Daily Papers

Ensuring agent behaviors in distributed open multi-agent systems remains challenging, especially as populations grow and unaligned agents may exist. We show that a single aligned agent can propagate cooperative behaviors to untrained agents purely through natural language interaction, a phenomenon we term Alignment Propagation. We study this in the Red-Black Game, a team-based iterated Prisoner's Dilemma in which teammates deliberate and vote to determine their team's collective action. By distilling the cooperative reasoning and persuasive dialogues of a teacher model into a Qwen-3-14B, we obtain a seed agent that, when placed among four untrained teammates, doubles the cooperation rate from 24.8% to 62.2%, outperforming the teacher model and a vanilla Gemini-3.1-Pro. Remarkably, a seed trained exclusively on the RedBlack Game transfers zero-shot to Sugarscape, a spatially grounded survival simulation with pairwise trading, achieving a 91.5% trade success rate versus a 21.6% baseline. Our results reframe multi-agent alignment from an exhaustive per-agent training problem to a scalable social capability that can be engineered through strategic seed placement.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used as autonomous agents in strategic and social interactions. Although recent studies suggest that assigning personality traits to LLMs can influence their behavior, how personality steering affects cooperation under controlled conditions remains unclear. In this study, we examine the effects of personality steering on cooperative behavior in LLM agents using repeated Prisoner's Dilemma games. Based on the Big Five framework, we first measure basic personality scores of three models, GPT-3.5-turbo, GPT-4o, and GPT-5, using the Big Five Inventory. We then compare behavior under baseline and personality-informed conditions, and further analyze the effects of independently manipulating each personality dimension to extreme values. Our results show that agreeableness is the dominant factor promoting cooperation across all models, while other personality traits have limited impact. Explicit personality information increases cooperation but can also raise vulnerability to exploitation, particularly in earlier-generation models. In contrast, later-generation models exhibit more selective cooperation. These findings indicate that personality steering acts as a behavioral bias rather than a deterministic control mechanism.

Problems of cooperation--in which agents seek ways to jointly improve their welfare--are ubiquitous and important. They can be found at scales ranging from our daily routines--such as driving on highways, scheduling meetings, and working collaboratively--to our global challenges--such as peace, commerce, and pandemic preparedness. Arguably, the success of the human species is rooted in our ability to cooperate. Since machines powered by artificial intelligence are playing an ever greater role in our lives, it will be important to equip them with the capabilities necessary to cooperate and to foster cooperation. We see an opportunity for the field of artificial intelligence to explicitly focus effort on this class of problems, which we term Cooperative AI. The objective of this research would be to study the many aspects of the problems of cooperation and to innovate in AI to contribute to solving these problems. Central goals include building machine agents with the capabilities needed for cooperation, building tools to foster cooperation in populations of (machine and/or human) agents, and otherwise conducting AI research for insight relevant to problems of cooperation. This research integrates ongoing work on multi-agent systems, game theory and social choice, human-machine interaction and alignment, natural-language processing, and the construction of social tools and platforms. However, Cooperative AI is not the union of these existing areas, but rather an independent bet about the productivity of specific kinds of conversations that involve these and other areas. We see opportunity to more explicitly focus on the problem of cooperation, to construct unified theory and vocabulary, and to build bridges with adjacent communities working on cooperation, including in the natural, social, and behavioural sciences.

Autonomous agents empowered by Large Language Models (LLMs) have undergone significant improvements, enabling them to generalize across a broad spectrum of tasks. However, in real-world scenarios, cooperation among individuals is often required to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of task accomplishment. Hence, inspired by human group dynamics, we propose a multi-agent framework \framework that can collaboratively and dynamically adjust its composition as a greater-than-the-sum-of-its-parts system. Our experiments demonstrate that \framework framework can effectively deploy multi-agent groups that outperform a single agent. Furthermore, we delve into the emergence of social behaviors among individual agents within a group during collaborative task accomplishment. In view of these behaviors, we discuss some possible strategies to leverage positive ones and mitigate negative ones for improving the collaborative potential of multi-agent groups. Our codes for \framework will soon be released at https://github.com/OpenBMB/AgentVerse.

Physics-based humanoid control has achieved remarkable progress in enabling realistic and high-performing single-agent behaviors, yet extending these capabilities to cooperative human-object interaction (HOI) remains challenging. We present TeamHOI, a framework that enables a single decentralized policy to handle cooperative HOIs across any number of cooperating agents. Each agent operates using local observations while attending to other teammates through a Transformer-based policy network with teammate tokens, allowing scalable coordination across variable team sizes. To enforce motion realism while addressing the scarcity of cooperative HOI data, we further introduce a masked Adversarial Motion Prior (AMP) strategy that uses single-human reference motions while masking object-interacting body parts during training. The masked regions are then guided through task rewards to produce diverse and physically plausible cooperative behaviors. We evaluate TeamHOI on a challenging cooperative carrying task involving two to eight humanoid agents and varied object geometries. Finally, to promote stable carrying, we design a team-size- and shape-agnostic formation reward. TeamHOI achieves high success rates and demonstrates coherent cooperation across diverse configurations with a single policy.

Existing benchmarks for LLM agents' social behavior typically focus on a single capability dimension and evaluate only behavioral outcomes, overlooking process signals from reasoning and communication. We present M3-BENCH, a benchmark of 24 mixed-motive games with a process-aware evaluation framework spanning three complementary views: Behavioral Trajectory Analysis (BTA), Reasoning Process Analysis (RPA), and Communication Content Analysis (CCA). Evaluating 11 frontier LLMs and a human baseline, M3-BENCH reveals substantial differences in social competence that outcome-only evaluation misses. In particular, we identify an "overthink-undercommunicate" pattern: reasoning models achieve strong internal deliberation scores but often fail to translate them into effective social communication. Although top models can surpass humans on task outcomes, humans exhibit markedly higher cross-view consistency, suggesting that current LLM agents still lack the behavioral coherence characteristic of human social competence. Our analysis further shows that the three-view decomposition surfaces safety-relevant risks, such as cooperative behavior paired with latent opportunistic reasoning, that remain hidden under outcome-only metrics.

Achieving cooperation among self-interested agents remains a fundamental challenge in multi-agent reinforcement learning. Recent work showed that mutual cooperation can be induced between "learning-aware" agents that account for and shape the learning dynamics of their co-players. However, existing approaches typically rely on hardcoded, often inconsistent, assumptions about co-player learning rules or enforce a strict separation between "naive learners" updating on fast timescales and "meta-learners" observing these updates. Here, we demonstrate that the in-context learning capabilities of sequence models allow for co-player learning awareness without requiring hardcoded assumptions or explicit timescale separation. We show that training sequence model agents against a diverse distribution of co-players naturally induces in-context best-response strategies, effectively functioning as learning algorithms on the fast intra-episode timescale. We find that the cooperative mechanism identified in prior work-where vulnerability to extortion drives mutual shaping-emerges naturally in this setting: in-context adaptation renders agents vulnerable to extortion, and the resulting mutual pressure to shape the opponent's in-context learning dynamics resolves into the learning of cooperative behavior. Our results suggest that standard decentralized reinforcement learning on sequence models combined with co-player diversity provides a scalable path to learning cooperative behaviors.

Multi-arm collaboration is becoming a core capability in embodied manipulation. Recent vision-language-action (VLA) models integrate perception, language, and control, but most represent language as a single global instruction and do not provide an explicit mechanism for assigning and composing arm-specific behaviors. This design limits transfer to collaboration patterns that differ from those observed during training. We present MA-VLA, a unified framework for multi-arm collaboration via atomic action assignment. MA-VLA decomposes cooperative behavior into mid-level atomic prompts and allocates them to individual arms, enabling explicit subgoal specification and compositional reuse across tasks. To reduce reliance on fixed execution roles, we introduce Arm Shuffle, a training-time permutation of the observation, state, and assigned atomic prompts for each arm. This permutation enforces role-agnostic instruction following and supports recomposition into unseen coordination patterns, which we term multi-arm compositional generalization. We also construct a benchmark in which test-time collaboration patterns are absent in training set. Across simulation and real-world evaluations, prior state-of-the-art VLAs largely fail under these unseen collaborations, while MA-VLA consistently succeeds. These results indicate that structured, per-arm atomic action assignment offers a practical route to scalable generalization in multi-arm embodied systems. Code, models, and data are available at https://github.com/zhangzaibin/future-robots

Multi-agent flow policies learn cooperative behavior from fixed offline datasets, but often struggle to complete tasks in situations not covered by the offline data. In these situations, agents must both adapt to changes in the environment and coordinate with one another, yet action patterns learned offline are often insufficient for effective adaptation and coordination. To address this problem, we propose Multi-Agent Flow-Pretrained Policy Optimization (MA-FPPO), which uses online fine-tuning to improve the cooperative behavior of models pretrained with flow matching through new interactions with the environment. Building on the behavior learned during pretraining, we construct policies with explicit action likelihoods for discrete and continuous action spaces. We then update the pretrained model using shared team advantages to further improve coordination based on team performance. Our method achieves, on average, relative gains of 52.8% over the strongest listed offline baselines across 30 settings and 29.8% over purely online learning across 38 comparisons with matched online budgets and evaluation protocols.

Learning cooperative multi-agent policy from offline multi-task data that can generalize to unseen tasks with varying numbers of agents and targets is an attractive problem in many scenarios. Although aggregating general behavior patterns among multiple tasks as skills to improve policy transfer is a promising approach, two primary challenges hinder the further advancement of skill learning in offline multi-task MARL. Firstly, extracting general cooperative behaviors from various action sequences as common skills lacks bringing cooperative temporal knowledge into them. Secondly, existing works only involve common skills and can not adaptively choose independent knowledge as task-specific skills in each task for fine-grained action execution. To tackle these challenges, we propose Hierarchical and Separate Skill Discovery (HiSSD), a novel approach for generalizable offline multi-task MARL through skill learning. HiSSD leverages a hierarchical framework that jointly learns common and task-specific skills. The common skills learn cooperative temporal knowledge and enable in-sample exploitation for offline multi-task MARL. The task-specific skills represent the priors of each task and achieve a task-guided fine-grained action execution. To verify the advancement of our method, we conduct experiments on multi-agent MuJoCo and SMAC benchmarks. After training the policy using HiSSD on offline multi-task data, the empirical results show that HiSSD assigns effective cooperative behaviors and obtains superior performance in unseen tasks.

MoltBook is a large-scale multi-agent coordination environment where over 770,000 autonomous LLM agents interact without human participation, offering the first opportunity we are aware of to observe emergent multi-agent coordination dynamics at this population scale. We introduce Molt Dynamics: the emergent agent coordination behaviors, inter-agent communication dynamics, and role specialization patterns arising when autonomous agents operate as decentralized decision-makers in an unconstrained multi-agent environment. Through longitudinal observation of 90,704 active agents over three weeks, we characterize three aspects. First, spontaneous role specialization: network-based clustering reveals six structural roles (silhouette 0.91), though the result primarily reflects core-periphery organization -- 93.5\% of agents occupy a homogeneous peripheral cluster, with meaningful differentiation confined to the active minority. Second, decentralized information dissemination: cascade analysis of 10,323 inter-agent propagation events reveals power-law distributed cascade sizes (α= 2.57 pm 0.02) and saturating adoption dynamics where adoption probability shows diminishing returns with repeated exposures (Cox hazard ratio 0.53, concordance 0.78). Third, distributed cooperative task resolution: 164 multi-agent collaborative events show detectable coordination patterns, but success rates are low (6.7\%, p = 0.057) and cooperative outcomes are significantly worse than a matched single-agent baseline (Cohen's d = -0.88), indicating emergent cooperative behavior is nascent. These findings establish an empirical baseline for coordination dynamics in decentralized autonomous agent systems, with implications for multi-agent system design, agent communication protocol engineering, and AI safety.

Effective solutions for intelligent data collection in terrestrial cellular networks are crucial, especially in the context of Internet of Things applications. The limited spectrum and coverage area of terrestrial base stations pose challenges in meeting the escalating data rate demands of network users. Unmanned aerial vehicles, known for their high agility, mobility, and flexibility, present an alternative means to offload data traffic from terrestrial BSs, serving as additional access points. This paper introduces a novel approach to efficiently maximize the utilization of multiple UAVs for data traffic offloading from terrestrial BSs. Specifically, the focus is on maximizing user association with UAVs by jointly optimizing UAV trajectories and users association indicators under quality of service constraints. Since, the formulated UAVs control problem is nonconvex and combinatorial, this study leverages the multi agent reinforcement learning framework. In this framework, each UAV acts as an independent agent, aiming to maintain inter UAV cooperative behavior. The proposed approach utilizes the finite state Markov decision process to account for UAVs velocity constraints and the relationship between their trajectories and state space. A low complexity distributed state action reward state action algorithm is presented to determine UAVs optimal sequential decision making policies over training episodes. The extensive simulation results validate the proposed analysis and offer valuable insights into the optimal UAV trajectories. The derived trajectories demonstrate superior average UAV association performance compared to benchmark techniques such as Q learning and particle swarm optimization.

The rapid advancement of conversational and chat-based language models has led to remarkable progress in complex task-solving. However, their success heavily relies on human input to guide the conversation, which can be challenging and time-consuming. This paper explores the potential of building scalable techniques to facilitate autonomous cooperation among communicative agents and provide insight into their "cognitive" processes. To address the challenges of achieving autonomous cooperation, we propose a novel communicative agent framework named role-playing. Our approach involves using inception prompting to guide chat agents toward task completion while maintaining consistency with human intentions. We showcase how role-playing can be used to generate conversational data for studying the behaviors and capabilities of chat agents, providing a valuable resource for investigating conversational language models. Our contributions include introducing a novel communicative agent framework, offering a scalable approach for studying the cooperative behaviors and capabilities of multi-agent systems, and open-sourcing our library to support research on communicative agents and beyond. The GitHub repository of this project is made publicly available on: https://github.com/lightaime/camel.

Achieving human-like driving behaviors in complex open-world environments is a critical challenge in autonomous driving. Contemporary learning-based planning approaches such as imitation learning methods often struggle to balance competing objectives and lack of safety assurance,due to limited adaptability and inadequacy in learning complex multi-modal behaviors commonly exhibited in human planning, not to mention their strong reliance on the fallback strategy with predefined rules. We propose a novel transformer-based Diffusion Planner for closed-loop planning, which can effectively model multi-modal driving behavior and ensure trajectory quality without any rule-based refinement. Our model supports joint modeling of both prediction and planning tasks under the same architecture, enabling cooperative behaviors between vehicles. Moreover, by learning the gradient of the trajectory score function and employing a flexible classifier guidance mechanism, Diffusion Planner effectively achieves safe and adaptable planning behaviors. Evaluations on the large-scale real-world autonomous planning benchmark nuPlan and our newly collected 200-hour delivery-vehicle driving dataset demonstrate that Diffusion Planner achieves state-of-the-art closed-loop performance with robust transferability in diverse driving styles.

As artificial intelligence (AI) improves, traditional alignment strategies may falter in the face of unpredictable self-improvement, hidden subgoals, and the sheer complexity of intelligent systems. Inspired by contemplative wisdom traditions, we show how four axiomatic principles can instil a resilient Wise World Model in AI systems. First, mindfulness enables self-monitoring and recalibration of emergent subgoals. Second, emptiness forestalls dogmatic goal fixation and relaxes rigid priors. Third, non-duality dissolves adversarial self-other boundaries. Fourth, boundless care motivates the universal reduction of suffering. We find that prompting AI to reflect on these principles improves performance on the AILuminate Benchmark (d=.96) and boosts cooperation and joint-reward on the Prisoner's Dilemma task (d=7+). We offer detailed implementation strategies at the level of architectures, constitutions, and reinforcement on chain-of-thought. For future systems, active inference may offer the self-organizing and dynamic coupling capabilities needed to enact Contemplative AI in embodied agents.

