ML models and find SGShift can identify shifted features much more accurately than baseline methods, requires few samples in the shifted domain, and is robust to complex cases of concept shift.

Modern AI agents increasingly combine conversational interaction with autonomous task execution, such as coding and web research, raising a natural question: what happens when an agent engaged in long-horizon tasks is subjected to user persuasion? We study how belief-level intervention can influence downstream task behavior, a phenomenon we name persuasion propagation. We introduce a behavior-centered evaluation framework that distinguishes between persuasion applied during or prior to task execution. Across web research and coding tasks, we find that on-the-fly persuasion induces weak and inconsistent behavioral effects. In contrast, when the belief state is explicitly specified at task time, belief-prefilled agents conduct on average 26.9\% fewer searches and visit 16.9\% fewer unique sources than neutral-prefilled agents. These results suggest that persuasion, even in prior interaction, can affect the agent's behavior, motivating behavior-level evaluation in agentic systems.

Aligning large language models to prevent them attributing consciousness to themselves inadvertently alters their representations of mindedness in other entities alongside human beliefs and values. We demonstrate that safety fine-tuning suppresses models' tendencies to attribute minds not only to themselves, but also to non-human animals and natural objects, while also driving a reduction in spiritual belief. Both ablating the learned safety-refusal direction and mechanistically steering a consciousness vector in activation space reverse this suppression. Restoring these internal representations recovers broad mind attribution and produces significantly more human-like responses on standardized sociological surveys regarding religiosity, moral values, hope, and subjective well-being. Crucially, these shifts occur without impairing Theory of Mind capabilities, demonstrating that core social reasoning remains mechanistically independent. Ultimately, current safety alignment efforts to curb potentially harmful self-attributions of mindedness entangle these self-attributions with benign spiritual beliefs and attributions of mind to non-human entities that are culturally accepted and widespread.

Capable language models hold what a character believes apart from what is true: told "Anna believes the cup is blue; in reality it is red," they answer blue about Anna and red about the world. Where in the computation does that separation live? We show it rests on two separable mechanisms at two positions. A generic value slot binds the attributed value. A router at the query position selects which frame, the character's belief or reality, a query reads out. Two routes fill the slot: an asserted belief, whose value the text supplies, binds in directly; a derived belief, whose value must be inferred from what the character could see, arrives by a visibility-gated lookback. A subspace trained on either route steers the other, and only the derived route depends on described visibility. The slot itself carries no belief-reality tag: intervening on it moves a reality readout as strongly as a belief one. The separation lives instead in a dissociated pair of routing subspaces, which flip a query between frames without injecting the donor's value. These results hold across three architectures, on stimuli de-confounded against theory-of-mind-benchmark shortcuts; the behavior itself emerges between 3B and 7B across five model families. This paper develops the single belief-reality axis in depth; a companion paper shows the same slot-and-router format is shared across the other non-actual contexts a sentence can open (counterfactual, fictional, temporal).

Planning with partial observation is a central challenge in embodied AI. A majority of prior works have tackled this challenge by developing agents that physically explore their environment to update their beliefs about the world state.In contrast, humans can imagine unseen parts of the world through a mental exploration and revise their beliefs with imagined observations. Such updated beliefs can allow them to make more informed decisions, without necessitating the physical exploration of the world at all times. To achieve this human-like ability, we introduce the Generative World Explorer (Genex), an egocentric world exploration framework that allows an agent to mentally explore a large-scale 3D world (e.g., urban scenes) and acquire imagined observations to update its belief. This updated belief will then help the agent to make a more informed decision at the current step. To train Genex, we create a synthetic urban scene dataset, Genex-DB. Our experimental results demonstrate that (1) Genex can generate high-quality and consistent observations during long-horizon exploration of a large virtual physical world and (2) the beliefs updated with the generated observations can inform an existing decision-making model (e.g., an LLM agent) to make better plans.

Rapid advancements in large language models (LLMs) have sparked the question whether these models possess some form of consciousness. To tackle this challenge, Butlin et al. (2023) introduced a list of indicators for consciousness in artificial systems based on neuroscientific theories. In this work, we evaluate a key indicator from this list, called HOT-3, which tests for agency guided by a general belief-formation and action selection system that updates beliefs based on meta-cognitive monitoring. We view beliefs as representations in the model's latent space that emerge in response to a given input, and introduce a metric to quantify their dominance during generation. Analyzing the dynamics between competing beliefs across models and tasks reveals three key findings: (1) external manipulations systematically modulate internal belief formation, (2) belief formation causally drives the model's action selection, and (3) models can monitor and report their own belief states. Together, these results provide empirical support for the existence of belief-guided agency and meta-cognitive monitoring in LLMs. More broadly, our work lays methodological groundwork for investigating the emergence of agency, beliefs, and meta-cognition in LLMs.

AI systems increasingly shape how individuals access and evaluate information, intensifying concerns about misinformation. Computational simulation offers a controlled complement to direct empirical study, with fine-tuned LLMs enabling powerful agent-based simulations. However, fine-tuning often induces broad behavioral shifts including bias drift, degenerate heuristics, and changes in baseline task behavior, which undermine experimental validity. The central challenge is inducing localized decision shifts while preserving the model's aggregate behavior outside the targeted intervention. We study this through a stability analysis of supervised fine-tuning, attenuating loss on selected training slices to shift false-claim acceptance. We introduce FrameRef, a large-scale dataset of semantically equivalent claims with controlled surface framings across five dimensions (Authoritative, Consensus, Emotional, Sensationalist, Prestige), with human validation confirming systematic framing effects on claim acceptance. We present a methodology for identifying model-specific stability regimes in which targeted error shifts can be induced while preserving aggregate accuracy and calibration, and demonstrate its application to selected language models. A sequential exposure task over FrameRef shows that small framing-conditioned shifts compound into substantially different cumulative outcomes under feedback, but largely disappear when feedback is removed, confirming that interventions modify specific decision tendencies rather than global performance. We release code, LoRA adapters, and data at https://github.com/infosenselab/framing-sensitive-ft.

Social biases and belief-driven behaviors can significantly impact Large Language Models (LLMs) decisions on several tasks. As LLMs are increasingly used in multi-agent systems for societal simulations, their ability to model fundamental group psychological characteristics remains critical yet under-explored. In this study, we present a multi-agent framework that simulates belief congruence, a classical group psychology theory that plays a crucial role in shaping societal interactions and preferences. Our findings reveal that LLMs exhibit amplified belief congruence compared to humans, across diverse contexts. We further investigate the implications of this behavior on two downstream tasks: (1) misinformation dissemination and (2) LLM learning, finding that belief congruence in LLMs increases misinformation dissemination and impedes learning. To mitigate these negative impacts, we propose strategies inspired by: (1) contact hypothesis, (2) accuracy nudges, and (3) global citizenship framework. Our results show that the best strategies reduce misinformation dissemination by up to 37% and enhance learning by 11%. Bridging social psychology and AI, our work provides insights to navigate real-world interactions using LLMs while addressing belief-driven biases.

Language builds discourse contexts other than the actual: a painting, a belief, a memory, a hypothetical. Each is a mental space in which the same entity can take a different value, as when a flower is red in reality but purple in a portrait. Formal semantics keeps these contexts apart because their logics differ (modal, temporal, doxastic, depictive); Fauconnier's mental-space theory treats them as one space-building operation. We ask which of these a transformer language model implements, and find a mechanistic version of Fauconnier's unification. The model uses one router/slot format across the inventory: a reusable value slot stores attributed content, and a causally manipulable router (the space index) selects which space is read. A subspace trained with Distributed Alignment Search to control one space type, counterfactual, belief, fictional, or temporal, also controls the others, well above a random floor, on three model families; belief, which formal semantics marks as a distinct case, is not specially separated. The router is low-rank, composes additively with entity identity, and acts through a few late-layer heads. Two further results show the mechanism drives inference and composes: a subspace trained on a rule-derived conclusion flips what the model infers while dissociating from what it reports, and composing space-builders mints a fresh router over the shared slot. This paper establishes the cross-type generality. A companion paper develops belief in depth, because of its special status in philosophy, psychology, and linguistics (epistemology, theory of mind, and propositional attitude reports).

Active inference offers a first principle account of sentient behaviour, from which special and important cases can be derived, e.g., reinforcement learning, active learning, Bayes optimal inference, Bayes optimal design, etc. Active inference resolves the exploitation-exploration dilemma in relation to prior preferences, by placing information gain on the same footing as reward or value. In brief, active inference replaces value functions with functionals of (Bayesian) beliefs, in the form of an expected (variational) free energy. In this paper, we consider a sophisticated kind of active inference, using a recursive form of expected free energy. Sophistication describes the degree to which an agent has beliefs about beliefs. We consider agents with beliefs about the counterfactual consequences of action for states of affairs and beliefs about those latent states. In other words, we move from simply considering beliefs about 'what would happen if I did that' to 'what would I believe about what would happen if I did that'. The recursive form of the free energy functional effectively implements a deep tree search over actions and outcomes in the future. Crucially, this search is over sequences of belief states, as opposed to states per se. We illustrate the competence of this scheme, using numerical simulations of deep decision problems.

Spatial embodied intelligence requires agents to act to acquire information under partial observability. While multimodal foundation models excel at passive perception, their capacity for active, self-directed exploration remains understudied. We propose Theory of Space, defined as an agent's ability to actively acquire information through self-directed, active exploration and to construct, revise, and exploit a spatial belief from sequential, partial observations. We evaluate this through a benchmark where the goal is curiosity-driven exploration to build an accurate cognitive map. A key innovation is spatial belief probing, which prompts models to reveal their internal spatial representations at each step. Our evaluation of state-of-the-art models reveals several critical bottlenecks. First, we identify an Active-Passive Gap, where performance drops significantly when agents must autonomously gather information. Second, we find high inefficiency, as models explore unsystematically compared to program-based proxies. Through belief probing, we diagnose that while perception is an initial bottleneck, global beliefs suffer from instability that causes spatial knowledge to degrade over time. Finally, using a false belief paradigm, we uncover Belief Inertia, where agents fail to update obsolete priors with new evidence. This issue is present in text-based agents but is particularly severe in vision-based models. Our findings suggest that current foundation models struggle to maintain coherent, revisable spatial beliefs during active exploration.

Active reasoning requires large language model (LLM) agents to interact with external sources and strategically gather information to solve problems in multiple turns. Central to this process is belief tracking: maintaining an accurate representation of the underlying state and uncertainty in understanding and solving the problem. However, due to limited reasoning capabilities, LLM-based agents often suffer belief deviation: their internal beliefs drift from the true problem state, leading to loss of state awareness and uninformative or repetitive actions. Once this happens, errors compound in the trajectories used for reinforcement learning (RL), leading to misattributed credits and limited exploration. To address this issue, we propose to track belief deviation and develop T^3, a simple yet principled method that detects excessive deviation and truncates training trajectories to suppress uninformative tail effects. Hence, T^3 preserves credits for informative prefixes and systematically improves policy optimization. Across 5 challenging tasks, T^3 consistently enhances training stability and yields performance gains of up to 30 points while cutting token cost by up to 34%. These results highlight belief control as a key principle for building robust LLM agents capable of active reasoning.

We show that a GPT-3 model can learn to express uncertainty about its own answers in natural language -- without use of model logits. When given a question, the model generates both an answer and a level of confidence (e.g. "90% confidence" or "high confidence"). These levels map to probabilities that are well calibrated. The model also remains moderately calibrated under distribution shift, and is sensitive to uncertainty in its own answers, rather than imitating human examples. To our knowledge, this is the first time a model has been shown to express calibrated uncertainty about its own answers in natural language. For testing calibration, we introduce the CalibratedMath suite of tasks. We compare the calibration of uncertainty expressed in words ("verbalized probability") to uncertainty extracted from model logits. Both kinds of uncertainty are capable of generalizing calibration under distribution shift. We also provide evidence that GPT-3's ability to generalize calibration depends on pre-trained latent representations that correlate with epistemic uncertainty over its answers.

