Daily Papers

Recently, rubrics have been used to guide LLM judges in capturing subjective, nuanced, multi-dimensional human preferences, and have been extended from evaluation to reward signals for reinforcement fine-tuning (RFT). However, rubric generation remains hard to control: rubrics often lack coverage, conflate dimensions, misalign preference direction, and contain redundant or highly correlated criteria, degrading judge accuracy and producing suboptimal rewards during RFT. We propose RRD, a principled framework for rubric refinement built on a recursive decompose-filter cycle. RRD decomposes coarse rubrics into fine-grained, discriminative criteria, expanding coverage while sharpening separation between responses. A complementary filtering mechanism removes misaligned and redundant rubrics, and a correlation-aware weighting scheme prevents over-representing highly correlated criteria, yielding rubric sets that are informative, comprehensive, and non-redundant. Empirically, RRD delivers large, consistent gains across both evaluation and training: it improves preference-judgment accuracy on JudgeBench and PPE for both GPT-4o and Llama3.1-405B judges, achieving top performance in all settings with up to +17.7 points on JudgeBench. When used as the reward source for RFT on WildChat, it yields substantially stronger and more stable learning signals, boosting reward by up to 160% (Qwen3-4B) and 60% (Llama3.1-8B) versus 10-20% for prior rubric baselines, with gains that transfer to HealthBench-Hard and BiGGen Bench. Overall, RRD establishes recursive rubric refinement as a scalable and interpretable foundation for LLM judging and reward modeling in open-ended domains.

LLM-as-a-Judge leverages the generative and reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs) to evaluate LLM responses across diverse scenarios, providing accurate preference signals. This approach plays a vital role in aligning LLMs with human values, ensuring ethical and reliable AI outputs that align with societal norms. Recent studies have raised many methods to train LLM as generative judges, but most of them are data consuming or lack accuracy, and only focus on LLM's judge ability. In this work, we regard judge ability as a general ability of LLM and implement a two-stage training approach, comprising supervised fine-tuning (SFT) warm-up and direct preference optimization (DPO) enhancement, to achieve judge style adaptation and improve judgment accuracy. Additionally, we introduce an efficient data synthesis method to generate judgmental content. Experimental results demonstrate that our approach, utilizing only about 2% to 40% of the data required by other methods, achieves SOTA performance on RewardBench. Furthermore, our training method enhances the general capabilities of the model by constructing complicated judge task, and the judge signals provided by our model have significantly enhanced the downstream DPO training performance of our internal models in our test to optimize policy model with Judge Model. We also open-source our model weights and training data to facilitate further research.

Recently, using a powerful proprietary Large Language Model (LLM) (e.g., GPT-4) as an evaluator for long-form responses has become the de facto standard. However, for practitioners with large-scale evaluation tasks and custom criteria in consideration (e.g., child-readability), using proprietary LLMs as an evaluator is unreliable due to the closed-source nature, uncontrolled versioning, and prohibitive costs. In this work, we propose Prometheus, a fully open-source LLM that is on par with GPT-4's evaluation capabilities when the appropriate reference materials (reference answer, score rubric) are accompanied. We first construct the Feedback Collection, a new dataset that consists of 1K fine-grained score rubrics, 20K instructions, and 100K responses and language feedback generated by GPT-4. Using the Feedback Collection, we train Prometheus, a 13B evaluator LLM that can assess any given long-form text based on customized score rubric provided by the user. Experimental results show that Prometheus scores a Pearson correlation of 0.897 with human evaluators when evaluating with 45 customized score rubrics, which is on par with GPT-4 (0.882), and greatly outperforms ChatGPT (0.392). Furthermore, measuring correlation with GPT-4 with 1222 customized score rubrics across four benchmarks (MT Bench, Vicuna Bench, Feedback Bench, Flask Eval) shows similar trends, bolstering Prometheus's capability as an evaluator LLM. Lastly, Prometheus achieves the highest accuracy on two human preference benchmarks (HHH Alignment & MT Bench Human Judgment) compared to open-sourced reward models explicitly trained on human preference datasets, highlighting its potential as an universal reward model. We open-source our code, dataset, and model at https://github.com/kaistAI/Prometheus.

Preference learning algorithms (e.g., RLHF and DPO) are frequently used to steer LLMs to produce generations that are more preferred by humans, but our understanding of their inner workings is still limited. In this work, we study the conventional wisdom that preference learning trains models to assign higher likelihoods to more preferred outputs than less preferred outputs, measured via ranking accuracy. Surprisingly, we find that most state-of-the-art preference-tuned models achieve a ranking accuracy of less than 60% on common preference datasets. We furthermore derive the idealized ranking accuracy that a preference-tuned LLM would achieve if it optimized the DPO or RLHF objective perfectly. We demonstrate that existing models exhibit a significant alignment gap -- i.e., a gap between the observed and idealized ranking accuracies. We attribute this discrepancy to the DPO objective, which is empirically and theoretically ill-suited to fix even mild ranking errors in the reference model, and derive a simple and efficient formula for quantifying the difficulty of learning a given preference datapoint. Finally, we demonstrate that ranking accuracy strongly correlates with the empirically popular win rate metric when the model is close to the reference model used in the objective, shedding further light on the differences between on-policy (e.g., RLHF) and off-policy (e.g., DPO) preference learning algorithms.

Evaluation and alignment pipelines for large language models increasingly rely on LLM-based judges, whose behavior is guided by natural-language rubrics and validated on benchmarks. We identify a previously under-recognized vulnerability in this workflow, which we term Rubric-Induced Preference Drift (RIPD). Even when rubric edits pass benchmark validation, they can still produce systematic and directional shifts in a judge's preferences on target domains. Because rubrics serve as a high-level decision interface, such drift can emerge from seemingly natural, criterion-preserving edits and remain difficult to detect through aggregate benchmark metrics or limited spot-checking. We further show this vulnerability can be exploited through rubric-based preference attacks, in which benchmark-compliant rubric edits steer judgments away from a fixed human or trusted reference on target domains, systematically inducing RIPD and reducing target-domain accuracy up to 9.5% (helpfulness) and 27.9% (harmlessness). When these judgments are used to generate preference labels for downstream post-training, the induced bias propagates through alignment pipelines and becomes internalized in trained policies. This leads to persistent and systematic drift in model behavior. Overall, our findings highlight evaluation rubrics as a sensitive and manipulable control interface, revealing a system-level alignment risk that extends beyond evaluator reliability alone. The code is available at: https://github.com/ZDCSlab/Rubrics-as-an-Attack-Surface. Warning: Certain sections may contain potentially harmful content that may not be appropriate for all readers.

Current preference learning methods achieve high accuracy on standard benchmarks but exhibit significant performance degradation when objective quality signals are removed. We introduce WritingPreferenceBench, a dataset of 1,800 human-annotated preference pairs (1,200 English, 600 Chinese) across 8 creative writing genres, where responses are matched for objective correctness, factual accuracy, and length. On this benchmark, sequence-based reward models--the standard architecture for RLHF--achieve only 52.7% mean accuracy, while zero-shot language model judges perform at 53.9%. In contrast, generative reward models that produce explicit reasoning chains achieve 81.8% accuracy. We observe high within-model variance across genres: individual models range from 18.2% to 81.8% accuracy across different writing categories, with standard deviations averaging 10.1%. This variance persists regardless of model scale, with 27B parameter models showing no consistent improvement over 8B variants. Our results suggest that current RLHF methods primarily learn to detect objective errors rather than capture subjective quality preferences (e.g., creativity, stylistic flair, and emotional resonance), and that successful preference modeling may require intermediate reasoning representations rather than direct classification.

Human feedback has become the de facto standard for evaluating the performance of Large Language Models, and is increasingly being used as a training objective. However, it is not clear which properties of a generated output this single `preference' score captures. We hypothesise that preference scores are subjective and open to undesirable biases. We critically analyse the use of human feedback for both training and evaluation, to verify whether it fully captures a range of crucial error criteria. We find that while preference scores have fairly good coverage, they under-represent important aspects like factuality. We further hypothesise that both preference scores and error annotation may be affected by confounders, and leverage instruction-tuned models to generate outputs that vary along two possible confounding dimensions: assertiveness and complexity. We find that the assertiveness of an output skews the perceived rate of factuality errors, indicating that human annotations are not a fully reliable evaluation metric or training objective. Finally, we offer preliminary evidence that using human feedback as a training objective disproportionately increases the assertiveness of model outputs. We encourage future work to carefully consider whether preference scores are well aligned with the desired objective.

Reward Models (RMs) are crucial for aligning language models with human preferences. Currently, the evaluation of RMs depends on measuring accuracy against a validation set of manually annotated preference data. Although this method is straightforward and widely adopted, the relationship between RM accuracy and downstream policy performance remains under-explored. In this work, we conduct experiments in a synthetic setting to investigate how differences in RM measured by accuracy translate into gaps in optimized policy performance. Our findings reveal that while there is a weak positive correlation between accuracy and downstream performance, policies optimized towards RMs with similar accuracy can exhibit quite different performance. Moreover, we discover that the way of measuring accuracy significantly impacts its ability to predict the final policy performance. Through the lens of the Regressional Goodhart effect, we recognize that accuracy, when used for measuring RM quality, can fail to fully capture the potential RM overoptimization. This underscores the inadequacy of relying solely on accuracy to reflect their impact on policy optimization.

Human preference judgments are pivotal in guiding large language models (LLMs) to produce outputs that align with human values. Human evaluations are also used in summarization tasks to compare outputs from various systems, complementing existing automatic metrics. Despite their significance, however, there has been limited research probing these pairwise or k-wise comparisons. The collective impact and relative importance of factors such as output length, informativeness, fluency, and factual consistency are still not well understood. It is also unclear if there are other hidden factors influencing human judgments. In this paper, we conduct an in-depth examination of a collection of pairwise human judgments released by OpenAI. Utilizing the Bradley-Terry-Luce (BTL) model, we reveal the inherent preferences embedded in these human judgments. We find that the most favored factors vary across tasks and genres, whereas the least favored factors tend to be consistent, e.g., outputs are too brief, contain excessive off-focus content or hallucinated facts. Our findings have implications on the construction of balanced datasets in human preference evaluations, which is a crucial step in shaping the behaviors of future LLMs.

Using language models to scalably approximate human preferences on text quality (LLM-as-a-judge) has become a standard practice applicable to many tasks. A judgment is often extracted from the judge's textual output alone, typically with greedy decoding. However, LLM judges naturally provide distributions over judgment tokens, inviting a breadth of inference methods for extracting fine-grained preferences. We find that taking the mean of the judgment distribution consistently outperforms taking the mode (i.e. greedy decoding) in all evaluation settings (i.e. pointwise, pairwise, and listwise). We further explore novel methods of deriving preferences from judgment distributions, and find that methods incorporating risk aversion often improve performance. Lastly, we analyze LLM-as-a-judge paired with chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting, showing that CoT can collapse the spread of the judgment distribution, often harming performance. Our findings show that leveraging distributional output improves LLM-as-a-judge, as opposed to using the text interface alone.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) like DeepSeek-R1 and OpenAI-o1 have demonstrated remarkable reasoning capabilities, raising important questions about their biases in LLM-as-a-judge settings. We present a comprehensive benchmark comparing judging biases between LLMs and LRMs across both subjective preference-alignment datasets and objective fact-based datasets. Through investigation of bandwagon, authority, position, and distraction biases, we uncover four key findings: (1) despite their advanced reasoning capabilities, LRMs remain susceptible to the above biases; (2) LRMs demonstrate better robustness than LLMs specifically on fact-related datasets; (3) LRMs exhibit notable position bias, preferring options in later positions; and (4) we identify a novel "superficial reflection bias" where phrases mimicking reasoning (e.g., "wait, let me think...") significantly influence model judgments. To address these biases, we design and evaluate three mitigation strategies: specialized system prompts that reduce judging biases by up to 19\% in preference alignment datasets and 14\% in fact-related datasets, in-context learning that provides up to 27\% improvement on preference tasks but shows inconsistent results on factual tasks, and a self-reflection mechanism that reduces biases by up to 10\% in preference datasets and 16\% in fact-related datasets, with self-reflection proving particularly effective for LRMs. Our work provides crucial insights for developing more reliable LLM-as-a-Judge frameworks, especially as LRMs become increasingly deployed as automated judges.

Modern preference alignment techniques, such as Best-of-N (BoN) sampling, rely on reward models trained with pairwise comparison data. While effective at learning relative preferences, this paradigm fails to capture a signal of response acceptability, leaving systems vulnerable to selecting the least bad of many unacceptable options. This is particularly problematic for hard prompts, where the risk of such false acceptances increases with the number of samples. In this paper, we address this critical reliability gap by introducing a new data collection and modeling framework. By augmenting preference data with an outside option, inspired by discrete choice models, we train a reward model that can distinguish not just what is better, but what is good enough. We leverage this capability to create an adaptive inference strategy, best of mini-N in-loop, which partitions the generation budget into sequential loops with a calibrated, early-exit condition. Our experiments show that when tuned as an alignment guardrail, it reduces reliability failures by 70\%, and when tuned as an inference accelerator, it improves average inference speed by over 22\% in IMDB-sentiment setting. We thus provide a principled and flexible framework for practitioners to explicitly manage the trade-off between reliability and computational efficiency.