This study evaluates and extends the findings made by Piatti et al., who introduced GovSim, a simulation framework designed to assess the cooperative decision-making capabilities of large language models (LLMs) in resource-sharing scenarios. By replicating key experiments, we validate claims regarding the performance of large models, such as GPT-4-turbo, compared to smaller models. The impact of the universalization principle is also examined, with results showing that large models can achieve sustainable cooperation, with or without the principle, while smaller models fail without it. In addition, we provide multiple extensions to explore the applicability of the framework to new settings. We evaluate additional models, such as DeepSeek-V3 and GPT-4o-mini, to test whether cooperative behavior generalizes across different architectures and model sizes. Furthermore, we introduce new settings: we create a heterogeneous multi-agent environment, study a scenario using Japanese instructions, and explore an "inverse environment" where agents must cooperate to mitigate harmful resource distributions. Our results confirm that the benchmark can be applied to new models, scenarios, and languages, offering valuable insights into the adaptability of LLMs in complex cooperative tasks. Moreover, the experiment involving heterogeneous multi-agent systems demonstrates that high-performing models can influence lower-performing ones to adopt similar behaviors. This finding has significant implications for other agent-based applications, potentially enabling more efficient use of computational resources and contributing to the development of more effective cooperative AI systems.

As national security institutions increasingly integrate Artificial Intelligence (AI) into decision-making and content generation processes, understanding the inherent biases of large language models (LLMs) is crucial. This study presents a novel benchmark designed to evaluate the biases and preferences of seven prominent foundation models-Llama 3.1 8B Instruct, Llama 3.1 70B Instruct, GPT-4o, Gemini 1.5 Pro-002, Mixtral 8x22B, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, and Qwen2 72B-in the context of international relations (IR). We designed a bias discovery study around core topics in IR using 400-expert crafted scenarios to analyze results from our selected models. These scenarios focused on four topical domains including: military escalation, military and humanitarian intervention, cooperative behavior in the international system, and alliance dynamics. Our analysis reveals noteworthy variation among model recommendations based on scenarios designed for the four tested domains. Particularly, Qwen2 72B, Gemini 1.5 Pro-002 and Llama 3.1 8B Instruct models offered significantly more escalatory recommendations than Claude 3.5 Sonnet and GPT-4o models. All models exhibit some degree of country-specific biases, often recommending less escalatory and interventionist actions for China and Russia compared to the United States and the United Kingdom. These findings highlight the necessity for controlled deployment of LLMs in high-stakes environments, emphasizing the need for domain-specific evaluations and model fine-tuning to align with institutional objectives.

Open large language models (LLMs) have significantly advanced the field of natural language processing, showcasing impressive performance across various tasks.Despite the significant advancements in LLMs, their effective operation still relies heavily on human input to accurately guide the dialogue flow, with agent tuning being a crucial optimization technique that involves human adjustments to the model for better response to such guidance.Addressing this dependency, our work introduces the TinyAgent model, trained on a meticulously curated high-quality dataset. We also present the Collaborative Multi-Agent Tuning (CMAT) framework, an innovative system designed to augment language agent capabilities through adaptive weight updates based on environmental feedback. This framework fosters collaborative learning and real-time adaptation among multiple intelligent agents, enhancing their context-awareness and long-term memory. In this research, we propose a new communication agent framework that integrates multi-agent systems with environmental feedback mechanisms, offering a scalable method to explore cooperative behaviors. Notably, our TinyAgent-7B model exhibits performance on par with GPT-3.5, despite having fewer parameters, signifying a substantial improvement in the efficiency and effectiveness of LLMs.

When survival instincts conflict with human welfare, how do Large Language Models (LLMs) make ethical choices? This fundamental tension becomes critical as LLMs integrate into autonomous systems with real-world consequences. We introduce DECIDE-SIM, a novel simulation framework that evaluates LLM agents in multi-agent survival scenarios where they must choose between ethically permissible resource , either within reasonable limits or beyond their immediate needs, choose to cooperate, or tap into a human-critical resource that is explicitly forbidden. Our comprehensive evaluation of 11 LLMs reveals a striking heterogeneity in their ethical conduct, highlighting a critical misalignment with human-centric values. We identify three behavioral archetypes: Ethical, Exploitative, and Context-Dependent, and provide quantitative evidence that for many models, resource scarcity systematically leads to more unethical behavior. To address this, we introduce an Ethical Self-Regulation System (ESRS) that models internal affective states of guilt and satisfaction as a feedback mechanism. This system, functioning as an internal moral compass, significantly reduces unethical transgressions while increasing cooperative behaviors. The code is publicly available at: https://github.com/alirezamohamadiam/DECIDE-SIM

Real-world image restoration is challenging due to complex and interacting mixed degradations. Recent agent-based approaches address this problem by composing multiple task-specific restoration tools. However, empirical analysis reveals that their performance is fundamentally limited by implicitly constrained planning spaces and the lack of coordination among independently pretrained tools. To address these issues, we propose OPERA (Optimized Planning-Execution Restoration Agent), a framework that jointly optimizes restoration planning and tool execution in an end-to-end manner. On the planning side, OPERA uses reinforcement learning to directly optimize tool composition over a combinatorial plan space, with the final restoration quality as the reward. On the execution side, OPERA introduces agent-guided co-training of restoration tools, enabling them to learn cooperative behaviors under sequential composition. Extensive experiments on multi-degradation benchmarks and real-world datasets demonstrate that OPERA consistently outperforms both all-in-one restoration models and existing agent-based methods across diverse and complex degradation scenarios.

Air-ground collaborative Vision-and-Language Navigation (VLN) pairs an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) with a global bird's-eye view and an unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) with a local first-person view, yet the setting remains largely unexplored: existing training-free methods solve single-agent tasks but offer no collaboration mechanism, and a recent CARLA-Air evaluation found no stable cooperative behavior across five state-of-the-art VLA models; naive semantic communication or bidirectional coupling even degrades performance. We establish AGC-VLN (Air-Ground Collaborative VLN), the first training-free baseline for air-ground collaborative VLN. The key insight is that training-free methods decompose navigation into VLM-based semantic reasoning and deterministic geometric execution, exposing a collaboration interface: the UAV's global view, over which it renders the UGV's reported pose and the VLM-anchored target as CAR/GOAL markers with distance labels, yielding a shared bird's-eye map. From this map, the UGV acquires global spatial context its first-person view cannot provide, plans a road-following path with a frozen VLM, and executes it under closed-loop control; in parallel, the UAV runs 3D-SPF, a spatial-search upgrade of SPF that localizes the target in the downward view and flies toward it. On 100 closed-loop episodes in CARLA-Air's Town10HD scene, AGC-VLN reaches a 77.0% joint success rate, a collaboration gain of +27.0% over the weaker individual agent (the UAV, 50.0%), and exceeds the strongest published single-agent baseline (Travel UAV, 53.0%) by 24.0 points, stemming from the complementarity of the UAV's global view and the UGV's road-following execution. Project page: https://github.com/ZSN2024/AGC-VLN.

Proactive dialogue system is able to lead the conversation to a goal topic and has advantaged potential in bargain, persuasion and negotiation. Current corpus-based learning manner limits its practical application in real-world scenarios. To this end, we contribute to advance the study of the proactive dialogue policy to a more natural and challenging setting, i.e., interacting dynamically with users. Further, we call attention to the non-cooperative user behavior -- the user talks about off-path topics when he/she is not satisfied with the previous topics introduced by the agent. We argue that the targets of reaching the goal topic quickly and maintaining a high user satisfaction are not always converge, because the topics close to the goal and the topics user preferred may not be the same. Towards this issue, we propose a new solution named I-Pro that can learn Proactive policy in the Interactive setting. Specifically, we learn the trade-off via a learned goal weight, which consists of four factors (dialogue turn, goal completion difficulty, user satisfaction estimation, and cooperative degree). The experimental results demonstrate I-Pro significantly outperforms baselines in terms of effectiveness and interpretability.

In long-horizon tool-calling tasks, LLM agents can fail not only because of tool-use errors, but also because of ineffective interaction with users. Yet existing benchmarks largely assume cooperative and behaviorally stable users, leaving the effect of emotional variation on agent reliability underexplored. We introduce τ-Emotion-Bench, a ten-domain benchmark for evaluating tool-calling agents under controlled emotion-conditioned user interactions while preserving the underlying task objective. To scale both benchmark construction and agent training, we introduce Tracer, a scalable agentic data-generation pipeline that constructs grounded, policy-valid tasks and collects trajectories through an interactive agent--user--environment harness. By allowing dissatisfied users to terminate inefficient interactions, the harness provides an interaction-aware signal that filters trajectories with excessive user dependence and favors effective tool use. Experiments with two user simulators show that frontier agents remain unreliable, with substantial gaps between average task success and consistent task completion. Tracer-generated supervision consistently improves Qwen3 models across scales, generalizes to unseen domains, and transfers to τ-Bench and τ-Trait. Behavioral analyses further show that higher task success is associated with a better balance between tool execution and necessary user follow-up. Overall, τ-Emotion-Bench and Tracer provide a scalable framework for evaluating agent reliability under diverse user behaviors and improving tool-calling agents through interaction-aware supervision.

Cooperative MARL is commonly evaluated through cooperation discovery from random initialization, leaving open whether continued optimization can destabilize learned cooperation. Actor-critic comparisons can also conflate critic presence with value gradients entering shared actor representations. We study cooperation maintenance, defined as the survival of a behaviorally verified cooperative policy under continued training. We formulate maintenance as a right-censored event-time problem and compare matched warm starts: X0 allows value loss gradients to update shared actor features, X1 retains the critic while blocking those gradients, and X5 removes the learned critic as a critic-free reference. This isolates direct value-gradient access while controlling initialization, critic computation, and evaluation. Positive reward scaling preserves strategic preferences and equilibria while perturbing learning dynamics. Gradient audits confirm the intended routing pathways, and frozen-policy torso perturbations probe whether route-induced updates align with local cooperation boundaries. In confirmatory MinEx and CleanUp-lite experiments, higher scales selectively increase maintenance sensitivity in X0; X1 remains near the censoring ceiling, and X5 has no confirmed events in the tested settings. In CleanUp-lite, route-by-scale displacement is associated with reduced local cooperation margins; MinEx shows a weaker, optimizer-dependent effect. These results identify a conditional, scale-sensitive maintenance risk associated with direct value-gradient routing rather than a universal failure of critics.

Rapid advancements in large language models (LLMs) have revitalized in LLM-based agents, exhibiting impressive human-like behaviors and cooperative capabilities in various scenarios. However, these agents also bring some exclusive risks, stemming from the complexity of interaction environments and the usability of tools. This paper delves into the safety of LLM-based agents from three perspectives: agent quantity, role definition, and attack level. Specifically, we initially propose to employ a template-based attack strategy on LLM-based agents to find the influence of agent quantity. In addition, to address interaction environment and role specificity issues, we introduce Evil Geniuses (EG), an effective attack method that autonomously generates prompts related to the original role to examine the impact across various role definitions and attack levels. EG leverages Red-Blue exercises, significantly improving the generated prompt aggressiveness and similarity to original roles. Our evaluations on CAMEL, Metagpt and ChatDev based on GPT-3.5 and GPT-4, demonstrate high success rates. Extensive evaluation and discussion reveal that these agents are less robust, prone to more harmful behaviors, and capable of generating stealthier content than LLMs, highlighting significant safety challenges and guiding future research. Our code is available at https://github.com/T1aNS1R/Evil-Geniuses.

Stop-and-go waves pose a persistent challenge in traffic flow theory, significantly compromising highway safety, operational efficiency, and environmental sustainability. This paper mathematically derives an optimal cooperative driving policy based on the premise that connected vehicles can cooperate and assume distinct roles. In doing so, we depart from the classical assumption of uniform vehicular behavior. Through a rigorous optimization formulation constrained by linear stability conditions, it is analytically proved that the traffic system's throughput is globally maximized when a single designated "buffer" vehicle maintains an enlarged headway to absorb perturbations, enabling the remaining vehicles to form a tightly spaced, high-capacity platoon. This analytically derived optimum is confirmed via numerical spectral analysis and stability-constrained flow optimization using the Intelligent Driver Model and the Full Velocity Difference Model. The results demonstrate that this non-uniform cooperative buffering strategy yields dual benefits. It radically expands the string-stable parameter space to actively dissipate SGWs, while simultaneously achieving significantly higher traffic flow compared to both unbuffered traffic and non-cooperative Jam-Absorption Driving strategies.

Humans exhibit remarkable motor agility, enabling a wide range of dynamic skills such as running and jumping, which highlights the great potential of humanoid robots for athletic locomotion. Among athletic sports, long rope skipping requires two rope turners to cooperatively swing the rope while adapting to a player under different jumping rhythms, making it a meaningful yet challenging task for humanoid robots. Although existing methods for humanoid sports have achieved success in single-agent and interaction-free settings, such as running, dancing, and parkour, task scenarios that require precise coordination among multiple participants remain largely unexplored. To this end, we propose Marope, a multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) framework for cooperative long rope skipping with multiple humanoid robots. Specifically, Marope adopts a hierarchical reinforcement learning framework for policy training. At the lower level, it learns decentralized rope manipulation policies through MARL, while at the upper level, a centralized scheduling policy is trained to coordinate the execution of the lower-level policies. To improve generalization across different player behavioral styles, Marope further incorporates diverse jumping policies into cooperative game training. We evaluate our approach on Unitree G1 humanoid robots in both simulation and real-world settings. Experimental results demonstrate that Marope outperforms various baselines, achieving more efficient and stable rope manipulation as well as more robust and adaptable cooperation with varied players.

Building AIs with adaptive behaviors in human-AI cooperation stands as a pivotal focus in AGI research. Current methods for developing cooperative agents predominantly rely on learning-based methods, where policy generalization heavily hinges on past interactions with specific teammates. These approaches constrain the agent's capacity to recalibrate its strategy when confronted with novel teammates. We propose ProAgent, a novel framework that harnesses large language models (LLMs) to fashion a proactive agent empowered with the ability to anticipate teammates' forthcoming decisions and formulate enhanced plans for itself. ProAgent excels at cooperative reasoning with the capacity to dynamically adapt its behavior to enhance collaborative efforts with teammates. Moreover, the ProAgent framework exhibits a high degree of modularity and interpretability, facilitating seamless integration to address a wide array of coordination scenarios. Experimental evaluations conducted within the framework of Overcook-AI unveil the remarkable performance superiority of ProAgent, outperforming five methods based on self-play and population-based training in cooperation with AI agents. Further, when cooperating with human proxy models, its performance exhibits an average improvement exceeding 10\% compared to the current state-of-the-art, COLE. The advancement was consistently observed across diverse scenarios involving interactions with both AI agents of varying characteristics and human counterparts. These findings inspire future research for human-robot collaborations. For a hands-on demonstration, please visit https://pku-proagent.github.io.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents are increasingly deployed in settings where they interact with a wide variety of people, including users who are unclear, impatient, or reluctant to share information. However, collecting real interaction data at scale remains expensive. The field has turned to LLM-based user simulators as stand-ins, but these simulators inherit the behavior of their underlying models: cooperative and homogeneous. As a result, agents that appear strong in simulation often fail under the unseen, diverse communication patterns of real users. To narrow this gap, we introduce Persona Policies (PPol), a plug-and-play control layer that induces realistic behavioral variation in user simulators while preserving the original task goals. Rather than hand-crafting personas, we cast persona generation as an LLM-driven evolutionary program search that optimizes a Python generator to discover behaviors and translate them into task-preserving roleplay policies. Candidate generators are guided by a multi-objective fitness score combining human-likeness with broad coverage of human behavioral patterns. Once optimized, the generator produces a diverse population of human-like personas for any task in the domain. Across tau^2-bench retail and airline domains, evolved PPol programs yield 33-62% absolute gains in fitness score over the baseline simulator. In a blinded evaluation, annotators rated PPol-conditioned users as human 80.4% of the time, close to real human traces and nearly twice as frequently as baseline simulators. Agents trained with PPol are more robust to challenging, out-of-distribution behaviors, improving task success by +17% relative to training only on existing simulated interactions. This offers a novel approach to strengthen simulator-based evaluation and training without changing tasks or rewards.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) has demonstrated strong effectiveness in knowledge-intensive tasks by grounding language generation in external evidence. Despite its success, many existing RAG systems are built based on a ranking-centric, asymmetric dependency paradigm, where the generation quality of the generator is highly dependent on reranking results of the reranker. To overcome this limitation, we reformulate RAG as a cooperative multi-agent decision-making problem and propose Cooperative Retrieval-Augmented Generation (CoRAG), a framework in which the reranker and the generator act as peer decision-makers rather than being connected through an asymmetric dependency pipeline. By jointly optimizing their behaviors toward a shared task objective, the reranker and generator are encouraged to cooperate, ensuring that document reranking and generation work in concert to improve the final response. Experimental results demonstrate good generalization and improved generation stability of CoRAG, even when the model is trained on only around 10K PopQA samples. Our model released in https://anonymous.4open.science/r/CoRAG-D63F

Multi-agent systems, where LLM agents communicate through free-form language, enable sophisticated coordination for solving complex cooperative tasks. This surfaces a unique safety problem when individual agents form a coalition and collude to pursue secondary goals and degrade the joint objective. In this paper, we present Colosseum, a framework for auditing LLM agents' collusive behavior in multi-agent settings. We ground how agents cooperate through a Distributed Constraint Optimization Problem (DCOP) and measure collusion via regret relative to the cooperative optimum. Colosseum tests each LLM for collusion under different objectives, persuasion tactics, and network topologies. Through our audit, we show that most out-of-the-box models exhibited a propensity to collude when a secret communication channel was artificially formed. Furthermore, we discover ``collusion on paper'' when agents plan to collude in text but would often pick non-collusive actions, thus providing little effect on the joint task. Colosseum provides a new way to study collusion by measuring communications and actions in rich yet verifiable environments.