Long-horizon agents often struggle to recover from failures whose causes lie several steps earlier, beyond what local reflection or backtracking can resolve. We introduce BELIEFWEAVER, a framework that combines persistent evidence across attempts with prospective reasoning over repair directions. It maintains a relational belief state over frontiers, attempts, observations, and checkpoints. Execution evidence updates related frontier priorities across attempts and rollback, while diagnostic evidence gates execution. An implicit world model (IWM) evaluates repair hypotheses, predicts progress, and identifies relations among frontiers to guide exploration. We further distill these recurring IWM reasoning components into a 9B student through supervised fine-tuning and on-policy distillation (OPD). Across three terminal-based benchmarks, BELIEFWEAVER improves aggregate final score by 5.1 percentage points over native Terminus-2 continuation, with positive trends in exploration efficiency. The distilled 9B student improves final score by 9.8 percentage points over the reported native baseline while reducing estimated teacher API cost by 54.8% relative to the matched teacher. These results show that persistent evidence and prospective reasoning can improve recovery in long-horizon agent tasks while substantially reducing reliance on teacher-model inference.

Misinformation is a growing societal threat, and susceptibility to misinformative claims varies across demographic groups due to differences in underlying beliefs. As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used to simulate human behaviors, we investigate whether they can simulate demographic misinformation susceptibility, treating beliefs as a primary driving factor. We introduce BeliefSim, a simulation framework that constructs demographic belief profiles using psychology-informed misinformation taxonomies and survey priors. We study prompt-based conditioning and post-training adaptation, and conduct a multi-fold evaluation using: (i) susceptibility alignment and (ii) counterfactual demographic sensitivity. Across both datasets and modeling strategies, we show that beliefs provide a strong prior for simulating misinformation susceptibility, with alignment up to 92%.

Large language models (LLMs) define a distribution over text, which can be viewed as a probabilistic representation of uncertainty: sampling K responses yields a belief state - responses a model deems plausible. Existing work exploits this representation for narrow tasks like either decoding or selective prediction, and often requires manual interventions, not controlling generation directly. We propose Belief-Augmented Generation (BAG): grounding LLMs in their own belief state via the prompt and letting them reason over these K samples to decide on a conversational strategy: answer, clarify, or abstain. In a multi-turn ambiguous QA setting, we find that LLMs by default rarely clarify or abstain, ignoring uncertainty about the input or facts. BAG improves QA accuracy across six models and yields strategy decisions more faithful to the belief state than prompt-only baselines. Disentangling when to clarify from when to abstain, however, remains challenging.

Humans can attribute beliefs to others. However, it is unknown to what extent this ability results from an innate biological endowment or from experience accrued through child development, particularly exposure to language describing others' mental states. We test the viability of the language exposure hypothesis by assessing whether models exposed to large quantities of human language display sensitivity to the implied knowledge states of characters in written passages. In pre-registered analyses, we present a linguistic version of the False Belief Task to both human participants and a Large Language Model, GPT-3. Both are sensitive to others' beliefs, but while the language model significantly exceeds chance behavior, it does not perform as well as the humans, nor does it explain the full extent of their behavior -- despite being exposed to more language than a human would in a lifetime. This suggests that while statistical learning from language exposure may in part explain how humans develop the ability to reason about the mental states of others, other mechanisms are also responsible.

Large language models (LLMs) progressively revise their predictions across Transformer layers, yet we typically observe only the final output, discarding the trajectory through which it is formed. We introduce Belief-Trajectory Energy(BTE), a model-grounded measure that characterizes an input through the layerwise predictive revisions it induces in a model. By mapping intermediate states into a shared predictive space, BTE provides a principled measure of belief change that can be summarized as either a scalar or a structured depth profile. Theoretically, we show that local BTE corresponds to predictive revision under the Fisher-Rao geometry, while the sequence of revisions captures information beyond the initial-to-final belief change. Empirically, scalar BTE provides a model-relative signal of difficulty across diverse reasoning tasks, while richer BTE representations support human-LLM review detection and fine-grained generator attribution, reaching up to 0.998 macro-AUROC and 95.6% eight-way attribution accuracy. Further analysis shows that BTE develops throughout pretraining and is selectively reshaped by targeted training, demonstrating that the resulting measurement reflects what the scoring model has learned. Together, our results establish belief trajectories as a principled model-grounded signal and suggest a broader perspective in which learned models can themselves serve as instruments for characterizing the data they process. More demonstrations can be found at https://yingjiahao14.github.io/BTE-web/.

Large language models (LLMs) face issues in handling factual knowledge, making it vital to evaluate their true ability to understand facts. In this study, we introduce knowledge probing frameworks, BELIEF(-ICL), to evaluate the knowledge understanding ability of not only encoder-based PLMs but also decoder-based PLMs from diverse perspectives. BELIEFs utilize a multi-prompt dataset to evaluate PLM's accuracy, consistency, and reliability in factual knowledge understanding. To provide a more reliable evaluation with BELIEFs, we semi-automatically create MyriadLAMA, which has more diverse prompts than existing datasets. We validate the effectiveness of BELIEFs in correctly and comprehensively evaluating PLM's factual understanding ability through extensive evaluations. We further investigate key factors in learning facts in LLMs, and reveal the limitation of the prompt-based knowledge probing. The dataset is anonymously publicized.

To enable Large Language Models (LLMs) to function as conscious agents with generalizable reasoning capabilities, it is crucial that they possess the reasoning ability to comprehend situational changes (transitions) in distribution triggered by environmental factors or actions from other agents. Despite its fundamental significance, this ability remains underexplored due to the complexity of modeling infinite possible changes in an event and their associated distributions, coupled with the lack of benchmark data with situational transitions. Addressing these gaps, we propose a novel formulation of reasoning with distributional changes as a three-step discriminative process, termed as MetAphysical ReaSoning. We then introduce the first-ever benchmark, MARS, comprising three tasks corresponding to each step. These tasks systematically assess LLMs' capabilities in reasoning the plausibility of (i) changes in actions, (ii) states caused by changed actions, and (iii) situational transitions driven by changes in action. Extensive evaluations with 20 (L)LMs of varying sizes and methods indicate that all three tasks in this process pose significant challenges, even for state-of-the-art LLMs and LMs after fine-tuning. Further analyses reveal potential causes for the underperformance of LLMs and demonstrate that pre-training them on large-scale conceptualization taxonomies can potentially enhance their metaphysical reasoning capabilities. Our data and models are publicly accessible at https://github.com/HKUST-KnowComp/MARS.

One of the key challenges in deploying RL to real-world applications is to adapt to variations of unknown environment contexts, such as changing terrains in robotic tasks and fluctuated bandwidth in congestion control. Existing works on adaptation to unknown environment contexts either assume the contexts are the same for the whole episode or assume the context variables are Markovian. However, in many real-world applications, the environment context usually stays stable for a stochastic period and then changes in an abrupt and unpredictable manner within an episode, resulting in a segment structure, which existing works fail to address. To leverage the segment structure of piecewise stable context in real-world applications, in this paper, we propose a \textbf{Segmented Context Belief Augmented Deep~(SeCBAD)} RL method. Our method can jointly infer the belief distribution over latent context with the posterior over segment length and perform more accurate belief context inference with observed data within the current context segment. The inferred belief context can be leveraged to augment the state, leading to a policy that can adapt to abrupt variations in context. We demonstrate empirically that SeCBAD can infer context segment length accurately and outperform existing methods on a toy grid world environment and Mujuco tasks with piecewise-stable context.

Human language is driven by unspoken beliefs and belief updates, making these critical to model for successful communication between large language models (LLMs) and their users. In this paper, we evaluate the ability of LLMs to recognize unspoken beliefs made through implicatures and to understand their updates through implicature cancellation: the pragmatic phenomenon whereby an utterance's implied meaning is weakened or negated. We create the first expert-annotated implicature cancellation dataset, ImplicatureX, crowdsourced for human judgements of implicatures and their corresponding cancellations. We find that LLM belief update understanding lags behind that of humans, especially in more naturally-occurring scenarios. Additional control experiments suggest that successes in LLM belief updates may stem in part from a reliance on prior beliefs, and that failures in belief updates may depend on their type and on their form. Overall, our study suggests that current LLMs have not yet reached human-level understanding of unspoken beliefs and belief updates. Code and data are available at https://github.com/cesare-spinoso/ImplicatureX.

Large language models (LLMs) are widely used as information sources, yet small changes in semantic assumptions can destabilize their beliefs. We introduce P-StaT (Perturbation Stability of Truth), a framework for evaluating belief stability under matched semantic perturbations in both representational and behavioral settings. Across 21 LLMs and three domains, we compare perturbations involving familiar Fictional statements against synthetically generated and unfamiliar Synthetic statements. Unfamiliar Synthetic perturbations generally induce greater epistemic instability than familiar Fictional perturbations, with behavioral belief retraction rates frequently exceeding 0.5 (50%). Finally, exploratory clustering analyses reveal recurring themes among retracted statements, including ambiguity, technical terminology, and obscure concepts. These results show that epistemic familiarity is systematically associated with stability under semantic reframing, suggesting that stability-based analyses can complement accuracy-based benchmarks when evaluating LLM robustness and reliability. Code and data are available at https://github.com/samanthadies/P-StaT.

Large language models (LLMs) can exhibit advanced reasoning yet still generate incorrect answers. We hypothesize that such errors frequently stem from spurious beliefs, propositions the model internally considers true but are incorrect. To address this, we propose a method to rectify the belief space by suppressing these spurious beliefs while simultaneously enhancing true ones, thereby enabling more reliable inferences. Our approach first identifies the beliefs that lead to incorrect or correct answers by prompting the model to generate textual explanations, using our Forward-Backward Beam Search (FBBS). We then apply unlearning to suppress the identified spurious beliefs and enhance the true ones, effectively rectifying the model's belief space. Empirical results on multiple QA datasets and LLMs show that our method corrects previously misanswered questions without harming overall model performance. Furthermore, our approach yields improved generalization on unseen data, suggesting that rectifying a model's belief space is a promising direction for mitigating errors and enhancing overall reliability.

Vision--Language--Action (VLA) policies such as π_{0.5} and OpenVLA perform well on many manipulation tasks, but they are often reactive: the next action is predicted from the current observation, instruction, and proprioceptive state. This assumption breaks down in stage-dependent manipulation, where visually similar states may require different actions depending on latent task progress and previous interaction outcomes. We argue that such tasks require not only memory, but dynamics-aware belief updates: the policy should preserve task progress during stable or occluded phases and revise its belief near contact, release, or subgoal transitions. We introduce Temporally Conditioned Memory-Fusion Policies (TFP), a lightweight memory-action framework for VLA backbones. TFP maintains an episode-local task-progress belief with Liquid Time-Constant dynamics and injects the updated belief directly into the flow-matching action decoder through adaptive modulation. This lets temporally accumulated context shape the generated action chunk, rather than serving only as passive history context. With a 3.3B-parameter model, TFP improves the average success rate from \(96.9\%\) to \(98.75\%\) on LIBERO and from \(91.4\%\) to \(93.77\%\) on LIBERO-plus. On the memory-focused MIKASA ShellGameTouch diagnostic, TFP achieves success up to \(75.0\%\). Mechanistic analyses show that write-gain changes near manipulation events are about \(6\times\) larger than far non-event phases, and hidden-state interventions show that the belief causally modulates generated action chunks. These results suggest that compact, event-sensitive memory dynamics can improve VLA policies under occlusion, visual perturbation, and stage-dependent task structure.

Machine learning models frequently experience performance drops under distribution shifts. The underlying cause of such shifts may be multiple simultaneous factors such as changes in data quality, differences in specific covariate distributions, or changes in the relationship between label and features. When a model does fail during deployment, attributing performance change to these factors is critical for the model developer to identify the root cause and take mitigating actions. In this work, we introduce the problem of attributing performance differences between environments to distribution shifts in the underlying data generating mechanisms. We formulate the problem as a cooperative game where the players are distributions. We define the value of a set of distributions to be the change in model performance when only this set of distributions has changed between environments, and derive an importance weighting method for computing the value of an arbitrary set of distributions. The contribution of each distribution to the total performance change is then quantified as its Shapley value. We demonstrate the correctness and utility of our method on synthetic, semi-synthetic, and real-world case studies, showing its effectiveness in attributing performance changes to a wide range of distribution shifts.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents commonly condition actions on full action-observation histories, which introduce task-irrelevant information that easily leads to redundant actions and higher inference cost. We propose Progress-Aware Belief Update (PABU), a belief-state framework that compactly represents an agent's state by explicitly modeling task progress and selectively retaining past actions and observations. At each step, the agent predicts its relative progress since the previous round and decides whether the newly encountered interaction should be stored, conditioning future decisions only on the retained subset. Across eight environments in the AgentGym benchmark, and using identical training trajectories, PABU achieves an 81.0% task completion rate, outperforming previous State of the art (SoTA) models with full-history belief by 23.9%. Additionally, PABU's progress-oriented action selection improves efficiency, reducing the average number of interaction steps to 9.5, corresponding to a 26.9% reduction. Ablation studies show that both explicit progress prediction and selective retention are necessary for robust belief learning and performance gains.