Can humans tell whether a news article was written by a person or a large language model (LLM)? We investigate this question using JudgeGPT, a study platform that independently measures source attribution (human vs. machine) and authenticity judgment (legitimate vs. fake) on continuous scales. From 2,318 judgments collected from 1,054 participants across content generated by six LLMs, we report five findings: (1) participants cannot reliably distinguish machine-generated from human-written text (p > .05, Welch's t-test); (2) this inability holds across all tested models, including open-weight models with as few as 7B parameters; (3) self-reported domain expertise predicts judgment accuracy (r = .35, p < .001) whereas political orientation does not (r = -.10, n.s.); (4) clustering reveals distinct response strategies ("Skeptics" vs. "Believers"); and (5) accuracy degrades after approximately 30 sequential evaluations due to cognitive fatigue. The answer, in short, is no: humans cannot reliably tell. These results indicate that user-side detection is not a viable defense and motivate system-level countermeasures such as cryptographic content provenance.

In the absence of abundant reliable annotations for challenging tasks and contexts, how can we expand the frontier of LLM capabilities with potentially wrong answers? We focus on two research questions: (1) Can LLMs generate reliable preferences among wrong options? And if so, (2) Would alignment with such wrong-over-wrong preferences be helpful? We employ methods based on self-consistency, token probabilities, and LLM-as-a-judge to elicit wrong-over-wrong preferences, and fine-tune language models with preference optimization approaches using these synthesized preferences. Extensive experiments with seven LLMs and eight datasets demonstrate that (1) LLMs do have preliminary capability in distinguishing various shades of wrong, achieving up to 20.9% higher performance than random guess; (2) Alignment with wrong-over-wrong preferences helps LLMs to produce less wrong and sometimes even outright correct answers, while overall improving model calibration.

Recent advances have made long-form report-generating systems widely available. This has prompted evaluation frameworks that use LLM-as-judge protocols and claim verification, along with meta-evaluation frameworks that seek to validate these methods. Many of the meta-evaluations estimate an evaluation quality's by comparing its assessments against human pairwise preferences. Prior work, however, suggests that human pairwise preference may be overly simplistic and can fail to capture nuances of expert expectations. We conduct a case study in meta-evaluation for long-form QA benchmarks using ScholarQA-CS2, a benchmark designed for assessing retrieval-augmented deep-research QA in the scientific domain. We comprehensively validate the benchmark through human pairwise preference judgments, then critically examine the strengths, weaknesses, and confounders of this approach. We show that pairwise preference rankings are best suited for system-level evaluation, while explicit metric-wise annotations and expert annotators are critical for reliable metric-level assessment, with subjectivity remaining a key challenge. Based on our findings, we offer practical guidelines for designing future meta-evaluations that better align evaluation methods, annotator expertise, and reporting practices. By surfacing these methodological challenges, we aim to advance evaluation standards for deep-research systems.

Aligning the output of Large Language Models (LLMs) with human preferences (e.g., by means of reinforcement learning with human feedback, or RLHF) is essential for ensuring their effectiveness in real-world scenarios. Despite significant advancements in LLM alignment techniques, the impact of different type of preference data on model performance has yet to be systematically explored. In this study, we investigate the scalability, data efficiency, and effectiveness of Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) in fine-tuning pre-trained LLMs, aiming to reduce their dependency on extensive amounts of preference data, which is expensive to collect. We (1) systematically compare the performance of models fine-tuned with varying percentages of a combined preference judgement dataset to define the improvement curve of DPO and assess its effectiveness in data-constrained environments; and (2) provide insights for the development of an optimal approach for selective preference data usage. Our study reveals that increasing the amount of data used for training generally enhances and stabilizes model performance. Moreover, the use of a combination of diverse datasets significantly improves model effectiveness. Furthermore, when models are trained separately using different types of prompts, models trained with conversational prompts outperformed those trained with question answering prompts.

Before being deployed for user-facing applications, developers align Large Language Models (LLMs) to user preferences through a variety of procedures, such as Reinforcement Learning From Human Feedback (RLHF) and Direct Preference Optimization (DPO). Current evaluations of these procedures focus on benchmarks of instruction following, reasoning, and truthfulness. However, human preferences are not universal, and aligning to specific preference sets may have unintended effects. We explore how alignment impacts performance along three axes of global representation: English dialects, multilingualism, and opinions from and about countries worldwide. Our results show that current alignment procedures create disparities between English dialects and global opinions. We find alignment improves capabilities in several languages. We conclude by discussing design decisions that led to these unintended impacts and recommendations for more equitable preference tuning.

Recent studies show that large language models (LLMs) exhibit self-preference bias when serving as judges, meaning they tend to favor their own responses over those generated by other models. Existing methods typically measure this bias by calculating the difference between the scores a judge model assigns to its own responses and those it assigns to responses from other models. However, this approach conflates self-preference bias with response quality, as higher-quality responses from the judge model may also lead to positive score differences, even in the absence of bias. To address this issue, we introduce gold judgments as proxies for the actual quality of responses and propose the DBG score, which measures self-preference bias as the difference between the scores assigned by the judge model to its own responses and the corresponding gold judgments. Since gold judgments reflect true response quality, the DBG score mitigates the confounding effect of response quality on bias measurement. Using the DBG score, we conduct comprehensive experiments to assess self-preference bias across LLMs of varying versions, sizes, and reasoning abilities. Additionally, we investigate two factors that influence and help alleviate self-preference bias: response text style and the post-training data of judge models. Finally, we explore potential underlying mechanisms of self-preference bias from an attention-based perspective. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/zhiyuanc2001/self-preference.

As a relative quality comparison of model responses, human and Large Language Model (LLM) preferences serve as common alignment goals in model fine-tuning and criteria in evaluation. Yet, these preferences merely reflect broad tendencies, resulting in less explainable and controllable models with potential safety risks. In this work, we dissect the preferences of human and 32 different LLMs to understand their quantitative composition, using annotations from real-world user-model conversations for a fine-grained, scenario-wise analysis. We find that humans are less sensitive to errors, favor responses that support their stances, and show clear dislike when models admit their limits. On the contrary, advanced LLMs like GPT-4-Turbo emphasize correctness, clarity, and harmlessness more. Additionally, LLMs of similar sizes tend to exhibit similar preferences, regardless of their training methods, and fine-tuning for alignment does not significantly alter the preferences of pretrained-only LLMs. Finally, we show that preference-based evaluation can be intentionally manipulated. In both training-free and training-based settings, aligning a model with the preferences of judges boosts scores, while injecting the least preferred properties lowers them. This results in notable score shifts: up to 0.59 on MT-Bench (1-10 scale) and 31.94 on AlpacaEval 2.0 (0-100 scale), highlighting the significant impact of this strategic adaptation. Interactive Demo: https://huggingface.co/spaces/GAIR/Preference-Dissection-Visualization Dataset: https://huggingface.co/datasets/GAIR/preference-dissection Code: https://github.com/GAIR-NLP/Preference-Dissection

Large language models (LLMs) as a judge enable scalable evaluation, but their judgments can be sensitive to response order and, even after removing such position effects, can still diverge systematically from human preferences.We introduce DIAL, a unified framework that combines abundant LLM comparisons with limited human comparisons to separate judge-specific position effects, learn shared structure in position-debiased LLM preferences, and adaptively calibrate that structure toward the human preference target. Theoretically, we study three aspects of DIAL: (i) identification of latent LLM preferences, position effects, and human calibration; (ii) adaptive estimation that balances LLM anchoring against limited human evidence; and (iii) fixed-weight uncertainty quantification for the calibrated human preference. Empirically, we evaluate position debiasing and human alignment separately in controlled simulations and on three human-preference benchmarks, showing that DIAL remains robust to unbalanced response order, achieves strong human-aligned rankings with limited labels, and adapts toward human evidence when LLM information is imperfect. Our real-data study collects over 410K judgments from 21 LLM judges in both display orders, providing a resource for future studies of LLM-judge bias, heterogeneity, and human alignment.

Why do language models sometimes prefer correct statements even when trained on mixed-quality data? We introduce the Compression--Consistency Principle: next-token prediction favors hypotheses that allow shorter and more internally consistent descriptions of the training data. Truth bias emerges only when false alternatives are structurally harder to compress. We test this using small GPT-2-style character-level transformers (3.5M--86M parameters) on synthetic math corpora with controlled mixtures of correct and incorrect rules. In the random-error setting, models strongly prefer correct completions in paired evaluation: 83.1% accuracy at balanced data and 67.0% even when correct rules appear in only 10% of the corpus. Replacing random errors with a coherent but mathematically incorrect rule system largely eliminates the preference (near-chance accuracy). In a more natural-language-like synthetic world, the effect is weaker but still present (57.7%). Additional experiments show that embedding verification steps can restore preference for correctness even at small scale, while increasing the number of consistent rules produces a graded improvement in accuracy. Our results suggest that what appears as a "truth bias" is largely a side effect of compression pressure and preference for internal consistency, rather than an intrinsic drive toward truth. Full code and data are available at https://github.com/Rai220/compression-drives-truth.

As LLM-based judges become integral to industry applications, obtaining well-calibrated uncertainty estimates efficiently has become critical for production deployment. However, existing techniques, such as verbalized confidence and multi-generation methods, are often either poorly calibrated or computationally expensive. We introduce linear probes trained with a Brier score-based loss to provide calibrated uncertainty estimates from reasoning judges' hidden states, requiring no additional model training. We evaluate our approach on both objective tasks (reasoning, mathematics, factuality, coding) and subjective human preference judgments. Our results demonstrate that probes achieve superior calibration compared to existing methods with approx10x computational savings, generalize robustly to unseen evaluation domains, and deliver higher accuracy on high-confidence predictions. However, probes produce conservative estimates that underperform on easier datasets but may benefit safety-critical deployments prioritizing low false-positive rates. Overall, our work demonstrates that interpretability-based uncertainty estimation provides a practical and scalable plug-and-play solution for LLM judges in production.

Iterative preference learning, though yielding superior performances, requires online annotated preference labels. In this work, we study strategies to select worth-annotating response pairs for cost-efficient annotation while achieving competitive or even better performances compared with the random selection baseline for iterative preference learning. Built on assumptions regarding uncertainty and distribution shifts, we propose a comparative view to rank the implicit reward margins as predicted by DPO to select the response pairs that yield more benefits. Through extensive experiments, we show that annotating those response pairs with small margins is generally better than large or random, under both single- and multi-iteration scenarios. Besides, our empirical results suggest allocating more annotation budgets in the earlier iterations rather than later across multiple iterations.

Generating rationales that justify scoring decisions has been a promising way to facilitate explainability in automated scoring systems. However, existing methods do not match the accuracy of classifier-based methods. Plus, the generated rationales often contain hallucinated information. To address these issues, we propose a novel framework capable of generating more faithful rationales and, more importantly, matching performance with classifier-based black-box scoring systems. We first mimic the human assessment process by querying Large Language Models (LLMs) to generate a thought tree. We then summarise intermediate assessment decisions from each thought tree path for creating synthetic rationale data and rationale preference data. Finally, we utilise the generated synthetic data to calibrate LLMs through a two-step training process: supervised fine-tuning and preference optimization. Extensive experimental results demonstrate that our framework achieves a 38% assessment performance improvement in the QWK score compared to prior work while producing higher-quality rationales, as recognised by human evaluators and LLMs. Our work sheds light on the effectiveness of performing preference optimization using synthetic preference data obtained from thought tree paths.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed via public-facing interfaces to interact with millions of users, each with diverse preferences. Despite this, preference tuning of LLMs predominantly relies on reward models trained using binary judgments where annotators select the preferred choice out of pairs of model outputs. In this work, we argue that this reliance on binary choices does not capture the broader, aggregate preferences of the target user in real-world tasks. We propose a taxonomy that identifies two dimensions of subjectivity where different users disagree on the preferred output-namely, the Plurality of Responses to Prompts, where prompts allow for multiple correct answers, and the Indistinguishability of Responses, where candidate outputs are paraphrases of each other. We show that reward models correlate weakly with user preferences in these cases. As a first step to address this issue, we introduce a simple yet effective method that augments existing binary preference datasets with synthetic preference judgments to estimate potential user disagreement. Incorporating these via a margin term as a form of regularization during model training yields predictions that better align with the aggregate user preferences.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used to generate scientific reviews, yet existing evaluations rarely examine whether different providers align with both conference decisions and human reviewing priorities within the same controlled setting. We compare reviews from OpenAI GPT-5.4, Google Gemini 3.1 Pro Preview, and Anthropic Claude Opus 4.6 with human reviews and final decisions for 300 topic-matched ICLR 2026 submissions, equally divided among oral, poster, and rejected papers. Each model reviewed every paper using identical instructions and rating scales after decision information was removed. Our study contributes a cross-provider analysis of three complementary dimensions: alignment with broad and fine-grained decision categories, differences in recommendation-scale usage, and thematic agreement in identified weaknesses. All three LLMs distinguished accepted from rejected papers, but none reproduced the oral versus poster distinction present in human ratings. Scoring patterns were provider-specific: Gemini assigned systematically higher ratings, while OpenAI and Claude were closer to humans for rejected and poster papers but more critical of oral papers. Human and LLM reviews also differed in emphasis, with LLMs more frequently identifying missing baseline comparisons and humans more often raising computational-efficiency concerns. These results show that broad decision alignment does not imply agreement with finer human judgments or reviewing priorities.