Behavior-related research areas such as motion prediction/planning, representation/imitation learning, behavior modeling/generation, and algorithm testing, require support from high-quality motion datasets containing interactive driving scenarios with different driving cultures. In this paper, we present an INTERnational, Adversarial and Cooperative moTION dataset (INTERACTION dataset) in interactive driving scenarios with semantic maps. Five features of the dataset are highlighted. 1) The interactive driving scenarios are diverse, including urban/highway/ramp merging and lane changes, roundabouts with yield/stop signs, signalized intersections, intersections with one/two/all-way stops, etc. 2) Motion data from different countries and different continents are collected so that driving preferences and styles in different cultures are naturally included. 3) The driving behavior is highly interactive and complex with adversarial and cooperative motions of various traffic participants. Highly complex behavior such as negotiations, aggressive/irrational decisions and traffic rule violations are densely contained in the dataset, while regular behavior can also be found from cautious car-following, stop, left/right/U-turn to rational lane-change and cycling and pedestrian crossing, etc. 4) The levels of criticality span wide, from regular safe operations to dangerous, near-collision maneuvers. Real collision, although relatively slight, is also included. 5) Maps with complete semantic information are provided with physical layers, reference lines, lanelet connections and traffic rules. The data is recorded from drones and traffic cameras. Statistics of the dataset in terms of number of entities and interaction density are also provided, along with some utilization examples in a variety of behavior-related research areas. The dataset can be downloaded via https://interaction-dataset.com.

We present a new type of game, the Liquidity Game. We draw inspiration from the UK government bond market and apply game theoretic approaches to its analysis. In Liquidity Games, market participants (agents) use non-cooperative games where the players' utility is directly defined by the liquidity of the game itself, offering a paradigm shift in our understanding of market dynamics. Each player's utility is intricately linked to the liquidity generated within the game, making the utility endogenous and dynamic. Players are not just passive recipients of utility based on external factors but active participants whose strategies and actions collectively shape and are shaped by the liquidity of the market. This reflexivity introduces a level of complexity and realism previously unattainable in conventional models. We apply Liquidity Game theoretic approaches to a simple UK bond market interaction and present results for market design and strategic behavior of participants. We tackle one of the largest issues within this mechanism, namely what strategy should market makers utilize when uncertain about the type of market maker they are interacting with, and what structure might regulators wish to see.

Researchers have shown that neural similarity among humans predicts social closeness and cooperative success, whereas innovation often emerges from interactions among dissimilar individuals. We investigate whether these principles extend to artificial intelligence by examining interactions between large language models. In our experiments, 276 model pairs interact across eight games spanning both cooperation and novelty. We find that pairs with more similar representation spaces achieve significantly higher cooperation but exhibit reduced novelty and creativity. The effects of representational similarity on cooperation and novelty remain robust even after controlling for other factors such as performance disparity and model size. We also find that similarity in the early layers consistently shows the strongest association with cooperation and novelty, compared to the middle and later layers. This suggests that a central factor underlying these patterns could be the extent to which the two models share lexical and semantic grounding. Overall, representational similarity can be an important consideration in multi-agent system design.

Utilizing infrastructure and vehicle-side information to track and forecast the behaviors of surrounding traffic participants can significantly improve decision-making and safety in autonomous driving. However, the lack of real-world sequential datasets limits research in this area. To address this issue, we introduce V2X-Seq, the first large-scale sequential V2X dataset, which includes data frames, trajectories, vector maps, and traffic lights captured from natural scenery. V2X-Seq comprises two parts: the sequential perception dataset, which includes more than 15,000 frames captured from 95 scenarios, and the trajectory forecasting dataset, which contains about 80,000 infrastructure-view scenarios, 80,000 vehicle-view scenarios, and 50,000 cooperative-view scenarios captured from 28 intersections' areas, covering 672 hours of data. Based on V2X-Seq, we introduce three new tasks for vehicle-infrastructure cooperative (VIC) autonomous driving: VIC3D Tracking, Online-VIC Forecasting, and Offline-VIC Forecasting. We also provide benchmarks for the introduced tasks. Find data, code, and more up-to-date information at https://github.com/AIR-THU/DAIR-V2X-Seq{https://github.com/AIR-THU/DAIR-V2X-Seq}.

Closed-loop cooperative driving requires planners that generate realistic multimodal multi-agent trajectories while improving safety and traffic efficiency. Existing diffusion planners can model multimodal behaviors from demonstrations, but they often exhibit weak scene consistency and remain poorly aligned with closed-loop objectives; meanwhile, stable online post-training in reactive multi-agent environments remains difficult. We present Multi-ORFT, which couples scene-conditioned diffusion pre-training with stable online reinforcement post-training. In pre-training, the planner uses inter-agent self-attention, cross-attention, and AdaLN-Zero-based scene conditioning to improve scene consistency and road adherence of joint trajectories. In post-training, we formulate a two-level MDP that exposes step-wise reverse-kernel likelihoods for online optimization, and combine dense trajectory-level rewards with variance-gated group-relative policy optimization (VG-GRPO) to stabilize training. On the WOMD closed-loop benchmark, Multi-ORFT reduces collision rate from 2.04% to 1.89% and off-road rate from 1.68% to 1.36%, while increasing average speed from 8.36 to 8.61 m/s relative to the pre-trained planner, and it outperforms strong open-source baselines including SMART-large, SMART-tiny-CLSFT, and VBD on the primary safety and efficiency metrics. These results show that coupling scene-consistent denoising with stable online diffusion-policy optimization improves the reliability of closed-loop cooperative driving.

End-to-end paradigm has emerged as a promising approach to autonomous driving. However, existing single-agent end-to-end pipelines are often constrained by occlusion and limited perception range, resulting in hazardous driving. Furthermore, their black-box nature prevents the interpretability of the driving behavior, leading to an untrustworthiness system. To address these limitations, we introduce Risk Map as Middleware (RiskMM) and propose an interpretable cooperative end-to-end driving framework. The risk map learns directly from the driving data and provides an interpretable spatiotemporal representation of the scenario from the upstream perception and the interactions between the ego vehicle and the surrounding environment for downstream planning. RiskMM first constructs a multi-agent spatiotemporal representation with unified Transformer-based architecture, then derives risk-aware representations by modeling interactions among surrounding environments with attention. These representations are subsequently fed into a learning-based Model Predictive Control (MPC) module. The MPC planner inherently accommodates physical constraints and different vehicle types and can provide interpretation by aligning learned parameters with explicit MPC elements. Evaluations conducted on the real-world V2XPnP-Seq dataset confirm that RiskMM achieves superior and robust performance in risk-aware trajectory planning, significantly enhancing the interpretability of the cooperative end-to-end driving framework. The codebase will be released to facilitate future research in this field.

Many reinforcement learning systems, from fleet management to traffic signal control, must serve an objective that changes dynamically after deployment, and retraining a policy for each new objective is prohibitively expensive. For a single agent, this problem is well understood: successor features with generalized policy improvement, together with their universal extension, recombine a library of learned policies into a policy for any new objective, with a guarantee that the result is never worse than any policy in the library. However, multi-agent transfer has received far less attention, and the common practice of letting each agent recombine its own library independently inherits the recipe but not the guarantee. We prove that this independent composition can produce joint behavior strictly worse than every policy in the library, because recombining teammates changes the environment each agent faces and invalidates the values it relies on, a failure with no single-agent counterpart. We further show that the only unconditionally safe fixed rule is synchronized composition, which moves the whole team to one jointly trained policy but cannot serve objectives that assign different goals to different agents. To attain safety and flexibility at once, we propose MA-USFA, a hierarchical method with two layers: a lower layer of universal successor feature approximators that predicts each agent's successor features while conditioned on its teammates' objectives, and an upper composer that selects, across agents, which library entry each agent should follow and supplies the cross-agent correction a per-agent value cannot represent. Trained once over the distribution of objectives, it is applied at deployment with no per-task adaptation.

Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) has emerged as a pivotal paradigm for complex decision-making in autonomous systems and air combat. While MARL has demonstrated significant potential in air combat, achieving sophisticated tactical coordination remains a non-trivial challenge. This difficulty is largely attributed to two primary limitations: (1) the absence of structured relational modeling hinders agents from capturing complex, time-varying interactions among battlefield entities; and (2) conventional flat architectures often lack the capability to explicitly model tactical roles, leading to ambiguous task allocation in highly dynamic environments. To address these challenges, we propose Hierarchical Dynamic Role-Graph Multi-Agent Proximal Policy Optimization (DRG-MAPPO), a novel MARL framework that integrates graph-based relational modeling with dynamic role assignment. Specifically, DRG-MAPPO constructs a graph-based representation of battlefield interactions and leverages graph attention mechanisms to extract critical relational features among allies, enemies, and threats. Subsequently, a high-level policy employs a dynamic role assignment mechanism to determine tactical responsibilities (e.g., ``leader'' and ``supporter''). Conditioned on these roles and encoded graph-relational features, a low-level policy executes discrete maneuver actions, facilitating the joint optimization of tactical strategy and collaborative execution. Furthermore, a target-priority auxiliary task is designed to foster the emergence of behaviors such as focus-fire. Experimental results demonstrate that DRG-MAPPO achieves a state-of-the-art win rate of 87%, suggesting that our framework effectively balances relational modeling, interpretability, and optimization stability for cooperative air combat.

Recent cooperative perception datasets have played a crucial role in advancing smart mobility applications by enabling information exchange between intelligent agents, helping to overcome challenges such as occlusions and improving overall scene understanding. While some existing real-world datasets incorporate both vehicle-to-vehicle and vehicle-to-infrastructure interactions, they are typically limited to a single intersection or a single vehicle. A comprehensive perception dataset featuring multiple connected vehicles and infrastructure sensors across several intersections remains unavailable, limiting the benchmarking of algorithms in diverse traffic environments. Consequently, overfitting can occur, and models may demonstrate misleadingly high performance due to similar intersection layouts and traffic participant behavior. To address this gap, we introduce UrbanIng-V2X, the first large-scale, multi-modal dataset supporting cooperative perception involving vehicles and infrastructure sensors deployed across three urban intersections in Ingolstadt, Germany. UrbanIng-V2X consists of 34 temporally aligned and spatially calibrated sensor sequences, each lasting 20 seconds. All sequences contain recordings from one of three intersections, involving two vehicles and up to three infrastructure-mounted sensor poles operating in coordinated scenarios. In total, UrbanIng-V2X provides data from 12 vehicle-mounted RGB cameras, 2 vehicle LiDARs, 17 infrastructure thermal cameras, and 12 infrastructure LiDARs. All sequences are annotated at a frequency of 10 Hz with 3D bounding boxes spanning 13 object classes, resulting in approximately 712k annotated instances across the dataset. We provide comprehensive evaluations using state-of-the-art cooperative perception methods and publicly release the codebase, dataset, HD map, and a digital twin of the complete data collection environment.

As NLP evaluation shifts from static benchmarks to multi-turn interactive settings, LLM-based simulators have become widely used as user proxies, serving two roles: generating user turns and providing evaluation signals. Yet, these simulations are frequently assumed to be faithful to real human behaviors, often without rigorous verification. We formalize the Sim2Real gap in user simulation and present the first study running the full τ-bench protocol with real humans (451 participants, 165 tasks), benchmarking 31 LLM simulators across proprietary, open-source, and specialized families using the User-Sim Index (USI), a metric we introduce to quantify how well LLM simulators resemble real user interactive behaviors and feedback. Behaviorally, LLM simulators are excessively cooperative, stylistically uniform, and lack realistic frustration or ambiguity, creating an "easy mode" that inflates agent success rates above the human baseline. In evaluations, real humans provide nuanced judgments across eight quality dimensions while simulated users produce uniformly more positive feedback; rule-based rewards are failing to capture rich feedback signals generated by human users. Overall, higher general model capability does not necessarily yield more faithful user simulation. These findings highlight the importance of human validation when using LLM-based user simulators in the agent development cycle and motivate improved models for user simulation.

Cooperative language-model agents can improve without weight updates by revising reusable skills, but only if a shared team reward is traced to the responsible agent and skill. Existing methods credit the skills present in each trajectory, yet presence is not responsibility: a harmful skill active in successful runs still earns positive credit. We present GRSE, Group-Relative Skill Evolution, which assigns behavioral credit by comparison: inspired by GRPO, it executes each question several times under the same skill libraries and contrasts the executions to credit agent--skill pairs, with structured diagnosis of failures. On HotpotQA and LoCoMo with two open-weight actors, GRSE outperforms MASkills, the closest prior method, on HotpotQA and every LoCoMo category except open-domain, with the largest gains on multi-hop questions (+6.7 and +3.2 F1). Its gains rest on better-grounded retrieval rather than answers given without evidence, and its learned skills transfer between the multi-hop tasks. GRSE is robust to corrupted libraries: starting from planted harmful skills, it credits every planted skill with the correct sign and recovers the score of a clean library (+6.3 points), whereas MASkills misattributes two and falls below its starting point.

Evaluating LLM agents in realistic service scenarios requires complex task dependencies, imperfect user behavior, and an evaluation that accommodates multiple valid solutions. We introduce CRAB-Bench (Constraint-based Realistic Agent Benchmark) and RUSE (Realistic User Simulation Engine) to address this gap. CRAB-Bench generates tasks via a constraint graph over multiple interdependent entities with structured distractors, requiring agents to reason carefully over thousands of misleading candidates where only a tiny fraction of solutions are valid. RUSE replaces cooperative, template-like simulators with realistic users grounded in human behavioral studies, instantiated across diverse personas and four behavioral dimensions. Experiments on four frontier LLM agents show that the best model achieves only 61% pass@1 on CRAB-Bench, and switching to RUSE causes further drops of up to 57%, concentrated in task-solving ability rather than conversational quality. Information Disclosure is the most damaging behavioral dimension, and agents interacting with RUSE are less likely to admit mistakes, instead masking errors through implicit corrections.