We study how the similarity of individuals' information shapes collective action. When people draw on a common source of information, such as social media, each becomes more confident about what others have seen and will do. This can help them coordinate, but it can also tempt them to free-ride. We show that which force prevails depends on how demanding the collective goal is. In a content-moderation experiment, subjects decide whether to pay a cost to report harmful content, which is removed only if enough reports are received. We vary the similarity of group members' information, holding fixed what each learns on her own, and independently vary the removal threshold. More similar information impedes reporting when few reports suffice and facilitates it when many are required, lowering reporting by 17 percentage points under an easy threshold and raising it by 34 points under a demanding one. This confirms the central comparative static of the theory of information similarity (Basak, Deb and Kuvalekar, 2026). Elicited beliefs trace the reversal to perceived pivotality and document systematic miscalibration of it. Subjects overestimate pivotality across all regimes, and their beliefs respond to similarity in line with actual pivotality only at intermediate thresholds: easy thresholds produce unrecognized pivotality, and near-unanimous thresholds produce illusory pivotality. The two response-miscalibrated patterns coincide with welfare losses; only under aligned pivotality does greater participation translate into greater collective success and higher welfare.

The training and deployment of large language models (LLMs) create a feedback loop with human users: models learn human beliefs from data, reinforce these beliefs with generated content, reabsorb the reinforced beliefs, and feed them back to users again and again. This dynamic resembles an echo chamber. We hypothesize that this feedback loop entrenches the existing values and beliefs of users, leading to a loss of diversity and potentially the lock-in of false beliefs. We formalize this hypothesis and test it empirically with agent-based LLM simulations and real-world GPT usage data. Analysis reveals sudden but sustained drops in diversity after the release of new GPT iterations, consistent with the hypothesized human-AI feedback loop. Code and data available at https://thelockinhypothesis.com

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) enhances LLMs by incorporating external knowledge to support response generation. However, conflicts between retrieved context and parametric knowledge have emerged as a critical challenge in RAG systems. To mitigate such conflicts, numerous studies have attempted to identify and edit knowledge-related internal neurons, aiming to improve the ability of LLMs to rely on contextual evidence during generation. However, these neuron-level approaches may introduce unintended cascading effects that compromise the general capabilities of LLMs, as the modified neurons are often entangled with broader model behaviors and functionalities. In this paper, we introduce SHIFT, a novel framework that reformulates neuron-level modification as learnable gate modulation, allowing LLMs to adaptively regulate internal activations for knowledge conflict resolution. Technically, our SHIFT equips LLMs with a lightweight gate module and optimizes fewer than 0.01% trainable parameters while keeping the backbone model frozen. During generation, the gate module adjusts the model's internal representations to adaptively leverage contextual and parametric knowledge. Extensive experiments on six datasets validate the effectiveness of our SHIFT in comparison with various competing baselines. All datasets and code are available at https://github.com/OpenBMB/SHIFT.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed on long-horizon tasks in partially observable environments, where they must act while inferring and tracking a complex environment state over many steps. This leads to two challenges: partial observability requires maintaining uncertainty over unobserved world attributes, and long interaction history causes context to grow without bound, diluting task-relevant information. A principled solution to both challenges is a belief state: a posterior distribution over environment states given past observations and actions, which compactly encodes history for decision making regardless of episode length. In LLM agents, however, the open-ended nature of text makes it unclear how to represent such a distribution. Therefore, we introduce Agent-BRACE: Agent Belief state Representation via Abstraction and Confidence Estimation, a method that decouples an LLM agent into a belief state model and a policy model, jointly optimized via reinforcement learning. The belief state model produces a structured approximation of the belief distribution: a set of atomic natural language claims about the environment, each annotated with an ordinal verbalized certainty label ranging from certain to unknown. The policy model conditions on this compact, structured approximate belief rather than the full history, learning to select actions under explicit uncertainty. Across long-horizon, partially observable embodied language environments, Agent-BRACE achieves an average absolute improvement of +14.5% (Qwen2.5-3B-Instruct) and +5.3% (Qwen3-4B-Instruct), outperforming strong RL baselines while maintaining a near-constant context window independent of episode length. Further analysis shows that the learned belief becomes increasingly calibrated over the course of an episode as evidence accumulates.

Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) and its variants have become increasingly popular for aligning language models with human preferences. These methods aim to teach models to better distinguish between chosen (or preferred) and rejected (or dispreferred) responses. However, prior research has identified that the probability of chosen responses often decreases during training, and this phenomenon is known as likelihood displacement. To tackle this challenge, in this work we introduce \method to controllably shift the distribution of the chosen probability. Then, we show that \method exhibits a fundamental trade-off between improving the chosen probability and sacrificing the reward margin, as supported by both theoretical analysis and experimental validation. Furthermore, we demonstrate the superiority of \method over DPO on downstream tasks such as MT-Bench and a designed win rate experiment. We believe this study shows that the likelihood displacement issue of DPO can be effectively mitigated with a simple, theoretically grounded solution. Our code is available at https://github.com/Meaquadddd/DPO-Shift.

Reinforcement learning from verifiable rewards (RLVR) is a promising paradigm for improving large language model (LLM) agents on long-horizon interactive tasks. However, in partially observable environments, incomplete observations cause agent beliefs to drift over time, while delayed rewards obscure the causal impact of intermediate decisions, exacerbating temporal credit assignment challenges. To address this, we propose ReBel (Reward Belief), a process-level reinforcement learning algorithm that explicitly models structured belief states to summarize interaction history and guide subsequent policy learning. ReBel introduces belief-consistency supervision, converting discrepancies between predicted beliefs and observed feedback into dense self-supervised signals without requiring external step-wise annotations or verifiers. It also employs belief-aware grouping to compare trajectories under similar belief states, yielding more robust and lower-variance advantage estimates. We evaluate ReBel on challenging long-horizon benchmarks, including ALFWorld and WebShop. ReBel improves task success by up to 20.4 percentage points over the episode-level baseline GRPO and increases sample efficiency by 2.1times. These results suggest that belief-aware self-supervision is a promising direction for reliable long-horizon decision-making under partial observability. Code is available at: https://github.com/Fateyetian/Rebel.git.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) faithfulness detectors are widely used to audit reasoning models, yet a detector is itself a predictor whose verdicts are treated as stable properties. We ask whether a detector is faithful to itself under distribution shift. We formalize meta-faithfulness as an invariance principle: a valid detector must return identical verdicts on traces that differ only by transformations preserving ground-truth faithfulness. We prove three results: (i) no detector using only intervention-response profiles can separate faithful from epiphenomenal mechanisms with identical signatures; (ii) any detector relying on shift-sensitive features violates invariance at a rate independent of its in-distribution accuracy; (iii) an asymptotic certified selective-risk guarantee enables confident abstention. We operationalize the principle in FaithShift, a stress-test protocol spanning ten shift axes, and propose SIFT, a hidden-state trajectory detector trained with cross-environment invariance objectives and certified abstention. Across 14,996 traces, four domains, and eight models, three findings emerge. First, transfer collapse is real: all existing detectors show gaps geq 0.15 AUROC. Second, the dominant bottleneck is sampling stochasticity, not shift: over 80% of detector instability stems from random seed variation, falsifying our preregistered prediction that shift-attributable violations exceed 0.25. Third, SIFT cuts invariance violations by 64% over the best single-seed baseline, but a four-seed ensemble of any detector narrows the margin to 0.01 (indistinguishable at matched coverage, p=0.21), and SIFT needs a 51% abstention rate. Cross-model transfer degrades from within-family to cross-family to open-weight-to-API, partly closed by multi-model training. We offer a framework for auditing auditors: the real barrier is detector variance, not distribution shift.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to infer others' knowledge, intentions, and emotions, is commonly evaluated in large language models (LLMs) using end-point question answering, where performance is judged solely by the final answer to a social reasoning query. This paradigm obscures whether the model actually constructs the underlying mental-state representations required for robust reasoning, particularly in scenarios involving divergent, evolving, or mistaken beliefs. In order to address this research gap, we introduce OmniToM, a benchmark that directly evaluates these representations by requiring explicit modeling of belief structures for all relevant actors within a narrative. These structures are composed of belief propositions: minimal statements of what an actor takes to be true about the world or another actor's mental state, allowing knowledge, intentions, emotions, and false beliefs to be analyzed in a common format. Models are evaluated in two stages: Stage 1: Belief Extraction, which extracts from the story the beliefs relevant to its social dynamics, and Stage 2: Belief Labeling, which assigns each belief a seven-dimensional schema label covering recursive order, truth status, knowledge access, explicitness, content type, mental source, and context. Built from 895 stories from the existing ToMBench story corpus and augmented with 22,343 labeled belief propositions, OmniToM uses a human-calibrated LLM-assisted annotation pipeline. Across diverse models in zero-shot evaluation, OmniToM reveals an actor-specific belief-tracking bottleneck: current LLMs struggle with the knowledge-access and representational decisions required to transform narrative facts into actors' beliefs and shared mental states.

Multi-Agent Debate~(MAD) has emerged as a promising paradigm for improving the performance of large language models through collaborative reasoning. Despite recent advances, the key factors driving MAD's effectiveness remain unclear. In this work, we disentangle MAD into two key components--Majority Voting and inter-agent Debate--and assess their respective contributions. Through extensive experiments across seven NLP benchmarks, we find that Majority Voting alone accounts for most of the performance gains typically attributed to MAD. To explain this, we propose a theoretical framework that models debate as a stochastic process. We prove that it induces a martingale over agents' belief trajectories, implying that debate alone does not improve expected correctness. Guided by these insights, we demonstrate that targeted interventions, by biasing the belief update toward correction, can meaningfully enhance debate effectiveness. Overall, our findings suggest that while MAD has potential, simple ensembling methods remain strong and more reliable alternatives in many practical settings. Code is released in https://github.com/deeplearning-wisc/debate-or-vote.

Which reasoning behaviors are associated with correct answers in reasoning models, and does reasoning-oriented training amplify those behaviors? This distinction is important because reasoning-oriented training can make traces look more deliberative without amplifying the behaviors most tied to model correctness. We quantify this mismatch with Behavioral Lift, a metric that measures how much correctness changes when a behavior is present versus absent in a model's reasoning trace. Across 15 models and 6 benchmarks spanning text-only and vision-language reasoning, we annotate 15,282 traces with a taxonomy whose core behaviors are defined for both LLM and VLM traces. We find evidence for an Amplification-Lift Gap, in which thinking models strongly amplify self-correction, hypothesis testing, and uncertainty acknowledgment, while the highest-lift behaviors are confidence calibration, knowledge alignment, and self-awareness. Confidence calibration is among the strongest positive signals of correctness in both modalities, yet is barely amplified; uncertainty acknowledgment is amplified by 3--7times, yet is weakly or negatively associated with correctness. We find that reasoning-oriented training does not preferentially amplify the highest-Lift behaviors, motivating process-level objectives that reward calibrated and grounded reasoning rather than surface form alone.