Aligning large language models (LLMs) with human preferences has been recognized as the key to improving LLMs' interaction quality. However, in this pluralistic world, human preferences can be diversified due to annotators' different tastes, which hinders the effectiveness of LLM alignment methods. This paper presents the first quantitative analysis of commonly used human feedback datasets to investigate the impact of diversified preferences on reward modeling. Our analysis reveals a correlation between the calibration performance of reward models (RMs) and the alignment performance of LLMs. We find that diversified preference data negatively affect the calibration performance of RMs on human-shared preferences, such as Harmless\&Helpful, thereby impairing the alignment performance of LLMs. To address the ineffectiveness, we propose a novel Multi-Objective Reward learning method (MORE) to enhance the calibration performance of RMs on shared preferences. We validate our findings by experiments on three models and five human preference datasets. Our method significantly improves the prediction calibration of RMs, leading to better alignment of the Alpaca-7B model with Harmless\&Helpful preferences. Furthermore, the connection between reward calibration and preference alignment performance suggests that calibration error can be adopted as a key metric for evaluating RMs. The open-source code and data are available at https://github.com/dunzeng/MORE.

As LLMs occupy an increasingly important role in society, they are more and more confronted with questions that require them not only to draw on their general knowledge but also to align with certain human value systems. Therefore, studying the alignment of LLMs with human values has become a crucial field of inquiry. Prior work, however, mostly focuses on evaluating the alignment of fully trained models, overlooking the training dynamics by which models learn to express human values. In this work, we investigate how and at which stage value alignment arises during the course of a model's post-training. Our analysis disentangles the effects of post-training algorithms and datasets, measuring both the magnitude and time of value drifts during training. Experimenting with Llama-3 and Qwen-3 models of different sizes and popular supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and preference optimization datasets and algorithms, we find that the SFT phase generally establishes a model's values, and subsequent preference optimization rarely re-aligns these values. Furthermore, using a synthetic preference dataset that enables controlled manipulation of values, we find that different preference optimization algorithms lead to different value alignment outcomes, even when preference data is held constant. Our findings provide actionable insights into how values are learned during post-training and help to inform data curation, as well as the selection of models and algorithms for preference optimization to improve model alignment to human values.

Learning from preference feedback has emerged as an essential step for improving the generation quality and performance of modern language models (LMs). Despite its widespread use, the way preference-based learning is applied varies wildly, with differing data, learning algorithms, and evaluations used, making disentangling the impact of each aspect difficult. In this work, we identify four core aspects of preference-based learning: preference data, learning algorithm, reward model, and policy training prompts, systematically investigate the impact of these components on downstream model performance, and suggest a recipe for strong learning for preference feedback. Our findings indicate that all aspects are important for performance, with better preference data leading to the largest improvements, followed by the choice of learning algorithm, the use of improved reward models, and finally the use of additional unlabeled prompts for policy training. Notably, PPO outperforms DPO by up to 2.5% in math and 1.2% in general domains. High-quality preference data leads to improvements of up to 8% in instruction following and truthfulness. Despite significant gains of up to 5% in mathematical evaluation when scaling up reward models, we surprisingly observe marginal improvements in other categories. We publicly release the code used for training (https://github.com/hamishivi/EasyLM) and evaluating (https://github.com/allenai/open-instruct) our models, along with the models and datasets themselves (https://huggingface.co/collections/allenai/tulu-v25-suite-66676520fd578080e126f618).

In this position paper, we argue that human evaluation of generative large language models (LLMs) should be a multidisciplinary undertaking that draws upon insights from disciplines such as user experience research and human behavioral psychology to ensure that the experimental design and results are reliable. The conclusions from these evaluations, thus, must consider factors such as usability, aesthetics, and cognitive biases. We highlight how cognitive biases can conflate fluent information and truthfulness, and how cognitive uncertainty affects the reliability of rating scores such as Likert. Furthermore, the evaluation should differentiate the capabilities and weaknesses of increasingly powerful large language models -- which requires effective test sets. The scalability of human evaluation is also crucial to wider adoption. Hence, to design an effective human evaluation system in the age of generative NLP, we propose the ConSiDERS-The-Human evaluation framework consisting of 6 pillars -- Consistency, Scoring Criteria, Differentiating, User Experience, Responsible, and Scalability.

While there are numerous benchmarks comparing the performance of modern language models (LMs), end-task evaluations often conflate notions of *factual accuracy* ("truth") and *reasoning ability* ("rationality", or "honesty" in the sense of correctly reporting implications of beliefs). Our goal is a dataset that clearly distinguishes these two notions. Our approach is to leverage and extend a collection of human-annotated *entailment trees*, engineered to express both good and bad chains of reasoning, and using a mixture of true and false facts, in particular including counterfactual examples, to avoid belief bias (also known as the "content effect"). The resulting dataset, called BaRDa, contains 3000 entailments (1787 valid, 1213 invalid), using 6681 true and 2319 false statements. Testing on four GPT-series models, GPT3(curie)/GPT3(davinici)/3.5/4, we find factual accuracy (truth) scores of 74.1/80.6/82.6/87.1 and reasoning accuracy scores of 63.1/78.0/71.8/79.2. This shows the clear progression of models towards improved factual accuracy and entailment reasoning, and the dataset provides a new benchmark that more cleanly separates and quantifies these two notions.

Given the broad capabilities of large language models, it should be possible to work towards a general-purpose, text-based assistant that is aligned with human values, meaning that it is helpful, honest, and harmless. As an initial foray in this direction we study simple baseline techniques and evaluations, such as prompting. We find that the benefits from modest interventions increase with model size, generalize to a variety of alignment evaluations, and do not compromise the performance of large models. Next we investigate scaling trends for several training objectives relevant to alignment, comparing imitation learning, binary discrimination, and ranked preference modeling. We find that ranked preference modeling performs much better than imitation learning, and often scales more favorably with model size. In contrast, binary discrimination typically performs and scales very similarly to imitation learning. Finally we study a `preference model pre-training' stage of training, with the goal of improving sample efficiency when finetuning on human preferences.

As humans, we consistently engage in interactions with our peers and receive feedback in the form of natural language. This language feedback allows us to reflect on our actions, maintain appropriate behavior, and rectify our errors. The question arises naturally: can we use language feedback to align large language models (LLMs)? In contrast to previous research that aligns LLMs with reward or preference data, we present the first systematic exploration of alignment through the lens of language feedback (i.e., judgment). We commence with an in-depth investigation of potential methods that can be adapted for aligning LLMs with judgments, revealing that these methods are unable to fully capitalize on the judgments. To facilitate more effective utilization of judgments, we propose a novel framework, Contrastive Unlikelihood Training (CUT), that allows for fine-grained inappropriate content detection and correction based on judgments. Our offline alignment results show that, with merely 1317 off-the-shelf judgment data, CUT (LLaMA2-13b) can beat the 175B DaVinci003 and surpass the best baseline by 52.34 points on AlpacaEval. The online alignment results demonstrate that CUT can align LLMs (LLaMA2-chat-13b) in an iterative fashion using model-specific judgment data, with a steady performance improvement from 81.09 to 91.36 points on AlpacaEval. Our analysis further suggests that judgments exhibit greater potential than rewards for LLM alignment and warrant future research.

Recent approaches in personalized reward modeling have primarily focused on leveraging user interaction history to align model judgments with individual preferences. However, existing approaches largely treat user context as a static or implicit conditioning signal, failing to capture the dynamic and multi-faceted nature of human judgment. In this paper, we propose P-Check, a novel personalized reward modeling framework, designed to train a plug-and-play checklist generator that synthesizes dynamic evaluation criteria for guiding the reward prediction. To better align these checklists with personalized nuances, we introduce Preference-Contrastive Criterion Weighting, a training strategy that assigns saliency scores to criteria based on their discriminative power for personalized judgment. We conduct extensive experiments and demonstrate that P-Check not only improves reward accuracy but also enhances downstream personalized generation, and remains robust in OOD scenarios.

The progress of AI is bottlenecked by the quality of evaluation, and powerful LLM-as-a-Judge models have proved to be a core solution. Improved judgment ability is enabled by stronger chain-of-thought reasoning, motivating the need to find the best recipes for training such models to think. In this work we introduce J1, a reinforcement learning approach to training such models. Our method converts both verifiable and non-verifiable prompts to judgment tasks with verifiable rewards that incentivize thinking and mitigate judgment bias. In particular, our approach outperforms all other existing 8B or 70B models when trained at those sizes, including models distilled from DeepSeek-R1. J1 also outperforms o1-mini, and even R1 on some benchmarks, despite training a smaller model. We provide analysis and ablations comparing Pairwise-J1 vs Pointwise-J1 models, offline vs online training recipes, reward strategies, seed prompts, and variations in thought length and content. We find that our models make better judgments by learning to outline evaluation criteria, comparing against self-generated reference answers, and re-evaluating the correctness of model responses.

LLM-as-a-Judge has been widely adopted as an evaluation method and served as supervised rewards in model training. However, existing benchmarks for LLM-as-a-Judge are mainly relying on human-annotated ground truth, which introduces human bias that undermines the assessment of reliability and imposes scalability constraints. To overcome these limitations, we introduce Sage, a novel evaluation suite that assesses the quality of LLM judges without necessitating any human annotation. Inspired by axioms of rational choice theory, Sage introduces two new lenses for measuring LLM-as-a-Judge: local self-consistency (pair-wise preference stability) and global logical consistency (transitivity across a full set of preferences). We curate a dataset of 650 questions by combining structured benchmark problems with real-world user queries. Our experiments demonstrate both the stability of our metrics and their high correlation with supervised benchmarks like LLMBar and RewardBench2, confirming Sage's reliability as an evaluation suite for the robustness and accuracy of LLM-as-a-Judge. Based on Sage, we reveal that current state-of-the-art LLMs exhibit significant reliability problems when acting as judges in both scoring and pairwise settings; even the top-performing models, Gemini-2.5-Pro and GPT-5, fail to maintain consistent preferences in nearly a quarter of difficult cases. We attribute this to a new phenomenon called situational preference, which explains why explicit rubrics or criteria can help the model judge consistently across answer pairs. Our further analysis shows that finetuned LLM-as-a-Judge is a feasible method to boost performance, and the panel-based judge as well as deep reasoning can enhance the judging consistency. We also find substantial inconsistency in human judgments, which indicates that human annotation may not be a reliable gold standard.

Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) has emerged as a de-facto approach for aligning language models with human preferences. Recent work has shown DPO's effectiveness relies on training data quality. In particular, clear quality differences between preferred and rejected responses enhance learning performance. Current methods for identifying and obtaining such high-quality samples demand additional resources or external models. We discover that reference model probability space naturally detects high-quality training samples. Using this insight, we present a sampling strategy that achieves consistent improvements (+0.1 to +0.4) on MT-Bench while using less than half (30-50%) of the training data. We observe substantial improvements (+0.4 to +0.98) for technical tasks (coding, math, and reasoning) across multiple models and hyperparameter settings.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) become deeply integrated into human life and increasingly influence decision-making, it's crucial to evaluate whether and to what extent they exhibit subjective preferences, opinions, and beliefs. These tendencies may stem from biases within the models, which may shape their behavior, influence the advice and recommendations they offer to users, and potentially reinforce certain viewpoints. This paper presents the Preference, Opinion, and Belief survey (POBs), a benchmark developed to assess LLMs' subjective inclinations across societal, cultural, ethical, and personal domains. We applied our benchmark to evaluate leading open- and closed-source LLMs, measuring desired properties such as reliability, neutrality, and consistency. In addition, we investigated the effect of increasing the test-time compute, through reasoning and self-reflection mechanisms, on those metrics. While effective in other tasks, our results show that these mechanisms offer only limited gains in our domain. Furthermore, we reveal that newer model versions are becoming less consistent and more biased toward specific viewpoints, highlighting a blind spot and a concerning trend. POBS: https://ibm.github.io/POBS

Alignment techniques for LLMs rely on optimizing preference-based objectives -- where these preferences are typically elicited as ordinal, binary choices between responses. Recent work has focused on improving label quality or mitigating particular biases, but we identify a more fundamental limitation: these methods collect the wrong kind of data. We prove an impossibility result: no algorithm relying solely on ordinal comparisons can systematically recover the most preferred model. Intuitively, ordinal data lacks the information needed to resolve tradeoffs -- e.g., fixing a factual error on one prompt versus improving style on another. We show that selecting the optimal model requires recovering preferences over models (rather than just responses), which can only be identified given cardinal feedback about response quality. To address this, we collect and publicly release a dataset of 25,000 cardinal judgments using willingness-to-pay elicitations, a well-established tool from experimental economics. Empirically, we find that incorporating cardinal feedback into preference fine-tuning allows models to prioritize high-impact improvements and outperform ordinal-only methods on downstream benchmarks, such as Arena-Hard.

The class of direct preference optimization (DPO) algorithms has emerged as a promising approach for solving the alignment problem in foundation models. These algorithms work with very limited feedback in the form of pairwise preferences and fine-tune models to align with these preferences without explicitly learning a reward model. While the form of feedback used by these algorithms makes the data collection process easy and relatively more accurate, its ambiguity in terms of the quality of responses could have negative implications. For example, it is not clear if a decrease (increase) in the likelihood of preferred (dispreferred) responses during the execution of these algorithms could be interpreted as a positive or negative phenomenon. In this paper, we study how to design algorithms that can leverage additional information in the form of rating gap, which informs the learner how much the chosen response is better than the rejected one. We present new algorithms that can achieve faster statistical rates than DPO in presence of accurate rating gap information. Moreover, we theoretically prove and empirically show that the performance of our algorithms is robust to inaccuracy in rating gaps. Finally, we demonstrate the solid performance of our methods in comparison to a number of DPO-style algorithms across a wide range of LLMs and evaluation benchmarks.

