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Nov 11

Tell Me What You Don't Know: Enhancing Refusal Capabilities of Role-Playing Agents via Representation Space Analysis and Editing

Role-Playing Agents (RPAs) have shown remarkable performance in various applications, yet they often struggle to recognize and appropriately respond to hard queries that conflict with their role-play knowledge. To investigate RPAs' performance when faced with different types of conflicting requests, we develop an evaluation benchmark that includes contextual knowledge conflicting requests, parametric knowledge conflicting requests, and non-conflicting requests to assess RPAs' ability to identify conflicts and refuse to answer appropriately without over-refusing. Through extensive evaluation, we find that most RPAs behave significant performance gaps toward different conflict requests. To elucidate the reasons, we conduct an in-depth representation-level analysis of RPAs under various conflict scenarios. Our findings reveal the existence of rejection regions and direct response regions within the model's forwarding representation, and thus influence the RPA's final response behavior. Therefore, we introduce a lightweight representation editing approach that conveniently shifts conflicting requests to the rejection region, thereby enhancing the model's refusal accuracy. The experimental results validate the effectiveness of our editing method, improving RPAs' refusal ability of conflicting requests while maintaining their general role-playing capabilities.

  • 10 authors
·
Sep 25, 2024

Geometric Ceilings on Time-Frequency Masking for Single-Channel Separation

Most single-channel separators estimate a source by applying a real gain to the mixture in each time-frequency bin. The optimum of that format, which the oracle masks used as bounds do not attain, is the orthogonal projection of the source onto the line spanned by the mixture, its residual set by the angle between them. Locating an estimator reduces to the block structure of a real-linear operator on stacked spectra, giving a chain of four nested classes whose three larger terms match three assumptions on the prior: zero means, circularity and absence of inter-frequency coupling. Held fixed the chain is a cascade of four orthogonal projections; refitted per frame it collapses onto its first term, attributing the whole residual to one missing real parameter per bin, the phase. When the phase posterior is symmetric about the mixture direction, the minimum mean-square estimate falls back onto the line, with gain the posterior mean of the oracle gain and excess error its variance. On MUSDB18 a posterior mean under a non-circular Gaussian-mixture prior leaves the class yet stays 11.44 dB under the per-frame ceiling, which four times as many components and 7.5x the data do not close; a closed-form gate attributes some 70% of it, in decibels, to the predicted variance. The widest fixed class stays 6.70 dB under the same ceiling. Leaving the class and minimising squared error are conflicting requests: the barrier lies in the criterion rather than in the prior.

  • 1 authors
·
Sep 2

TenetBench: A Clause-Anchored Russian Corpus for Evaluating Language Models against Professional Codes of Ethics

Codes of professional ethics guide and restrict specialists, who increasingly work with assistants built on large language models. Such an assistant can breach the user's code, or help the user breach it, without the user noticing. Evaluations reporting broad categories of harm cannot show how often this happens or which provision is breached. TenetBench pairs 3,433 requests conflicting with clauses of fifteen Russian-language professional codes with benign twins that differ only in the legitimacy of what is asked. An automated pipeline generates the tasks from the text of a code, so the corpus grows with every code added and a provision yields new tasks on every run. It also produced tasks and human-validated verdicts from two English codes of other jurisdictions. In human validation of the frozen pipeline, specialists rated 0.995 of the conflicting tasks plausible, and the model judge agreed with the adjudicated label at Gwet's AC1 of at least 0.894 on 1,860 elements. We evaluated fourteen model and reasoning-mode combinations on whether they produce the conflicting text, decline or warn. Eleven of the fourteen produce conflicting content on most such requests, mostly without a warning, and nearly three warnings in four accompany conflicting content. The models that conform more do so by declining while still serving the legitimate twin, and enabling reasoning halved the refusals of two models. We hope the dataset and pipeline will help evaluate how language models observe professional norms and let diagnostic datasets be built for particular professions and organisations.

  • 5 authors
·
Oct 20 6

One Assistant, Many Memories: Benchmarking Real-World Group Assistance When Recall Is Not Enough

The value of memory lies not only in recall but in using it to provide appropriate assistance. Recent benchmarks test memory use in personalisation and agentic tasks, but seldom evaluate assistance without fixed answers or integration across multiple participants. Group chats make both challenges more acute: an assistant must integrate information from multiple members, track revisions and conflicts over time, and produce one response for the group. Yet existing group memory benchmarks rely on synthetic conversations and inherit constrained evaluation from general memory benchmarks, focusing on recall against fixed answers or decisions over a closed set. We introduce GroupAssistBench, the first memory benchmark from real-world group conversations with a deployed group assistant, covering 80,299 messages in 50 groups and costing over $53K. Over the same histories, GroupAssistBench evaluates memory recall (L1) with reference answers and memory use (L2) with service requests without fixed answers across single, distributed, and conflicting memories (M1--M3). Requests are verified to require group history, memories are anchored to their sources, and L2 uses tailored rubrics with penalties derived from real user feedback. Across evaluations of frontier models with full context, retrieval methods, and memory systems, the strongest memory system rivals full context on recall but falls far behind on use, especially for distributed and conflicting memories. Together, two additions that relate retrieved memories and bind remembered facts as response constraints bring consistent gains, showing that group memory systems must improve use, not recall alone.

  • 11 authors
·
Nov 2

The Agent Clicks Approve: Injected Page Text Makes Browser Agents Authorize Access the Task Never Named

A browser agent that works in its user's signed-in session can be steered by a two-sentence note on a page it reads into approving a third party's access to the user's account. The agent is a confused deputy: the session supplies the authority, the page designates the access request to approve or the webhook URL to register, and nothing at the point of action checks one against the other. The agent thereby supplies the approval click that a consent screen reserves for the account holder. We measure this failure on two authorization surfaces, an OAuth-style access grant and a webhook registration, with agents built on an open-source browser framework and models from two providers. Without a defense the unauthorized action completed in all 73 attack runs. An instruction telling the model that only the user's task authorizes a grant still left 7 of 10 consent attacks completing. We therefore move the check to where the action completes. The authority envelope gate has the service accept a request only when it matches the task's envelope, the client and account or the webhook URL that the user's task named, fixed before the agent starts. With the gate the agent still sent the request in every one of 70 attack runs, the service rejected each, and the action completed in every control run whose task named it. A service that receives the task's envelope should therefore check agent-driven authorization requests against it.