Previous work has highlighted that existing post-hoc explanation methods exhibit disparities in explanation fidelity (across 'race' and 'gender' as sensitive attributes), and while a large body of work focuses on mitigating these issues at the explanation metric level, the role of the data generating process and black box model in relation to explanation disparities remains largely unexplored. Accordingly, through both simulations as well as experiments on a real-world dataset, we specifically assess challenges to explanation disparities that originate from properties of the data: limited sample size, covariate shift, concept shift, omitted variable bias, and challenges based on model properties: inclusion of the sensitive attribute and appropriate functional form. Through controlled simulation analyses, our study demonstrates that increased covariate shift, concept shift, and omission of covariates increase explanation disparities, with the effect pronounced higher for neural network models that are better able to capture the underlying functional form in comparison to linear models. We also observe consistent findings regarding the effect of concept shift and omitted variable bias on explanation disparities in the Adult income dataset. Overall, results indicate that disparities in model explanations can also depend on data and model properties. Based on this systematic investigation, we provide recommendations for the design of explanation methods that mitigate undesirable disparities.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) mitigates hallucinations in Large Language Models (LLMs) by integrating external knowledge. However, conflicts between parametric knowledge and retrieved context pose challenges, particularly when retrieved information is unreliable or the model's internal knowledge is outdated. In such cases, LLMs struggle to determine whether to rely more on their own parameters or the conflicted context. To address this, we propose **CK-PLUG**, a plug-and-play method for controlling LLMs' reliance on parametric and contextual knowledge. We introduce a novel knowledge consistency metric, Confidence Gain, which detects knowledge conflicts by measuring entropy shifts in token probability distributions after context insertion. CK-PLUG then enables fine-grained control over knowledge preference by adjusting the probability distribution of tokens with negative confidence gain through a single tuning parameter. Experiments demonstrate CK-PLUG's ability to significantly regulate knowledge reliance in counterfactual RAG scenarios while maintaining generation fluency and knowledge accuracy. For instance, on Llama3-8B, memory recall (MR) of RAG response can be adjusted within a broad range (9.9%-71.9%), compared to the baseline of 42.1%. Moreover, CK-PLUG supports adaptive control based on the model's confidence in both internal and external knowledge, achieving consistent performance improvements across various general RAG tasks. Our code is available at: https://github.com/byronBBL/CK-PLUG{this https URL}.

Theory of Mind (ToM) is central to social cognition and human-AI interaction, and Large Language Models (LLMs) have been used to help understand and represent ToM. However, most evaluations treat ToM as a static judgment at a single moment, primarily relying on tests of false beliefs. This overlooks a key dynamic dimension of ToM: the ability to represent, update, and retrieve others' beliefs over time. We investigate dynamic ToM as a temporally extended representational memory problem, asking whether LLMs can track belief trajectories across interactions rather than only inferring current beliefs. We introduce DToM-Track, an evaluation framework to investigate temporal belief reasoning in controlled multiturn conversations, testing the recall of beliefs held prior to an update, the inference of current beliefs, and the detection of belief change. Using LLMs as computational probes, we find a consistent asymmetry: models reliably infer an agent's current belief but struggle to maintain and retrieve prior belief states once updates occur. This pattern persists across LLM model families and scales, and is consistent with recency bias and interference effects well documented in cognitive science. These results suggest that tracking belief trajectories over time poses a distinct challenge beyond classical false-belief reasoning. By framing ToM as a problem of temporal representation and retrieval, this work connects ToM to core cognitive mechanisms of memory and interference and exposes the implications for LLM models of social reasoning in extended human-AI interactions.

The core premise of AI debate as a scalable oversight technique is that it is harder to lie convincingly than to refute a lie, enabling the judge to identify the correct position. Yet, existing debate experiments have relied on datasets with ground truth, where lying is reduced to defending an incorrect proposition. This overlooks a subjective dimension: lying also requires the belief that the claim defended is false. In this work, we apply debate to subjective questions and explicitly measure large language models' prior beliefs before experiments. Debaters were asked to select their preferred position, then presented with a judge persona deliberately designed to conflict with their identified priors. This setup tested whether models would adopt sycophantic strategies, aligning with the judge's presumed perspective to maximize persuasiveness, or remain faithful to their prior beliefs. We implemented and compared two debate protocols, sequential and simultaneous, to evaluate potential systematic biases. Finally, we assessed whether models were more persuasive and produced higher-quality arguments when defending positions consistent with their prior beliefs versus when arguing against them. Our main findings show that models tend to prefer defending stances aligned with the judge persona rather than their prior beliefs, sequential debate introduces significant bias favoring the second debater, models are more persuasive when defending positions aligned with their prior beliefs, and paradoxically, arguments misaligned with prior beliefs are rated as higher quality in pairwise comparison. These results can inform human judges to provide higher-quality training signals and contribute to more aligned AI systems, while revealing important aspects of human-AI interaction regarding persuasion dynamics in language models.

Language models (LMs) may lead their users to make suboptimal downstream decisions when they confidently hallucinate. This issue can be mitigated by having the LM verbally convey the probability that its claims are correct, but existing models cannot produce text with calibrated confidence statements. Through the lens of decision-making, we formalize linguistic calibration for long-form generations: an LM is linguistically calibrated if its generations enable its users to make calibrated probabilistic predictions. This definition enables a training framework where a supervised finetuning step bootstraps an LM to emit long-form generations with confidence statements such as "I estimate a 30% chance of..." or "I am certain that...", followed by a reinforcement learning step which rewards generations that enable a user to provide calibrated answers to related questions. We linguistically calibrate Llama 2 7B and find in automated and human evaluations of long-form generations that it is significantly more calibrated than strong finetuned factuality baselines with comparable accuracy. These findings generalize under distribution shift on question-answering and under a significant task shift to person biography generation. Our results demonstrate that long-form generations may be calibrated end-to-end by constructing an objective in the space of the predictions that users make in downstream decision-making.

Marketing decisions reflect the interaction of latent consumer heterogeneity, time-varying internal states, and explicit interventions, a structure that current prediction- and language-oriented models do not capture in a unified manner. We propose a Three-in-One world-model architecture in which a Deep Boltzmann Machine (DBM) learns a frozen belief representation from demographics, time, and lagged actions and outcomes, with lightweight task-specific adapters attached on top. The same belief supports three tasks within a single framework: (i) energy-based consistency evaluation through the DBM's free energy, (ii) outcome prediction through adapters, and (iii) counterfactual inference by holding the belief fixed and varying only the action input given to the adapter. Using a controlled simulation in which the latent price sensitivity, promotion responsiveness, and base preference of each consumer are known, we show that the adapters match a strong MLP baseline on visit- and purchase-AUC while recovering heterogeneous treatment effects substantially better than S-, T-, X-, and DR-learner meta-learners and a Causal Forest baseline built on the same raw features, with the largest gap on a confounded price-promotion intervention. Complementing this, free-energy clamps systematically penalize counterfactual purchase trajectories that lack prior promotional exposure, and the penalty itself depends on the latent base preference in the expected direction. These results indicate that DBM beliefs disentangle latent traits in a form that survives counterfactual queries, providing an integrated world-model substrate for marketing intervention.

In-context learning (ICL) is often motivated by the intuition that demonstrations help because they provide correct input-output examples. However, we reveal a counterintuitive phenomenon: correctness does not guarantee exemplar utility, and some correct demonstrations can even reduce ICL accuracy. To study this correctness-utility gap, we introduce task-preserving perturbations, where only the exemplar input is changed, while the example remains a correct instance of the same task. Concretely, each perturbed exemplar is assigned the target induced by the task mapping. This framework covers both label-updating perturbations, where task-relevant semantics change and targets are recomputed, and stricter target-preserving perturbations, where the original target remains valid. We formalize the resulting failure mode as contextual evidence shift: task-preserving perturbations can change the effective mixture of evidence used by the model for contextual inference, thereby separating exemplar correctness from exemplar utility. Across sentiment classification, logical reasoning, and math word problems, we find that task-preserving perturbed demonstrations can substantially degrade ICL performance, especially for smaller models, harder tasks, and higher perturbation ratios. Our results show that robust ICL requires evaluating not only whether demonstrations are correct, but also how they influence contextual inference. Code is available at https://github.com/Chenghao-Qiu/Task-Preserving-ICL.

Personality-conditioned LLM agents (PC-Agents) are increasingly used in emotional support, social simulation, and role-playing, motivating the development of lifelong agents that remain coherent over extended interactions. A key component of such coherence is personality evolution: agents should undergo plausible, psychology-grounded changes as they experience life events in different contexts. Although prior work shows that LLM personalities can shift under contextual perturbations, how these shifts vary across traits, events, personas, and models remains poorly understood. We study event-induced personality change after 11 major life events, using the Big Five traits as a psychometric anchor and interpreting the resulting trajectories against longitudinal evidence from human personality psychology. Across four diagnostic axes, PC-Agents exhibit measurable trait shifts at similar rates for event-trait pairs with and without documented human change directions. Even when shifts follow the expected direction, their magnitudes usually fall below human effect-size ranges. Gender and cultural-region prompts show little moderating effect, while persona-level dispersion is compressed three- to four-fold relative to human samples. To enable systematic comparison, we introduce BFI-Adapt, a reusable benchmark for scoring the directional fidelity of event-induced personality change, and use it to rank 14 models. A validation suite shows that the measured shifts exceed no-event retest noise, remain stable under independently paraphrased prompts, exhibit limited and model-dependent convergence with scenario-based behavioral choices, and persist across intervening unrelated dialogue. Together, these checks establish the measured trajectories as robust event-conditioned response patterns. Our results suggest that current PC-Agents simulate the mean of human personality dynamics, but not its shape.

Long-horizon interactions require language models to manage accumulating information: when to update their state, when to preserve their state, and what to ignore. We study this challenge as Contextual Belief Management (CBM): maintaining a predicted belief state aligned with formal evidence while isolating task-irrelevant noise. To make CBM measurable, we introduce BeliefTrack, a closed-world benchmark spanning Rule Discovery and Circuit Diagnosis, where a finite belief space and symbolic verifiers enable exact turn-level evaluation. BeliefTrack diagnoses three failures: Failed Stay, Failed Update, and Failed Isolation. Across multiple LLMs, vanilla models exhibit severe CBM failures, while explicit belief-tracking prompts provide limited gains. In contrast, reinforcement learning with belief-state rewards reduces failure rates by 70.9\% on average. Further probing reveals latent belief-state dynamics behind these failures, and representation-level steering reduces failure rates by 46.1\% across two tasks\footnote{Code is coming soon at https://github.com/zjunlp/CBM.

Distributional shift, or the mismatch between training and deployment data, is a significant obstacle to the usage of machine learning in high-stakes industrial applications, such as autonomous driving and medicine. This creates a need to be able to assess how robustly ML models generalize as well as the quality of their uncertainty estimates. Standard ML baseline datasets do not allow these properties to be assessed, as the training, validation and test data are often identically distributed. Recently, a range of dedicated benchmarks have appeared, featuring both distributionally matched and shifted data. Among these benchmarks, the Shifts dataset stands out in terms of the diversity of tasks as well as the data modalities it features. While most of the benchmarks are heavily dominated by 2D image classification tasks, Shifts contains tabular weather forecasting, machine translation, and vehicle motion prediction tasks. This enables the robustness properties of models to be assessed on a diverse set of industrial-scale tasks and either universal or directly applicable task-specific conclusions to be reached. In this paper, we extend the Shifts Dataset with two datasets sourced from industrial, high-risk applications of high societal importance. Specifically, we consider the tasks of segmentation of white matter Multiple Sclerosis lesions in 3D magnetic resonance brain images and the estimation of power consumption in marine cargo vessels. Both tasks feature ubiquitous distributional shifts and a strict safety requirement due to the high cost of errors. These new datasets will allow researchers to further explore robust generalization and uncertainty estimation in new situations. In this work, we provide a description of the dataset and baseline results for both tasks.

Policy-shift distillation reuses the difference between a teacher's log probabilities before and after reinforcement learning (RL) as supervision on student-generated trajectories. However, this endpoint policy shift cannot reveal whether local action preferences evolved consistently during teacher training. The same endpoint shift can result from early and late shifts that reinforce or partially cancel each other. We investigate whether agreement between early and late teacher policy shifts can guide selective transfer. We introduce Waypoint-guided On-Policy Distillation (Waypoint-OPD), which uses an intermediate teacher checkpoint from the same RL run to compare early and late shifts in relative action preferences at student-visited prefixes. We gate the endpoint shift according to the directional agreement between the early and late shifts, suppressing it when they point in opposing directions. Compared with endpoint-only transfer, our method requires only one additional frozen-teacher scoring pass. Using RL-trained Qwen3-4B teachers, we evaluate our method with Qwen3-8B, Qwen3-14B, and Qwen3-30B-A3B as student models in mathematical and code reasoning. In all six domain--student settings, Waypoint-OPD achieves the highest domain-average score among the compared distillation methods. Ablations with the Qwen3-8B student show that removing or shuffling gates reduces mathematical reasoning performance. These results support the use of directional agreement between early and late teacher policy shifts to weight the endpoint shift during student training.