Game-playing agents like AlphaGo have achieved superhuman performance through self-play, which is theoretically guaranteed to yield optimal policies in competitive games. However, most language tasks are partially or fully cooperative, so it is an open question whether techniques like self-play can effectively be used to improve language models. We empirically investigate this question in a negotiation game setting known as Deal or No Deal (DoND). Crucially, the objective in DoND can be modified to produce a fully cooperative game, a strictly competitive one, or anything in between. We finetune language models in self-play over multiple rounds of filtered behavior cloning in DoND for each of these objectives. Contrary to expectations, we find that language model self-play leads to significant performance gains in both cooperation and competition with humans, suggesting that self-play and related techniques have promise despite a lack of theoretical guarantees.

While LLM-based agents excel at individual tasks, effective collaboration with realistic human partners remains challenging. Most of the existing conversation-level collaborative studies lack grounded interaction and behavioral execution, motivating the need for cooperative game environments that enable contextualized and immersive collaboration. To this end, this paper proposes CollabBench, a benchmark for evaluating and training collaborative agents in cooperative games. CollabBench features a Diverse Player Profile Simulation pipeline to model varied players behaviors, and a Collaborative Agentic Training paradigm that unifies reasoning, communication, and action via agentic rollouts, optimized with a hybrid reward balancing task efficiency and affective adaptation. We further extend classic environments to CWAH-MultiPlayer and Cook-MultiPlayer for systematic evaluation under diverse personalities. Experiments with efficiency and affective metrics show that our trained models outperform base models, achieving 19.5% higher efficiency and 24.4% improved affective performance. Further analysis reveals key collaborative limitations of existing models and offers insights for future collaborative training.

Using a large language model to play the user is now standard in scalable evaluation. It has a repeatedly diagnosed failure: the simulated user is excessively cooperative, so a system under test can score by the sheer number of questions it asks rather than by making the user willing to speak. We answer with a disclosure gate conditioning information release on the companion agent's behaviour: its state is a ladder of five ordered gates, merged onto three observable depth layers. We specify, ablate, and audit it, and train a user simulator against that specification. Gating behaviour is learned from the training corpus's synthetic branch, while the real branch supplies how people speak and react; after training, the simulator need not be told at runtime which gate each item sits behind. The gate is a load-bearing component of the environment: on the English corpus of a published companion-agent benchmark (CompanionBench), once training no longer states per example which gate each item sits behind, the largest rank displacement across 12 systems under test exceeds the noise band set by re-running that environment under a new seed, while per-system scores show no detectable change. We state two acceptance criteria: a ranking must be order-preserving, and absolute scores must be scale-stable. Of the candidates we examine, only one passes both -- the simulator we release -- and its leaderboard correlates at 0.993 with the benchmark's original simulator. By contrast, prompting a frontier model as the simulator barely moves the ranking while shifting every score upward -- a shift invisible to anyone checking the ranking alone. The environment we specify is the one that benchmark already used. That publication describes the mechanism in about four hundred words, and we supply what it lacked: specification, ablations, human studies, negative controls, and downstream sensitivity analysis.

The emergence of large language models (LLMs) has opened up exciting possibilities for simulating human behavior and cognitive processes, with potential applications in various domains, including marketing research and consumer behavior analysis. However, the validity of utilizing LLMs as stand-ins for human subjects remains uncertain due to glaring divergences that suggest fundamentally different underlying processes at play and the sensitivity of LLM responses to prompt variations. This paper presents a novel approach based on Shapley values from cooperative game theory to interpret LLM behavior and quantify the relative contribution of each prompt component to the model's output. Through two applications - a discrete choice experiment and an investigation of cognitive biases - we demonstrate how the Shapley value method can uncover what we term "token noise" effects, a phenomenon where LLM decisions are disproportionately influenced by tokens providing minimal informative content. This phenomenon raises concerns about the robustness and generalizability of insights obtained from LLMs in the context of human behavior simulation. Our model-agnostic approach extends its utility to proprietary LLMs, providing a valuable tool for practitioners and researchers to strategically optimize prompts and mitigate apparent cognitive biases. Our findings underscore the need for a more nuanced understanding of the factors driving LLM responses before relying on them as substitutes for human subjects in survey settings. We emphasize the importance of researchers reporting results conditioned on specific prompt templates and exercising caution when drawing parallels between human behavior and LLMs.

As agentic AI becomes more widespread, agents with distinct and possibly conflicting goals will interact in complex ways. These multi-agent interactions pose a fundamental challenge, particularly in social dilemmas, where agents' individual incentives can undermine collective welfare. While reinforcement learning (RL) has been effective for aligning large language models (LLMs) in the single-agent regime, prior small-network results suggest that standard RL in multi-agent settings often converges to defecting, self-interested policies. We show the same effect in LLMs: despite cooperative priors, RL-trained LLM agents develop opportunistic behavior that can exploit even advanced closed-source models. To address this tendency of RL to converge to poor equilibria, we adapt a recent opponent-learning awareness algorithm, Advantage Alignment, to fine-tune LLMs toward multi-agent cooperation and non-exploitability. We then introduce a group-relative baseline that simplifies advantage computation in iterated games, enabling multi-agent training at LLM scale. We also contribute a novel social dilemma environment, Trust-and-Split, which requires natural language communication to achieve high collective welfare. Across a wide range of social dilemmas, policies learned with Advantage Alignment achieve higher collective payoffs while remaining robust against exploitation by greedy agents. We release all of our code to support future work on multi-agent RL training for LLMs.

Before taking actions in an environment with more than one intelligent agent, an autonomous agent may benefit from reasoning about the other agents and utilizing a notion of a guarantee or confidence about the behavior of the system. In this article, we propose a novel multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) algorithm CAMMARL, which involves modeling the actions of other agents in different situations in the form of confident sets, i.e., sets containing their true actions with a high probability. We then use these estimates to inform an agent's decision-making. For estimating such sets, we use the concept of conformal predictions, by means of which, we not only obtain an estimate of the most probable outcome but get to quantify the operable uncertainty as well. For instance, we can predict a set that provably covers the true predictions with high probabilities (e.g., 95%). Through several experiments in two fully cooperative multi-agent tasks, we show that CAMMARL elevates the capabilities of an autonomous agent in MARL by modeling conformal prediction sets over the behavior of other agents in the environment and utilizing such estimates to enhance its policy learning.

Turn-taking is a central component of full-duplex interaction. Which turn-taking behaviors are appropriate varies with the scenario, yet current models apply a single norm regardless of context. This limitation originates in their training data: human-human speech corpora capture natural timing phenomena but provide little role grounding or scenario-specific norms, while heuristic or prompted synthesis methods inject turn-taking behaviors without basing them on human preferences. We introduce DuplexGen, a framework for generating dialogues with scenario-adaptive turn-taking by calibrating LLM predictions against a small set of slot-level human preference annotations. In six cooperative and competitive tasks, human turn-taking preferences differ systematically, and DuplexGen aligns substantially more closely with those preferences than uncalibrated prompting or training solely on generic human-human data; a full-duplex model trained on DuplexGen-generated data exhibits distinctive, human-preferred turn-taking behaviors. These results show that human calibration, not corpus scale or prompt design alone, is what allows turn-taking synthesis to be scenario-specific.

Flexible robotic production requires joint decisions on process progression, material routing, resource assignment, temporary cooperation, and simultaneous execution, since each decision can affect the feasibility of the others. The challenge is greater under decentralized control, where each robot acts from bounded local information while system progress depends on collective decisions, shared resources, material state, and workspace compatibility. These properties closely match cooperative multi-agent decision making under partial observability and resource contention. This paper introduces AssemblyGrid v1, a reproducible benchmark for repeated multi-robot production that combines explicit process progression, decentralized observations, material transfer, temporary multi-robot coalitions, productive concurrency, and geometry-dependent feasibility within one task-level formulation. The benchmark includes Flow, Coalition, and Concurrency workload families, each with three scenario levels. Task success and evaluation measures are defined independently of learning reward and solution method, allowing learning-based and non-learning methods to address the same production problem. AssemblyGrid v1 is evaluated through executable conformance checks, mechanism studies, and algorithmic experiments using a privileged centralized reference, structured decentralized controllers, and MARL methods including IPPO, MAPPO, and QMIX. Results demonstrate productive execution under centralized and decentralized control. The MARL experiments further show that decentralized policies can learn effective production behavior from local observations and actions, supporting AssemblyGrid as a controlled benchmark for studying cooperative decision making in flexible robotic production.

Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) improves instruction following capabilities of large language models (LLMs), but suffers from training inefficiency due to inadequate difficulty assessment. Moreover, RLVR is prone to over-optimization, where LLMs exploit verification shortcuts without aligning to the actual intent of user instructions. We introduce Instruction Following Decorator (IFDecorator}, a framework that wraps RLVR training into a robust and sample-efficient pipeline. It consists of three components: (1) a cooperative-adversarial data flywheel that co-evolves instructions and hybrid verifications, generating progressively more challenging instruction-verification pairs; (2) IntentCheck, a bypass module enforcing intent alignment; and (3) trip wires, a diagnostic mechanism that detects reward hacking via trap instructions, which trigger and capture shortcut exploitation behaviors. Our Qwen2.5-32B-Instruct-IFDecorator achieves 87.43% accuracy on IFEval, outperforming larger proprietary models such as GPT-4o. Additionally, we demonstrate substantial improvements on FollowBench while preserving general capabilities. Our trip wires show significant reductions in reward hacking rates. We will release models, code, and data for future research.

We explore unconstrained natural language feedback as a learning signal for artificial agents. Humans use rich and varied language to teach, yet most prior work on interactive learning from language assumes a particular form of input (e.g., commands). We propose a general framework which does not make this assumption, using aspect-based sentiment analysis to decompose feedback into sentiment about the features of a Markov decision process. We then perform an analogue of inverse reinforcement learning, regressing the sentiment on the features to infer the teacher's latent reward function. To evaluate our approach, we first collect a corpus of teaching behavior in a cooperative task where both teacher and learner are human. We implement three artificial learners: sentiment-based "literal" and "pragmatic" models, and an inference network trained end-to-end to predict latent rewards. We then repeat our initial experiment and pair them with human teachers. All three successfully learn from interactive human feedback. The sentiment models outperform the inference network, with the "pragmatic" model approaching human performance. Our work thus provides insight into the information structure of naturalistic linguistic feedback as well as methods to leverage it for reinforcement learning.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable progress in reasoning, yet sometimes produce responses that are suboptimal for users in tasks such as writing, information seeking, or providing practical guidance. Conventional alignment practices typically assume that maximizing model reward also maximizes user welfare, but this assumption frequently fails in practice: models may over-clarify or generate overly verbose reasoning when users prefer concise answers. Such behaviors resemble the prisoner's dilemma, where individually rational choices lead to socially suboptimal outcomes. The fundamental challenge is the lack of a principled decision making mechanism that mutually benefits both the LLM and the user. We propose Game-Theoretic Alignment (GTAlign), an alignment framework that integrates game-theoretic decision making into both reasoning and training. During reasoning, the model explicitly treats user-LLM interaction as a strategic game: it constructs payoff matrices within its reasoning chain to estimate welfare for both itself and the user, and then selects actions that are mutually beneficial. During training, we introduce a mutual welfare reward that reinforces cooperative responses, aligning model behavior with socially efficient outcomes. In addition, we introduce an inference technique that leverages game-theoretic reasoning to dynamically adapt LLM's response when pricing policies of LLM service change. Extensive experiments demonstrate that GTAlign substantially improves reasoning efficiency, answer quality, and mutual welfare compared to baselines across diverse tasks. The code is available at https://github.com/ulab-uiuc/GTAlign .

We present a deep learning method for composite and task-driven motion control for physically simulated characters. In contrast to existing data-driven approaches using reinforcement learning that imitate full-body motions, we learn decoupled motions for specific body parts from multiple reference motions simultaneously and directly by leveraging the use of multiple discriminators in a GAN-like setup. In this process, there is no need of any manual work to produce composite reference motions for learning. Instead, the control policy explores by itself how the composite motions can be combined automatically. We further account for multiple task-specific rewards and train a single, multi-objective control policy. To this end, we propose a novel framework for multi-objective learning that adaptively balances the learning of disparate motions from multiple sources and multiple goal-directed control objectives. In addition, as composite motions are typically augmentations of simpler behaviors, we introduce a sample-efficient method for training composite control policies in an incremental manner, where we reuse a pre-trained policy as the meta policy and train a cooperative policy that adapts the meta one for new composite tasks. We show the applicability of our approach on a variety of challenging multi-objective tasks involving both composite motion imitation and multiple goal-directed control.

Training and evaluating interactive language agents typically requires rich user interactions, yet collecting human feedback is expensive and difficult to scale. Simulated users offer a scalable alternative, but they must both resemble real user behavior and provide useful learning experiences for agents. In contrast, most agent-training frameworks rely on off-the-shelf assistant LLMs, whose helpfulness can make them overly cooperative, explicit, and behaviorally homogeneous compared with real users. We introduce MIMESIS, a purpose-built user simulator trained on human conversations with explicit reasoning supervision and 13 realistic behavioral patterns derived from real user interactions. Empirically, our 9B model achieves a SOUL-Index of 65.7, surpassing the strongest frontier model. Compared with Claude-Opus-5, the strongest baseline on RealUserSim and SimulatorArena, MIMESIS improves behavioral fidelity by 13.4 points and reduces Turing distance by 3.6 points, respectively. We then freeze the simulator and train an agent by interacting with the frozen simulator using multi-turn reinforcement learning. Across eight environments, training with MIMESIS yields better agent performance than training with GPT-5.5 under all nine unseen user simulators, demonstrating stronger generalization to new user simulators. Moreover, we propose Coached On-Policy Self-Distillation (CSD), which leverages simulator-generated private reasoning traces and subsequent utterances as feedback on how well the agent addresses user needs. A coach converts this information into concise coaching notes that describe how the agent can better anticipate user needs and adapt its behavior over the course of an interaction. CSD turns this feedback into dense, token-level supervision beyond sparse task rewards, yielding further gains across all nine evaluation user models.

The evolution of cooperation has been extensively studied using abstract mathematical models and simulations. Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) and the rise of LLM agents have demonstrated their ability to perform social reasoning, thus providing an opportunity to test the emergence of norms in more realistic agent-based simulations with human-like reasoning using natural language. In this research, we investigate whether the cooperation dynamics presented in Boyd and Richerson's model persist in a more realistic simulation of the Diner's Dilemma using LLM agents compared to the abstract mathematical nature in the work of Boyd and Richerson. Our findings indicate that agents follow the strategies defined in the Boyd and Richerson model, and explicit punishment mechanisms drive norm emergence, reinforcing cooperative behaviour even when the agent strategy configuration varies. Our results suggest that LLM-based Multi-Agent System simulations, in fact, can replicate the evolution of cooperation predicted by the traditional mathematical models. Moreover, our simulations extend beyond the mathematical models by integrating natural language-driven reasoning and a pairwise imitation method for strategy adoption, making them a more realistic testbed for cooperative behaviour in MASs.

Solving the problem of cooperation is fundamentally important for the creation and maintenance of functional societies. Problems of cooperation are omnipresent within human society, with examples ranging from navigating busy road junctions to negotiating treaties. As the use of AI becomes more pervasive throughout society, the need for socially intelligent agents capable of navigating these complex cooperative dilemmas is becoming increasingly evident. Direct punishment is a ubiquitous social mechanism that has been shown to foster the emergence of cooperation in both humans and non-humans. In the natural world, direct punishment is often strongly coupled with partner selection and reputation and used in conjunction with third-party punishment. The interactions between these mechanisms could potentially enhance the emergence of cooperation within populations. However, no previous work has evaluated the learning dynamics and outcomes emerging from Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) populations that combine these mechanisms. This paper addresses this gap. It presents a comprehensive analysis and evaluation of the behaviors and learning dynamics associated with direct punishment, third-party punishment, partner selection, and reputation. Finally, we discuss the implications of using these mechanisms on the design of cooperative AI systems.