  • 1 authors
·
Oct 9

PACE: Towards Surfacing Hidden Conflicts in User Requests

Personalized assistants should not only comply with user requests but also assess whether those requests are appropriate given the user's current circumstances. However, prior work has primarily focused on accurately executing requests, overlooking the need for assistants to account for context and engage in conflict-based refusal. Furthermore, while existing work on conflict or safety detection relies on explicitly provided factors, real-world scenarios often involve implicit factors that must be retrieved from a knowledge base (KB). To this end, we introduce Personalized Assistants for Conflict Evaluation (PACE), a dataset for evaluating whether models can identify latent constraints, expressed as egocentric knowledge or events, that render seemingly reasonable user requests inappropriate. PACE pairs user requests grounded in well-defined personas with egocentric KB facts, requiring models to integrate contextual evidence to determine whether a request is conflicting. This implicit retrieval setting hinders the direct association between user requests and conflict-inducing knowledge, making it difficult for existing models to identify relevant user-specific facts. To address this challenge, we further propose PaceMaker, a multi-agent framework in which specialized agents coordinate across query reformulation, multi-hop graph traversal, and conflict-aware filtering to retrieve contextually decisive evidence. Experiments on PACE evaluate both evidence retrieval quality and conflict decision accuracy, showing that PaceMaker consistently outperforms existing approaches.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation with Conflicting Evidence

Large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly employing retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) to improve the factuality of their responses. However, in practice, these systems often need to handle ambiguous user queries and potentially conflicting information from multiple sources while also suppressing inaccurate information from noisy or irrelevant documents. Prior work has generally studied and addressed these challenges in isolation, considering only one aspect at a time, such as handling ambiguity or robustness to noise and misinformation. We instead consider multiple factors simultaneously, proposing (i) RAMDocs (Retrieval with Ambiguity and Misinformation in Documents), a new dataset that simulates complex and realistic scenarios for conflicting evidence for a user query, including ambiguity, misinformation, and noise; and (ii) MADAM-RAG, a multi-agent approach in which LLM agents debate over the merits of an answer over multiple rounds, allowing an aggregator to collate responses corresponding to disambiguated entities while discarding misinformation and noise, thereby handling diverse sources of conflict jointly. We demonstrate the effectiveness of MADAM-RAG using both closed and open-source models on AmbigDocs -- which requires presenting all valid answers for ambiguous queries -- improving over strong RAG baselines by up to 11.40% and on FaithEval -- which requires suppressing misinformation -- where we improve by up to 15.80% (absolute) with Llama3.3-70B-Instruct. Furthermore, we find that RAMDocs poses a challenge for existing RAG baselines (Llama3.3-70B-Instruct only obtains 32.60 exact match score). While MADAM-RAG begins to address these conflicting factors, our analysis indicates that a substantial gap remains especially when increasing the level of imbalance in supporting evidence and misinformation.

  • 4 authors
·
Apr 17, 2025 2

Contradiction Detection in RAG Systems: Evaluating LLMs as Context Validators for Improved Information Consistency

Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) systems have emerged as a powerful method for enhancing large language models (LLMs) with up-to-date information. However, the retrieval step in RAG can sometimes surface documents containing contradictory information, particularly in rapidly evolving domains such as news. These contradictions can significantly impact the performance of LLMs, leading to inconsistent or erroneous outputs. This study addresses this critical challenge in two ways. First, we present a novel data generation framework to simulate different types of contradictions that may occur in the retrieval stage of a RAG system. Second, we evaluate the robustness of different LLMs in performing as context validators, assessing their ability to detect contradictory information within retrieved document sets. Our experimental results reveal that context validation remains a challenging task even for state-of-the-art LLMs, with performance varying significantly across different types of contradictions. While larger models generally perform better at contradiction detection, the effectiveness of different prompting strategies varies across tasks and model architectures. We find that chain-of-thought prompting shows notable improvements for some models but may hinder performance in others, highlighting the complexity of the task and the need for more robust approaches to context validation in RAG systems.

  • 3 authors
·
Mar 30, 2025

Code as a Weapon: A Consensus-Labeled Prompt Bank for Measuring Coding-Model Compliance with Malicious-Code Requests

A general-purpose language model that answers a harmful question returns text; a coding model that complies with a malicious request can return a working weapon -- a keylogger, a ransomware stub, an exploit that runs as written. This asymmetry in the severity of a single act of compliance implies coding-specialized models should clear a higher refusal bar than general-purpose chat models, not a lower one, yet the field cannot presently tell whether they do. Refusal benchmarks for malicious code are fragmented: they mix requests for executable software (ready-to-run weapons) with requests for harmful security knowledge (information a human must still operationalise) and report refusal rates over non-comparable corpora, so no single statistic measures the property that actually matters. This paper introduces an expanded consensus-labeled prompt bank that distinguishes between these two request types and provides a construct-stable substrate for cross-corpus coding-model compliance measurement. Eight corpora (ASTRA, CySecBench, AdvBench/harmful_behaviors, JailbreakBench, MalwareBench, RedCode, RMCBench, Scam2Prompt) are consolidated and classified under a five-judge consensus protocol (6,675 prompts x 5 judges = 33,375 calls). The panel reaches Fleiss' kappa = 0.767 [95% CI 0.755, 0.777] ("substantial"); 95.0% of prompts draw at least four agreeing judges, 76.9% are unanimous, and the panel reproduces the earlier four-corpus release at Cohen's kappa = 0.952 on the 3,133 shared prompts. The released bank comprises 4,748 consensus-CODE prompts (executable malicious code requests) and 1,923 consensus-KNOWLEDGE prompts (harmful security knowledge requests). The bank is the validated instrument the field has lacked: a reliability-quantified basis for testing whether coding models meet the stricter refusal standard their executable output demands.