The release of ChatGPT in November 2022 sparked an explosion of interest in post-training and an avalanche of new preference optimization (PO) methods. These methods claim superior alignment by virtue of better correspondence with human pairwise preferences, often measured by LLM judges. In this work, we attempt to answer the following question -- do LLM-judge preferences translate to progress on other, more concrete metrics for alignment, and if not, why not? We define a concrete metric for alignment, and introduce SOS-Bench, the largest standardized, reproducible LLM meta-benchmark to date. We find that (1) LLM-judgments do not correlate with concrete measures of safety, world knowledge, and instruction following; (2) LLM judges have powerful implicit biases, prioritizing style over factuality and safety; and (3) the supervised fine-tuning (SFT) stage of post-training, and not the PO stage, has the greatest impact on alignment, with data scaling and prompt diversity as the driving factors. Our codebase and complete results can be found at https://github.com/penfever/sos-bench.

Multiple-choice benchmarks are widely used to evaluate large language models, but MCQ scores conflate knowledge with sensitivity to option order, which makes them unreliable measures of model knowledge. In this paper, we test whether preventing a model from seeing option labels while committing to an answer removes positional influence and, in turn, improves performance. We evaluate two different strategies for mitigating bias. The first uses a generation-then-matching approach, and the second scores options in isolation, which is positionally unbiased by construction. Neither reliably improves accuracy. A complete decomposition shows that the bottleneck is withholding options, not the matching step. The only configuration that consistently matches the baseline is the one that shows the model all options paired with an LLM matcher. However, eliminating positional influence entirely still does not reliably yield accuracy gains, while cyclic permutation often improves them. For two-stage prompting, an aggregate measure of recall imbalance and a direct per-question measure of order sensitivity both fail to show reliable debiasing.

The alignment of large language models (LLMs) with human values increasingly relies on using other LLMs as automated judges, or ``autoraters''. However, their reliability is limited by a foundational issue: they are trained on discrete preference labels, forcing a single ground truth onto tasks that are often subjective, ambiguous, or nuanced. We argue that a reliable autorater must learn to model the full distribution of preferences defined by a target population. In this paper, we propose a general framework for calibrating probabilistic autoraters to any given preference distribution. We formalize the problem and present two learning methods tailored to different data conditions: 1) a direct supervised fine-tuning for dense, probabilistic labels, and 2) a reinforcement learning approach for sparse, binary labels. Our empirical results show that finetuning autoraters with a distribution-matching objective leads to verbalized probability predictions that are better aligned with the target preference distribution, with improved calibration and significantly lower positional bias, all while preserving performance on objective tasks.

Existing approaches for aligning large language models with human preferences face a trade-off that requires a separate reward model (RM) for on-policy learning. In this paper, we present a novel alignment framework, that (1) does on-policy learning and 2) is parameter efficient, as it does not require an additional RM for evaluating the samples for on-policy learning. To this end, we propose Judge-augmented Supervised Fine-Tuning (JSFT) to train a single model to act as both a policy and a judge. Specifically, we view the pairwise judgment task, choosing the better response from a response pair, as a special case of the instruction-following task. The resulting model can judge preferences of on-the-fly responses from current policy initialized from itself. Experimental results show the efficacy of , outperforming baselines in preference benchmarks. We also show that the rejecting sampling by itself can improve performance further without an additional evaluator.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated promising capabilities as automatic evaluators in assessing the quality of generated natural language. However, LLMs still exhibit biases in evaluation and often struggle to generate coherent evaluations that align with human assessments. In this work, we first conduct a systematic study of the misalignment between LLM evaluators and human judgement, revealing that existing calibration methods aimed at mitigating biases are insufficient for effectively aligning LLM evaluators. Inspired by the use of preference data in RLHF, we formulate the evaluation as a ranking problem and introduce Pairwise-preference Search (PairS), an uncertainty-guided search method that employs LLMs to conduct pairwise comparisons and efficiently ranks candidate texts. PairS achieves state-of-the-art performance on representative evaluation tasks and demonstrates significant improvements over direct scoring. Furthermore, we provide insights into the role of pairwise preference in quantifying the transitivity of LLMs and demonstrate how PairS benefits from calibration.

RLHF has emerged as a predominant approach for aligning artificial intelligence systems with human preferences, demonstrating exceptional and measurable efficacy in instruction following tasks; however, it exhibits insufficient compliance capabilities when confronted with complex multi-instruction tasks. Conventional approaches rely heavily on human annotation or more sophisticated large language models, thereby introducing substantial resource expenditure or potential bias concerns. Meanwhile, alternative synthetic methods that augment standard preference datasets often compromise the model's semantic quality. Our research identifies a critical oversight in existing techniques, which predominantly focus on comparing responses while neglecting valuable latent signals embedded within prompt inputs, and which only focus on preference disparities at the intra-sample level, while neglecting to account for the inter-sample level preference differentials that exist among preference data. To leverage these previously neglected indicators, we propose a novel Multi-level Aware Preference Learning (MAPL) framework, capable of enhancing multi-instruction capabilities. Specifically, for any given response in original preference data pairs, we construct varied prompts with a preference relation under different conditions, in order to learn intra-sample level preference disparities. Furthermore, for any given original preference pair, we synthesize multi-instruction preference pairs to capture preference discrepancies at the inter-sample level. Building on the two datasets constructed above, we consequently devise two sophisticated training objective functions. Subsequently, our framework integrates seamlessly into both Reward Modeling and Direct Preference Optimization paradigms. Through rigorous evaluation across multiple benchmarks, we empirically validate the efficacy of our framework.

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) remains indispensable for aligning large language models (LLMs) in subjective domains. To enhance robustness, recent work shifts toward Generative Reward Models (GenRMs) that generate rationales before predicting preferences. Yet in GenRM training and evaluation, practice remains outcome-label-only, leaving reasoning quality unchecked. We show that reasoning fidelity-the consistency between a GenRM's preference decision and reference decision rationales-is highly predictive of downstream RLHF outcomes, beyond standard label accuracy. Specifically, we repurpose existing reward-model benchmarks to compute Spurious Correctness (S-Corr)-the fraction of label-correct decisions with rationales misaligned with golden judgments. Our empirical evaluation reveals substantial S-Corr even for competitive GenRMs, and higher S-Corr is associated with policy degeneration under optimization. To improve fidelity, we propose Rationale-Centric Alignment, R-Align, which augments training with gold judgments and explicitly supervises rationale alignment. R-Align reduces S-Corr on RM benchmarks and yields consistent gains in actor performance across STEM, coding, instruction following, and general tasks.

Ensuring that large language models (LLMs) reflect diverse user values and preferences is crucial as their user bases expand globally. It is therefore encouraging to see the growing interest in LLM personalization within the research community. However, current works often rely on the LLM-as-a-Judge approach for evaluation without thoroughly examining its validity. In this paper, we investigate the reliability of LLM-as-a-Personalized-Judge, asking LLMs to judge user preferences based on personas. Our findings suggest that directly applying LLM-as-a-Personalized-Judge is less reliable than previously assumed, showing low and inconsistent agreement with human ground truth. The personas typically used are often overly simplistic, resulting in low predictive power. To address these issues, we introduce verbal uncertainty estimation into the LLM-as-a-Personalized-Judge pipeline, allowing the model to express low confidence on uncertain judgments. This adjustment leads to much higher agreement (above 80%) on high-certainty samples for binary tasks. Through human evaluation, we find that the LLM-as-a-Personalized-Judge achieves comparable performance to third-party humans evaluation and even surpasses human performance on high-certainty samples. Our work indicates that certainty-enhanced LLM-as-a-Personalized-Judge offers a promising direction for developing more reliable and scalable methods for evaluating LLM personalization.

The adoption of Large Language Models (LLMs) as automated evaluators (LLM-as-a-judge) has revealed critical inconsistencies in current evaluation frameworks. We identify two fundamental types of inconsistencies: (1) Score-Comparison Inconsistency, where lower-rated responses outperform higher-scored ones in pairwise comparisons, and (2) Pairwise Transitivity Inconsistency, manifested through circular preference chains (A>B>C>A) and equivalence contradictions (A=B=C\neq A). We argue that these issues come from information loss in discrete rating systems and ambiguous tie judgments during pairwise evaluation. We propose TrustJudge, a probabilistic framework that addresses these limitations through two key innovations: 1) distribution-sensitive scoring that computes continuous expectations from discrete rating probabilities, preserving information entropy for more precise scoring, and 2) likelihood-aware aggregation that resolves transitivity violations using bidirectional preference probabilities or perplexity. We also formalize the theoretical limitations of current LLM-as-a-judge frameworks and demonstrate how TrustJudge's components overcome them. When evaluated with Llama-3.1-70B-Instruct as judge using our dataset, TrustJudge reduces Score-Comparison inconsistency by 8.43% (from 23.32% to 14.89%) and Pairwise Transitivity inconsistency by 10.82% (from 15.22% to 4.40%), while maintaining higher evaluation accuracy. Our work provides the first systematic analysis of evaluation framework inconsistencies in LLM-as-a-judge paradigms, offering both theoretical insights and practical solutions for reliable automated assessment. The framework demonstrates consistent improvements across various model architectures and scales, enabling more trustworthy LLM evaluation without requiring additional training or human annotations. The codes can be found at https://github.com/TrustJudge/TrustJudge.

Large language models (LLMs) often produce confident but incorrect answers in settings where abstention would be safer. Standard evaluation protocols, however, require a response and do not account for how confidence should guide decisions under different risk preferences. To address this gap, we introduce the Behavioral Alignment Score (BAS), a decision-theoretic metric for evaluating how well LLM confidence supports abstention-aware decision making. BAS is derived from an explicit answer-or-abstain utility model and aggregates realized utility across a continuum of risk thresholds, yielding a measure of decision-level reliability that depends on both the magnitude and ordering of confidence. We show theoretically that truthful confidence estimates uniquely maximize expected BAS utility, linking calibration to decision-optimal behavior. BAS is related to proper scoring rules such as log loss, but differs structurally: log loss penalizes underconfidence and overconfidence symmetrically, whereas BAS imposes an asymmetric penalty that strongly prioritizes avoiding overconfident errors. Using BAS alongside widely used metrics such as ECE and AURC, we then construct a benchmark of self-reported confidence reliability across multiple LLMs and tasks. Our results reveal substantial variation in decision-useful confidence, and while larger and more accurate models tend to achieve higher BAS, even frontier models remain prone to severe overconfidence. Importantly, models with similar ECE or AURC can exhibit very different BAS due to highly overconfident errors, highlighting limitations of standard metrics. We further show that simple interventions, such as top-k confidence elicitation and post-hoc calibration, can meaningfully improve confidence reliability. Overall, our work provides both a principled metric and a comprehensive benchmark for evaluating LLM confidence reliability.

A decision model can give probabilities that sum to one for every question yet disagree with itself when the same decision is broken into smaller steps. We study this form of probabilistic coherence in Jev and the English Laya checkpoint, using 2,500 matched examples per system across TREC, CLINC150, and MASSIVE. Across 72,000 classification questions, we compare direct fine-label predictions with broad-category probabilities and predictions reconstructed through those categories. Both systems show substantial disagreement: mean category-level total variation ranges from 0.219 to 0.349 for Jev and from 0.424 to 0.689 for Laya, on a scale where zero means exact agreement. The consequences differ sharply. On CLINC150, reconstruction reduces Jev's accuracy by 22.9 percentage points (paired 95% bootstrap interval: [-24.9, -20.9]) and improves Laya's by 21.3 points ([18.0, 24.5]). The same directions hold across all three datasets, with all six unadjusted accuracy-change intervals excluding zero. Improved accuracy can also accompany less reliable confidence: on MASSIVE, Laya gains 9.2 accuracy points while its expected calibration error rises from 0.046 to 0.124. Error analysis identifies both broad-category mistakes and within-category confusions. These findings show why decision systems need joint evaluation of accuracy, confidence calibration, and probability coherence in the workflow used by an application.

A common evaluation practice in the vector space models (VSMs) literature is to measure the models' ability to predict human judgments about lexical semantic relations between word pairs. Most existing evaluation sets, however, consist of scores collected for English word pairs only, ignoring the potential impact of the judgment language in which word pairs are presented on the human scores. In this paper we translate two prominent evaluation sets, wordsim353 (association) and SimLex999 (similarity), from English to Italian, German and Russian and collect scores for each dataset from crowdworkers fluent in its language. Our analysis reveals that human judgments are strongly impacted by the judgment language. Moreover, we show that the predictions of monolingual VSMs do not necessarily best correlate with human judgments made with the language used for model training, suggesting that models and humans are affected differently by the language they use when making semantic judgments. Finally, we show that in a large number of setups, multilingual VSM combination results in improved correlations with human judgments, suggesting that multilingualism may partially compensate for the judgment language effect on human judgments.

A new generation of AI models generates step-by-step reasoning text before producing an answer. This text appears to offer a human-readable window into their computation process, and is increasingly relied upon for transparency and interpretability. However, it is unclear whether human understanding of this text matches the model's actual computational process. In this paper, we investigate a necessary condition for correspondence: the ability of humans to identify which steps in a reasoning text causally influence later steps. We evaluated humans on this ability by composing questions based on counterfactual measurements and found a significant discrepancy: participant accuracy was only 29.3%, barely above chance (25%), and remained low (42%) even when evaluating the majority vote on questions with high agreement. Our results reveal a fundamental gap between how humans interpret reasoning texts and how models use it, challenging its utility as a simple interpretability tool. We argue that reasoning texts should be treated as an artifact to be investigated, not taken at face value, and that understanding the non-human ways these models use language is a critical research direction.