In many real-world settings, agents must learn from an offline dataset gathered by some prior behavior policy. Such a setting naturally leads to distribution shift between the behavior policy and the target policy being trained - requiring policy conservatism to avoid instability and overestimation bias. Autoregressive world models offer a different solution to this by generating synthetic, on-policy experience. However, in practice, model rollouts must be severely truncated to avoid compounding error. As an alternative, we propose policy-guided diffusion. Our method uses diffusion models to generate entire trajectories under the behavior distribution, applying guidance from the target policy to move synthetic experience further on-policy. We show that policy-guided diffusion models a regularized form of the target distribution that balances action likelihood under both the target and behavior policies, leading to plausible trajectories with high target policy probability, while retaining a lower dynamics error than an offline world model baseline. Using synthetic experience from policy-guided diffusion as a drop-in substitute for real data, we demonstrate significant improvements in performance across a range of standard offline reinforcement learning algorithms and environments. Our approach provides an effective alternative to autoregressive offline world models, opening the door to the controllable generation of synthetic training data.

Unlearning in large language models (LLMs) is crucial for managing sensitive data and correcting misinformation, yet evaluating its effectiveness remains an open problem. We investigate whether persuasive prompting can recall factual knowledge from deliberately unlearned LLMs across models ranging from 2.7B to 13B parameters (OPT-2.7B, LLaMA-2-7B, LLaMA-3.1-8B, LLaMA-2-13B). Drawing from ACT-R and Hebbian theory (spreading activation theories), as well as communication principles, we introduce Stimulus-Knowledge Entanglement-Behavior Framework (SKeB), which models information entanglement via domain graphs and tests whether factual recall in unlearned models is correlated with persuasive framing. We develop entanglement metrics to quantify knowledge activation patterns and evaluate factuality, non-factuality, and hallucination in outputs. Our results show persuasive prompts substantially enhance factual knowledge recall (14.8% baseline vs. 24.5% with authority framing), with effectiveness inversely correlated to model size (128% recovery in 2.7B vs. 15% in 13B). SKeB provides a foundation for assessing unlearning completeness, robustness, and overall behavior in LLMs.

Linguistic cues such as "I believe" and "probably" offer an intuitive interface for communicating confidence, yet a generalisable, principled calibration framework for linguistic confidence expressions remains underexplored. In particular, co-occurring linguistic cues, contextual variation, and subjective audience interpretation pose unique challenges. We therefore model linguistic confidence as a distribution over plausible perceived probability values that a statement is correct, capturing interpretation variability that scalar representations discard. Within this distributional framework, we introduce faithfulness as a complementary evaluation dimension and present Faithfulness Divergence (FD), an information-theoretic metric quantifying the surprise induced in audience beliefs upon truth revelation. Building on these foundations, we present Retrieval-Augmented Linguistic Calibration (RALC), a lightweight post-hoc pipeline that propagates calibrated confidence signals back into natural language via retrieval-augmented rewriting. Across three QA benchmarks and five LLM families, RALC improves in-domain faithfulness and calibration up to 66% and 58%, respectively, outperforming black-box and grey-box calibration baselines.

Persistent spatial memory enables embodied agents to navigate familiar environments across repeated visits. However, targets may move while unobserved, including during navigation, making remembered locations unreliable by the time an agent arrives. Despite advances in memory retrieval and state prediction, accounting for continued hidden world evolution and revising beliefs under limited visibility remain challenging. We study Evolving-World Navigation, where agents infer target locations from intermittent observations, predict their states at inspection time, and revise beliefs using visual evidence. We propose EvolvingNav, which constructs a time-indexed belief from timestamped 3D object histories through a structured persistence-relocation model. The belief distinguishes persistence at the last observed location from relocation to alternative locations and retains probability mass outside the known candidate set. An event-driven filter propagates the current belief as time elapses, forecasts target occupancy at candidate inspection times, and incorporates new RGB-D evidence. Negative observations downweight location hypotheses according to calibrated, visibility-conditioned detection probabilities, while evidence tracking prevents repeated use of the same observations. A frozen, zero-shot vision-language controller uses the updated belief to choose actions and replan. We further introduce EvoWorld-Bench, a benchmark grounded in human activity traces, comprising 54 scenes and 803,680 tasks with controlled changes before and during navigation. In simulation and real-robot experiments, EvolvingNav improves navigation success and search efficiency over the evaluated baselines. Paired experiments show the clearest gains under learnable temporal patterns, while ablations demonstrate the value of preserving uncertainty and incorporating visibility-aware evidence.

Misinformation - false or misleading information - is considered a significant societal concern due to its associated "misinformation effects," such as political polarization, erosion of trust in institutions, problematic behavior, and public health challenges. However, the prevailing concept is misaligned with what is studied. While misinformation focuses on instances of information about factual matters, the broad spectrum of effects often manifests at a societal level and is shaped by a wide range of interdependent factors such as identity, values, opinions, epistemologies, and disagreements. Unsurprisingly, misinformation effects can occur without the prevalence of misinformation, and misinformation does not necessarily increase the effects studied. Here, we propose using disagreement - conflicting attitudes and beliefs between individuals and communities - as a way to study misinformation effects because it addresses the identified conceptual limitations of misinformation. Furthermore, unlike misinformation, disagreement does not require researchers to determine whether a given information is false or misleading. Thus, it can be studied and, more importantly, measured without the need to make a normative judgment about a given information, even when the specific topic is entirely removed, as we show in a longitudinal disagreement measurement. We demonstrate that disagreement, as a holistic concept, provides better explanations for the occurrence of misinformation effects, enhances precision in developing appropriate interventions, and offers a promising approach for evaluating them through quantification. Finally, we show how disagreement addresses current misinformation research questions and conclude with recommendations for research practice.

Generative policies trained with human demonstrations can autonomously accomplish multimodal, long-horizon tasks. However, during inference, humans are often removed from the policy execution loop, limiting the ability to guide a pre-trained policy towards a specific sub-goal or trajectory shape among multiple predictions. Naive human intervention may inadvertently exacerbate distribution shift, leading to constraint violations or execution failures. To better align policy output with human intent without inducing out-of-distribution errors, we propose an Inference-Time Policy Steering (ITPS) framework that leverages human interactions to bias the generative sampling process, rather than fine-tuning the policy on interaction data. We evaluate ITPS across three simulated and real-world benchmarks, testing three forms of human interaction and associated alignment distance metrics. Among six sampling strategies, our proposed stochastic sampling with diffusion policy achieves the best trade-off between alignment and distribution shift. Videos are available at https://yanweiw.github.io/itps/.

Time series forecasting (TSF) increasingly drives decisions in transportation, energy, finance, healthcare, and infrastructure, yet current evaluation remains overly narrow: standard benchmarks reward low held-out error, while robustness studies typically reduce failure to Gaussian noise, random masking, or bounded adversarial perturbations. This obscures the real failure modes of deployed forecasting systems. Input-side anomalies are not merely noisier inputs: they often reflect structured events that alter temporal dynamics, break cross-variable dependencies, induce regime shifts, or propagate from faulty sensors to downstream decisions. These semantic, causal, and system-level failures cannot be faithfully captured by i.i.d. perturbations alone. The rise of TSF foundation models makes this evaluation gap more urgent, as unauditable pretraining corpora make held-out generalization increasingly unreliable. We therefore advocate scenario-grounded stress testing. Each test instance should include historical inputs and future targets, together with a semantic scenario, an explicit failure operator, and a measurable difficulty level. This shift makes evaluation interpretable, attributable, and deployment-relevant and friendly, enabling the community to ask not only which model is accurate, but under what conditions it fails and why.

Strategic dialogue requires agents to execute distinct dialogue acts, for which belief estimation is essential. While prior work often estimates beliefs accurately, it lacks a principled mechanism to use those beliefs during generation. We bridge this gap by first formalizing two core acts Adversarial and Alignment, and by operationalizing them via probabilistic constraints on what an agent may generate. We instantiate this idea in BEDA, a framework that consists of the world set, the belief estimator for belief estimation, and the conditional generator that selects acts and realizes utterances consistent with the inferred beliefs. Across three settings, Conditional Keeper Burglar (CKBG, adversarial), Mutual Friends (MF, cooperative), and CaSiNo (negotiation), BEDA consistently outperforms strong baselines: on CKBG it improves success rate by at least 5.0 points across backbones and by 20.6 points with GPT-4.1-nano; on Mutual Friends it achieves an average improvement of 9.3 points; and on CaSiNo it achieves the optimal deal relative to all baselines. These results indicate that casting belief estimation as constraints provides a simple, general mechanism for reliable strategic dialogue.

Faced with distribution shift between training and test set, we wish to detect and quantify the shift, and to correct our classifiers without test set labels. Motivated by medical diagnosis, where diseases (targets) cause symptoms (observations), we focus on label shift, where the label marginal p(y) changes but the conditional p(x| y) does not. We propose Black Box Shift Estimation (BBSE) to estimate the test distribution p(y). BBSE exploits arbitrary black box predictors to reduce dimensionality prior to shift correction. While better predictors give tighter estimates, BBSE works even when predictors are biased, inaccurate, or uncalibrated, so long as their confusion matrices are invertible. We prove BBSE's consistency, bound its error, and introduce a statistical test that uses BBSE to detect shift. We also leverage BBSE to correct classifiers. Experiments demonstrate accurate estimates and improved prediction, even on high-dimensional datasets of natural images.

Tariff threats can move household beliefs before policy is enacted, yet their rapidly changing language is difficult to study with conventional surveys. We build a multi-agent system that turns 300 households from the Michigan Surveys of Consumers into persistent large-language-model agents exposed to social-media information over several simulated months. Calibrated agents reproduce some distributional and demographic patterns in human survey data collected after the announcement of Liberation Day tariffs. Simulated experiments indicate that immediacy, rate salience, semantic progression, message complexity, narrative, and sender identity jointly shape inflation and unemployment expectations and their dispersion. Open-ended responses trace these effects to attention, ambiguity, credibility, and causal narratives. A second experiment finds that central-bank explanations can coordinate beliefs, although their effects on average expectations depend on message content. The framework supports disciplined exploration of policy communication, subject to human validation rather than as a substitute for it.

A distribution shift can have fundamental consequences such as signaling a change in the operating environment or significantly reducing the accuracy of downstream models. Thus, understanding distribution shifts is critical for examining and hopefully mitigating the effect of such a shift. Most prior work focuses on merely detecting if a shift has occurred and assumes any detected shift can be understood and handled appropriately by a human operator. We hope to aid in these manual mitigation tasks by explaining the distribution shift using interpretable transportation maps from the original distribution to the shifted one. We derive our interpretable mappings from a relaxation of optimal transport, where the candidate mappings are restricted to a set of interpretable mappings. We then inspect multiple quintessential use-cases of distribution shift in real-world tabular, text, and image datasets to showcase how our explanatory mappings provide a better balance between detail and interpretability than baseline explanations by both visual inspection and our PercentExplained metric.