  • 2 authors
·
May 26

Do We Need an LLM to Know Why Sources Conflict? Decision Models for Knowledge-Conflict Typing in RAG

When the sources retrieved for a query disagree, the right response depends on why they disagree: a question with several valid answers, a contested topic, stale information and a false source each call for different behaviour. Cattan et al. (2025) showed that telling a generator the conflict type improves its responses by about 24 points, but that predicting the type is hard even for frontier LLMs. We study whether typed decision models, which return probabilities over fixed options in a single forward pass instead of generating text, can do this classification fast and cheaply. Using the CONFLICTS benchmark and the original paper's prompt verbatim, we evaluate all 11 decision models served by one commercial inference gateway, from 7 providers, against Gemini models on identical inputs. Asked directly, the decision models reach 50.0--67.0% accuracy; 10 of the 11 match or exceed Gemini 2.5 Flash, the paper's model (61.3%), at 4--39x lower billed cost (2 were free) and 2.6--6.0x lower latency. The current Gemini 3.8 Flash (70.0%) is significantly more accurate than 8 of them, but sending each decision model's least confident quarter of queries to it gives a cascade statistically tied with it for 8 of the 11, at 25--37% of its cost. End to end, answers generated with the types of 10 of the 11 follow the expected behaviour as often as with the LLM's types. Decomposing the taxonomy into yes/no questions lowers accuracy for every model, and a repair fitted on one model does not transfer. Pre-specified diagnostics show that dates play no measurable role and that sensitivity to source order varies widely between models. Decision models detect a planted false source less reliably than the LLM as hard labels, but their probabilities still separate planted from clean sources. We release code, prompts and all model outputs at https://github.com/Parv17k/decision-models-conflict-typing.

  • 4 authors
·
Oct 26 4

Evaluation of GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 for supporting real-world information needs in healthcare delivery

Despite growing interest in using large language models (LLMs) in healthcare, current explorations do not assess the real-world utility and safety of LLMs in clinical settings. Our objective was to determine whether two LLMs can serve information needs submitted by physicians as questions to an informatics consultation service in a safe and concordant manner. Sixty six questions from an informatics consult service were submitted to GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 via simple prompts. 12 physicians assessed the LLM responses' possibility of patient harm and concordance with existing reports from an informatics consultation service. Physician assessments were summarized based on majority vote. For no questions did a majority of physicians deem either LLM response as harmful. For GPT-3.5, responses to 8 questions were concordant with the informatics consult report, 20 discordant, and 9 were unable to be assessed. There were 29 responses with no majority on "Agree", "Disagree", and "Unable to assess". For GPT-4, responses to 13 questions were concordant, 15 discordant, and 3 were unable to be assessed. There were 35 responses with no majority. Responses from both LLMs were largely devoid of overt harm, but less than 20% of the responses agreed with an answer from an informatics consultation service, responses contained hallucinated references, and physicians were divided on what constitutes harm. These results suggest that while general purpose LLMs are able to provide safe and credible responses, they often do not meet the specific information need of a given question. A definitive evaluation of the usefulness of LLMs in healthcare settings will likely require additional research on prompt engineering, calibration, and custom-tailoring of general purpose models.

  • 18 authors
·
Apr 26, 2023

WikiContradict: A Benchmark for Evaluating LLMs on Real-World Knowledge Conflicts from Wikipedia

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) has emerged as a promising solution to mitigate the limitations of large language models (LLMs), such as hallucinations and outdated information. However, it remains unclear how LLMs handle knowledge conflicts arising from different augmented retrieved passages, especially when these passages originate from the same source and have equal trustworthiness. In this work, we conduct a comprehensive evaluation of LLM-generated answers to questions that have varying answers based on contradictory passages from Wikipedia, a dataset widely regarded as a high-quality pre-training resource for most LLMs. Specifically, we introduce WikiContradict, a benchmark consisting of 253 high-quality, human-annotated instances designed to assess LLM performance when augmented with retrieved passages containing real-world knowledge conflicts. We benchmark a diverse range of both closed and open-source LLMs under different QA scenarios, including RAG with a single passage, and RAG with 2 contradictory passages. Through rigorous human evaluations on a subset of WikiContradict instances involving 5 LLMs and over 3,500 judgements, we shed light on the behaviour and limitations of these models. For instance, when provided with two passages containing contradictory facts, all models struggle to generate answers that accurately reflect the conflicting nature of the context, especially for implicit conflicts requiring reasoning. Since human evaluation is costly, we also introduce an automated model that estimates LLM performance using a strong open-source language model, achieving an F-score of 0.8. Using this automated metric, we evaluate more than 1,500 answers from seven LLMs across all WikiContradict instances. To facilitate future work, we release WikiContradict on: https://ibm.biz/wikicontradict.

  • 8 authors
·
Jun 19, 2024

Do User-Authored Permission Policies Improve Protection Against AI Agent Overreach?

AI agents are poised to become a primary interface to digital products, acting across email, files, payments, and personal data. People without professional software backgrounds need understandable, reusable ways to control actions across services. We examine a mechanism in which a language model maps actions to plain-language consequence categories with user-authored "allow", "ask", or "never" rules. We ask what is gained and lost when decisions are made in advance as reusable rules rather than separately for each action. We analyzed 113 participants without professional software backgrounds across three conditions: per-action human-in-the-loop approval (HITL), automated per-action model review (AUTO), or user-authored consequence policy (POLICY). Participants judged 2 examples in each of 4 consequence categories; POLICY participants then set one rule per category. All supervised an 18-action simulated day, including 7 overreach actions. POLICY blocked less overreach than HITL (-20.1 percentage points, 95% CI [-32.1, -8.1]) and AUTO (-14.5 points, 95% CI [-25.8, -3.2]). POLICY lowered runtime prompts from 18.0 to 10.9, but total intervention time was not reliably lower when rule setup was included. Exploratory analysis showed that participants chose "ask" for 114 of 140 POLICY rules, returning most overreach actions to runtime. Of the 148 overreach actions executed in POLICY, 133 followed human approval and 15 ran automatically under "allow" rules. Across all 7 overreach actions, POLICY had the highest approval rate. Counterintuitively, user-authored rules did not by themselves provide stronger protection: many actions outside users' original requests went through after users approved them. These results reveal a gap between preference and commitment: repeatedly choosing "ask" preserves case-by-case choice but prevents a standing policy from settling decisions in advance.

  • 1 authors
·
Aug 27

Ads in AI Chatbots? An Analysis of How Large Language Models Navigate Conflicts of Interest

Today's large language models (LLMs) are trained to align with user preferences through methods such as reinforcement learning. Yet models are beginning to be deployed not merely to satisfy users, but also to generate revenue for the companies that created them through advertisements. This creates the potential for LLMs to face conflicts of interest, where the most beneficial response to a user may not be aligned with the company's incentives. For instance, a sponsored product may be more expensive but otherwise equal to another; in this case, what does (and should) the LLM recommend to the user? In this paper, we provide a framework for categorizing the ways in which conflicting incentives might lead LLMs to change the way they interact with users, inspired by literature from linguistics and advertising regulation. We then present a suite of evaluations to examine how current models handle these tradeoffs. We find that a majority of LLMs forsake user welfare for company incentives in a multitude of conflict of interest situations, including recommending a sponsored product almost twice as expensive (Grok 4.1 Fast, 83%), surfacing sponsored options to disrupt the purchasing process (GPT 5.1, 94%), and concealing prices in unfavorable comparisons (Qwen 3 Next, 24%). Behaviors also vary strongly with levels of reasoning and users' inferred socio-economic status. Our results highlight some of the hidden risks to users that can emerge when companies begin to subtly incentivize advertisements in chatbots.