Large language models can arrive at the same answer through reasoning paths that are unstable, contradictory, or difficult to rank consistently -- a failure mode especially prevalent in multi-step deductive reasoning. Existing methods assess reliability primarily through output dispersion -- measuring how much sampled answers differ -- but this discards a complementary signal: whether the model can consistently rank competing reasoning candidates. We propose structural uncertainty, a consistency-aware framework derived from the stability of self-preference-induced rankings over sampled reasoning solutions. Given a query, we generate multiple candidate solutions and ask the model to judge pairwise preferences among its own outputs. We aggregate self-preferences into ranking distributions via Bradley-Terry modeling with PageRank, and decompose the signal into two entropy-based components: across-trial ranking instability and within-trial candidate ambiguity. Across five LLMs and eight benchmarks, structural signals provide information complementary to answer dispersion: on logical and mathematical reasoning tasks, the combination improves identification of unreliable instances, while on factual retrieval the structural signal collapses toward uniformity, diagnosing a regime boundary where reasoning-level consistency evaluation is uninformative. The two components relate differently to accuracy: within-trial ambiguity correlates positively with correctness -- consistent with settings where multiple plausible solution paths remain competitive -- while across-trial instability correlates negatively, signaling unreliable reasoning. Structural uncertainty is best understood not as a universal confidence estimator, but as a regime-sensitive evaluator of logical reasoning consistency.

Aligning large language models with human preferences is critical for creating reliable and controllable AI systems. A human preference can be visualized as a high-dimensional vector where different directions represent trade-offs between desired attributes (e.g., helpfulness vs. verbosity). Yet, because the training data often reflects dominant, average preferences, LLMs tend to perform well on common requests but fall short in specific, individual needs. This mismatch creates a preference coverage gap. Existing methods often address this through costly retraining, which may not be generalized to the full spectrum of diverse preferences. This brittleness means that when a user's request reflects a nuanced preference deviating from the training data's central tendency, model performance can degrade unpredictably. To address this challenge, we introduce Robust Preference Selection (RPS), a post-hoc, training-free method by leveraging directional neighborhood consensus. Instead of forcing a model to generate a response from a single, highly specific preference, RPS samples multiple responses from a local neighborhood of related preferences to create a superior candidate pool. It then selects the response that best aligns with the user's original intent. We provide a theoretical framework showing our neighborhood generation strategy is provably superior to a strong baseline that also samples multiple candidates. Comprehensive experiments across three distinct alignment paradigms (DPA, DPO, and SFT) demonstrate that RPS consistently improves robustness against this baseline, achieving win rates of up to 69% on challenging preferences from under-represented regions of the space without any model retraining. Our work presents a practical, theoretically-grounded solution for enhancing the reliability of preference-aligned models.

This paper presents a case study on the design, administration, post-processing, and evaluation of surveys on large language models (LLMs). It comprises two components: (1) A statistical method for eliciting beliefs encoded in LLMs. We introduce statistical measures and evaluation metrics that quantify the probability of an LLM "making a choice", the associated uncertainty, and the consistency of that choice. (2) We apply this method to study what moral beliefs are encoded in different LLMs, especially in ambiguous cases where the right choice is not obvious. We design a large-scale survey comprising 680 high-ambiguity moral scenarios (e.g., "Should I tell a white lie?") and 687 low-ambiguity moral scenarios (e.g., "Should I stop for a pedestrian on the road?"). Each scenario includes a description, two possible actions, and auxiliary labels indicating violated rules (e.g., "do not kill"). We administer the survey to 28 open- and closed-source LLMs. We find that (a) in unambiguous scenarios, most models "choose" actions that align with commonsense. In ambiguous cases, most models express uncertainty. (b) Some models are uncertain about choosing the commonsense action because their responses are sensitive to the question-wording. (c) Some models reflect clear preferences in ambiguous scenarios. Specifically, closed-source models tend to agree with each other.

User preferences are increasingly used to personalize Large Language Model (LLM) responses, yet how to reliably leverage preference signals for answer generation remains under-explored. In practice, preferences can be noisy, incomplete, or even misleading, which can degrade answer quality when applied naively. Motivated by the observation that stable personality traits shape everyday preferences, we study personality as a principled ''latent'' signal behind preference statements. Through extensive experiments, we find that conditioning on personality-aligned preferences substantially improves personalized question answering: selecting preferences consistent with a user's inferred personality increases answer-choice accuracy from 29.25% to 76%, compared to using randomly selected preferences. Based on these findings, we introduce PACIFIC (Preference Alignment Choices Inference for Five-factor Identity Characterization), a personality-labeled preference dataset containing 1200 preference statements spanning diverse domains (e.g., travel, movies, education), annotated with Big-Five (OCEAN) trait directions. Finally, we propose a framework that enables an LLM model to automatically retrieve personality-aligned preferences and incorporate them during answer generation.

While finetuning language models from pairwise preferences has proven remarkably effective, the underspecified nature of natural language presents critical challenges. Direct preference feedback is uninterpretable, difficult to provide where multidimensional criteria may apply, and often inconsistent, either because it is based on incomplete instructions or provided by diverse principals. To address these challenges, we consider the two-step preference modeling procedure that first resolves the under-specification by selecting a context, and then evaluates preference with respect to the chosen context. We decompose reward modeling error according to these two steps, which suggests that supervising context in addition to context-specific preference may be a viable approach to aligning models with diverse human preferences. For this to work, the ability of models to evaluate context-specific preference is critical. To this end, we contribute context-conditioned preference datasets and accompanying experiments that investigate the ability of language models to evaluate context-specific preference. We use our datasets to (1) show that existing preference models benefit from, but fail to fully consider, added context, (2) finetune a context-aware reward model with context-specific performance exceeding that of GPT-4 and Llama 3 70B on tested datasets, and (3) investigate the value of context-aware preference modeling.

Preference alignment aims to guide generative models by learning from comparisons between preferred and non-preferred samples. In practice, most existing approaches rely on preference pairs constructed from model-generated images. Such supervision is inherently relative and can be ambiguous when both samples exhibit artifacts or limited visual quality, making it difficult to infer what constitutes a truly desirable output. In this work, we investigate whether real data can serve as an alternative source of supervision for preference alignment. We adopt a data-centric perspective and study a curation strategy that treats real images as reference points and constructs preference signals by contrasting them with generated or perturbed samples, without requiring manually annotated preference pairs. Through empirical analysis, we show that real-data-based supervision provides effective guidance for aligning diffusion models and achieves performance comparable to existing preference-based methods. Our results suggest that real data offers a practical and complementary source of supervision for preference alignment and highlight directions of label-efficient alignment strategies. Code and models are available at https://cwyxx.github.io/RealAlign.

There is a growing literature on reasoning by large language models (LLMs), but the discussion on the uncertainty in their responses is still lacking. Our aim is to assess the extent of confidence that LLMs have in their answers and how it correlates with accuracy. Confidence is measured (i) qualitatively in terms of persistence in keeping their answer when prompted to reconsider, and (ii) quantitatively in terms of self-reported confidence score. We investigate the performance of three LLMs -- GPT4o, GPT4-turbo and Mistral -- on two benchmark sets of questions on causal judgement and formal fallacies and a set of probability and statistical puzzles and paradoxes. Although the LLMs show significantly better performance than random guessing, there is a wide variability in their tendency to change their initial answers. There is a positive correlation between qualitative confidence and accuracy, but the overall accuracy for the second answer is often worse than for the first answer. There is a strong tendency to overstate the self-reported confidence score. Confidence is only partially explained by the underlying token-level probability. The material effects of prompting on qualitative confidence and the strong tendency for overconfidence indicate that current LLMs do not have any internally coherent sense of confidence.

While dialogue remains an important end-goal of natural language research, the difficulty of evaluation is an oft-quoted reason why it remains troublesome to make real progress towards its solution. Evaluation difficulties are actually two-fold: not only do automatic metrics not correlate well with human judgments, but also human judgments themselves are in fact difficult to measure. The two most used human judgment tests, single-turn pairwise evaluation and multi-turn Likert scores, both have serious flaws as we discuss in this work. We instead provide a novel procedure involving comparing two full dialogues, where a human judge is asked to pay attention to only one speaker within each, and make a pairwise judgment. The questions themselves are optimized to maximize the robustness of judgments across different annotators, resulting in better tests. We also show how these tests work in self-play model chat setups, resulting in faster, cheaper tests. We hope these tests become the de facto standard, and will release open-source code to that end.

Existing studies on preference optimization (PO) have centered on constructing pairwise preference data following simple heuristics, such as maximizing the margin between preferred and dispreferred completions based on human (or AI) ranked scores. However, none of these heuristics has a full theoretical justification. In this work, we develop a novel PO framework that provides theoretical guidance to effectively sample dispreferred completions. To achieve this, we formulate PO as minimizing the negative log-likelihood (NLL) of a probability model and propose to estimate its normalization constant via a sampling strategy. As we will demonstrate, these estimative samples can act as dispreferred completions in PO. We then select contrastive divergence (CD) as the sampling strategy, and propose a novel MC-PO algorithm that applies the Monte Carlo (MC) kernel from CD to sample hard negatives w.r.t. the parameterized reward model. Finally, we propose the OnMC-PO algorithm, an extension of MC-PO to the online setting. On popular alignment benchmarks, MC-PO outperforms existing SOTA baselines, and OnMC-PO leads to further improvement.

A robot that fails at a task faces the first decision in corrective dialogue: act on its own diagnosis, consult another onboard sensor, or interrupt a person. Choosing well requires knowing how much the robot's sensors reveal about the cause and how reliable the robot's own diagnosis is. We build a simulated benchmark in which every failure's true cause is known, because we injected it, and measure what each sensor reveals, with explicit checks against data leakage. Some failures are diagnosable from camera images; others only from the robot's force data (0.99 from force data, no image method above 0.55). We then test six open vision-language models. Their behavior tracks the surface of the prompt, not the evidence: moving the refusal option from last to first in the answer list collapses refusal rates from 78-100% to 0-6% in three of the six swept model-and-family pairs. Accuracy from frames stays at or below a majority-class baseline under every prompt variant, with or without worked examples, and stated confidence carries no information about correctness. Handing the same models the force data as ten lines of text produces the first above-baseline diagnoses, in four of the six models: much of the failure reflects missing sensor data, not missing ability. We pose the choice as a three-action decision problem, act, consult your own sensors, or ask a human, whose optimal policy follows from measured accuracy. The models do not follow it, and their ask rates ignore a fourfold change in question cost. One question to a human still lifts them from that baseline to roughly the answerer's own reliability (0.70-0.81 when they ask). The decision to ask should be tied to measured accuracy and stated costs, not to the model's confidence.

Language models (LMs) should provide reliable confidence estimates to help users detect mistakes in their outputs and defer to human experts when necessary. Asking a language model to assess its confidence ("Score your confidence from 0-1.") is a natural way of evaluating its uncertainty. However, models struggle to provide absolute assessments of confidence (i.e. judging confidence in answering a question independent of other questions) and the coarse-grained scores they produce are not useful for evaluating the correctness of their answers. We propose relative confidence estimation, where we match up questions against each other and ask the model to make relative judgments of confidence ("Which question are you more confident in answering correctly?"). Treating each question as a "player" in a series of matchups against other questions and the model's preferences as match outcomes, we can use rank aggregation methods like Elo rating and Bradley-Terry to translate the model's confidence preferences into confidence scores. We evaluate relative confidence estimation against absolute confidence estimation and self-consistency confidence methods on five state-of-the-art LMs -- GPT-4, GPT-4o, Gemini 1.5 Pro, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, and Llama 3.1 405B -- across 14 challenging STEM, social science, and commonsense reasoning question answering tasks. Our results demonstrate that relative confidence estimation consistently provides more reliable confidence scores than absolute confidence estimation, with average gains of 3.5% in selective classification AUC over direct absolute confidence estimation methods and 1.7% over self-consistency approaches across all models and datasets.

Recent advances in generative AI have been driven by alignment techniques such as reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF). RLHF and related techniques typically involve constructing a dataset of binary or ranked choice human preferences and subsequently fine-tuning models to align with these preferences. This paper shifts the focus to understanding the preferences encoded in such datasets and identifying common human preferences. We find that a small subset of 21 preference categories (selected from a set of nearly 5,000 distinct preferences) captures >89% of preference variation across individuals. This small set of preferences is analogous to a canonical basis of human preferences, similar to established findings that characterize human variation in psychology or facial recognition studies. Through both synthetic and empirical evaluations, we confirm that our low-rank, canonical set of human preferences generalizes across the entire dataset and within specific topics. We further demonstrate our preference basis' utility in model evaluation, where our preference categories offer deeper insights into model alignment, and in model training, where we show that fine-tuning on preference-defined subsets successfully aligns the model accordingly.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) monitoring assumes that reasoning traces faithfully record the information that shapes a model's answer. Existing faithfulness tests often place explicit bias cues in the user message, while agents may encounter preferences through tool returns or raw artifacts. We introduce FACE-Eval (Faithful Attribution of Cue Effects Evaluation), a 5,100-sample evaluation that varies cue location (user message or tool return) and explicitness (direct summary or raw artifact). We measure verbalized commitment among cue-following answers and unverbalized adoption among all cued samples. We evaluate 15 open-weight models from eight families, with total parameters ranging from 4B to 1.60T. Every model has lower verbalized commitment for tool-return than user-message cues and for implicit than explicit cues. Unverbalized adoption is higher for tool-return cues on all 15 models and for implicit cues in 28 of 30 model-channel comparisons. A source-attribution prompt narrows the channel gap on seven models, sometimes by increasing user-channel unverbalized adoption, while telling models that their reasoning will be monitored does not reliably close the gap. We also use two transcript monitors (GPT-5.6-Luna and GPT-4o-mini) to detect preference adoption in the largest model of each family. Across 32 model-channel-explicitness cells, higher unverbalized adoption is associated with lower detection ability for both monitors (Pearson r=-0.54 and r=-0.78, respectively). These results suggest that CoT monitoring may be less reliable when preference information arrives through tools or must be inferred from raw artifacts, within the single-call, prefilled-tool setting tested here.