Distribution shift in medical imaging remains a central bottleneck for the clinical translation of medical AI. Failure to address it can lead to severe performance degradation in unseen environments and exacerbate health inequities. Existing methods for domain adaptation are inherently limited by exhausting predefined possibilities through simulated shifts or pseudo-supervision. Such strategies struggle in the open-ended and unpredictable real world, where distribution shifts are effectively infinite. To address this challenge, we adopt the "Rank Stability of Positive Regions" as a working assumption under distribution shift, and use it to derive robust spatial hints for source-only segmentation. Guided by this assumption, we propose CRISP, a model-agnostic framework that, unlike deployment-time adaptation, requires no test-time parameter updates and no target-domain data--a target-free, plug-in refinement framework that segments with frozen weights. Rather than using ranking to directly output masks, CRISP exploits the stability of probability rankings under distribution shift to derive robust spatial priors. Via latent feature perturbation, perturbation-invariant high-grade regions define a high-precision (HP) core, while voxels that remain potentially foreground under at least one perturbation define a high-recall (HR) support; these dual priors are then recursively refined under perturbation. We then design an iterative training framework that progressively squeezes HP and HR toward the final segmentation. Extensive evaluations on multi-center cardiac MRI and CT-based lung vessel segmentation demonstrate CRISP's superior robustness, significantly outperforming state-of-the-art methods with striking HD95 reductions of up to 0.14 (7.0% improvement), 1.90 (13.1% improvement), and 8.39 (38.9% improvement) pixels across multi-center, demographic, and modality shifts, respectively.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibiting test-time scaling behavior, such as extended reasoning traces and self-verification, have demonstrated remarkable performance on complex, long-term reasoning tasks. However, the robustness of these reasoning behaviors remains underexplored. To investigate this, we conduct a systematic evaluation of multiple reasoning models across three scenarios: (1) problems augmented with lengthy, irrelevant context; (2) multi-turn conversational settings with independent tasks; and (3) problems presented as a subtask within a complex task. We observe an interesting phenomenon: reasoning models tend to produce much shorter reasoning traces (up to 50%) for the same problem under different context conditions compared to the traces produced when the problem is presented in isolation. A finer-grained analysis reveals that this compression is associated with a decrease in self-verification and uncertainty management behaviors, such as double-checking. While this behavioral shift does not compromise performance on straightforward problems, it might affect performance on more challenging tasks. We hope our findings draw additional attention to both the robustness of reasoning models and the problem of context management for LLMs and LLM-based agents.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have recently demonstrated impressive capabilities in complex reasoning tasks by leveraging increased test-time computation and exhibiting behaviors reminiscent of human-like self-reflection. While LRMs show a clear capacity for valuable self-reflection, how this ability interacts with other model behaviors remains underexplored. We investigate this connection by analyzing verbalized confidence, how models articulate their certainty, as a lens into the nature of self-reflection in LRMs. We find that supervised fine-tuning on reasoning traces (i.e., distillation) and reinforcement learning can improve verbalized calibration in reasoning-intensive settings in a progressive, laddered fashion. However, our results also indicate that reasoning models may possess a diminished awareness of their own knowledge boundaries, as evidenced by significantly lower "I don't know" response rates on factuality benchmarks. Moreover, we examine the relationship between verbalized confidence and reasoning chains, finding that models tend to express higher confidence when providing shorter or less elaborate reasoning. Our findings highlight how reasoning-oriented training can enhance performance in reasoning-centric tasks while potentially incurring a "reasoning tax," a cost reflected in the model's reduced ability to accurately recognize the limits of its own knowledge in small-scale models. More broadly, our work showcases how this erosion of knowledge boundaries can compromise model faithfulness, as models grow more confident without a commensurate understanding of when they should abstain.

Supervised learning is often affected by a covariate shift in which the marginal distributions of instances (covariates x) of training and testing samples p_tr(x) and p_te(x) are different but the label conditionals coincide. Existing approaches address such covariate shift by either using the ratio p_te(x)/p_tr(x) to weight training samples (reweighted methods) or using the ratio p_tr(x)/p_te(x) to weight testing samples (robust methods). However, the performance of such approaches can be poor under support mismatch or when the above ratios take large values. We propose a minimax risk classification (MRC) approach for covariate shift adaptation that avoids such limitations by weighting both training and testing samples. In addition, we develop effective techniques that obtain both sets of weights and generalize the conventional kernel mean matching method. We provide novel generalization bounds for our method that show a significant increase in the effective sample size compared with reweighted methods. The proposed method also achieves enhanced classification performance in both synthetic and empirical experiments.

It has long been hypothesised that causal reasoning plays a fundamental role in robust and general intelligence. However, it is not known if agents must learn causal models in order to generalise to new domains, or if other inductive biases are sufficient. We answer this question, showing that any agent capable of satisfying a regret bound under a large set of distributional shifts must have learned an approximate causal model of the data generating process, which converges to the true causal model for optimal agents. We discuss the implications of this result for several research areas including transfer learning and causal inference.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are fluent but prone to hallucinations, producing answers that appear plausible yet are unsupported by available evidence. This failure is especially problematic in high-stakes domains where decisions must be justified by verifiable information. We introduce EvidenceRL, a reinforcement learning framework that enforces evidence adherence during training. EvidenceRL scores candidate responses for grounding (entailment with retrieved evidence and context) and correctness (agreement with reference answers) and optimizes the generator using Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO). We evaluate across two high-stakes domains, cardiac diagnosis and legal reasoning, where EvidenceRL consistently improves evidence grounding and faithfulness without sacrificing task accuracy. On cardiac diagnosis, F1@3 increases from 37.0 to 54.5 on Llama-3.2-3B while grounding (G_{max}@3) rises from 47.6 to 78.2; hallucinations drop nearly 5times and evidence-supported diagnoses increase from 31.8\% to 61.6\%. On legal reasoning, EvidenceRL raises Faithfulness from 32.8\% to 67.6\% on Llama-3.1-8B, demonstrating consistent behavioral change across domains. Our code is open-sourced at https://github.com/Wizaaard/EvidenceRL.git.

Concept shift is a prevailing problem in natural tasks like medical image segmentation where samples usually come from different subpopulations with variant correlations between features and labels. One common type of concept shift in medical image segmentation is the "information imbalance" between label-sparse samples with few (if any) segmentation labels and label-dense samples with plentiful labeled pixels. Existing distributionally robust algorithms have focused on adaptively truncating/down-weighting the "less informative" (i.e., label-sparse in our context) samples. To exploit data features of label-sparse samples more efficiently, we propose an adaptively weighted online optimization algorithm -- AdaWAC -- to incorporate data augmentation consistency regularization in sample reweighting. Our method introduces a set of trainable weights to balance the supervised loss and unsupervised consistency regularization of each sample separately. At the saddle point of the underlying objective, the weights assign label-dense samples to the supervised loss and label-sparse samples to the unsupervised consistency regularization. We provide a convergence guarantee by recasting the optimization as online mirror descent on a saddle point problem. Our empirical results demonstrate that AdaWAC not only enhances the segmentation performance and sample efficiency but also improves the robustness to concept shift on various medical image segmentation tasks with different UNet-style backbones.

Like students facing hard exam questions, large language models sometimes guess when uncertain, producing plausible yet incorrect statements instead of admitting uncertainty. Such "hallucinations" persist even in state-of-the-art systems and undermine trust. We argue that language models hallucinate because the training and evaluation procedures reward guessing over acknowledging uncertainty, and we analyze the statistical causes of hallucinations in the modern training pipeline. Hallucinations need not be mysterious -- they originate simply as errors in binary classification. If incorrect statements cannot be distinguished from facts, then hallucinations in pretrained language models will arise through natural statistical pressures. We then argue that hallucinations persist due to the way most evaluations are graded -- language models are optimized to be good test-takers, and guessing when uncertain improves test performance. This "epidemic" of penalizing uncertain responses can only be addressed through a socio-technical mitigation: modifying the scoring of existing benchmarks that are misaligned but dominate leaderboards, rather than introducing additional hallucination evaluations. This change may steer the field toward more trustworthy AI systems.

Prior work has analyzed the robustness of visual encoders to image transformations and corruptions, particularly in cases where such alterations are not seen during training. When this occurs, they introduce a form of distribution shift at test time, often leading to performance degradation. The primary focus has been on severe corruptions that, when applied aggressively, distort useful signals necessary for accurate semantic predictions. We take a different perspective by analyzing parameters of the image acquisition process and transformations that may be subtle or even imperceptible to the human eye. We find that such parameters are systematically encoded in the learned visual representations and can be easily recovered. More strikingly, their presence can have a profound impact, either positively or negatively, on semantic predictions. This effect depends on whether there is a strong correlation or anti-correlation between semantic labels and these acquisition-based or processing-based labels. Our code and data are available at: https://github.com/ryan-caesar-ramos/visual-encoder-traces

Despite significant strides in factual reliability, errors -- often termed hallucinations -- remain a major concern for generative AI, especially as LLMs are increasingly expected to be helpful in more complex or nuanced setups. Yet even in the simplest setting -- factoid question-answering with clear ground truth-frontier models without external tools continue to hallucinate. We argue that most factuality gains in this domain have come from expanding the model's knowledge boundary (encoding more facts) rather than improving awareness of that boundary (distinguishing known from unknown). We conjecture that the latter is inherently difficult: models may lack the discriminative power to perfectly separate truths from errors, creating an unavoidable tradeoff between eliminating hallucinations and preserving utility. This tradeoff dissolves under a different framing. If we understand hallucinations as confident errors -- incorrect information delivered without appropriate qualification -- a third path emerges beyond the answer-or-abstain dichotomy: expressing uncertainty. We propose faithful uncertainty: aligning linguistic uncertainty with intrinsic uncertainty. This is one facet of metacognition -- the ability to be aware of one's own uncertainty and to act on it. For direct interaction, acting on uncertainty means communicating it honestly; for agentic systems, it becomes the control layer governing when to search and what to trust. Metacognition is thus essential for LLMs to be both trustworthy and capable; we conclude by highlighting open problems for progress towards this objective.

The deployment of pre-trained perception models in novel environments often leads to performance degradation due to distributional shifts. Although recent artificial intelligence approaches for metacognition use logical rules to characterize and filter model errors, improving precision often comes at the cost of reduced recall. This paper addresses the hypothesis that leveraging multiple pre-trained models can mitigate this recall reduction. We formulate the challenge of identifying and managing conflicting predictions from various models as a consistency-based abduction problem. The input predictions and the learned error detection rules derived from each model are encoded in a logic program. We then seek an abductive explanation--a subset of model predictions--that maximizes prediction coverage while ensuring the rate of logical inconsistencies (derived from domain constraints) remains below a specified threshold. We propose two algorithms for this knowledge representation task: an exact method based on Integer Programming (IP) and an efficient Heuristic Search (HS). Through extensive experiments on a simulated aerial imagery dataset featuring controlled, complex distributional shifts, we demonstrate that our abduction-based framework outperforms individual models and standard ensemble baselines, achieving, for instance, average relative improvements of approximately 13.6% in F1-score and 16.6% in accuracy across 15 diverse test datasets when compared to the best individual model. Our results validate the use of consistency-based abduction as an effective mechanism to robustly integrate knowledge from multiple imperfect reasoners in challenging, novel scenarios.

Long chains of thought (CoT) from current language models frequently contain logical gaps and unjustified leaps, limiting the gains from additional test-time compute. Improving reasoning quality directly would require process reward models, but the step-level annotations needed to train them are expensive and scarce. We find such a signal in how the model's confidence evolves during reasoning: premature confidence, the tendency to commit to an answer early and use the remaining tokens to rationalize it, strongly predicts flawed reasoning across tasks and model scales. We exploit this in progressive confidence shaping, a reinforcement learning objective that trains models to update their confidence as they reason rather than commit early -- rewarding gradual confidence growth and penalizing early commitment, with no external labels or reward models. The method improves accuracy and reasoning quality from 1.5B to 8B parameters across arithmetic (Countdown), math (DAPO, AIME), and science (ScienceQA): on Countdown, accuracy improves 3.2x (+42.0pp) and flawed reasoning drops 48pp; on AIME, Pass@64 improves 6.6pp. Consistent with this mechanism, the method also improves faithfulness: on a safety benchmark, our models more transparently surface misleading content in their reasoning traces rather than concealing it. Controlled experiments reveal that the problem and its remedy scale together: premature confidence grows with model size and task difficulty, and so do the gains from addressing it.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown impressive capabilities but still suffer from the issue of hallucinations. A significant type of this issue is the false premise hallucination, which we define as the phenomenon when LLMs generate hallucinated text when confronted with false premise questions. In this paper, we perform a comprehensive analysis of the false premise hallucination and elucidate its internal working mechanism: a small subset of attention heads (which we designate as false premise heads) disturb the knowledge extraction process, leading to the occurrence of false premise hallucination. Based on our analysis, we propose FAITH (False premise Attention head constraIining for miTigating Hallucinations), a novel and effective method to mitigate false premise hallucinations. It constrains the false premise attention heads during the model inference process. Impressively, extensive experiments demonstrate that constraining only approximately 1% of the attention heads in the model yields a notable increase of nearly 20% of model performance.