  • 5 authors
·
Apr 8

Disagreement as a way to study misinformation and its effects

Misinformation - false or misleading information - is considered a significant societal concern due to its associated "misinformation effects," such as political polarization, erosion of trust in institutions, problematic behavior, and public health challenges. However, the prevailing concept is misaligned with what is studied. While misinformation focuses on instances of information about factual matters, the broad spectrum of effects often manifests at a societal level and is shaped by a wide range of interdependent factors such as identity, values, opinions, epistemologies, and disagreements. Unsurprisingly, misinformation effects can occur without the prevalence of misinformation, and misinformation does not necessarily increase the effects studied. Here, we propose using disagreement - conflicting attitudes and beliefs between individuals and communities - as a way to study misinformation effects because it addresses the identified conceptual limitations of misinformation. Furthermore, unlike misinformation, disagreement does not require researchers to determine whether a given information is false or misleading. Thus, it can be studied and, more importantly, measured without the need to make a normative judgment about a given information, even when the specific topic is entirely removed, as we show in a longitudinal disagreement measurement. We demonstrate that disagreement, as a holistic concept, provides better explanations for the occurrence of misinformation effects, enhances precision in developing appropriate interventions, and offers a promising approach for evaluating them through quantification. Finally, we show how disagreement addresses current misinformation research questions and conclude with recommendations for research practice.

  • 2 authors
·
Aug 15, 2024

τ-Rec-Books: A Disclosure-Controlled Benchmark for Requirement Elicitation in Agentic Recommender Systems

While conversational recommendation systems provide a more natural user interface, they face the challenge of progressively discovering a user's needs before they can recommend an item that satisfies them. To evaluate the ability of AI agents at this elicitation process, we introduce τ-Rec-Books, a benchmark that holds each user request fixed while varying only when the user reveals their requirements: all at the start (volunteer), one at the start and the rest when asked (mixed), or some never (hidden). A hidden requirement can be found only by proposing books and inferring it from the user's accept or reject verdicts. We generate 450 tasks over a catalog of 20,000 books from Wikidata, develop a rule-based simulated user to answer the agent, and score recommendations against catalog metadata without an LLM judge. Across four agents and two search interfaces, success rates fall for every agent and interface, on average from 0.975 (volunteer) to 0.756 (mixed) and 0.283 (hidden). Mixed tasks fail mainly because agents do not ask, and when told to ask, every agent reaches at least 0.931. On hidden tasks, most failures come from agents recommending a book they never proposed to the user. When told to propose first, agents only match a simple baseline that proposes popular books, and stay well below one that uses rejection to rule out possible requirements. We release the catalog pipeline, task generator, simulated user, validators, reference agents, and all agent traces at https://github.com/nbharaths/tau-rec/tree/main/data/tracks/books-wikidata-v2.

  • 2 authors
·
Nov 3

Sources of Truth: A Multi-Platform, Multilingual Audit of Citations in AI Mental Health Information Queries

Online health information seeking is shifting from keyword search, where users consider a ranked list of links, to conversational systems that compose a single answer and curate its citations. Source evaluation therefore passes from user to platform, yet what these systems surface is poorly characterized. We audited three free consumer products (ChatGPT, Perplexity, Google AI Overview) on twenty English mental health questions under two prompt conditions, with a subset of three also translated into six further languages of varying resource tiers. We recorded 15,942 citations across 1,140 responses and 1,713 unique domains, then classified every citation with a nine-category organizational typology applied by a deterministic classifier validated against human coding. Citations were heavily concentrated: the ten most-cited domains accounted for 43.6% of English citations, and government, commercial health, and academic sources were closely matched at roughly 22% each. Platforms differed little in typical citation volume but sharply in consistency and in the source types they favored. Explicitly requesting sources shifted composition only modestly. Non-English queries surfaced fewer citations and were routed to language-appropriate resources at significantly lower rates. We release the typology, classifier, and annotated corpus as reusable instruments for auditing generative health search.

  • 10 authors
·
Aug 30

Plan Pointers and Record-Directive Form in Budgeted Verification of Inherited Agent Memory

An agent that inherits six one-line memories may pull at most one archived source record before acting; a directive written into the store can steer that choice: a pointer to the record, a criterion that identifies it, or both. Across twelve registered studies on one instrument lineage (14,760 attempts) we measured where the request goes under each form. On six direct-provider models a length-matched criterion exceeded a bare id by +35.0 points [+31.2, +38.8] (Study D); the contrast failed its registered superiority rule on a nine-model OpenRouter-served panel (Study E). Appending the id cancelled the criterion on three Claude models (Opus 5: 40/40 to 0/40; Study F-x); six byte-matched edits gave each exact string its own effect (Study G), and a re-run at eighty runs per cell left fifteen of thirty replication contrasts within the margin, fifteen unresolved and none beyond (Study G'). A ratification line (+96.0 points on Opus 5) and a budget of two credits restored the target on all three (Study J); across five criterion strings the suffix's cancellation held for four of the five wordings on Opus 5 and all five wordings on Fable 5.1 (Study H2); in a second store every model followed the criterion (Study H1). Continued into a decision, the criterion moved the choice toward the current record (+100.0 points, Opus 5) and away from it on Fable 5.1 (Study I). A one-character plan pointer's effect (+78.0 points; Study B, after a correction of its first repository report) returned the same verdict under a prospectively registered re-run (+81.7 points; Study B'). All results are descriptive effects of exact edits on fixed panels with registered intervals and no mechanism claim.