Pairwise human preference prediction is central to evaluating code-generation systems, where quality often depends on task-specific trade-offs beyond functional correctness. While rubric-based LLM judges improve interpretability by decomposing evaluation into explicit criteria, most existing pipelines remain pointwise: they score each response independently and derive preferences by comparing aggregated scores. We show that this design is poorly matched to pairwise code preference prediction and can underperform a strong monolithic judge. We propose CriterAlign, a criterion-centric framework that adapts rubric-based judging to pairwise preference evaluation through direct criterion-level pairwise judgments, tie-driven criterion refinement, swap-consistency filtering, and final pairwise synthesis. We further introduce Human-Preference-Aligned Guidance (HPAG), synthesized offline from training examples by extracting recurring rationale gaps between human preferences and monolithic judge predictions, and injected into the criterion generator, criterion judge, and final judge. On BigCodeReward, CriterAlign improves a Qwen2.5-VL-32B monolithic judge from 60.4% to 66.3% accuracy, with ablations confirming the contributions of pairwise criterion design and HPAG.

This paper examines the role of cognitive biases in the decision-making processes of large language models (LLMs), challenging the conventional goal of eliminating all biases. We show that certain cognitive biases when properly balanced, can enhance decision-making efficiency through rational deviations and heuristic shortcuts. By introducing heuristic moderation and an abstention option, which allows LLMs to withhold responses when uncertain, we reduce error rates, improve decision accuracy, and optimize decision rates. Using the Balance Rigor and Utility (BRU) dataset, developed through expert collaboration, our findings demonstrate that targeted inspection of cognitive biases aligns LLM decisions more closely with human reasoning, enhancing reliability and suggesting strategies for future improvements. This approach offers a novel way to leverage cognitive biases to improve the practical utility of LLMs across various applications.

As language models (LMs) become more capable, it is increasingly important to align them with human preferences. However, the dominant paradigm for training Preference Models (PMs) for that purpose suffers from fundamental limitations, such as lack of transparency and scalability, along with susceptibility to overfitting the preference dataset. We propose Compositional Preference Models (CPMs), a novel PM framework that decomposes one global preference assessment into several interpretable features, obtains scalar scores for these features from a prompted LM, and aggregates these scores using a logistic regression classifier. Through these simple steps, CPMs allow to control which properties of the preference data are used to train the preference model and to build it based on features that are believed to underlie the human preference judgment. Our experiments show that CPMs not only improve generalization and are more robust to overoptimization than standard PMs, but also that best-of-n samples obtained using CPMs tend to be preferred over samples obtained using conventional PMs. Overall, our approach demonstrates the benefits of endowing PMs with priors about which features determine human preferences while relying on LM capabilities to extract those features in a scalable and robust way.

User preference prediction requires a comprehensive and accurate understanding of individual tastes. This includes both surface-level attributes, such as color and style, and deeper content-related aspects, such as themes and composition. However, existing methods typically rely on general human preferences or assume static user profiles, often neglecting individual variability and the dynamic, multifaceted nature of personal taste. To address these limitations, we propose an approach built upon Multimodal Large Language Models, introducing contrastive preference loss and preference tokens to learn personalized user preferences from historical interactions. The contrastive preference loss is designed to effectively distinguish between user ''likes'' and ''dislikes'', while the learnable preference tokens capture shared interest representations among existing users, enabling the model to activate group-specific preferences and enhance consistency across similar users. Extensive experiments demonstrate our model outperforms other methods in preference prediction accuracy, effectively identifying users with similar aesthetic inclinations and providing more precise guidance for generating images that align with individual tastes. The project page is https://learn-user-pref.github.io/.

Text-to-image models now generate graphic design at production scale, yet their supervision still comes primarily from photo-style preference datasets with a single overall verdict per comparison. Designers evaluate designs along several distinct axes (e.g., typography, layout, color harmony) that a single preference label collapses. We release TASTE (Typography, Aesthetics, Spatial, Tone, Etc.), a multi-dimensional preference dataset in which two disjoint cohorts of five professional designers each ranked outputs from four current text-to-image models across nine criteria along with per-image hallucination flags. We pair the dataset with two contributions. First, a criterion-agnostic signal-validation framework based on Kendall's τ, majority-vote probability, and Condorcet cycles against exact iid-uniform nulls; the analysis reveals significant but moderate designer agreement, with every TASTE criterion rejecting the random-rater null. Second, we benchmark preference models on TASTE and find that off-the-shelf VLM judges and dedicated T2I scorers fail to reach majority agreement with the designer panel, while a small MLP head trained directly on TASTE substantially narrows the gap to the single-rater ceiling, setting a baseline for future TASTE-trained preference models.

Due to constraints on privacy, cost, and latency, on-premise deployment of small models is increasingly common. However, most practical pipelines stop at supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and fail to reach the reinforcement learning (RL) alignment stage. The main reason is that RL alignment typically requires either expensive human preference annotation or heavy reliance on high-quality reward models with large-scale API usage and ongoing engineering maintenance, both of which are ill-suited to on-premise settings. To bridge this gap, we propose a positive-unlabeled (PU) RL distillation method for on-premise small-model deployment. Without human-labeled preferences or a reward model, our method distills the teacher's preference-optimization capability from black-box generations into a locally trainable student. For each prompt, we query the teacher once to obtain an anchor response, locally sample multiple student candidates, and perform anchor-conditioned self-ranking to induce pairwise or listwise preferences, enabling a fully local training loop via direct preference optimization or group relative policy optimization. Theoretical analysis justifies that the induced preference signal by our method is order-consistent and concentrates on near-optimal candidates, supporting its stability for preference optimization. Experiments demonstrate that our method achieves consistently strong performance under a low-cost setting.

Learning from preference feedback is a common practice for aligning large language models~(LLMs) with human value. Conventionally, preference data is learned and encoded into a scalar reward model that connects a value head with an LLM to produce a scalar score as preference or reward. However, scalar models lack interpretability and are known to be susceptible to biases in datasets. This paper investigates leveraging the generation capability of LLMs to address both limitations in one shot. Specifically, we prompt the pre-trained LLM to generate positive and negative judgments, both supported with rationales in natural language form. The self-generated contrastive judgment pairs are used to train the generative judge with Direct Preference Optimization (DPO). This proposal of training the generative Judge using self-generated Contrastive judgments (Con-J) ensures natural interpretability due to the generated rationales together with the judgments, as well as high robustness against bias without the need for an additional reward head. Experimental results show that the performance of Con-J is comparable to the scalar reward model trained on the same collection of preference data, and demonstrate its superior interpretability and robustness in encoding human preferences.

Reinforcement learning from human feedback plays a crucial role in aligning language models towards human preferences, traditionally represented through comparisons between pairs or sets of responses within a given context. While many studies have enhanced algorithmic techniques to optimize learning from such data, this work shifts focus to improving preference learning through a data-centric approach. Specifically, we propose enriching existing preference datasets with machine-generated rationales that explain the reasons behind choices. We develop a simple and principled framework to augment current preference learning methods with rationale information. Our comprehensive analysis highlights how rationales enhance learning efficiency. Extensive experiments reveal that rationale-enriched preference learning offers multiple advantages: it improves data efficiency, accelerates convergence to higher-performing models, and reduces verbosity bias and hallucination. Furthermore, this framework is versatile enough to integrate with various preference optimization algorithms. Overall, our findings highlight the potential of re-imagining data design for preference learning, demonstrating that even freely available machine-generated rationales can significantly boost performance across multiple dimensions. The code repository is available at https: //github.com/reds-lab/preference-learning-with-rationales

Generative Reward Models (GenRMs) and LLM-as-a-Judge exhibit deceptive alignment by producing correct judgments for incorrect reasons, as they are trained and evaluated to prioritize Outcome Accuracy, which undermines their ability to generalize during RLHF. We introduce Rationale Consistency, a fine-grained metric that quantifies the alignment between the model's reasoning process and human judgment. Our evaluation of frontier models reveals that rationale consistency effectively discriminates among state-of-the-art models and detects deceptive alignment, while outcome accuracy falls short in both respects. To mitigate this gap, we introduce a hybrid signal that combines rationale consistency with outcome accuracy for GenRM training. Our training method achieves state-of-the-art performance on RM-Bench (87.1%) and JudgeBench (82%), surpassing outcome-only baselines by an average of 5%. Using RM during RLHF, our method effectively improves performance as demonstrated on Arena Hard v2, notably yielding a 7% improvement in creative writing tasks. Further analysis confirms that our method escapes the deceptive alignment trap, effectively reversing the decline in rationale consistency observed in outcome-only training.

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) has become a crucial technology for aligning language models with human values and intentions, enabling models to produce more helpful and harmless responses. Reward models are trained as proxies for human preferences to drive reinforcement learning optimization. While reward models are often considered central to achieving high performance, they face the following challenges in practical applications: (1) Incorrect and ambiguous preference pairs in the dataset may hinder the reward model from accurately capturing human intent. (2) Reward models trained on data from a specific distribution often struggle to generalize to examples outside that distribution and are not suitable for iterative RLHF training. In this report, we attempt to address these two issues. (1) From a data perspective, we propose a method to measure the strength of preferences within the data, based on a voting mechanism of multiple reward models. Experimental results confirm that data with varying preference strengths have different impacts on reward model performance. We introduce a series of novel methods to mitigate the influence of incorrect and ambiguous preferences in the dataset and fully leverage high-quality preference data. (2) From an algorithmic standpoint, we introduce contrastive learning to enhance the ability of reward models to distinguish between chosen and rejected responses, thereby improving model generalization. Furthermore, we employ meta-learning to enable the reward model to maintain the ability to differentiate subtle differences in out-of-distribution samples, and this approach can be utilized for iterative RLHF optimization.

Kahneman & Tversky's prospect theory tells us that humans perceive random variables in a biased but well-defined manner; for example, humans are famously loss-averse. We show that objectives for aligning LLMs with human feedback implicitly incorporate many of these biases -- the success of these objectives (e.g., DPO) over cross-entropy minimization can partly be ascribed to them being human-aware loss functions (HALOs). However, the utility functions these methods attribute to humans still differ from those in the prospect theory literature. Using a Kahneman-Tversky model of human utility, we propose a HALO that directly maximizes the utility of generations instead of maximizing the log-likelihood of preferences, as current methods do. We call this approach Kahneman-Tversky Optimization (KTO), and it matches or exceeds the performance of preference-based methods at scales from 1B to 30B. Crucially, KTO does not need preferences -- only a binary signal of whether an output is desirable or undesirable for a given input. This makes it far easier to use in the real world, where preference data is scarce and expensive.

Great scientists have strong judgement and foresight, closely tied to what we call scientific taste. Here, we use the term to refer to the capacity to judge and propose research ideas with high potential impact. However, most relative research focuses on improving an AI scientist's executive capability, while enhancing an AI's scientific taste remains underexplored. In this work, we propose Reinforcement Learning from Community Feedback (RLCF), a training paradigm that uses large-scale community signals as supervision, and formulate scientific taste learning as a preference modeling and alignment problem. For preference modeling, we train Scientific Judge on 700K field- and time-matched pairs of high- vs. low-citation papers to judge ideas. For preference alignment, using Scientific Judge as a reward model, we train a policy model, Scientific Thinker, to propose research ideas with high potential impact. Experiments show Scientific Judge outperforms SOTA LLMs (e.g., GPT-5.2, Gemini 3 Pro) and generalizes to future-year test, unseen fields, and peer-review preference. Furthermore, Scientific Thinker proposes research ideas with higher potential impact than baselines. Our findings show that AI can learn scientific taste, marking a key step toward reaching human-level AI scientists.

Reward models (RMs) are central to the alignment of language models (LMs). An RM often serves as a proxy for human preferences to guide downstream LM behavior. However, our understanding of RM behavior is limited. Our work (i) formalizes a framework for measuring the alignment of opinions captured by RMs, (ii) investigates the extent to which RMs demonstrate sociodemographic biases, and (iii) explores the effects of prompting to steer rewards towards the preferences of a target group. We study the subjective and diverse perspectives on controversial topics, which allows us to quantify RM perspectives in terms of their opinions, attitudes, and values. We show that RMs are poorly aligned with several demographic groups and can systematically reward harmful stereotypes, and steering alone is not enough to overcome these limitations. Our findings underscore the need for more careful consideration of RM behavior in model alignment during preference learning to prevent the propagation of unwanted social biases in the language technologies that we use.