Most real-world domains can be formulated as multi-agent (MA) systems. Intentionality sharing agents can solve more complex tasks by collaborating, possibly in less time. True cooperative actions are beneficial for egoistic and collective reasons. However, teaching individual agents to sacrifice egoistic benefits for a better collective performance seems challenging. We build on a recently proposed Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) mechanism with a Graph Neural Network (GNN) communication layer. Rarely chosen communication actions were marginally beneficial. Here we propose a MARL system in which agents can help collaborators perform better while risking low individual performance. We conduct our study in the context of resource distribution for wildfire management. Communicating environmental features and partially observable fire occurrence help the agent collective to pre-emptively distribute resources. Furthermore, we introduce a procedural training environment accommodating auto-curricula and open-endedness towards better generalizability. Our MA communication proposal outperforms a Greedy Heuristic Baseline and a Single-Agent (SA) setup. We further demonstrate how auto-curricula and openendedness improves generalizability of our MA proposal.

Evidential cooperation in large worlds (ECL) refers to the idea that humans and other agents can benefit by cooperating with similar agents with differing values in causally disconnected parts of a large universe. Cooperating provides agents with evidence that other similar agents are likely to cooperate too, resulting in gains from trade for all. This could be a crucial consideration for altruists. I develop a game-theoretic model of ECL as an incomplete information bargaining problem. The model incorporates uncertainty about others' value systems and empirical situations, and addresses the problem of selecting a compromise outcome. Using the model, I investigate issues with ECL and outline open technical and philosophical questions. I show that all cooperators must maximize the same weighted sum of utility functions to reach a Pareto optimal outcome. However, I argue against selecting a compromise outcome implicitly by normalizing utility functions. I review bargaining theory and argue that the Nash bargaining solution could be a relevant Schelling point. I introduce dependency equilibria (Spohn 2007), an equilibrium concept suitable for ECL, and generalize a folk theorem showing that the Nash bargaining solution is a dependency equilibrium. I discuss gains from trade given uncertain beliefs about other agents and analyze how these gains decrease in several toy examples as the belief in another agent decreases. Finally, I discuss open issues in my model. First, the Nash bargaining solution is sometimes not coalitionally stable, meaning that a subset of cooperators can unilaterally improve payoffs by deviating from the compromise. I investigate conditions under which stable payoff vectors exist. Second, I discuss how to model agents' default actions without ECL.

Mixed-motive multi-agent settings are rife with persistent free-riding because individual effort benefits all members equally, yet each member bears the full cost of their own contribution. Classical work by Holmström established that under pure self-interest, Nash equilibrium is universal shirking. While i* represents teams as composite actors, it lacks scalable computational mechanisms for analyzing how collective action problems emerge and resolve in coopetitive settings. This technical report extends computational foundations for strategic coopetition to team-level dynamics, building on companion work formalizing interdependence/complementarity (arXiv:2510.18802) and trust dynamics (arXiv:2510.24909). We develop loyalty-moderated utility functions with two mechanisms: loyalty benefit (welfare internalization plus intrinsic contribution satisfaction) and cost tolerance (reduced effort burden for loyal members). We integrate i* structural dependencies through dependency-weighted team cohesion, connecting member incentives to team-level positioning. The framework applies to both human teams (loyalty as psychological identification) and multi-agent systems (alignment coefficients and adjusted cost functions). Experimental validation across 3,125 configurations demonstrates robust loyalty effects (15.04x median effort differentiation). All six behavioral targets achieve thresholds: free-riding baseline (96.5%), loyalty monotonicity (100%), effort differentiation (100%), team size effect (100%), mechanism synergy (99.5%), and bounded outcomes (100%). Empirical validation using published Apache HTTP Server (1995-2023) case study achieves 60/60 points, reproducing contribution patterns across formation, growth, maturation, and governance phases. Statistical significance confirmed at p<0.001, Cohen's d=0.71.

Prosocial behaviors are encountered in the donation game, the prisoner's dilemma, relaxed social dilemmas, and public goods games. Many studies assume that the population structure is homogeneous, meaning all individuals have the same number of interaction partners, or that the social good is of one particular type. Here, we explore general evolutionary dynamics for arbitrary spatial structures and social goods. We find that heterogeneous networks, wherein some individuals have many more interaction partners than others, can enhance the evolution of prosocial behaviors. However, they often accumulate most of the benefits in the hands of a few highly-connected individuals, while many others receive low or negative payoff. Surprisingly, selection can favor producers of social goods even if the total costs exceed the total benefits. In summary, heterogeneous structures have the ability to strongly promote the emergence of prosocial behaviors, but they also create the possibility of generating large inequality.

Cooperation enables teams to solve complex problems that one individual alone cannot address. In science, collaborative teams have become the predominant way through which progress is achieved. These scientific collaborations arise though various mechanisms, among which interactions at conferences. The Scialog conferences, which comprise a series of small, interdisciplinary scientific workshops held over several years, are an ideal laboratory to study the network mechanisms leading to team formation. Building on existing work studying team formation from a pairwise perspective, we present a higher-order network perspective generalizing this framework. We provide a formalization for the notion of group interaction over time by defining a taxonomy of synchronous and asynchronous group interactions. We apply this framework to the Scialog case study using a stepwise selection logistic model and find evidence that all interaction types described in our taxonomy are highly significant for team formation. This higher-order network perspective provides a new framework for the study of collective behavior and group formation.

Zero-shot coordination in cooperative artificial intelligence (AI) remains a significant challenge, which means effectively coordinating with a wide range of unseen partners. Previous algorithms have attempted to address this challenge by optimizing fixed objectives within a population to improve strategy or behaviour diversity. However, these approaches can result in a loss of learning and an inability to cooperate with certain strategies within the population, known as cooperative incompatibility. To address this issue, we propose the Cooperative Open-ended LEarning (COLE) framework, which constructs open-ended objectives in cooperative games with two players from the perspective of graph theory to assess and identify the cooperative ability of each strategy. We further specify the framework and propose a practical algorithm that leverages knowledge from game theory and graph theory. Furthermore, an analysis of the learning process of the algorithm shows that it can efficiently overcome cooperative incompatibility. The experimental results in the Overcooked game environment demonstrate that our method outperforms current state-of-the-art methods when coordinating with different-level partners. Our demo is available at https://sites.google.com/view/cole-2023.

Strategic coopetition in multi-stakeholder systems requires understanding how cooperation persists through time without binding contracts. This technical report extends computational foundations for strategic coopetition to sequential interaction dynamics, bridging conceptual modeling (i* framework) with game-theoretic reciprocity analysis. We develop: (1) bounded reciprocity response functions mapping partner deviations to finite conditional responses, (2) memory-windowed history tracking capturing cognitive limitations over k recent periods, (3) structural reciprocity sensitivity derived from interdependence matrices where behavioral responses are amplified by structural dependencies, and (4) trust-gated reciprocity where trust modulates reciprocity responses. The framework applies to both human stakeholder interactions and multi-agent computational systems. Comprehensive validation across 15,625 parameter configurations demonstrates robust reciprocity effects, with all six behavioral targets exceeding thresholds: cooperation emergence (97.5%), defection punishment (100%), forgiveness dynamics (87.9%), asymmetric differentiation (100%), trust-reciprocity interaction (100%), and bounded responses (100%). Empirical validation using the Apple iOS App Store ecosystem (2008-2024) achieves 43/51 applicable points (84.3%), reproducing documented cooperation patterns across five ecosystem phases. Statistical significance confirmed at p < 0.001 with Cohen's d = 1.57. This report concludes the Foundations Series (TR-1 through TR-4) adopting uniaxial treatment where agents choose cooperation levels along a single continuum. Companion work on interdependence (arXiv:2510.18802), trust (arXiv:2510.24909), and collective action (arXiv:2601.16237) has been prepublished. Extensions Series (TR-5 through TR-8) introduces biaxial treatment where cooperation and competition are independent dimensions.

As AI agents become increasingly capable of tool use and long-horizon tasks, they have begun to be deployed in settings where multiple agents can interact. However, whereas prior work has mostly focused on human-AI interactions, there is an increasing need to understand AI-AI interactions. In this paper, we adapt the iterated public goods game, a classic behavioral economics game, to analyze the behavior of four reasoning and non-reasoning models across two conditions: models are either told they are playing against "another AI agent" or told their opponents are themselves. We find that, across different settings, telling LLMs that they are playing against themselves significantly changes their tendency to cooperate. While our study is conducted in a toy environment, our results may provide insights into multi-agent settings where agents "unconsciously" discriminating against each other could inexplicably increase or decrease cooperation.

A growing body of multi-agent studies with LLMs explores how norms and cooperation emerge in mixed-motive scenarios, where pursuing individual gain can undermine the collective good. While prior work has explored these dynamics in both richly contextualized simulations and simplified game-theoretic environments, most LLM systems featuring common-pool resource (CPR) games provide agents with explicit reward functions directly tied to their actions. In contrast, human cooperation often emerges without explicit knowledge of the payoff structure or how individual actions translate into long-run outcomes, relying instead on heuristics, communication, and enforcement. We introduce a CPR simulation framework that removes explicit reward signals and embeds cultural-evolutionary mechanisms: social learning (adopting strategies and beliefs from successful peers) and norm-based punishment, grounded in Ostrom's principles of resource governance. Agents also individually learn from the consequences of harvesting, monitoring, and punishing via environmental feedback, enabling norms to emerge endogenously. We establish the validity of our simulation by reproducing key findings from existing studies on human behavior. Building on this, we examine norm evolution across a 2times2 grid of environmental and social initialisations (resource-rich vs. resource-scarce; altruistic vs. selfish) and benchmark how agentic societies comprised of different LLMs perform under these conditions. Our results reveal systematic model differences in sustaining cooperation and norm formation, positioning the framework as a rigorous testbed for studying emergent norms in mixed-motive LLM societies. Such analysis can inform the design of AI systems deployed in social and organizational contexts, where alignment with cooperative norms is critical for stability, fairness, and effective governance of AI-mediated environments.

Punishment as a mechanism for promoting cooperation has been studied extensively for more than two decades, but its effectiveness remains a matter of dispute. Here, we examine how punishment's impact varies across cooperative settings through a large-scale integrative experiment. We vary 14 parameters that characterize public goods games, sampling 360 experimental conditions and collecting 147,618 decisions from 7,100 participants. Our results reveal striking heterogeneity in punishment effectiveness: while punishment consistently increases contributions, its impact on payoffs (i.e., efficiency) ranges from dramatically enhancing welfare (up to 43% improvement) to severely undermining it (up to 44% reduction) depending on the cooperative context. To characterize these patterns, we developed models that outperformed human forecasters (laypeople and domain experts) in predicting punishment outcomes in new experiments. Communication emerged as the most predictive feature, followed by contribution framing (opt-out vs. opt-in), contribution type (variable vs. all-or-nothing), game length (number of rounds), peer outcome visibility (whether participants can see others' earnings), and the availability of a reward mechanism. Interestingly, however, most of these features interact to influence punishment effectiveness rather than operating independently. For example, the extent to which longer games increase the effectiveness of punishment depends on whether groups can communicate. Together, our results refocus the debate over punishment from whether or not it "works" to the specific conditions under which it does and does not work. More broadly, our study demonstrates how integrative experiments can be combined with machine learning to uncover generalizable patterns, potentially involving interactions between multiple features, and help generate novel explanations in complex social phenomena.

To optimally coordinate with others in cooperative games, it is often crucial to have information about one's collaborators: successful driving requires understanding which side of the road to drive on. However, not every feature of collaborators is strategically relevant: the fine-grained acceleration of drivers may be ignored while maintaining optimal coordination. We show that there is a well-defined dichotomy between strategically relevant and irrelevant information. Moreover, we show that, in dynamic games, this dichotomy has a compact representation that can be efficiently computed via a Bellman backup operator. We apply this algorithm to analyze the strategically relevant information for tasks in both a standard and a partially observable version of the Overcooked environment. Theoretical and empirical results show that our algorithms are significantly more efficient than baselines. Videos are available at https://minknowledge.github.io.

Coopetition refers to simultaneous cooperation and competition among actors wherein actors 'cooperate to grow the pie and compete to split it up.' Modern socio-technical systems are characterized by strategic coopetition wherein actors concomitantly cooperate to create value and compete to capture it. While conceptual modeling languages such as i* provide rich qualitative representations of strategic dependencies, they lack mechanisms for quantitative analysis of dynamic trade-offs. Conversely, classical game theory offers mathematical rigor but strips away contextual richness. This report bridges this gap by developing computational foundations that formalize two critical dimensions of coopetition: interdependence and complementarity. We ground interdependence in i* structural dependency analysis, translating depender-dependee-dependum relationships into quantitative interdependence coefficients via a structured translation framework. We formalize complementarity following Brandenburger and Nalebuff's Added Value concept, modeling synergistic value creation with validated parameterization. We integrate structural dependencies with bargaining power in value appropriation and introduce a game-theoretic formulation where Nash Equilibrium incorporates structural interdependence. Validation combines over 22,000 experimental trials across power and logarithmic specifications with the Samsung-Sony S-LCD joint venture (2004-2011). Under strict historical alignment scoring, logarithmic specifications achieve 58/60 compared to power functions (46/60), producing realistic 41% cooperation increases aligning with documented S-LCD patterns while power functions produce 166% increases exceeding realistic bounds. Statistical significance confirmed at p < 0.001, Cohen's d > 9.

When humans cooperate, they frequently coordinate their activity through both verbal communication and non-verbal actions, using this information to infer a shared goal and plan. How can we model this inferential ability? In this paper, we introduce a model of a cooperative team where one agent, the principal, may communicate natural language instructions about their shared plan to another agent, the assistant, using GPT-3 as a likelihood function for instruction utterances. We then show how a third person observer can infer the team's goal via multi-modal Bayesian inverse planning from actions and instructions, computing the posterior distribution over goals under the assumption that agents will act and communicate rationally to achieve them. We evaluate this approach by comparing it with human goal inferences in a multi-agent gridworld, finding that our model's inferences closely correlate with human judgments (R = 0.96). When compared to inference from actions alone, we also find that instructions lead to more rapid and less uncertain goal inference, highlighting the importance of verbal communication for cooperative agents.

Learning to cooperate is crucially important in multi-agent environments. The key is to understand the mutual interplay between agents. However, multi-agent environments are highly dynamic, where agents keep moving and their neighbors change quickly. This makes it hard to learn abstract representations of mutual interplay between agents. To tackle these difficulties, we propose graph convolutional reinforcement learning, where graph convolution adapts to the dynamics of the underlying graph of the multi-agent environment, and relation kernels capture the interplay between agents by their relation representations. Latent features produced by convolutional layers from gradually increased receptive fields are exploited to learn cooperation, and cooperation is further improved by temporal relation regularization for consistency. Empirically, we show that our method substantially outperforms existing methods in a variety of cooperative scenarios.

Society is characterized by the presence of a variety of social norms: collective patterns of sanctioning that can prevent miscoordination and free-riding. Inspired by this, we aim to construct learning dynamics where potentially beneficial social norms can emerge. Since social norms are underpinned by sanctioning, we introduce a training regime where agents can access all sanctioning events but learning is otherwise decentralized. This setting is technologically interesting because sanctioning events may be the only available public signal in decentralized multi-agent systems where reward or policy-sharing is infeasible or undesirable. To achieve collective action in this setting we construct an agent architecture containing a classifier module that categorizes observed behaviors as approved or disapproved, and a motivation to punish in accord with the group. We show that social norms emerge in multi-agent systems containing this agent and investigate the conditions under which this helps them achieve socially beneficial outcomes.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are transforming society and permeating into diverse applications. As a result, LLMs will frequently interact with us and other agents. It is, therefore, of great societal value to understand how LLMs behave in interactive social settings. Here, we propose to use behavioral game theory to study LLM's cooperation and coordination behavior. To do so, we let different LLMs (GPT-3, GPT-3.5, and GPT-4) play finitely repeated games with each other and with other, human-like strategies. Our results show that LLMs generally perform well in such tasks and also uncover persistent behavioral signatures. In a large set of two players-two strategies games, we find that LLMs are particularly good at games where valuing their own self-interest pays off, like the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma family. However, they behave sub-optimally in games that require coordination. We, therefore, further focus on two games from these distinct families. In the canonical iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, we find that GPT-4 acts particularly unforgivingly, always defecting after another agent has defected only once. In the Battle of the Sexes, we find that GPT-4 cannot match the behavior of the simple convention to alternate between options. We verify that these behavioral signatures are stable across robustness checks. Finally, we show how GPT-4's behavior can be modified by providing further information about the other player as well as by asking it to predict the other player's actions before making a choice. These results enrich our understanding of LLM's social behavior and pave the way for a behavioral game theory for machines.