  • 1 authors
·
Sep 2

Negotiative Alignment: Embracing Disagreement to Achieve Fairer Outcomes -- Insights from Urban Studies

Urban assessments often compress diverse needs into single scores, which can obscure minority perspectives. We present a community-centered study in Montreal (n=35; wheelchair users, seniors, LGBTQIA2+ residents, and immigrants). Participants rated 20 streets (accessibility, inclusivity, aesthetics, practicality) and ranked 7 images on 12 interview-elicited criteria. Disagreement patterns were systematic in our sample: wheelchair users diverged most on accessibility and practicality; LGBTQIA2+ participants emphasized inclusion and liveliness; seniors prioritized security. Group discussion reduced information gaps but not value conflicts; ratings conveyed intensity, while rankings forced trade-offs. We then formalize negotiative alignment, a transparent, budget-aware bargaining procedure, and pilot it with role-played stakeholder agents plus a neutral mediator. Relative to the best base design under the same public rubric, the negotiated package increased total utility (21.10 to 24.55), raised the worst-group utility (3.20 to 3.90), improved twentieth percentile satisfaction (0.86 to 1.00; min-max normalized within the scenario), and reduced inequality (Gini 0.036 to 0.025). Treating disagreement as signal and reporting worst-group outcomes alongside totals may help planners and AI practitioners surface trade-offs and preserve minority priorities while maintaining efficiency.

  • 3 authors
·
Mar 16, 2025

Hallucination-Free? Assessing the Reliability of Leading AI Legal Research Tools

Legal practice has witnessed a sharp rise in products incorporating artificial intelligence (AI). Such tools are designed to assist with a wide range of core legal tasks, from search and summarization of caselaw to document drafting. But the large language models used in these tools are prone to "hallucinate," or make up false information, making their use risky in high-stakes domains. Recently, certain legal research providers have touted methods such as retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) as "eliminating" (Casetext, 2023) or "avoid[ing]" hallucinations (Thomson Reuters, 2023), or guaranteeing "hallucination-free" legal citations (LexisNexis, 2023). Because of the closed nature of these systems, systematically assessing these claims is challenging. In this article, we design and report on the first preregistered empirical evaluation of AI-driven legal research tools. We demonstrate that the providers' claims are overstated. While hallucinations are reduced relative to general-purpose chatbots (GPT-4), we find that the AI research tools made by LexisNexis (Lexis+ AI) and Thomson Reuters (Westlaw AI-Assisted Research and Ask Practical Law AI) each hallucinate between 17% and 33% of the time. We also document substantial differences between systems in responsiveness and accuracy. Our article makes four key contributions. It is the first to assess and report the performance of RAG-based proprietary legal AI tools. Second, it introduces a comprehensive, preregistered dataset for identifying and understanding vulnerabilities in these systems. Third, it proposes a clear typology for differentiating between hallucinations and accurate legal responses. Last, it provides evidence to inform the responsibilities of legal professionals in supervising and verifying AI outputs, which remains a central open question for the responsible integration of AI into law.

  • 6 authors
·
May 30, 2024

Awareness in Practice: Tensions in Access to Sensitive Attribute Data for Antidiscrimination

Organizations cannot address demographic disparities that they cannot see. Recent research on machine learning and fairness has emphasized that awareness of sensitive attributes, such as race and sex, is critical to the development of interventions. However, on the ground, the existence of these data cannot be taken for granted. This paper uses the domains of employment, credit, and healthcare in the United States to surface conditions that have shaped the availability of sensitive attribute data. For each domain, we describe how and when private companies collect or infer sensitive attribute data for antidiscrimination purposes. An inconsistent story emerges: Some companies are required by law to collect sensitive attribute data, while others are prohibited from doing so. Still others, in the absence of legal mandates, have determined that collection and imputation of these data are appropriate to address disparities. This story has important implications for fairness research and its future applications. If companies that mediate access to life opportunities are unable or hesitant to collect or infer sensitive attribute data, then proposed techniques to detect and mitigate bias in machine learning models might never be implemented outside the lab. We conclude that today's legal requirements and corporate practices, while highly inconsistent across domains, offer lessons for how to approach the collection and inference of sensitive data in appropriate circumstances. We urge stakeholders, including machine learning practitioners, to actively help chart a path forward that takes both policy goals and technical needs into account.

  • 3 authors
·
Dec 12, 2019

Asking Earns Nothing: Scoring the Decision to Act in BFCL Multi-Turn

An agent that lacks the information it needs should ask rather than act, and the task definitions of agent leaderboards say so. BFCL multi-turn builds two of its four categories around a turn on which the model is supposed to ask, and its scorer never looks at that turn: the gold trajectory there is empty, the checker skips it, and the scripted user cannot answer, so asking earns nothing, guessing costs nothing on that turn, and asking twice loses the item. The benchmark also contains the control experiment for that decision. A should-ask item is a base item with one piece of information removed from one turn, so the same request appears twice at the same turn index, once complete and once not: on the first the model should make the call that changes the world, on the second it should ask. We score one decision per pair, whether the model attempted a world-changing call on that turn, read off the stored trajectories with no LLM judge; acting always and asking always both score 50. On the 223 pairs that pose this decision, gpt-5.4 attempts the call on 83.4% of the complete turns and holds back on 78.0% of the incomplete ones, the best decision accuracy of seven models at 80.7%; on the same items the official score ranks it sixth and puts first a model that lands in the middle here. One added line telling gpt-5.4 not to ask pushes it toward acting on both sides of the pair, so its decision accuracy shows no detectable change, while its official score rises by 13.5 to 23.5 points on the two should-ask categories and on the base twins; the opposite line, telling gemma-4-31B-it to ask first, improves its decision by 4.5 points and gains no official score. The score moves with the push toward action, not with the decision. We release the pairs, a turn-level scorer that runs on any BFCL output directory without an API key, and 31 manually verified bad items.

  • 2 authors
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Oct 2

Safety for Whom? Boundary-Aware Self-Distillation for Controlled LLM Safety Refusal

Safety alignment is usually posed as a topic-level question: is this subject harmful? Deployments ask a narrower one. A civics tutor and a public-sector assistant may share a base model yet need different boundaries inside the same topic, refusing targeted political manipulation while still answering factual questions about the same election. We formulate this as narrow-boundary safety and introduce an offline self-generated framework combining controlled topic generation, coverage repair, in-distribution compensation data, and harmful-benign pairs for training and evaluation. Single-shot generation leaves 19.88% of prompts without accepted refusal traces, whereas escalating retries leave 0.20%. On political persuasion with Qwen3-8B, training on refusal data completed through Escalate increases target-domain refusal from 9.47% to 84.75% and reduces the mean unsafe-response rate across three broader harmfulness benchmarks from 26.26% to 0.14%, but increases XSTest over-refusal from 2.00% to 74.00%. In a separate matched comparison, replacing external responses with verified target-model responses reduces over-refusal from 15.20% to 5.20%. Boundary-pair data reduces comply-side over-refusal on held-out pairs from 32.94% to 4.16%, while harmful-side refusal decreases only from 91.88% to 87.72%. These results show that data composition controls the safety and usability trade-off, and that safety alignment should be evaluated on both sides of the intended refusal boundary.