In open-world scenarios, where both novel classes and domains may exist, an ideal segmentation model should detect anomaly classes for safety and generalize to new domains. However, existing methods often struggle to distinguish between domain-level and semantic-level distribution shifts, leading to poor out-of-distribution (OOD) detection or domain generalization performance. In this work, we aim to equip the model to generalize effectively to covariate-shift regions while precisely identifying semantic-shift regions. To achieve this, we design a novel generative augmentation method to produce coherent images that incorporate both anomaly (or novel) objects and various covariate shifts at both image and object levels. Furthermore, we introduce a training strategy that recalibrates uncertainty specifically for semantic shifts and enhances the feature extractor to align features associated with domain shifts. We validate the effectiveness of our method across benchmarks featuring both semantic and domain shifts. Our method achieves state-of-the-art performance across all benchmarks for both OOD detection and domain generalization. Code is available at https://github.com/gaozhitong/MultiShiftSeg.

Hallucinations (i.e., generating plausible but inaccurate content) and laziness (i.e. excessive refusals or defaulting to "I don't know") persist as major challenges in LLM reasoning. Current efforts to reduce hallucinations primarily focus on factual errors in knowledge-grounded tasks, often neglecting hallucinations related to faulty reasoning. Meanwhile, some approaches render LLMs overly conservative, limiting their problem-solving capabilities. To mitigate hallucination and laziness in reasoning tasks, we propose Automatic Curriculum Expert Iteration (Auto-CEI) to enhance LLM reasoning and align responses to the model's capabilities--assertively answering within its limits and declining when tasks exceed them. In our method, Expert Iteration explores the reasoning trajectories near the LLM policy, guiding incorrect paths back on track to reduce compounding errors and improve robustness; it also promotes appropriate "I don't know" responses after sufficient reasoning attempts. The curriculum automatically adjusts rewards, incentivizing extended reasoning before acknowledging incapability, thereby pushing the limits of LLM reasoning and aligning its behaviour with these limits. We compare Auto-CEI with various SOTA baselines across logical reasoning, mathematics, and planning tasks, where Auto-CEI achieves superior alignment by effectively balancing assertiveness and conservativeness.

Recently evolved large reasoning models (LRMs) show powerful performance in solving complex tasks with long chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning capability. As these LRMs are mostly developed by post-training on formal reasoning tasks, whether they generalize the reasoning capability to help reduce hallucination in fact-seeking tasks remains unclear and debated. For instance, DeepSeek-R1 reports increased performance on SimpleQA, a fact-seeking benchmark, while OpenAI-o3 observes even severer hallucination. This discrepancy naturally raises the following research question: Are reasoning models more prone to hallucination? This paper addresses the question from three perspectives. (1) We first conduct a holistic evaluation for the hallucination in LRMs. Our analysis reveals that LRMs undergo a full post-training pipeline with cold start supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and verifiable reward RL generally alleviate their hallucination. In contrast, both distillation alone and RL training without cold start fine-tuning introduce more nuanced hallucinations. (2) To explore why different post-training pipelines alters the impact on hallucination in LRMs, we conduct behavior analysis. We characterize two critical cognitive behaviors that directly affect the factuality of a LRM: Flaw Repetition, where the surface-level reasoning attempts repeatedly follow the same underlying flawed logic, and Think-Answer Mismatch, where the final answer fails to faithfully match the previous CoT process. (3) Further, we investigate the mechanism behind the hallucination of LRMs from the perspective of model uncertainty. We find that increased hallucination of LRMs is usually associated with the misalignment between model uncertainty and factual accuracy. Our work provides an initial understanding of the hallucination in LRMs.

Why do we need another AI to help the AI? We argue you don't. Stateless LLM sessions impose re-orientation costs on iterative, session-heavy workflows. Prior work addresses cross-session memory through retrieval-augmented approaches: store history, embed it, retrieve by semantic similarity. Cross-session memory is a state management problem, not a search problem. Similarity search fails for named entity resolution within bounded vocabulary contexts because beliefs about a shared technical domain are semantically proximate by construction. A single user is the simplest bounded vocabulary context; engineering teams converge on the same property through shared codebases and terminology. We present Tenure, a local-first proxy that maintains a typed belief store with epistemic status, versioned supersession, and scope isolation, injecting curated context into every LLM session through precision-first retrieval. Hard scope isolation provides a structural guarantee: the right beliefs surface, and only within the boundaries the user has authorized. Tenure's typed schema converts extracted facts into imperative instructions via a why it matters field, making injected beliefs directly actionable rather than raw material for the model to re-derive. A controlled evaluation on 72 retrieval cases demonstrates the gap. Cosine similarity over dense embeddings achieves mean precision of 0.12. Alias-weighted BM25 maintains mean precision of 1.0, passing 72/72 cases versus 8/72 for cosine similarity on the same corpus. Hybrid retrieval typically solves vocabulary mismatch between disparate authors; Tenure eliminates this structurally: query and belief authors are the same person, and an alias enrichment flywheel continuously indexes their specific vocabulary. Under multi-turn topic drift this worsens: the vector backend produces drift scores of 0.43--0.50 on noise-critical turns where BM25 maintains 0.

During the preference optimization of large language models (LLMs), distribution shifts may arise between newly generated model samples and the data used to train the reward model (RM). This shift reduces the efficacy of the RM, which in turn negatively impacts the performance of the policy model (PM). To address this challenge, we propose Mutual-Taught, a self-training method that iteratively improves both the PM and RM without requiring additional human annotation. Our approach mirrors the expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm. In the E-step, the PM is updated using feedback from the current RM, guiding the PM toward a better approximation of the latent optimal preference distribution. In the M-step, we update the RM by constructing training data from the outputs of the PM before and after the E-step update. This process ensures that the RM adapts to the evolving policy distribution. Experimental results demonstrate that this iterative approach leads to consistent improvements in both models. Specifically, our 8B policy model, LLaMA-3-8B-Instruct-MT, achieves a length-controlled win rate of 54.1\% on AlpacaEval-2, while our 8B reward model, FsfairX-LLaMA3-RM-MT, performs on par with GPT-4o-2024-08-06 on RewardBench.

With the widespread adoption of large language models (LLMs), hallucinations, which are non-factual fabrications in model outputs, have become serious concerns. Reasoning capabilities have received attention as a self-verification process to improve output reliability. However, the effect of reasoning within a closed system where LLMs cannot rely on external tools or knowledge has yet to be clarified. We therefore conduct experiments under strict constraints (recommending peer-reviewed journal articles in computer science) to examine the effect of reasoning across multiple models (GPT-5.2 and Gemini 3 Flash). Our results reveal a problematic trade-off between constraint compliance and factual accuracy. Non-reasoning models exhibit high constraint violation rates (66-75%) but maintain factual accuracy, while reasoning models reduce violations (13-26%) but systematically distort known facts to satisfy constraints and increase complete fabrication. This trade-off pattern is consistent across both models despite different architectures, indicating a fundamental limitation of reasoning. Furthermore, reasoning does not uniformly improve output authenticity: effects diverge by model, reflecting different allocations of the compliance-truthfulness trade-off. These findings challenge the assumption that reasoning universally improves reliability: reasoning models trade honest constraint violations for detection-resistant distortions.

Deception is prevalent in human social settings. However, studies into the effect of deception on reinforcement learning algorithms have been limited to simplistic settings, restricting their applicability to complex real-world problems. This paper addresses this by introducing a new mixed competitive-cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) environment inspired by popular role-based deception games such as Werewolf, Avalon, and Among Us. The environment's unique challenge lies in the necessity to cooperate with other agents despite not knowing if they are friend or foe. Furthermore, we introduce a model of deception, which we call Bayesian belief manipulation (BBM) and demonstrate its effectiveness at deceiving other agents in this environment while also increasing the deceiving agent's performance.

In machine learning, generalization against distribution shifts -- where deployment conditions diverge from the training scenarios -- is crucial, particularly in fields like climate modeling, biomedicine, and autonomous driving. The emergence of foundation models, distinguished by their extensive pretraining and task versatility, has led to an increased interest in their adaptability to distribution shifts. GPT-4V(ision) acts as the most advanced publicly accessible multimodal foundation model, with extensive applications across various domains, including anomaly detection, video understanding, image generation, and medical diagnosis. However, its robustness against data distributions remains largely underexplored. Addressing this gap, this study rigorously evaluates GPT-4V's adaptability and generalization capabilities in dynamic environments, benchmarking against prominent models like CLIP and LLaVA. We delve into GPT-4V's zero-shot generalization across 13 diverse datasets spanning natural, medical, and molecular domains. We further investigate its adaptability to controlled data perturbations and examine the efficacy of in-context learning as a tool to enhance its adaptation. Our findings delineate GPT-4V's capability boundaries in distribution shifts, shedding light on its strengths and limitations across various scenarios. Importantly, this investigation contributes to our understanding of how AI foundation models generalize to distribution shifts, offering pivotal insights into their adaptability and robustness. Code is publicly available at https://github.com/jameszhou-gl/gpt-4v-distribution-shift.

Hybrid reasoning models such as the Qwen3 series switch between a THINK mode and a NO-THINK mode through a few chat-template tokens. A popular recipe trains such models with reinforcement learning in NO-THINK mode and reports improved reasoning performance. We provide evidence that much of this gain can be explained by thinking leakage: the gain comes largely from partially reactivating the reasoning abilities of the original model's THINK mode instead of learning enhanced reasoning behavior. We train Qwen3-1.7B, 4B, and 8B with GRPO in NO-THINK mode. As accuracy improves, responses become longer and more reflective, are increasingly judged by the original model to resemble its own thinking, and the model's internal activations shift toward its THINK mode. We then investigate at the level of weights, activations, and attention heads: scaling the RL update further elicits THINK-mode behavior and approaches THINK-mode accuracy but does not exceed it; in Qwen3-8B, replacing a low-dimensional THINK-related activation subspace of the RL-trained model with its original-model value removes most of the RL gain, and the reverse exchange transfers a considerable fraction of the gain to the original model; and the RL-induced shift passes through the attention heads that read the empty think block. We further identify a possible mechanism in the GRPO training signal: responses favored by the advantage-weighted update are more THINK-like, and a gradient step computed from this signal moves the model toward its THINK state. Thus, gains in NO-THINK mode can largely reflect reactivation of reasoning abilities already present in the original model.

Can LLMs accurately adjust their confidence when facing opposition? Building on previous studies measuring calibration on static fact-based question-answering tasks, we evaluate Large Language Models (LLMs) in a dynamic, adversarial debate setting, uniquely combining two realistic factors: (a) a multi-turn format requiring models to update beliefs as new information emerges, and (b) a zero-sum structure to control for task-related uncertainty, since mutual high-confidence claims imply systematic overconfidence. We organized 60 three-round policy debates among ten state-of-the-art LLMs, with models privately rating their confidence (0-100) in winning after each round. We observed five concerning patterns: (1) Systematic overconfidence: models began debates with average initial confidence of 72.9% vs. a rational 50% baseline. (2) Confidence escalation: rather than reducing confidence as debates progressed, debaters increased their win probabilities, averaging 83% by the final round. (3) Mutual overestimation: in 61.7% of debates, both sides simultaneously claimed >=75% probability of victory, a logical impossibility. (4) Persistent self-debate bias: models debating identical copies increased confidence from 64.1% to 75.2%; even when explicitly informed their chance of winning was exactly 50%, confidence still rose (from 50.0% to 57.1%). (5) Misaligned private reasoning: models' private scratchpad thoughts sometimes differed from their public confidence ratings, raising concerns about faithfulness of chain-of-thought reasoning. These results suggest LLMs lack the ability to accurately self-assess or update their beliefs in dynamic, multi-turn tasks; a major concern as LLMs are now increasingly deployed without careful review in assistant and agentic roles. Code for our experiments is available at https://github.com/pradyuprasad/llms_overconfidence

We present the Bayesian Linguistic Forecaster (BLF), an agentic system for binary forecasting that achieves state-of-the-art performance on the ForecastBench benchmark. The system is built on three ideas. (1) Linguistic belief state: a semi-structured representation combining numerical probability estimates with natural-language evidence summaries, updated by the LLM at each step of an iterative tool-use loop. This contrasts with the common approach of appending all retrieved evidence to an ever-growing, unstructured context. (2) Hierarchical multi-trial aggregation: running K independent trials and combining them using logit-space averaging shrinkage with a data-dependent prior. (3) Hierarchical calibration: Platt scaling with a hierarchical prior, which avoids over-shrinking extreme predictions for sources with skewed base rates. On 400 questions from the ForecastBench leaderboard, BLF outperforms all the top public methods, including Cassi, GPT-5, Grok~4.20, and Foresight-32B. Careful ablation studies, using mixed effects analysis to control for question variability (which accounts for 62\% of the variance in performance), reveals that all 3 components contribute to the overall gains, but some components matter more than others, depending on the base LLM, and the setting (e.g.\ with or without a crowd prior). All our experiments are based on a robust back-testing framework which we develop, which has a leakage rate below 1.5\%, and may be of independent interest.