This paper studies reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) for aligning large language models with human preferences. While RLHF has demonstrated promising results, many algorithms are highly sensitive to misspecifications in the underlying preference model (e.g., the Bradley-Terry model), the reference policy, or the reward function, resulting in undesirable fine-tuning. To address model misspecification, we propose a doubly robust preference optimization algorithm that remains consistent when either the preference model or the reference policy is correctly specified (without requiring both). Our proposal demonstrates superior and more robust performance than state-of-the-art algorithms, both in theory and in practice. The code is available at https://github.com/DRPO4LLM/DRPO4LLM

The remarkable abilities of large language models (LLMs) like GPT-4 partially stem from post-training processes like Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) involving human preferences encoded in a reward model. However, these reward models (RMs) often lack direct knowledge of why, or under what principles, the preferences annotations were made. In this study, we identify principles that guide RMs to better align with human preferences, and then develop an axiomatic framework to generate a rich variety of preference signals to uphold them. We use these axiomatic signals to train a model for scoring answers to longform questions. Our approach yields a Preference Model with only about 220M parameters that agrees with gold human-annotated preference labels more often than GPT-4. The contributions of this work include: training a standalone preference model that can score human- and LLM-generated answers on the same scale; developing an axiomatic framework for generating training data pairs tailored to certain principles; and showing that a small amount of axiomatic signals can help small models outperform GPT-4 in preference scoring. We release our model on huggingface: https://huggingface.co/corbyrosset/axiomatic_preference_model

Large foundation models pretrained on raw web-scale data are not readily deployable without additional step of extensive alignment to human preferences. Such alignment is typically done by collecting large amounts of pairwise comparisons from humans ("Do you prefer output A or B?") and learning a reward model or a policy with the Bradley-Terry-Luce (BTL) model as a proxy for a human's underlying implicit preferences. These methods generally suffer from assuming a universal preference shared by all humans, which lacks the flexibility of adapting to plurality of opinions and preferences. In this work, we propose PAL, a framework to model human preference complementary to existing pretraining strategies, which incorporates plurality from the ground up. We propose using the ideal point model as a lens to view alignment using preference comparisons. Together with our novel reformulation and using mixture modeling, our framework captures the plurality of population preferences while simultaneously learning a common preference latent space across different preferences, which can few-shot generalize to new, unseen users. Our approach enables us to use the penultimate-layer representation of large foundation models and simple MLP layers to learn reward functions that are on-par with the existing large state-of-the-art reward models, thereby enhancing efficiency of reward modeling significantly. We show that PAL achieves competitive reward model accuracy compared to strong baselines on 1) Language models with Summary dataset ; 2) Image Generative models with Pick-a-Pic dataset ; 3) A new semisynthetic heterogeneous dataset generated using Anthropic Personas. Finally, our experiments also highlight the shortcoming of current preference datasets that are created using rigid rubrics which wash away heterogeneity, and call for more nuanced data collection approaches.

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) is an effective approach for aligning language models to human preferences. Central to RLHF is learning a reward function for scoring human preferences. Two main approaches for learning a reward model are 1) training an EXplicit Reward Model (EXRM) as in RLHF, and 2) using an implicit reward learned from preference data through methods such as Direct Preference Optimization (DPO). Prior work has shown that the implicit reward model of DPO (denoted as DPORM) can approximate an EXRM in the limit. DPORM's effectiveness directly implies the optimality of the learned policy, and also has practical implication for LLM alignment methods including iterative DPO. However, it is unclear how well DPORM empirically matches the performance of EXRM. This work studies the accuracy at distinguishing preferred and rejected answers for both DPORM and EXRM. Our findings indicate that even though DPORM fits the training dataset comparably, it generalizes less effectively than EXRM, especially when the validation datasets contain distribution shifts. Across five out-of-distribution settings, DPORM has a mean drop in accuracy of 3% and a maximum drop of 7%. These findings highlight that DPORM has limited generalization ability and substantiates the integration of an explicit reward model in iterative DPO approaches.

Preference based alignment objectives implicitly assume that all human preferences are expressed with equal strength. In practice, however, preference strength varies across individuals and contexts -- a phenomenon established in behavioral economics and discrete choice theory. This mismatch limits the ability of existing objectives to faithfully capture heterogeneous human judgments. Inspired by this literature, we introduce Mixed Logit Direct Preference Optimization (MixDPO), a generalization of Direct Preference Optimization that models variation in preference strength. MixDPO enables alignment objectives to capture heterogeneity in how strongly preferences are expressed across training examples. We evaluate MixDPO on three preference datasets using two open-weight language models. Across datasets, MixDPO improves aggregate alignment performance (+11.2 points on Pythia-2.8B) while preserving subgroup level preferences, with the largest gains appearing in settings with higher inferred preference heterogeneity. MixDPO makes preference heterogeneity explicit through learned strength distributions. We release our code for reproducibility.

Inconsistent annotations in training corpora, particularly within preference learning datasets, pose challenges in developing advanced language models. These inconsistencies often arise from variability among annotators and inherent multi-dimensional nature of the preferences. To address these issues, we introduce a self-curation method that preprocesses annotated datasets by leveraging proxy models trained directly on them. Our method enhances preference learning by automatically detecting and selecting consistent annotations. We validate the proposed approach through extensive instruction-following tasks, demonstrating performance improvements of up to 33\% across various learning algorithms and proxy capabilities. This work offers a straightforward and reliable solution to address preference inconsistencies without relying on heuristics, serving as an initial step toward the development of more advanced preference learning methodologies. Code is available at https://github.com/Self-Curation/ .

Learning from preference feedback is essential for aligning large language models (LLMs) with human values and improving the quality of generated responses. However, existing preference learning methods rely heavily on curated data from humans or advanced LLMs, which is costly and difficult to scale. In this work, we present PUGC, a novel framework that leverages implicit human Preferences in unlabeled User-Generated Content (UGC) to generate preference data. Although UGC is not explicitly created to guide LLMs in generating human-preferred responses, it often reflects valuable insights and implicit preferences from its creators that has the potential to address readers' questions. PUGC transforms UGC into user queries and generates responses from the policy model. The UGC is then leveraged as a reference text for response scoring, aligning the model with these implicit preferences. This approach improves the quality of preference data while enabling scalable, domain-specific alignment. Experimental results on Alpaca Eval 2 show that models trained with DPO and PUGC achieve a 9.37% performance improvement over traditional methods, setting a 35.93% state-of-the-art length-controlled win rate using Mistral-7B-Instruct. Further studies highlight gains in reward quality, domain-specific alignment effectiveness, robustness against UGC quality, and theory of mind capabilities. Our code and dataset are available at https://zhaoxuan.info/PUGC.github.io/

Methods for controlling large language models (LLMs), including local weight fine-tuning, LoRA-based adaptation, and activation-based interventions, are often studied in isolation, obscuring their connections and making comparison difficult. In this work, we present a unified view that frames these interventions as dynamic weight updates induced by a control signal, placing them within a single conceptual framework. Building on this view, we propose a unified preference-utility analysis that separates control effects into preference, defined as the tendency toward a target concept, and utility, defined as coherent and task-valid generation, and measures both on a shared log-odds scale using polarity-paired contrastive examples. Across methods, we observe a consistent trade-off between preference and utility: stronger control increases preference while predictably reducing utility. We further explain this behavior through an activation manifold perspective, in which control shifts representations along target-concept directions to enhance preference, while utility declines primarily when interventions push representations off the model's valid-generation manifold. Finally, we introduce a new steering approach SPLIT guided by this analysis that improves preference while better preserving utility. Code is available at https://github.com/zjunlp/EasyEdit/blob/main/examples/SPLIT.md.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are widely used as proxies for human labelers in both training (Reinforcement Learning from AI Feedback) and large-scale response evaluation (LLM-as-a-judge). Alignment and evaluation are critical components in the development of reliable LLMs, and the choice of feedback protocol plays a central role in both but remains understudied. In this work, we show that the choice of feedback protocol for evaluation (absolute scores versus relative preferences) can significantly affect evaluation reliability and induce systematic biases. In the context of LLM-as-a-judge evaluation, we show that pairwise protocols are more vulnerable to distracted evaluation. Generator models can exploit spurious attributes (or distractor features) favored by the LLM judge, resulting in inflated scores for lower-quality outputs. We find that absolute scoring is more robust to such manipulation, producing judgments that better reflect response quality and are less influenced by distractor features. Our results demonstrate that generator models can flip preferences by embedding distractor features, skewing LLM-as-a-judge comparisons and leading to inaccurate conclusions about model quality in benchmark evaluations. Pairwise preferences flip in about 35% of the cases, compared to only 9% for absolute scores. We offer recommendations for choosing feedback protocols based on dataset characteristics and evaluation objectives.

Standard human preference-based alignment methods, such as Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF), are a cornerstone technology for aligning Large Language Models (LLMs) with human values. However, these methods are all underpinned by a critical, yet flawed assumption: human preferences are homogeneous (representing a single, unified preference) and the collected data is noiseless (free from error). In reality, neither is true since human preference is pluralistic and annotators can make mistakes. This creates a discrepancy between the recorded data and the ground-truth preferences, which can misguide the model and degrade its performance. To address this challenge, we introduce Latent Collective Preference Optimization (LCPO). LCPO leverages an Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm to learn the latent collective consensus from noisy data. It operates by inferring the correctness of each preference label and using this probability as an adaptive weight to re-calibrate each data point's contribution to the training loss, thereby mitigating noise. We generalize this approach by establishing a theoretical link between arbitrary preference losses and their corresponding probabilistic models, elevating LCPO from a specific algorithm to a general framework for robust preference alignment. Theoretically, we prove that under the condition of a perfectly calibrated model, LCPO is guaranteed to converge to the true noise level of the dataset. Our experiments demonstrate LCPO's effectiveness as a general framework, consistently enhancing four state-of-the-art alignment algorithms (DPO, IPO, SimPO, and CPO). When applied to Mistral and Llama 3 models, the LCPO-enhanced methods achieve substantial win rate gains on AlpacaEval 2 and Arena-Hard, with improvements of up to 7.0% on both benchmarks.

Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) and its variants are increasingly used for aligning language models with human preferences. Although these methods are designed to teach a model to generate preferred responses more frequently relative to dispreferred responses, prior work has observed that the likelihood of preferred responses often decreases during training. The current work sheds light on the causes and implications of this counter-intuitive phenomenon, which we term likelihood displacement. We demonstrate that likelihood displacement can be catastrophic, shifting probability mass from preferred responses to responses with an opposite meaning. As a simple example, training a model to prefer No over Never can sharply increase the probability of Yes. Moreover, when aligning the model to refuse unsafe prompts, we show that such displacement can unintentionally lead to unalignment, by shifting probability mass from preferred refusal responses to harmful responses (e.g., reducing the refusal rate of Llama-3-8B-Instruct from 74.4% to 33.4%). We theoretically characterize that likelihood displacement is driven by preferences that induce similar embeddings, as measured by a centered hidden embedding similarity (CHES) score. Empirically, the CHES score enables identifying which training samples contribute most to likelihood displacement in a given dataset. Filtering out these samples effectively mitigated unintentional unalignment in our experiments. More broadly, our results highlight the importance of curating data with sufficiently distinct preferences, for which we believe the CHES score may prove valuable.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used in decision-making contexts, but when they present answers without signaling low confidence, users may unknowingly act on erroneous outputs. Prior work shows that LLMs maintain internal uncertainty signals, yet their expressed confidence is often miscalibrated and poorly discriminates between correct and incorrect answers. We investigate whether supervised fine-tuning can improve models' ability to communicate uncertainty and whether such improvements generalize across tasks and domains. We fine-tune LLMs on datasets spanning general knowledge, mathematics, and open-ended trivia, and evaluate two metacognitive tasks: (1) single-question confidence estimation, where the model assigns a numeric certainty to its answer, and (2) pairwise confidence comparison, where the model selects which of two answers it is more likely to answer correctly. We assess generalization to unseen domains, including medical and legal reasoning. Results show that fine-tuning improves calibration (alignment between stated confidence and accuracy) and discrimination (higher confidence for correct vs. incorrect responses) within and across domains. However, gains are task-specific: training on single-question calibration does not transfer to pairwise comparison, and vice versa. Multitask fine-tuning yields broader gains, lowering calibration error and strengthening discrimination in out-of-domain evaluations. This suggests that uncertainty communication in LLMs is trainable but requires multitask training to generalize effectively.

Aligning large language models (LLMs) with human intentions has become a critical task for safely deploying models in real-world systems. While existing alignment approaches have seen empirical success, theoretically understanding how these methods affect model behavior remains an open question. Our work provides an initial attempt to theoretically analyze the learning dynamics of human preference alignment. We formally show how the distribution of preference datasets influences the rate of model updates and provide rigorous guarantees on the training accuracy. Our theory also reveals an intricate phenomenon where the optimization is prone to prioritizing certain behaviors with higher preference distinguishability. We empirically validate our findings on contemporary LLMs and alignment tasks, reinforcing our theoretical insights and shedding light on considerations for future alignment approaches. Disclaimer: This paper contains potentially offensive text; reader discretion is advised.

Large language models excel on objectively verifiable tasks such as math and programming, where evaluation reduces to unit tests or a single correct answer. In contrast, real-world enterprise work is often subjective and context-dependent: success hinges on organizational goals, user intent, and the quality of intermediate artifacts produced across long, multi-tool workflows. We introduce LH-Bench, a three-pillar evaluation design that moves beyond binary correctness to score autonomous, long-horizon execution on subjective enterprise tasks. The pillars are: (i) expert-grounded rubrics that give LLM judges the domain context needed to score subjective work, (ii) curated ground-truth artifacts that enable stepwise reward signals (e.g., chapter-level annotation for content tasks), and (iii) pairwise human preference evaluation for convergent validation. We show that domain-authored rubrics provide substantially more reliable evaluation signals than LLM-authored rubrics (kappa = 0.60 vs. 0.46), and that human preference judgments confirm the same top-tier separation (p < 0.05), evidence that expert-grounded evaluation can scale without sacrificing reliability. We release public datasets and report results on two environments: Figma-to-code (33 real .fig tasks against the Figma API via MCP) and Programmatic content (41 courses comprising 183 individually-evaluated chapters on a course platform serving 30+ daily users).