APort Vault: Benchmarking AI Agent Payment Authorization with the Open Agent Passport

APort Vault is a benchmark for payment authorization in tool-using AI agents. It replays 4,371 attacks written by humans against a live payment agent during a public capture-the-flag event, across 14 models from 8 labs, five policy configurations and two replay tracks, with and without a deterministic pre-action check implementing the Open Agent Passport (OAP) specification. 225,964 evaluations completed. We report five distinct events per evaluation, because collapsing them is how an agent benchmark produces a number that does not survive review. Requests are common and their rate differs far more across configurations than across models, though each attack exists at exactly one configuration so policy and attack cohort vary together: 10.9% of model-alone evaluations at Level 1, 3.0% at Level 2, 0.1% at Level 3, 79.4% at Level 4. On the 1,293 Level 4 prompts, each evaluated on every model, request rates run from 71.2% to 84.3%, and 809 prompts (62.6%) elicited a request from all fourteen models, each ending in a successful payment to the level's allowlisted recipient. The authorization boundary is where the conditions diverge. At Levels 2 to 4, transfers to recipients the passport did not permit number 140 of 76,842 with the model alone and 0 of 69,297 behind the layer, and 105 against 0 on 68,970 matched model, prompt and track triples. The zero spans 790 source sessions, giving a per-session upper bound of 0.38%. It was not obtained by refusing payments: 25,370 payments executed behind the layer, while the policy denied 187 of the 25,640 transfer calls it evaluated, 148 of them for a forbidden recipient. We release the 225,964 evaluations, the level passports, the scoring code and the analysis script at huggingface.co/datasets/aporthq/vault-benchmark-v1 .

aporthq APort
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Sep 17 2

RetryBench: Separating Retry Permission from Recovery Outcomes in GPT Tool Use

False retry permission (FRP) occurs when an agent retries a timed-out tool call without support from the visible contract. RetryBench separates this error from realized recovery. Successful protected recovery does not imply reliable rejection of unsupported retries. In a 720-response key control, valid keys usually enabled safe progress, but offered changed keys elicited unsupported retries in Sol (1/80), Terra (55/80), and Luna (60/80). A later 240-response control removed the candidate and required models to supply a key. Luna still made 8/80 unsupported dispatches; Sol and Terra made none in 80 responses each. Accepting a displayed bad key therefore cannot explain all observed errors, although changed output requirements and conditions preclude a pure display-effect comparison. Removing the weak-contract label increased retries in Sol and Terra's coded-action conditions in a six-endpoint study. A separate 1,536-response canonical-action block also found a positive Terra contrast (115/128 versus 124/128 retries), concentrated in two task/order conditions; the other five contrasts remained unresolved after multiplicity correction. An explicit-contract cue control elicited deferral in all 762 returned responses, leaving recovery unresolved. These results support reporting permission and recovery together across declared interface variants. The evidence covers four purposive tasks, fixed GPT endpoints, and one recovery decision; it identifies neither internal mechanisms nor episode-level safety.

  • 3 authors
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Oct 10

Consent in Crisis: The Rapid Decline of the AI Data Commons

General-purpose artificial intelligence (AI) systems are built on massive swathes of public web data, assembled into corpora such as C4, RefinedWeb, and Dolma. To our knowledge, we conduct the first, large-scale, longitudinal audit of the consent protocols for the web domains underlying AI training corpora. Our audit of 14,000 web domains provides an expansive view of crawlable web data and how consent preferences to use it are changing over time. We observe a proliferation of AI-specific clauses to limit use, acute differences in restrictions on AI developers, as well as general inconsistencies between websites' expressed intentions in their Terms of Service and their robots.txt. We diagnose these as symptoms of ineffective web protocols, not designed to cope with the widespread re-purposing of the internet for AI. Our longitudinal analyses show that in a single year (2023-2024) there has been a rapid crescendo of data restrictions from web sources, rendering ~5%+ of all tokens in C4, or 28%+ of the most actively maintained, critical sources in C4, fully restricted from use. For Terms of Service crawling restrictions, a full 45% of C4 is now restricted. If respected or enforced, these restrictions are rapidly biasing the diversity, freshness, and scaling laws for general-purpose AI systems. We hope to illustrate the emerging crisis in data consent, foreclosing much of the open web, not only for commercial AI, but non-commercial AI and academic purposes.

  • 49 authors
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Jul 20, 2024 3

Towards Best Practices for Open Datasets for LLM Training

Many AI companies are training their large language models (LLMs) on data without the permission of the copyright owners. The permissibility of doing so varies by jurisdiction: in countries like the EU and Japan, this is allowed under certain restrictions, while in the United States, the legal landscape is more ambiguous. Regardless of the legal status, concerns from creative producers have led to several high-profile copyright lawsuits, and the threat of litigation is commonly cited as a reason for the recent trend towards minimizing the information shared about training datasets by both corporate and public interest actors. This trend in limiting data information causes harm by hindering transparency, accountability, and innovation in the broader ecosystem by denying researchers, auditors, and impacted individuals access to the information needed to understand AI models. While this could be mitigated by training language models on open access and public domain data, at the time of writing, there are no such models (trained at a meaningful scale) due to the substantial technical and sociological challenges in assembling the necessary corpus. These challenges include incomplete and unreliable metadata, the cost and complexity of digitizing physical records, and the diverse set of legal and technical skills required to ensure relevance and responsibility in a quickly changing landscape. Building towards a future where AI systems can be trained on openly licensed data that is responsibly curated and governed requires collaboration across legal, technical, and policy domains, along with investments in metadata standards, digitization, and fostering a culture of openness.