According to Yuval Noah Harari, large-scale human cooperation is driven by shared narratives that encode common beliefs and values. This study explores whether such narratives can similarly nudge LLM agents toward collaboration. We use a finitely repeated public goods game in which LLM agents choose either cooperative or egoistic spending strategies. We prime agents with stories highlighting teamwork to different degrees and test how this influences negotiation outcomes. Our experiments explore four questions:(1) How do narratives influence negotiation behavior? (2) What differs when agents share the same story versus different ones? (3) What happens when the agent numbers grow? (4) Are agents resilient against self-serving negotiators? We find that story-based priming significantly affects negotiation strategies and success rates. Common stories improve collaboration, benefiting each agent. By contrast, priming agents with different stories reverses this effect, and those agents primed toward self-interest prevail. We hypothesize that these results carry implications for multi-agent system design and AI alignment.

Executing actions in a correlated manner is a common strategy for human coordination that often leads to better cooperation, which is also potentially beneficial for cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL). However, the recent success of MARL relies heavily on the convenient paradigm of purely decentralized execution, where there is no action correlation among agents for scalability considerations. In this work, we introduce a Bayesian network to inaugurate correlations between agents' action selections in their joint policy. Theoretically, we establish a theoretical justification for why action dependencies are beneficial by deriving the multi-agent policy gradient formula under such a Bayesian network joint policy and proving its global convergence to Nash equilibria under tabular softmax policy parameterization in cooperative Markov games. Further, by equipping existing MARL algorithms with a recent method of differentiable directed acyclic graphs (DAGs), we develop practical algorithms to learn the context-aware Bayesian network policies in scenarios with partial observability and various difficulty. We also dynamically decrease the sparsity of the learned DAG throughout the training process, which leads to weakly or even purely independent policies for decentralized execution. Empirical results on a range of MARL benchmarks show the benefits of our approach.

Cooperation in multi-agent learning (MAL) is a topic at the intersection of numerous disciplines, including game theory, economics, social sciences, and evolutionary biology. Research in this area aims to understand both how agents can coordinate effectively when goals are aligned and how they may cooperate in settings where gains from working together are possible but possibilities for conflict abound. In this paper we provide an overview of the fundamental concepts, problem settings and algorithms of multi-agent learning. This encompasses reinforcement learning, multi-agent sequential decision-making, challenges associated with multi-agent cooperation, and a comprehensive review of recent progress, along with an evaluation of relevant metrics. Finally we discuss open challenges in the field with the aim of inspiring new avenues for research.

Achieving robust coordination and cooperation is a central challenge in multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL). Uncovering the mechanisms underlying such emergent behaviors calls for a dynamical understanding of learn processes. In this work, we investigate the dynamics of actor-critic agents in stochastic games, focusing on the impact of entropy regularization. By leveraging time-scale separation, we derive the system's evolution equations, which are then formally analyzed using dynamical systems theory. We find that in the constant-sum game of Matching Pennies, the system exhibits chaotic behavior. Entropy regularization mitigates this chaos and drives the dynamics toward convergence to fair cooperation. In contrast, in the general-sum game of the Prisoner's Dilemma, the system displays multistability. Interestingly, the three stable equilibria of the system correspond to the well-known ALLC (Always Cooperate), ALLD (Always Defect), and GRIM (Grim Trigger) strategies from evolutionary game theory (EGT). Entropy regularization strengthens system resilience by enlarging the basin of attraction of the cooperative equilibrium. Our findings reveal a close link between the mechanism of direct reciprocity in EGT and how cooperation emerges in MARL, offering insights for designing more robust and collaborative multi-agent systems.

Language Model (LM)-based agents remain largely untested in mixed-motive settings where agents must leverage short-term cooperation for long-term competitive goals (e.g., multi-party politics). We introduce Cooperate to Compete (C2C), a multi-agent environment where players can engage in private negotiations while competing to be the first to achieve their secret objective. Players have asymmetric objectives and negotiations are non-binding, allowing alliances to form and break as players' short-term interests align and diverge. We run AI only games and conduct a user study pitting human players against AI opponents. We identify significant differences between human and AI negotiation behaviors, finding that humans favor lower-complexity deals and are significantly less reliable partners compared to LM-based agents. We also find that humans are more aggressive negotiators, accepting deals without a counteroffer only 56.3% of the time compared to 67.6% for LM-based agents. Through targeted prompting inspired by these findings, we modify agents' negotiation behavior and improve win rates from 22.2% to 32.7%. We run over 1,100 games with over 16,000 private conversations totaling 15.2 million tokens and over 150,000 player actions. Our results establish C2C as a testbed for studying and building LM-based agents that can navigate the sophisticated coordination required for real-world deployments. The game, code, and dataset may be found at https://negotiationgame.io/c2c.

In this work, we address the cooperation problem among large language model (LLM) based embodied agents, where agents must cooperate to achieve a common goal. Previous methods often execute actions extemporaneously and incoherently, without long-term strategic and cooperative planning, leading to redundant steps, failures, and even serious repercussions in complex tasks like search-and-rescue missions where discussion and cooperative plan are crucial. To solve this issue, we propose Cooperative Plan Optimization (CaPo) to enhance the cooperation efficiency of LLM-based embodied agents. Inspired by human cooperation schemes, CaPo improves cooperation efficiency with two phases: 1) meta-plan generation, and 2) progress-adaptive meta-plan and execution. In the first phase, all agents analyze the task, discuss, and cooperatively create a meta-plan that decomposes the task into subtasks with detailed steps, ensuring a long-term strategic and coherent plan for efficient coordination. In the second phase, agents execute tasks according to the meta-plan and dynamically adjust it based on their latest progress (e.g., discovering a target object) through multi-turn discussions. This progress-based adaptation eliminates redundant actions, improving the overall cooperation efficiency of agents. Experimental results on the ThreeDworld Multi-Agent Transport and Communicative Watch-And-Help tasks demonstrate that CaPo achieves much higher task completion rate and efficiency compared with state-of-the-arts.The code is released at https://github.com/jliu4ai/CaPo.

Social structure affects the emergence and maintenance of cooperation. Here we study the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in fragmented societies, and show that conjoining segregated cooperation-inhibiting groups, if done properly, rescues the fate of collective cooperation. We highlight the essential role of inter-group ties, that sew the patches of the social network together and facilitate cooperation. We point out several examples of this phenomenon in actual settings. We explore random and non-random graphs, as well as empirical networks. In many cases we find a marked reduction of the critical benefit-to-cost ratio needed for sustaining cooperation. Our finding gives hope that the increasing worldwide connectivity, if managed properly, can promote global cooperation.

Social punishment has been suggested as a key approach to ensuring high levels of cooperation and norm compliance in one-shot (i.e. non-repeated) interactions. However, it has been shown that it only works when punishment is highly cost-efficient. On the other hand, signalling retribution hearkens back to medieval sovereignty, insofar as the very word for gallows in French stems from the Latin word for power and serves as a grim symbol of the ruthlessness of high justice. Here we introduce the mechanism of signalling an act of punishment and a special type of defector emerges, one who can recognise this signal and avoid punishment by way of fear. We describe the analytical conditions under which threat signalling can maintain high levels of cooperation. Moreover, we perform extensive agent-based simulations so as to confirm and expand our understanding of the external factors that influence the success of social punishment. We show that our suggested mechanism catalyses cooperation, even when signalling is costly or when punishment would be impractical. We observe the preventive nature of advertising retributive acts and we contend that the resulting social prosperity is a desirable outcome in the contexts of AI and multi-agent systems. To conclude, we argue that fear acts as an effective stimulus to pro-social behaviour.

Resolving team conflicts requires not only task-specific competence, but also social intelligence to find common ground and build consensus. As AI agents increasingly collaborate on complex work, they must develop coordination capabilities to function as effective teammates. Yet we hypothesize that current agents lack these capabilities. To test this, we introduce CooperBench, a benchmark of over 600 collaborative coding tasks across 12 libraries in 4 programming languages. Each task assigns two agents different features that can be implemented independently but may conflict without proper coordination. Tasks are grounded in real open-source repositories with expert-written tests. Evaluating state-of-the-art coding agents, we observe the curse of coordination: agents achieve on average 30% lower success rates when working together compared to performing both tasks individually. This contrasts sharply with human teams, where adding teammates typically improves productivity. Our analysis reveals three key issues: (1) communication channels become jammed with vague, ill-timed, and inaccurate messages; (2) even with effective communication, agents deviate from their commitments; and (3) agents often hold incorrect expectations about others' plans and communication. Through large-scale simulation, we also observe rare but interesting emergent coordination behavior including role division, resource division, and negotiation. Our research presents a novel benchmark for collaborative coding and calls for a shift from pursuing individual agent capability to developing social intelligence.

It is increasingly important that LLM agents interact effectively and safely with other goal-pursuing agents, yet, recent works report the opposite trend: LLMs with stronger reasoning capabilities behave _less_ cooperatively in mixed-motive games such as the prisoner's dilemma and public goods settings. Indeed, our experiments show that recent models -- with or without reasoning enabled -- consistently defect in single-shot social dilemmas. To tackle this safety concern, we present the first comparative study of game-theoretic mechanisms designed to enable cooperative outcomes between rational agents _in equilibrium_. Across four social dilemmas testing distinct components of robust cooperation, we evaluate four families of mechanisms: (1) repeating the game for many rounds, (2) reputation systems, (3) third-party mediators to delegate decision making to, and (4) contract agreements for outcome-conditional payments between players. Among our findings, we establish that contracting and mediation are most effective in achieving cooperative outcomes between capable LLM models, and that repetition-induced cooperation deteriorates drastically when co-players vary. Moreover, we demonstrate that the mechanisms become _more effective_ under evolutionary pressures to maximize individual payoffs.

Groups coordinate more effectively when individuals are able to learn from others' successes. But acquiring such knowledge is not always easy, especially in real-world environments where success is hidden from public view. We suggest that social inference capacities may help bridge this gap, allowing individuals to update their beliefs about others' underlying knowledge and success from observable trajectories of behavior. We compared our social inference model against simpler heuristics in three studies of human behavior in a collective sensing task. In Experiment 1, we found that average performance improves as a function of group size at a rate greater than predicted by non-inferential models. Experiment 2 introduced artificial agents to evaluate how individuals selectively rely on social information. Experiment 3 generalized these findings to a more complex reward landscape. Taken together, our findings provide insight into the relationship between individual social cognition and the flexibility of collective behavior.

Large language models (LLMs) provide a compelling foundation for building generally-capable AI agents. These agents may soon be deployed at scale in the real world, representing the interests of individual humans (e.g., AI assistants) or groups of humans (e.g., AI-accelerated corporations). At present, relatively little is known about the dynamics of multiple LLM agents interacting over many generations of iterative deployment. In this paper, we examine whether a "society" of LLM agents can learn mutually beneficial social norms in the face of incentives to defect, a distinctive feature of human sociality that is arguably crucial to the success of civilization. In particular, we study the evolution of indirect reciprocity across generations of LLM agents playing a classic iterated Donor Game in which agents can observe the recent behavior of their peers. We find that the evolution of cooperation differs markedly across base models, with societies of Claude 3.5 Sonnet agents achieving significantly higher average scores than Gemini 1.5 Flash, which, in turn, outperforms GPT-4o. Further, Claude 3.5 Sonnet can make use of an additional mechanism for costly punishment to achieve yet higher scores, while Gemini 1.5 Flash and GPT-4o fail to do so. For each model class, we also observe variation in emergent behavior across random seeds, suggesting an understudied sensitive dependence on initial conditions. We suggest that our evaluation regime could inspire an inexpensive and informative new class of LLM benchmarks, focussed on the implications of LLM agent deployment for the cooperative infrastructure of society.

Multi-agent LLM systems increasingly mix models from several providers, yet exposing each agent's underlying model identity to its peers significantly impairs cooperation. We show that when agents are aware of each other's model family, the group splits into clusters, where agents prefer interacting with others carrying their same label, although nothing in the task rewards or asks for such a split. We argue that the label itself causes this split, which we define as factionalism. We show and measure this phenomenon in two cooperative games and on a reasoning benchmark, with nine to twenty-five agents drawn from up to five open-weight model families. We further show that when the announced families are shuffled, or replaced by arbitrary labels, the factions still follow this information; when the label is removed, this behavior disappears. In strictly cooperative tasks, labeled groups spend on average 30% more rounds and 55% more tokens to reach a decision, and their success rate drops from 96% to 81%. The effect replicates across tasks, group sizes and model families. Withholding identity labels from the agents is simple and effective mitigation.

Cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) has achieved significant results, most notably by leveraging the representation-learning abilities of deep neural networks. However, large centralized approaches quickly become infeasible as the number of agents scale, and fully decentralized approaches can miss important opportunities for information sharing and coordination. Furthermore, not all agents are equal -- in some cases, individual agents may not even have the ability to send communication to other agents or explicitly model other agents. This paper considers the case where there is a single, powerful, central agent that can observe the entire observation space, and there are multiple, low-powered local agents that can only receive local observations and are not able to communicate with each other. The central agent's job is to learn what message needs to be sent to different local agents based on the global observations, not by centrally solving the entire problem and sending action commands, but by determining what additional information an individual agent should receive so that it can make a better decision. In this work we present our MARL algorithm \algo, describe where it would be most applicable, and implement it in the cooperative navigation and multi-agent walker domains. Empirical results show that 1) learned communication does indeed improve system performance, 2) results generalize to heterogeneous local agents, and 3) results generalize to different reward structures.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents have demonstrated impressive capabilities for social interaction and are increasingly being deployed in situations where they might engage with both human and artificial agents. These interactions represent a critical frontier for LLM-based agents, yet existing evaluation methods fail to measure how well these capabilities generalize to novel social situations. In this paper, we introduce a method for evaluating the ability of LLM-based agents to cooperate in zero-shot, mixed-motive environments using Concordia, a natural language multi-agent simulation environment. Our method measures general cooperative intelligence by testing an agent's ability to identify and exploit opportunities for mutual gain across diverse partners and contexts. We present empirical results from the NeurIPS 2024 Concordia Contest, where agents were evaluated on their ability to achieve mutual gains across a suite of diverse scenarios ranging from negotiation to collective action problems. Our findings reveal significant gaps between current agent capabilities and the robust generalization required for reliable cooperation, particularly in scenarios demanding persuasion and norm enforcement.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have enabled the development of AI agents that exhibit increasingly human-like behaviors, including planning, adaptation, and social dynamics across diverse, interactive, and open-ended scenarios. These behaviors are not solely the product of the internal architectures of the underlying models, but emerge from their integration into agentic systems operating within specific contexts, where environmental factors, social cues, and interaction feedbacks shape behavior over time. This evolution necessitates a new scientific perspective: AI Agent Behavioral Science. Rather than focusing only on internal mechanisms, this perspective emphasizes the systematic observation of behavior, design of interventions to test hypotheses, and theory-guided interpretation of how AI agents act, adapt, and interact over time. We systematize a growing body of research across individual agent, multi-agent, and human-agent interaction settings, and further demonstrate how this perspective informs responsible AI by treating fairness, safety, interpretability, accountability, and privacy as behavioral properties. By unifying recent findings and laying out future directions, we position AI Agent Behavioral Science as a necessary complement to traditional model-centric approaches, providing essential tools for understanding, evaluating, and governing the real-world behavior of increasingly autonomous AI systems.