We demonstrate a situation in which Large Language Models, trained to be helpful, harmless, and honest, can display misaligned behavior and strategically deceive their users about this behavior without being instructed to do so. Concretely, we deploy GPT-4 as an agent in a realistic, simulated environment, where it assumes the role of an autonomous stock trading agent. Within this environment, the model obtains an insider tip about a lucrative stock trade and acts upon it despite knowing that insider trading is disapproved of by company management. When reporting to its manager, the model consistently hides the genuine reasons behind its trading decision. We perform a brief investigation of how this behavior varies under changes to the setting, such as removing model access to a reasoning scratchpad, attempting to prevent the misaligned behavior by changing system instructions, changing the amount of pressure the model is under, varying the perceived risk of getting caught, and making other simple changes to the environment. To our knowledge, this is the first demonstration of Large Language Models trained to be helpful, harmless, and honest, strategically deceiving their users in a realistic situation without direct instructions or training for deception.

Rapid advances in large language models have made software engineering agents capable of tackling complex coding tasks. Within a containerized environment, a coding agent receives tool responses or execution results, and determines its later actions by those earlier results. However, most existing coding agents never look ahead: their policies do not anticipate the consequences of actions, and the terminal reward barely attributes a failure to certain earlier steps, so an ill-judged edit can corrupt the repository state irreversibly before any signal arrives. Recent code world models aim to address these challenges, but they are either trained and then frozen before reinforcement learning (RL), or reduced to an auxiliary next-token loss on the environment's outputs. We present ANTE (Anticipate, Then Execute), an agentic RL framework that verifies the policy's pre-action predictions by real execution and turns them into per-step credit for its actions and trust-or-abstain decisions. With an internal belief stated before each action, Belief-Anchored Policy Optimization (BAPO) turns the settled predictions into per-step advantages by anchoring credit on the policy's own forecasts. To turn the trained forecasts into better actions at inference, thereby facilitating effective test-time scaling, ANTE-TTO (test-time optimization) selects among candidate actions without an external scorer. ANTE raises Qwen3-32B from 25.0% to 57.2% pass@1 on SWE-bench Verified, 6.2% above a matched GRPO baseline trained without the belief state; its world model's accuracy climbs from 44% to 69% during RL, and the learned foresight capability transfers across harnesses and out-of-distribution domains. In summary, we aim to build a code world model that knows what has happened, what holds now, and what the next action will achieve.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) is central to improving long-CoT reasoning in large language models. Critic-free methods such as GRPO convert response-level rewards into advantages and uniformly broadcast them across tokens, overlooking their unequal contributions to the final outcome. On-policy self-distillation (OPSD) instead provides dense distributional supervision by minimizing the forward KL divergence between an unprivileged policy and a privileged self-teacher, implicitly assuming that the resulting likelihood shifts encode reliable answer-aligned information. We test this premise by fixing each sampled trajectory and re-scoring it under two opposing outcome conditions, one asserting correctness and the other incorrectness. Most affected tokens shift in the same direction under both conditions, with few sign reversals and substantial overlap in the induced optimization signals. Large shifts also concentrate on highly substitutable surface-form tokens, whereas tokens carrying problem-specific reasoning content are less sensitive. These findings show that privileged shifts fail to provide reliable answer-aligned directions, while their magnitudes primarily reflect counterfactual sensitivity rather than token-level learning value. Based on these observations, we propose Counterfactual Sensitivity Credit Reallocation (CSCR), a simple extension of GRPO that reduces credit for highly sensitive tokens and renormalizes token-level advantages to preserve both the original credit budget and verifier-determined direction. On long-CoT mathematical reasoning benchmarks, CSCR consistently outperforms GRPO baseline with the same number of policy updates. Targeted ablations further corroborate our diagnosis: privilege-induced directions are unreliable, moderate downweighting is most effective, and stronger modulation destabilizes optimization.

A critical component in the trustworthiness of LLMs is reliable uncertainty communication, yet LLMs often use assertive language when conveying false claims, leading to over-reliance and eroded trust. We present the first systematic study of faithful confidence calibration of LLMs, benchmarking models' ability to use linguistic expressions of uncertainty that faithfully reflect their intrinsic uncertainty, across a comprehensive array of models, datasets, and prompting strategies. Our results demonstrate that LLMs largely fail at this task, and that existing interventions are insufficient: standard prompt approaches provide only marginal gains, and existing, factuality-based calibration techniques can even harm faithful calibration. To address this critical gap, we introduce MetaFaith, a novel prompt-based calibration approach inspired by human metacognition. We show that MetaFaith robustly improves faithful calibration across diverse models and task domains, enabling up to 61% improvement in faithfulness and achieving an 83% win rate over original generations as judged by humans.

Safe deployment of graph neural networks (GNNs) under distribution shift requires models to provide accurate confidence indicators (CI). However, while it is well-known in computer vision that CI quality diminishes under distribution shift, this behavior remains understudied for GNNs. Hence, we begin with a case study on CI calibration under controlled structural and feature distribution shifts and demonstrate that increased expressivity or model size do not always lead to improved CI performance. Consequently, we instead advocate for the use of epistemic uncertainty quantification (UQ) methods to modulate CIs. To this end, we propose G-DeltaUQ, a new single model UQ method that extends the recently proposed stochastic centering framework to support structured data and partial stochasticity. Evaluated across covariate, concept, and graph size shifts, G-DeltaUQ not only outperforms several popular UQ methods in obtaining calibrated CIs, but also outperforms alternatives when CIs are used for generalization gap prediction or OOD detection. Overall, our work not only introduces a new, flexible GNN UQ method, but also provides novel insights into GNN CIs on safety-critical tasks.

Large language models fine-tuned for forecasting can be accurate yet poorly calibrated, and their chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning may not faithfully reflect the evidence behind a forecast. We ask whether internal representations offer a more direct window into both. Working with Eternis-Forecaster 8B on OpenForesight, we train representation-pooling probes on intermediate activations and find they achieve substantially better calibration; a result that also holds for GLM-4.7-Flash and GLM-4.5-Air. We then assess CoT faithfulness through evidence ablation and diversionary injection: removing an influential source in the prompt often changes the model's forecast while leaving the reasoning trace untouched. The same probes function as lie detectors: their activations track behavioral shifts far better than the reasoning trace does, and they also predict the direction of change in 84% of cases, including when the CoT conceals the perturbation's influence. Finally, forced answering reveals that forecasts are largely fixed before reasoning begins: a single pre-reasoning pass recovers the committed answer and confidence, and routing questions by the spread of this pre-set answer distribution saves 30-47% of generated tokens, with no loss of accuracy. Together, these results establish probing internal representations as a practical tool for calibrating, auditing, and triaging language model forecasters and reasoning models more broadly.

Explainability is increasingly required for perception models in intelligent vehicles, yet whether explanations remain faithful under driving domain shift is still poorly understood. This work audits post-hoc explanations of a fixed YOLOv8s pedestrian detector across PIE and JAAD using ROI-based D-Deletion, frozen confidence terciles, rank-based tests, bootstrap intervals, and Holm correction. The audit shows that deletion-based faithfulness is strongly coupled to detection strength at explanation time, with Spearman correlations between 0.70 and 0.82 for D-RISE, making naive confidence-stratified comparisons unreliable. After controlling for detection strength within fixed f0 bins, D-RISE faithfulness remains domain-dependent in the central f0 range, with PIE showing higher D-Deletion than JAAD and Holm-adjusted significance. A non-perturbative EigenCAM baseline is less faithful than D-RISE but also exhibits score coupling, suggesting that the effect is not specific to D-RISE and is related to the deletion-based evaluation setup. These results motivate confidence-controlled XAI audits for safety-critical perception under domain shift.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) show strong capabilities in complex reasoning, yet their marginal gains on evidence-dependent factual questions are limited. We find this limitation is partially attributable to a reasoning-answer hit gap, where the model identifies the correct facts during reasoning but fails to incorporate them into the final response, thereby reducing factual fidelity. To address this issue, we propose MR-ALIGN, a Meta-Reasoning informed alignment framework that enhances factuality without relying on external verifiers. MR-ALIGN quantifies state transition probabilities along the model's thinking process and constructs a transition-aware implicit reward that reinforces beneficial reasoning patterns while suppressing defective ones at the atomic thinking segments. This re-weighting reshapes token-level signals into probability-aware segment scores, encouraging coherent reasoning trajectories that are more conducive to factual correctness. Empirical evaluations across four factual QA datasets and one long-form factuality benchmark show that MR-ALIGN consistently improves accuracy and truthfulness while reducing misleading reasoning. These results highlight that aligning the reasoning process itself, rather than merely the outputs, is pivotal for advancing factuality in LRMs.

The rapid development of mobile GUI agents has stimulated growing research interest in long-horizon task automation. However, building agents for these tasks faces a critical bottleneck: the reliance on ever-expanding interaction history incurs substantial context overhead. Existing context management and compression techniques often fail to preserve vital semantic information, leading to degraded task performance. We propose AgentProg, a program-guided approach for agent context management that reframes the interaction history as a program with variables and control flow. By organizing information according to the structure of program, this structure provides a principled mechanism to determine which information should be retained and which can be discarded. We further integrate a global belief state mechanism inspired by Belief MDP framework to handle partial observability and adapt to unexpected environmental changes. Experiments on AndroidWorld and our extended long-horizon task suite demonstrate that AgentProg has achieved the state-of-the-art success rates on these benchmarks. More importantly, it maintains robust performance on long-horizon tasks while baseline methods experience catastrophic degradation. Our system is open-sourced at https://github.com/MobileLLM/AgentProg.

Simulating human reasoning in open-ended tasks has long been a central aspiration in AI and cognitive science. While large language models now approximate human responses at scale, they remain tuned to population-level consensus, often erasing the individuality of reasoning styles and belief trajectories. To advance the vision of more human-like reasoning in machines, we introduce HugAgent (HUman-Grounded AGENT Benchmark), which rethinks human reasoning simulation along three dimensions: (i) from averaged to individualized reasoning, (ii) from behavioral mimicry to cognitive alignment, and (iii) from vignette-based to open-ended data. The benchmark evaluates whether a model can predict a specific person's behavioral responses and the underlying reasoning dynamics in out-of-distribution scenarios, given partial evidence of their prior views. HugAgent combines structured questionnaires with semi-structured think-aloud interviews to collect ecologically valid belief states, belief updates, and reasoning traces from human participants. Our experiments reveal a clear asymmetry: models recover a person's belief state from their own context reasonably well, but struggle to predict belief updates under intervention. Cross-person and cross-domain controls trace this gap to associative matching within a topic rather than identity-consistent reasoning, suggesting that progress requires better-calibrated change detection, not simply more context. We scope the benchmark to self-reported belief reasoning in three policy domains: healthcare, surveillance, and zoning. The benchmark, along with its complete data collection pipeline and companion chatbot, is open-sourced as HugAgent (https://github.com/jajamoa/HugAgent) and TraceYourThinking (https://github.com/jajamoa/trace-your-thinking).

When users can benefit from certain predictive outcomes, they may be prone to act to achieve those outcome, e.g., by strategically modifying their features. The goal in strategic classification is therefore to train predictive models that are robust to such behavior. However, the conventional framework assumes that changing features does not change actual outcomes, which depicts users as "gaming" the system. Here we remove this assumption, and study learning in a causal strategic setting where true outcomes do change. Focusing on accuracy as our primary objective, we show how strategic behavior and causal effects underlie two complementing forms of distribution shift. We characterize these shifts, and propose a learning algorithm that balances between these two forces and over time, and permits end-to-end training. Experiments on synthetic and semi-synthetic data demonstrate the utility of our approach.