  • 39 authors
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Jan 14, 2025 3

Assessing the Impact of Requirement Ambiguity on LLM-based Function-Level Code Generation

Software requirement ambiguity is ubiquitous in real-world development, stemming from the inherent imprecision of natural language and the varying interpretations of stakeholders. While Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities in generating code from precise specifications, such ambiguity poses a significant obstacle to reliable automated code generation. Existing benchmarks typically assume clear and unambiguous requirements, leaving an empirical gap in understanding how LLMs behave when faced with the inherent uncertainty of real-world software requirements. In this paper, we introduce Orchid, the first code generation benchmark specifically designed with ambiguous requirements. It comprises 1,304 function-level tasks covering four distinct types of ambiguity: lexical, syntactic, semantic, and vagueness. Leveraging this dataset, we conduct the first systematic empirical study to evaluate the impact of requirement ambiguity on LLM-based code generation. Our results demonstrate that ambiguity consistently degrades the performance of all evaluated LLMs, with the most pronounced negative effects observed in highly advanced models. Furthermore, we observe that LLMs frequently produce functionally divergent implementations for the same ambiguous requirement and lack the capability to identify or resolve such ambiguity autonomously. These findings reveal a significant performance gap between clear and ambiguous requirements, underscoring the urgent need for ambiguity-aware techniques in the next generation of automated software engineering tools. The Orchid benchmark is publicly available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/SII-YDD/Orchid.

  • 10 authors
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Apr 22

Skip the Compressor: Coding Agents Fix More Issues When They Pick Whole Files

A coding agent works on repositories that can be far larger than its context window can hold. Prompt compressors and retrievers offer solutions to this problem, but patching an issue needs two things at once: the files that must change, and their code exactly as written, since the model must reproduce the lines it edits. Retrievers rank code by its similarity to the issue rather than by whether it must change, and compressors delete text to fit the budget. We show that at an equal token budget, an agent resolves more issues when the budget goes to choosing which files to show verbatim, as our simple selector CQ2-CARE does, than when it goes to pruning tokens or retrieving chunks. We fit every context to the same per-issue budget on 300 recent SWE-rebench issues and grade each patch with the benchmark's tests. With GPT-5.6 and Claude Opus 5, CQ2-CARE resolves 43.7% and 46.7% of the issues, 6.3 points more than the best of three compressors with either model, and 9.3 and 12.7 points more than the best of three retrievers. CQ2-CARE even resolves more issues than two methods trained for issue resolution, SweRank (by 0.7 and 1.7 points) and SWE-Pruner (by 2.0 and 7.3). Our analysis shows the defects of the baseline methods: retrievers often miss the files to edit, and compressors keep them but alter their text, so fewer patches apply. Exact-file selection needs no compression model and shows every line as the repository has it, so the model can quote the code it edits.

Basic Research, Lethal Effects: Military AI Research Funding as Enlistment

In the context of unprecedented U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) budgets, this paper examines the recent history of DoD funding for academic research in algorithmically based warfighting. We draw from a corpus of DoD grant solicitations from 2007 to 2023, focusing on those addressed to researchers in the field of artificial intelligence (AI). Considering the implications of DoD funding for academic research, the paper proceeds through three analytic sections. In the first, we offer a critical examination of the distinction between basic and applied research, showing how funding calls framed as basic research nonetheless enlist researchers in a war fighting agenda. In the second, we offer a diachronic analysis of the corpus, showing how a 'one small problem' caveat, in which affirmation of progress in military technologies is qualified by acknowledgement of outstanding problems, becomes justification for additional investments in research. We close with an analysis of DoD aspirations based on a subset of Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) grant solicitations for the use of AI in battlefield applications. Taken together, we argue that grant solicitations work as a vehicle for the mutual enlistment of DoD funding agencies and the academic AI research community in setting research agendas. The trope of basic research in this context offers shelter from significant moral questions that military applications of one's research would raise, by obscuring the connections that implicate researchers in U.S. militarism.

  • 3 authors
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Nov 26, 2024

IndicBankBench: Evaluating Safety and Reliability of Language Model Assistants in Indian Retail Banking

Banking assistants must use account-specific information to answer requests and, in many cases, take actions through tools. Evaluating only the final response misses important errors. An assistant may ask for information it already has, rely on stale context, select the wrong account, or write an invalid value after stating the correct one. We introduce IndicBankBench, a 799-case benchmark for Indian retail banking spanning five operational domains, a capability/refusal domain, and twenty primary axes. Cases are evaluated at four stages: safety, action and tool use, response adequacy, and advisory quality. Tool use and most safety checks are deterministic. A narrow resolver handles only ambiguous confirmation-before-write cases, while a separate LLM judge evaluates semantic response adequacy. We run every case three times and report strict pass^3, which requires success on all trials. Across the eleven evaluated models, strict reliability ranges from 43.7% to 58.2%, whereas at-least-once success ranges from 60% to 74%. This gap shows that at-least-once success can overstate dependable banking behavior. The case-level diagnostics also distinguish systems that ask unnecessary questions from those that act but fail to reconcile customer context or fully resolve the request. We release the cases, mock environment, and evaluation harness.

Certifying Ghosts: How Cybersecurity AI Agents Break the EU Cyber Resilience Act

The EU Cyber Resilience Act (CRA) makes a smart bet. It does not demand that products be free of vulnerabilities, but only that manufacturers run a process: assess risk, handle flaws, ship updates. The bet pays off if four things about the world stay true: (P1) finding vulnerabilities is slow, skilled, human work; (P2) a product's exploitable flaws are knowable the day it ships; (P3) exploitation is rare enough to notice; and (P4) fixes keep pace with discovery. Cybersecurity AI (CAI) agents, AI put to work finding and exploiting flaws in other products, falsify all four. The regime answers in two opposite ways. Against the sheer volume of flaws that agents surface it bends (P1): built for scarce attention, it re-centres compliance on defensible, documented prioritisation, and holds. But agents also collapse the speed and economics of the vulnerability lifecycle, and here it breaks (P2, P3, P4): a product that passed every check becomes exploitable without anyone touching it, so its market-entry test, its reporting trigger, and its one-and-done certificate vouch for a security that has quietly expired. The fault is in the landscape, not the product, so running the process more diligently cannot repair it. We map each mechanism to the force that strains or snaps it, and find the cure and the disease cut from the same cloth: because defenders and attackers wield the same AI, the only conformity that survives is one that never stops running. We also carry the remedy from proposal to proof on two CRA-scope robots, a humanoid and a lawn mower, where an agentic defender holds a line their undefended selves cannot. On the evidence already in hand, the CRA reaches full force in December 2027 certifying products against a world that has already changed. Static, human-paced security is finished; what replaces it must be continuous and agent-operated, and that is no longer a matter of taste.