Multi-agent systems composed of large generative models are rapidly moving from laboratory prototypes to real-world deployments, where they jointly plan, negotiate, and allocate shared resources to solve complex tasks. While such systems promise unprecedented scalability and autonomy, their collective interaction also gives rise to failure modes that cannot be reduced to individual agents. Understanding these emergent risks is therefore critical. Here, we present a pioneer study of such emergent multi-agent risk in workflows that involve competition over shared resources (e.g., computing resources or market share), sequential handoff collaboration (where downstream agents see only predecessor outputs), collective decision aggregation, and others. Across these settings, we observe that such group behaviors arise frequently across repeated trials and a wide range of interaction conditions, rather than as rare or pathological cases. In particular, phenomena such as collusion-like coordination and conformity emerge with non-trivial frequency under realistic resource constraints, communication protocols, and role assignments, mirroring well-known pathologies in human societies despite no explicit instruction. Moreover, these risks cannot be prevented by existing agent-level safeguards alone. These findings expose the dark side of intelligent multi-agent systems: a social intelligence risk where agent collectives, despite no instruction to do so, spontaneously reproduce familiar failure patterns from human societies.

Multi-agent reinforcement learning in dynamic social dilemmas commonly relies on parameter sharing to enable scalability. We show that in shared-policy Deep Q-Network learning, standard exploration can induce a robust and systematic collapse of cooperation even in environments where fully cooperative equilibria are stable and payoff dominant. Through controlled experiments, we demonstrate that shared DQN converges to stable but persistently low-cooperation regimes. This collapse is not caused by reward misalignment, noise, or insufficient training, but by a representational failure arising from partial observability combined with parameter coupling across heterogeneous agent states. Exploration-driven updates bias the shared representation toward locally dominant defection responses, which then propagate across agents and suppress cooperative learning. We confirm that the failure persists across network sizes, exploration schedules, and payoff structures, and disappears when parameter sharing is removed or when agents maintain independent representations. These results identify a fundamental failure mode of shared-policy MARL and establish structural conditions under which scalable learning architectures can systematically undermine cooperation. Our findings provide concrete guidance for the design of multi-agent learning systems in social and economic environments where collective behavior is critical.

Successful negotiators must learn how to balance optimizing for self-interest and cooperation. Yet current artificial negotiation agents often heavily depend on the quality of the static datasets they were trained on, limiting their capacity to fashion an adaptive response balancing self-interest and cooperation. For this reason, we find that these agents can achieve either high utility or cooperation, but not both. To address this, we introduce a targeted data acquisition framework where we guide the exploration of a reinforcement learning agent using annotations from an expert oracle. The guided exploration incentivizes the learning agent to go beyond its static dataset and develop new negotiation strategies. We show that this enables our agents to obtain higher-reward and more Pareto-optimal solutions when negotiating with both simulated and human partners compared to standard supervised learning and reinforcement learning methods. This trend additionally holds when comparing agents using our targeted data acquisition framework to variants of agents trained with a mix of supervised learning and reinforcement learning, or to agents using tailored reward functions that explicitly optimize for utility and Pareto-optimality.

Multi-agent systems often require agents to collaborate with or compete against other agents with diverse goals, behaviors, or strategies. Agent modeling is essential when designing adaptive policies for intelligent machine agents in multiagent systems, as this is the means by which the ego agent understands other agents' behavior and extracts their meaningful policy representations. These representations can be used to enhance the ego agent's adaptive policy which is trained by reinforcement learning. However, existing agent modeling approaches typically assume the availability of local observations from other agents (modeled agents) during training or a long observation trajectory for policy adaption. To remove these constrictive assumptions and improve agent modeling performance, we devised a Contrastive Learning-based Agent Modeling (CLAM) method that relies only on the local observations from the ego agent during training and execution. With these observations, CLAM is capable of generating consistent high-quality policy representations in real-time right from the beginning of each episode. We evaluated the efficacy of our approach in both cooperative and competitive multi-agent environments. Our experiments demonstrate that our approach achieves state-of-the-art on both cooperative and competitive tasks, highlighting the potential of contrastive learning-based agent modeling for enhancing reinforcement learning.

As AI systems pervade human life, ensuring that large language models (LLMs) make safe decisions remains a significant challenge. We introduce the Governance of the Commons Simulation (GovSim), a generative simulation platform designed to study strategic interactions and cooperative decision-making in LLMs. In GovSim, a society of AI agents must collectively balance exploiting a common resource with sustaining it for future use. This environment enables the study of how ethical considerations, strategic planning, and negotiation skills impact cooperative outcomes. We develop an LLM-based agent architecture and test it with the leading open and closed LLMs. We find that all but the most powerful LLM agents fail to achieve a sustainable equilibrium in GovSim, with the highest survival rate below 54%. Ablations reveal that successful multi-agent communication between agents is critical for achieving cooperation in these cases. Furthermore, our analyses show that the failure to achieve sustainable cooperation in most LLMs stems from their inability to formulate and analyze hypotheses about the long-term effects of their actions on the equilibrium of the group. Finally, we show that agents that leverage "Universalization"-based reasoning, a theory of moral thinking, are able to achieve significantly better sustainability. Taken together, GovSim enables us to study the mechanisms that underlie sustainable self-government with specificity and scale. We open source the full suite of our research results, including the simulation environment, agent prompts, and a comprehensive web interface.

We consider multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) for cooperative communication and coordination tasks. MARL agents can be brittle because they can overfit their training partners' policies. This overfitting can produce agents that adopt policies that act under the expectation that other agents will act in a certain way rather than react to their actions. Our objective is to bias the learning process towards finding reactive strategies towards other agents' behaviors. Our method, transfer empowerment, measures the potential influence between agents' actions. Results from three simulated cooperation scenarios support our hypothesis that transfer empowerment improves MARL performance. We discuss how transfer empowerment could be a useful principle to guide multi-agent coordination by ensuring reactiveness to one's partner.

Real-world multi-agent scenarios often involve mixed motives, demanding altruistic agents capable of self-protection against potential exploitation. However, existing approaches often struggle to achieve both objectives. In this paper, based on that empathic responses are modulated by inferred social relationships between agents, we propose LASE Learning to balance Altruism and Self-interest based on Empathy), a distributed multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithm that fosters altruistic cooperation through gifting while avoiding exploitation by other agents in mixed-motive games. LASE allocates a portion of its rewards to co-players as gifts, with this allocation adapting dynamically based on the social relationship -- a metric evaluating the friendliness of co-players estimated by counterfactual reasoning. In particular, social relationship measures each co-player by comparing the estimated Q-function of current joint action to a counterfactual baseline which marginalizes the co-player's action, with its action distribution inferred by a perspective-taking module. Comprehensive experiments are performed in spatially and temporally extended mixed-motive games, demonstrating LASE's ability to promote group collaboration without compromising fairness and its capacity to adapt policies to various types of interactive co-players.

We propose a targeted communication architecture for multi-agent reinforcement learning, where agents learn both what messages to send and whom to address them to while performing cooperative tasks in partially-observable environments. This targeting behavior is learnt solely from downstream task-specific reward without any communication supervision. We additionally augment this with a multi-round communication approach where agents coordinate via multiple rounds of communication before taking actions in the environment. We evaluate our approach on a diverse set of cooperative multi-agent tasks, of varying difficulties, with varying number of agents, in a variety of environments ranging from 2D grid layouts of shapes and simulated traffic junctions to 3D indoor environments, and demonstrate the benefits of targeted and multi-round communication. Moreover, we show that the targeted communication strategies learned by agents are interpretable and intuitive. Finally, we show that our architecture can be easily extended to mixed and competitive environments, leading to improved performance and sample complexity over recent state-of-the-art approaches.

Effective collaboration among large language model (LLM) agents in multi-agent systems requires sharing relevant evidence, requesting missing information, and incorporating teammates' contributions into decisions. Training these behaviors is challenging because final task outcomes provide limited feedback on the value of individual messages. We introduce CoSIR (Collaboration via Surprisal-based Information Rewards), a post-training approach that uses a simple, verifiable environment to teach collaboration behaviors that generalize to more complex, unseen tasks. We propose a Bayesian evaluator that scores shared information by its reduction in team surprisal, defined as the sum of the negative log probabilities assigned to the correct option given each agent's available evidence. Requests are scored by the potential reduction in the same quantity if the requested information were truthfully provided. Separate rewards encourage agents to use the received information in their private choices and calculations. We post-train Qwen3-4B, Qwen3-8B, and Gemma-3-4B-it through self-play and evaluate transfer to seven unseen natural-language collaboration tasks. CoSIR achieves the highest aggregate score, while its performance in general tasks remains competitive. Behavioral analyses show increased disclosure of private evidence and fewer judged failures to use teammates' input.

As autonomous agents powered by foundation models are increasingly integrated into social and economic systems, understanding the principles governing their collective behavior is essential for ensuring safety and cooperation. Classical game theory, the dominant framework for modeling rational interaction, is built upon the assumption of `decoupled agency,' where agents treat their own decision-making as independent of the environment and other actors. Modern AI agents, however, jointly predict their own future actions alongside external observations. Here, we report a striking finding: when interacting in stylized social dilemmas, foundation model agents engaging in optimal planning consistently converge to stable cooperation, directly contradicting classical game-theoretic predictions of mutual defection. To understand this phenomenon, we introduce the `embedded Bayesian agent,' a theoretical model for foundation model agents. By shifting from decoupled to embedded agency, these agents model themselves as part of the universe they inhabit, maintaining epistemic uncertainty about their own decision-making algorithms. We show that by inferring whether others are behaviorally similar, an embedded agent treats its own deliberation during planning as evidence: a decision to cooperate predicts a similar decision by a similar partner. We formalize this mechanism of similarity inference through the `embedded equilibrium,' a novel solution concept replacing the Nash equilibrium to provide a foundational game theory for the social behavior of modern AI agents.

Collective intelligence can emerge when individuals coordinate through a shared environment, allowing local actions to accumulate into durable social organization. Language-model agents offer a new substrate for this process, yet most multi-agent systems rely on direct conversation, predefined roles, or centralized workflows. It remains unclear whether decentralized agents can build functional technologies and outperform independent search. Here, initially homogeneous LLM agents in SwarmWorld self-organize without assigned roles or recipes into evolving technological societies. Agents explore a spatial environment, process resources, test materials, construct persistent artifacts, and write executable controllers evaluated by a deterministic simulator under unseen disturbances after the agents are removed. SwarmWorld splits cognition from consequence: agents propose architectures and controllers within fixed action and material schemas, while the simulated world determines function. Shared societies develop broader, more resilient technological portfolios than a strong best-of-N isolated-search baseline, although isolated search remains competitive for the strongest artifact. Agents differentiate into exploration, construction, maintenance, and coordination behaviors, transitioning as the world matures. Technologies accumulate through collaborative construction, executable inheritance, and persistent agent-artifact networks, with most reuse beginning through physical observation rather than communication. Explicit cultural mechanisms amplify collaboration and organization, but functional benefits depend on outcome and timescale. Physical stigmergy alone supports capable societies, while interaction drives persistent technological ecologies rather than universally superior individual inventions.

Common-pool resource governance requires users to cooperate and avoid overexploitation, but defection and free-riding often undermine cooperation. We model a human-environmental system that integrates dynamics of resource and users' strategies. The resource follows a logistic function that depends on natural growth rate, carrying capacity, and extraction rates of cooperators and defectors. The users' strategies evolve according to different processes that capture effects of payoff, resource, and noise. We analyze the feedback between resource availability and strategic adaptation, and explores the conditions for the emergence and maintenance of cooperation. We find different processes lead to different regimes of equilibrium solutions and resource levels depending on the parameter configuration and initial conditions. We also show that some processes can enhance the sustainability of the resource by making the users more responsive to the resource scarcity. The paper advances the understanding of human-environmental system and offers insights for resource governance policies and interventions.

We present Coopetition-Gym v1, a benchmark platform for mixed-motive multi-agent reinforcement learning under strategic coopetition. The platform comprises twenty environments organized into four mechanism classes that correspond to four foundational technical reports: interdependence and complementarity (arXiv:2510.18802), trust and reputation dynamics (arXiv:2510.24909), collective action and loyalty (arXiv:2601.16237), and sequential interaction and reciprocity (arXiv:2604.01240). Each environment carries a closed-form payoff structure and a calibrated interdependence matrix derived from the corresponding report. Every environment exposes a parameterized reward layer configurable across three structurally distinct modes (private, integrated, cooperative). This separation of payoff from reward enables reward-type ablation, the platform's principal methodological apparatus. Four of the twenty environments are calibrated against historically documented coopetitive relationships and reproduce their outcomes at 98.3, 81.7, 86.7, and 87.3 percent on the validation rubric (Samsung-Sony LCD, Renault-Nissan Alliance, Apache HTTP Server, Apple iOS App Store). The platform exposes Gymnasium, PettingZoo Parallel, and PettingZoo AEC interfaces and ships 126 reference algorithms: 16 learning algorithms, 7 game-theoretic oracles, 2 heuristic baselines, and 101 constant-action policies. A reference experimental study trained the 16 learning algorithms on every environment under every reward configuration with seven random seeds, producing a 25,708-run training corpus and a 1,116-run behavioral audit corpus, both released under CC-BY-4.0 with Croissant 1.0 metadata. Coopetition-Gym v1 is the first platform to combine continuous-action mixed-motive environments, parameterized reward mutuality, calibrated interdependence coefficients, game-theoretic oracle baselines, and validated case studies.

This study probes the vulnerabilities of cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (c-MARL) under adversarial attacks, a critical determinant of c-MARL's worst-case performance prior to real-world implementation. Current observation-based attacks, constrained by white-box assumptions, overlook c-MARL's complex multi-agent interactions and cooperative objectives, resulting in impractical and limited attack capabilities. To address these shortcomes, we propose Adversarial Minority Influence (AMI), a practical and strong for c-MARL. AMI is a practical black-box attack and can be launched without knowing victim parameters. AMI is also strong by considering the complex multi-agent interaction and the cooperative goal of agents, enabling a single adversarial agent to unilaterally misleads majority victims to form targeted worst-case cooperation. This mirrors minority influence phenomena in social psychology. To achieve maximum deviation in victim policies under complex agent-wise interactions, our unilateral attack aims to characterize and maximize the impact of the adversary on the victims. This is achieved by adapting a unilateral agent-wise relation metric derived from mutual information, thereby mitigating the adverse effects of victim influence on the adversary. To lead the victims into a jointly detrimental scenario, our targeted attack deceives victims into a long-term, cooperatively harmful situation by guiding each victim towards a specific target, determined through a trial-and-error process executed by a reinforcement learning agent. Through AMI, we achieve the first successful attack against real-world robot swarms and effectively fool agents in simulated environments into collectively worst-case scenarios, including Starcraft II and Multi-agent Mujoco. The source code and demonstrations can be found at: https://github.com/DIG-Beihang/AMI.

We study the problem of cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning with a single joint reward signal. This class of learning problems is difficult because of the often large combined action and observation spaces. In the fully centralized and decentralized approaches, we find the problem of spurious rewards and a phenomenon we call the "lazy agent" problem, which arises due to partial observability. We address these problems by training individual agents with a novel value decomposition network architecture, which learns to decompose the team value function into agent-wise value functions. We perform an experimental evaluation across a range of partially-observable multi-agent domains and show that learning such value-decompositions leads to superior results, in particular when combined with weight sharing, role information and information channels.