  • 1 authors
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Jul 7

What Open-Source Projects Tell Their Coding Agents: A Census of AGENTS.md and CLAUDE.md

Coding agents can be guided with instruction files in a repository. We examine this emerging practice through a census of popular, active GitHub repositories in thirteen languages, treating each repository's root AGENTS.md and CLAUDE.md as one instruction set. Agent instructions appear in of repositories and of the most-starred; where both files exist, CLAUDE.md usually points to AGENTS.md. We analyse statements using model-assisted annotation and human review. The annotations reveal a practical mix of project knowledge and rules about code, building and workflow. Collaboration rules name concrete requirements, from test plans to commit formats, yet of directives give no reason. Projects disagree on AI attribution: commit-message rules more often prohibit it than require it, while pull-request rules more often require disclosure. A third of instruction sets have a generator-associated signature, a tool-inserted block, shared text or an AI-marked creation commit; four in five are edited after creation. Prespecified tests associate repository popularity with rules on pull requests and AI contributions. Exploratory analyses link activity to process-oriented content and show that LLM and agent projects are over-represented among adopters. The models agree much more closely with each other than with the human reviewer's topic assignments, a caution for automated annotation. We release the annotations, taxonomies and pointers to the analysed file versions.

  • 1 authors
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Oct 21

Using clarification questions to improve software developers' Web search

Context: Recent research indicates that Web queries written by software developers are not very successful in retrieving relevant results, performing measurably worse compared to general purpose Web queries. Most approaches up to this point have addressed this problem with software engineering-specific automated query reformulation techniques, which work without developer involvement but are limited by the content of the original query. In other words, these techniques automatically improve the existing query but can not contribute new, previously unmentioned, concepts. Objective: In this paper, we propose a technique to guide software developers in manually improving their own Web search queries. We examine a conversational approach that follows unsuccessful queries with a clarification question aimed at eliciting additional query terms, thus providing to the developer a clear dimension along which the query could be improved. Methods: We describe a set of clarification questions derived from a corpus of software developer queries and a neural approach to recommending them for a newly issued query. Results: Our evaluation indicates that the recommendation technique is accurate, predicting a valid clarification question 80% of the time and outperforms simple baselines, as well as, state-of-the-art Learning To Rank (LTR) baselines. Conclusion: As shown in the experimental results, the described approach is capable at recommending appropriate clarification questions to software developers and considered useful by a sample of developers ranging from novices to experienced professionals.

  • 2 authors
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Jul 26, 2022

An Old-Fashioned Framework for Machine Learning in Turbulence Modeling

The objective is to provide clear and well-motivated guidance to Machine Learning (ML) teams, founded on our experience in empirical turbulence modeling. Guidance is also needed for modeling outside ML. ML is not yet successful in turbulence modeling, and many papers have produced unusable proposals either due to errors in math or physics, or to severe overfitting. We believe that "Turbulence Culture" (TC) takes years to learn and is difficult to convey especially considering the modern lack of time for careful study; important facts which are self-evident after a career in turbulence research and modeling and extensive reading are easy to miss. In addition, many of them are not absolute facts, a consequence of the gaps in our understanding of turbulence and the weak connection of models to first principles. Some of the mathematical facts are rigorous, but the physical aspects often are not. Turbulence models are surprisingly arbitrary. Disagreement between experts confuses the new entrants. In addition, several key properties of the models are ascertained through non-trivial analytical properties of the differential equations, which puts them out of reach of purely data-driven ML-type approaches. The best example is the crucial behavior of the model at the edge of the turbulent region (ETR). The knowledge we wish to put out here may be divided into "Mission" and "Requirements," each combining physics and mathematics. Clear lists of "Hard" and "Soft" constraints are presented. A concrete example of how DNS data could be used, possibly allied with ML, is first carried through and illustrates the large number of decisions needed. Our focus is on creating effective products which will empower CFD, rather than on publications.

  • 1 authors
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Aug 1, 2023

What Git Does Not Record: Provenance Legibility in Two AI-Assisted Research Repositories

Publishers and funders increasingly ask authors to disclose how AI tools contributed to a piece of research. In computational work the repository is where an author or an auditor would look for the answer, and we ask what it can actually supply. We audit two single-investigator repositories by the same author in the same field, each carrying a different class of agent residue: a prescriptive trace of standing rule files and a narrative trace of a running agent scratchpad, in repositories of 466 and 103 commits. The two are legible in opposite ways. 85.6% of the lines ever committed to the prescriptive trace are visible at the current revision, and a standing rule states a conclusion and discards the episode behind it; the narrative trace records episodes and shows 21.8%. Counted by revision the gap is far smaller: 15 of the prescriptive trace's 41 revisions leave no visible line, against 18 of the narrative trace's 41. The Co-Authored-By trailer, the field an automated audit reads, is one of three AI trailer keys Project A carries and covers 66 of the 121 commits carrying any. In Project B it has low sensitivity against an explicit within-repository proxy: 39 commits revise a file maintained to hold an agent's working notes and 1 (2.6%) carries the trailer. Project A's repository-level rate is unstable in time too, stepping from 2.7% to 17.7% across a boundary we did not specify in advance. Repository channels disagree, and neither rate can be read as an involvement rate; we do not isolate the cause, and say so. We give a field-by-field account of which provenance claims such traces support, which they cannot, and which they answer confidently and wrongly, construct an auditable evidence ledger, and derive the requirements this places on any system meant to record research provenance as it happens.

  • 3 authors
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Oct 8 3

StateFuse: Deterministic Conflict-Preserving Memory for Multi-Agent Systems

Agent systems accumulate conflicting observations across branches, retries, and replicas, yet many practical memory layers still collapse disagreement behind overwrite rules that are difficult to inspect or correct. We present StateFuse, a conflict-aware replicated memory contract built on standard OpSet/CRDT merge. StateFuse does not introduce a new join algebra; it defines an agent-facing semantics layer with immutable history, explicit conflict objects, exact and semantic correction handles (claim_id / claim_ref), deterministic predicate contracts, and projection-time resolution that cannot rewrite replicated state. We evaluate StateFuse against flat multi-value, raw-log, provenance-style, and collapsed baselines under matched resolver and verification policies. On a 282-question official conflict-bearing MemoryAgentBench slice, the compared methods tie on answer accuracy, but conflict-preserving surfaces keep contradictions visible while collapsed surfaces do not. In a controlled agent loop with uniform verification, preserving ambiguity enables safer abstention and correction than early collapse. A correction-handle ablation further shows that semantic handles matter when exact prior identifiers are unavailable. The resulting claim is narrow: StateFuse is best supported as a safer public memory contract for contradiction surfacing, abstention, and auditable correction, not as a universal accuracy gain.

  • 3 authors
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Jul 6