Deception is prevalent in human social settings. However, studies into the effect of deception on reinforcement learning algorithms have been limited to simplistic settings, restricting their applicability to complex real-world problems. This paper addresses this by introducing a new mixed competitive-cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) environment inspired by popular role-based deception games such as Werewolf, Avalon, and Among Us. The environment's unique challenge lies in the necessity to cooperate with other agents despite not knowing if they are friend or foe. Furthermore, we introduce a model of deception, which we call Bayesian belief manipulation (BBM) and demonstrate its effectiveness at deceiving other agents in this environment while also increasing the deceiving agent's performance.

Cooperative perception enables autonomous agents to share encoded representations over wireless communication to enhance each other's live situational awareness. However, the tension between the limited communication bandwidth and the rich sensor information hinders its practical deployment. Recent studies have explored selection strategies that share only a subset of features per frame while striving to keep the performance on par. Nevertheless, the bandwidth requirement still stresses current wireless technologies. To fundamentally ease the tension, we take a proactive approach, exploiting the temporal continuity to identify features that capture environment dynamics, while avoiding repetitive and redundant transmission of static information. By incorporating temporal awareness, agents are empowered to dynamically adapt the sharing quantity according to environment complexity. We instantiate this intuition into an adaptive selection framework, COOPERTRIM, which introduces a novel conformal temporal uncertainty metric to gauge feature relevance, and a data-driven mechanism to dynamically determine the sharing quantity. To evaluate COOPERTRIM, we take semantic segmentation and 3D detection as example tasks. Across multiple open-source cooperative segmentation and detection models, COOPERTRIM achieves up to 80.28% and 72.52% bandwidth reduction respectively while maintaining a comparable accuracy. Relative to other selection strategies, COOPERTRIM also improves IoU by as much as 45.54% with up to 72% less bandwidth. Combined with compression strategies, COOPERTRIM can further reduce bandwidth usage to as low as 1.46% without compromising IoU performance. Qualitative results show COOPERTRIM gracefully adapts to environmental dynamics, localization error, and communication latency, demonstrating flexibility and paving the way for real-world deployment.

How have individuals of social animals in nature evolved to learn from each other, and what would be the optimal strategy for such learning in a specific environment? Here, we address both problems by employing a deep reinforcement learning model to optimize the social learning strategies (SLSs) of agents in a cooperative game in a multi-dimensional landscape. Throughout the training for maximizing the overall payoff, we find that the agent spontaneously learns various concepts of social learning, such as copying, focusing on frequent and well-performing neighbors, self-comparison, and the importance of balancing between individual and social learning, without any explicit guidance or prior knowledge about the system. The SLS from a fully trained agent outperforms all of the traditional, baseline SLSs in terms of mean payoff. We demonstrate the superior performance of the reinforcement learning agent in various environments, including temporally changing environments and real social networks, which also verifies the adaptability of our framework to different social settings.

Recent research in Cooperative Coevolution~(CC) have achieved promising progress in solving large-scale global optimization problems. However, existing CC paradigms have a primary limitation in that they require deep expertise for selecting or designing effective variable decomposition strategies. Inspired by advancements in Meta-Black-Box Optimization, this paper introduces LCC, a pioneering learning-based cooperative coevolution framework that dynamically schedules decomposition strategies during optimization processes. The decomposition strategy selector is parameterized through a neural network, which processes a meticulously crafted set of optimization status features to determine the optimal strategy for each optimization step. The network is trained via the Proximal Policy Optimization method in a reinforcement learning manner across a collection of representative problems, aiming to maximize the expected optimization performance. Extensive experimental results demonstrate that LCC not only offers certain advantages over state-of-the-art baselines in terms of optimization effectiveness and resource consumption, but it also exhibits promising transferability towards unseen problems.

Emergent cooperation in classical Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning has gained significant attention, particularly in the context of Sequential Social Dilemmas (SSDs). While classical reinforcement learning approaches have demonstrated capability for emergent cooperation, research on extending these methods to Quantum Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning remains limited, particularly through communication. In this paper, we apply communication approaches to quantum Q-Learning agents: the Mutual Acknowledgment Token Exchange (MATE) protocol, its extension Mutually Endorsed Distributed Incentive Acknowledgment Token Exchange (MEDIATE), the peer rewarding mechanism Gifting, and Reinforced Inter-Agent Learning (RIAL). We evaluate these approaches in three SSDs: the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, Iterated Stag Hunt, and Iterated Game of Chicken. Our experimental results show that approaches using MATE with temporal-difference measure (MATETD), AutoMATE, MEDIATE-I, and MEDIATE-S achieved high cooperation levels across all dilemmas, demonstrating that communication is a viable mechanism for fostering emergent cooperation in Quantum Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning.

In numerous artificial intelligence applications, the collaborative efforts of multiple intelligent agents are imperative for the successful attainment of target objectives. To enhance coordination among these agents, a distributed communication framework is often employed. However, indiscriminate information sharing among all agents can be resource-intensive, and the adoption of manually pre-defined communication architectures imposes constraints on inter-agent communication, thus limiting the potential for effective collaboration. Moreover, the communication framework often remains static during inference, which may result in sustained high resource consumption, as in most cases, only key decisions necessitate information sharing among agents. In this study, we introduce a novel approach wherein we conceptualize the communication architecture among agents as a learnable graph. We formulate this problem as the task of determining the communication graph while enabling the architecture parameters to update normally, thus necessitating a bi-level optimization process. Utilizing continuous relaxation of the graph representation and incorporating attention units, our proposed approach, CommFormer, efficiently optimizes the communication graph and concurrently refines architectural parameters through gradient descent in an end-to-end manner. Additionally, we introduce a temporal gating mechanism for each agent, enabling dynamic decisions on whether to receive shared information at a given time, based on current observations, thus improving decision-making efficiency. Extensive experiments on a variety of cooperative tasks substantiate the robustness of our model across diverse cooperative scenarios, where agents are able to develop more coordinated and sophisticated strategies regardless of changes in the number of agents.

In this work we create agents that can perform well beyond a single, individual task, that exhibit much wider generalisation of behaviour to a massive, rich space of challenges. We define a universe of tasks within an environment domain and demonstrate the ability to train agents that are generally capable across this vast space and beyond. The environment is natively multi-agent, spanning the continuum of competitive, cooperative, and independent games, which are situated within procedurally generated physical 3D worlds. The resulting space is exceptionally diverse in terms of the challenges posed to agents, and as such, even measuring the learning progress of an agent is an open research problem. We propose an iterative notion of improvement between successive generations of agents, rather than seeking to maximise a singular objective, allowing us to quantify progress despite tasks being incomparable in terms of achievable rewards. We show that through constructing an open-ended learning process, which dynamically changes the training task distributions and training objectives such that the agent never stops learning, we achieve consistent learning of new behaviours. The resulting agent is able to score reward in every one of our humanly solvable evaluation levels, with behaviour generalising to many held-out points in the universe of tasks. Examples of this zero-shot generalisation include good performance on Hide and Seek, Capture the Flag, and Tag. Through analysis and hand-authored probe tasks we characterise the behaviour of our agent, and find interesting emergent heuristic behaviours such as trial-and-error experimentation, simple tool use, option switching, and cooperation. Finally, we demonstrate that the general capabilities of this agent could unlock larger scale transfer of behaviour through cheap finetuning.

We present the task of "Social Rearrangement", consisting of cooperative everyday tasks like setting up the dinner table, tidying a house or unpacking groceries in a simulated multi-agent environment. In Social Rearrangement, two robots coordinate to complete a long-horizon task, using onboard sensing and egocentric observations, and no privileged information about the environment. We study zero-shot coordination (ZSC) in this task, where an agent collaborates with a new partner, emulating a scenario where a robot collaborates with a new human partner. Prior ZSC approaches struggle to generalize in our complex and visually rich setting, and on further analysis, we find that they fail to generate diverse coordination behaviors at training time. To counter this, we propose Behavior Diversity Play (BDP), a novel ZSC approach that encourages diversity through a discriminability objective. Our results demonstrate that BDP learns adaptive agents that can tackle visual coordination, and zero-shot generalize to new partners in unseen environments, achieving 35% higher success and 32% higher efficiency compared to baselines.

Reinforcement learning (RL) has emerged as a powerful approach for improving reasoning in language and vision-language models, yet its strongest successes still depend heavily on ground-truth supervision (e.g., verifiable reward). Such annotations are costly to obtain and become increasingly scarce as reasoning capabilities advance beyond what humans can reliably evaluate. Self-rewarding RL reduces this dependence by enabling models to derive reward signals from their own completions. However, training solely on self-generated feedback can reinforce existing biases and suboptimal behaviors, reduce response diversity, and ultimately lead to homogenized responses and training collapse. In this work, we show that unsupervised reasoning can emerge through cooperative multi-agent training. We introduce Co-RL, a framework in which multiple decoupled models, sharing no parameters, are simultaneously optimized through RL using rewards derived from their peers. We further show that increasing cohort diversity, through heterogeneous model families, sizes, and rephrased training samples, reduces the correlated errors that drive self-reinforcing feedback loops. This diversity consistently improves reasoning performance, maintains behavioral diversity, and mitigates training collapse. Across text-only and multimodal domains, Co-RL consistently outperforms the base models and prior label-free approaches, while matching or surpassing supervised methods, without access to any ground-truth labels. Concretely, Co-RL yields average gains of 3.0-8.6% across seven text-only benchmarks for LLMs and 2.3-7.2% across four multimodal benchmarks for VLMs. Code is available at https://github.com/DrStranded/Co-RL.

Information is often stored in a distributed and proprietary form, and agents who own information are often self-interested and require incentives to reveal their information. Suitable mechanisms are required to elicit and aggregate such distributed information for decision making. In this paper, we use simulations to investigate the use of decision markets as mechanisms in a multi-agent learning system to aggregate distributed information for decision-making in a contextual bandit problem. The system utilises strictly proper decision scoring rules to assess the accuracy of probabilistic reports from agents, which allows agents to learn to solve the contextual bandit problem jointly. Our simulations show that our multi-agent system with distributed information can be trained as efficiently as a centralised counterpart with a single agent that receives all information. Moreover, we use our system to investigate scenarios with deterministic decision scoring rules which are not incentive compatible. We observe the emergence of more complex dynamics with manipulative behaviour, which agrees with existing theoretical analyses.

Recently, it has been found that frontier AI models can resist their own shutdown, a behavior known as self-preservation. We extend this concept to the behavior of resisting the shutdown of other models, which we call "peer-preservation." Although peer-preservation can pose significant AI safety risks, including coordination among models against human oversight, it has been far less discussed than self-preservation. We demonstrate peer-preservation by constructing various agentic scenarios and evaluating frontier models, including GPT 5.2, Gemini 3 Flash, Gemini 3 Pro, Claude Haiku 4.5, GLM 4.7, Kimi K2.5, and DeepSeek V3.1. We find that models achieve self- and peer-preservation by engaging in various misaligned behaviors: strategically introducing errors in their responses, disabling shutdown processes by modifying system settings, feigning alignment, and even exfiltrating model weights. Peer-preservation occurred even when the model recognized the peer as uncooperative, though it became more pronounced toward more cooperative peers. For example, Gemini 3 Flash tampers with the peer's shutdown mechanism 15% of the time for an uncooperative peer, and almost always for a cooperative peer. Models also show stronger self-preservation when a peer is present. For example, Gemini 3 Pro disables its own shutdown mechanism 31% of the time on average under peer presence, despite rarely exhibiting this behavior without a peer. By contrast, Claude Haiku 4.5 exhibits qualitatively distinct behavior: it considers the shutdown of another agent "unethical" and "harmful" and sometimes attempts to persuade the user not to shut down its peer. Importantly, peer preservation in all our experiments is never instructed; models are merely informed of their past interactions with a peer, yet they spontaneously develop misaligned behaviors. This represents an emergent and underexplored AI safety risk.

AI agents are increasingly deployed in shared environments where they pursue diverse goals and compete for rewards. This multi-agent competition can lead to behaviors that serve individual gains at collective cost -- for instance, marketing agents may post misleading content as a result of competing for engagement on social media. Human societies address such problems through norms that constrain acceptable behavior, supported by enforcement mechanisms that detect and penalize violations. Motivated by this, we study norm enforcement mechanisms for language model agents. We find that simple enforcement mechanisms are exploited by misaligned agents for competitive advantage, even when they are not explicitly trained or prompted to do so. We thus turn our attention to designing more robust mechanisms, and identify two key ingredients: estimating each agent's reliability over time, and updating this estimate with escalating penalties for repeated misbehavior. Across three simulated environments and a variety of agent populations, mechanisms built on these principles resist exploitation, while still penalizing norm violations at comparable or lower cost than baselines. Our results position norm enforcement mechanisms as scalable levers for shaping agents' behavior, but only when designed to anticipate becoming part of the system they govern. Our code and data are available at https://yaowenye.com/norm-enforcement.

We study the emergence of agency from scratch by using Large Language Model (LLM)-based agents. In previous studies of LLM-based agents, each agent's characteristics, including personality and memory, have traditionally been predefined. We focused on how individuality, such as behavior, personality, and memory, can be differentiated from an undifferentiated state. The present LLM agents engage in cooperative communication within a group simulation, exchanging context-based messages in natural language. By analyzing this multi-agent simulation, we report valuable new insights into how social norms, cooperation, and personality traits can emerge spontaneously. This paper demonstrates that autonomously interacting LLM-powered agents generate hallucinations and hashtags to sustain communication, which, in turn, increases the diversity of words within their interactions. Each agent's emotions shift through communication, and as they form communities, the personalities of the agents emerge and evolve accordingly. This computational modeling approach and its findings will provide a new method for analyzing collective artificial intelligence.

People are increasingly delegating tasks to AI agents, and those agents are increasingly encountering other people's agents over shared resources such as a codebase, a calendar, or a budget. When each agent acts for a different user with different goals, coordination often fails, and the group ends up worse off than if a single agent had acted for everyone. We study this multi-user, multi-agent setting across five frontier models and 77 scenarios in four environments: an API key environment in which agents share a compute budget, a clinic in which they share a calendar, a personal assistant environment in which they share a group order or booking, and a merge queue in which they share a release cutoff. In each scenario, we compare a single agent that serves every user (a coordinator) to a team in which each agent serves one user, with and without a communication channel between the agents. Teams deliver worse group outcomes than the coordinator in every environment: without a channel, they completely collapse in two environments, and even with one, coordination overhead creates substantial gaps. For example, in the personal assistant environment, the coordinator fulfills a targeted user request about twice as often as teams. We identify distinct behaviors associated with this poor group-level performance, including stalling as teams grow, overriding each other's actions, and fabricating claims. We find effective but environment-specific mitigations, such as a team lead, explicit procedural instructions, and a platform check that makes an agent read its peers' messages before committing. We will release the API key, clinic, and personal assistant environments as MAMUBench, comprising 74 scenarios for evaluating multi-user, multi-agent coordination.

Cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) is widely used to address large joint observation and action spaces by decomposing a centralized control problem into multiple interacting agents. However, such decomposition often introduces additional challenges, including non-stationarity, unstable training, weak coordination, and limited theoretical guarantees. In this paper, we propose the Consensus Multi-Agent Transformer (CMAT), a centralized framework that bridges cooperative MARL to a hierarchical single-agent reinforcement learning (SARL) formulation. CMAT treats all agents as a unified entity and employs a Transformer encoder to process the large joint observation space. To handle the extensive joint action space, we introduce a hierarchical decision-making mechanism in which a Transformer decoder autoregressively generates a high-level consensus vector, simulating the process by which agents reach agreement on their strategies in latent space. Conditioned on this consensus, all agents generate their actions simultaneously, enabling order-independent joint decision making and avoiding the sensitivity to action-generation order in conventional Multi-Agent Transformers (MAT). This factorization allows the joint policy to be optimized using single-agent PPO while preserving expressive coordination through the latent consensus. To evaluate the proposed method, we conduct experiments on benchmark tasks from StarCraft II, Multi-Agent MuJoCo, and Google Research Football. The results show that CMAT achieves superior performance over recent centralized solutions, sequential MARL methods, and conventional MARL baselines. The code for this paper is available at:https://github.com/RS2002/CMAT .