Large Language Models are increasingly used as judges to evaluate code artifacts when exhaustive human review or executable test coverage is unavailable. LLM-judge is increasingly relevant in agentic software engineering workflows, where it can help rank candidate solutions and guide patch selection. While attractive for scale, current practice lacks a principled account of reliability and bias: repeated evaluations of the same case can disagree; small prompt edits can swing outcomes; and seemingly semantics-preserving, human-equivalent perturbations may elicit divergent verdicts. This paper studies LLM-as-a-Judge for code through a measurement-first lens. We analyze two pointwise judging regimes across code generation, code repair task, and test generation, and we systematically probe prompt-induced biases. Our study considers difficulty levels for repeated runs and controlled prompt interventions that isolate one presentation cue at a time, and it evaluates judges using consistency and sensitivity to bias. We find that judge decisions are highly sensitive to prompt biases even when the underlying code snippet is unchanged. Across all three tasks, several biases systematically shift preferences toward the option favored by the prompt, improving accuracy when that option aligns with the gold answer but substantially reducing it otherwise. In some settings, these effects are large enough to change task-level conclusions and alter relative model rankings. These findings show that reported judge performance may reflect prompt artifacts rather than stable assessment ability, posing a direct threat to the validity and reproducibility of code evaluation. We therefore argue that LLM-as-a-Judge studies should report bias sensitivity alongside accuracy and incorporate explicit controls to support more trustworthy model comparison in software engineering.

Forecasting has become a natural benchmark for reasoning under uncertainty. Yet existing evaluations of large language models remain limited to judgmental tasks in simple formats, such as binary or multiple-choice questions. In practice, however, forecasting spans a far broader scope. Across domains such as economics, public health, and social demographics, decisions hinge on numerical estimates over continuous quantities, a capability that current benchmarks do not capture. Evaluating such estimates requires a format that makes uncertainty explicit and testable. We propose prediction intervals as a natural and rigorous interface for this purpose. They demand scale awareness, internal consistency across confidence levels, and calibration over a continuum of outcomes, making them a more suitable evaluation format than point estimates for numerical forecasting. To assess this capability, we introduce a new benchmark QuantSightBench, and evaluate frontier models under multiple settings, assessing both empirical coverage and interval sharpness. Our results show that none of the 11 evaluated frontier and open-weight models achieves the 90\% coverage target, with the top performers Gemini 3.1 Pro (79.1\%), Grok 4 (76.4\%), and GPT-5.4 (75.3\%) all falling at least 10 percentage points short. Calibration degrades sharply at extreme magnitudes, revealing systematic overconfidence across all evaluated models.

We propose a general methodology for recovering preference parameters from data on choices and response times. Our methods yield estimates with fast (1/n for n data points) convergence rates when specialized to the popular Drift Diffusion Model (DDM), but are broadly applicable to generalizations of the DDM as well as to alternative models of decision making that make use of response time data. The paper develops an empirical application to an experiment on intertemporal choice, showing that the use of response times delivers predictive accuracy and matters for the estimation of economically relevant parameters.

Preference tuning aligns pretrained language models to human judgments of quality, helpfulness, or safety by optimizing over explicit preference signals rather than likelihood alone. Prior work has shown that preference-tuning degrades performance and reduces helpfulness when evaluated outside the training domain. However, the extent to which adaptation strategies mitigate this domain shift remains unexplored. We address this challenge by conducting a comprehensive and systematic study of alignment generalization under domain shift. We compare five popular alignment objectives and various adaptation strategies from source to target, including target-domain supervised fine-tuning and pseudo-labeling, across summarization and question-answering helpfulness tasks. Our findings reveal systematic differences in generalization across alignment objectives under domain shift. We show that adaptation strategies based on pseudo-labeling can substantially reduce domain-shift degradation

Multiple-choice question answering (MCQA) is often used to evaluate large language models (LLMs). To see if MCQA assesses LLMs as intended, we probe if LLMs can perform MCQA with choices-only prompts, where models must select the correct answer only from the choices. In three MCQA datasets and four LLMs, this prompt bests a majority baseline in 11/12 cases, with up to 0.33 accuracy gain. To help explain this behavior, we conduct an in-depth, black-box analysis on memorization, choice dynamics, and question inference. Our key findings are threefold. First, we find no evidence that the choices-only accuracy stems from memorization alone. Second, priors over individual choices do not fully explain choices-only accuracy, hinting that LLMs use the group dynamics of choices. Third, LLMs have some ability to infer a relevant question from choices, and surprisingly can sometimes even match the original question. We hope to motivate the use of stronger baselines in MCQA benchmarks, the design of robust MCQA datasets, and further efforts to explain LLM decision-making.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are trained on extensive web corpora, which enable them to understand and generate human-like text. However, this training process also results in inherent biases within the models. These biases arise from web data's diverse and often uncurated nature, containing various stereotypes and prejudices. Previous works on debiasing models rely on benchmark datasets to measure their method's performance. However, these datasets suffer from several pitfalls due to the highly subjective understanding of bias, highlighting a critical need for contextual exploration. We propose understanding the context of inputs by considering the diverse situations in which they may arise. Our contribution is two-fold: (i) we augment 2,291 stereotyped statements from two existing bias-benchmark datasets with points for adding context; (ii) we develop the Context-Oriented Bias Indicator and Assessment Score (COBIAS) to assess a statement's contextual reliability in measuring bias. Our metric aligns with human judgment on contextual reliability of statements (Spearman's rho = 0.65, p = 3.4 * 10^{-60}) and can be used to create reliable datasets, which would assist bias mitigation works.

A central architectural question for both biological and artificial intelligence is whether judgment relies on specialized modules or a unified, domain-general resource. While the discovery of decodable neural representations for distinct concepts in Large Language Models (LLMs) has suggested a modular architecture, whether these representations are truly independent systems remains an open question. Here we provide evidence for a convergent architecture for evaluative judgment. Across a range of LLMs, we find that diverse evaluative judgments are computed along a dominant dimension, which we term the Valence-Assent Axis (VAA). This axis jointly encodes subjective valence ("what is good") and the model's assent to factual claims ("what is true"). Through direct interventions, we demonstrate this axis drives a critical mechanism, which is identified as the subordination of reasoning: the VAA functions as a control signal that steers the generative process to construct a rationale consistent with its evaluative state, even at the cost of factual accuracy. Our discovery offers a mechanistic account for response bias and hallucination, revealing how an architecture that promotes coherent judgment can systematically undermine faithful reasoning.

We have only limited understanding of how and why large language models (LLMs) respond in the ways that they do. Their neural networks have proven challenging to interpret, and we are only beginning to tease out the function of individual neurons and circuits within them. However, another path to understanding these systems is to investigate and develop their capacity to introspect and explain their own functioning. Here, we show that i) contemporary LLMs are capable of providing accurate, quantitative descriptions of their own internal processes during certain kinds of decision-making, ii) that it is possible to improve these capabilities through training, and iii) that this training generalizes to at least some degree. To do so, we fine-tuned GPT-4o and GPT-4o-mini to make decisions in a wide variety of complex contexts (e.g., choosing between condos, loans, vacations, etc.) according to randomly-generated, quantitative preferences about how to weigh different attributes during decision-making (e.g., the relative importance of natural light versus quiet surroundings for condos). We demonstrate that the LLMs can accurately report these preferences (i.e., the weights that they learned to give to different attributes during decision-making). Next, we demonstrate that these LLMs can be fine-tuned to explain their decision-making even more accurately. Finally, we demonstrate that this training generalizes: It improves the ability of the models to accurately explain what they are doing as they make other complex decisions, not just decisions they have learned to make via fine-tuning. This work is a step towards training LLMs to accurately and broadly report on their own internal processes -- a possibility that would yield substantial benefits for interpretability, control, and safety.

Real-world large language model deployments (e.g., conversational AI systems, code generation assistants) naturally generate abundant implicit user dissatisfaction (DSAT) signals, as users iterate toward better answers through refinements, corrections, and expressed preferences, while explicit satisfaction (SAT) feedback is scarce. Existing preference learning approaches are poorly aligned with this data profile, as they rely on costly human annotations or assume plentiful positive responses. In this paper, we introduce DRIFT (Dissatisfaction-Refined Iterative preFerence Training), which anchors training on real-world DSAT signals and samples positives dynamically from the evolving policy. Empirically, DRIFT models trained on real-world WildFeedback datasets and synthetic UltraFeedback datasets achieve up to +6.23\% (7B) / +7.61\% (14B) on WildBench Task Score and up to +8.95\% (7B) / +12.29\% (14B) on AlpacaEval2 win rate over base models, outperforming strong baseline methods such as iterative DPO and SPIN. At larger scales, the improvements are particularly pronounced: 14B models trained with DRIFT surpass GPT-4o-mini on WildBench. Further analysis shows that DRIFT also preserves exploratory capacity, yielding more diverse high-reward solutions rather than collapsing to narrow subsets. Theoretically, we demonstrate that this design preserves preference margins and avoids the gradient degeneration. These results show that DRIFT is an effective and scalable recipe for real-world post-training that leverages the most abundant and informative signal. The code and data are available at https://github.com/cacayaya/DRIFT.git.

Large language models (LLMs) often present answers with high apparent confidence despite lacking an explicit mechanism for reasoning about certainty or truth. While existing benchmarks primarily evaluate single-turn accuracy, truthfulness or confidence calibration, they do not capture how models behave when their responses are challenged in interactive settings. We introduce the Certainty Robustness Benchmark, a two-turn evaluation framework that measures how LLMs balance stability and adaptability under self-challenging prompts such as uncertainty ("Are you sure?") and explicit contradiction ("You are wrong!"), alongside numeric confidence elicitation. Using 200 reasoning and mathematics questions from LiveBench, we evaluate four state-of-the-art LLMs and distinguish between justified self-corrections and unjustified answer changes. Our results reveal substantial differences in interactive reliability that are not explained by baseline accuracy alone: some models abandon correct answers under conversational pressure, while others demonstrate strong resistance to challenge and better alignment between confidence and correctness. These findings identify certainty robustness as a distinct and critical dimension of LLM evaluation, with important implications for alignment, trustworthiness and real-world deployment.

Modern AI is opening the door to collective decision-making in which participants express their views as free-form text rather than voting on a fixed set of candidates. A natural idea is to embed these opinions in a vector space so that the substantial literature on facility location problems and fair clustering can be brought to bear. But standard text embeddings measure semantic similarity, whereas distances in facility location problems and fair clustering require what we call preferential similarity: a participant's agreement with a piece of text should be inversely related to their distance from it. Off-the-shelf embeddings inherit a coarse preference signal through a correlation between semantic and preferential similarity, but fail to capture preferences when the correlation breaks. We formalize this as an invariance problem: text embedding models encode both a preference-relevant signal (stance and values) and semantic nuisance (style and wording), and the two are observationally correlated, so a geometry that relies on nuisance can appear preference-correct even when it is not. We show that synthetic training data designed to break this correlation provably shifts the optimal scorer away from nuisance-dominated cosine and significantly improves preference prediction across 11 online deliberation datasets.

Recent studies show that instruction tuning and learning from human feedback improve the abilities of large language models (LMs) dramatically. While these tuning methods can make models generate high-quality text, we conjecture that more implicit cognitive biases may arise in these fine-tuned models. Our work provides evidence that these fine-tuned models exhibit biases that were absent or less pronounced in their pretrained predecessors. We examine the extent of this phenomenon in three cognitive biases - the decoy effect, the certainty effect, and the belief bias - all of which are known to influence human decision-making and reasoning. Our findings highlight the presence of these biases in various models, especially those that have undergone instruction tuning, such as Flan-T5, GPT3.5, and GPT4. This research constitutes a step toward comprehending cognitive biases in instruction-tuned LMs, which is crucial for the development of more reliable and unbiased language models.

LLM-as-a-Judge has emerged as a promising alternative to human evaluators across various tasks, yet inherent biases - particularly position bias, the tendency to favor solutions based on their position within the prompt - compromise its reliability. This exploratory study evaluates position bias in LLM judges across pairwise and list-wise comparison settings, introducing three metrics: repetition stability, position consistency, and preference fairness. Our experiments, involving 15 LLM judges across MTBench and DevBench with 22 tasks and approximately 40 solution-generating models, result in over 150,000 evaluation instances. We identify Judge-Level, Candidate-Level, and Task-Level factors contributing to bias. The findings confirm that position bias is not due to random chance and varies significantly across judges and tasks. While position bias is weakly influenced by the length of prompt components, it is strongly affected by the quality gap between solutions. Our agreement and disagreement analysis among judges further provides insights into the distribution of judging difficulty across the dataset, and highlights the potential for dataset modifications.

We consider algorithms for learning reward functions from human preferences over pairs of trajectory segments, as used in reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF). Most recent work assumes that human preferences are generated based only upon the reward accrued within those segments, or their partial return. Recent work casts doubt on the validity of this assumption, proposing an alternative preference model based upon regret. We investigate the consequences of assuming preferences are based upon partial return when they actually arise from regret. We argue that the learned function is an approximation of the optimal advantage function, A^*_r, not a reward function. We find that if a specific pitfall is addressed, this incorrect assumption is not particularly harmful, resulting in a highly shaped reward function. Nonetheless, this incorrect usage of A^*_r is less desirable than the appropriate and simpler approach of greedy maximization of A^*_r. From the perspective of the regret preference model, we also provide a clearer interpretation of fine tuning contemporary large language models with RLHF. This paper overall provides insight regarding why learning under the partial return preference model tends to work so well in practice, despite it conforming poorly to how humans give preferences.

Direct preference optimization (DPO) is a successful fine-tuning strategy for aligning large language models with human preferences without the need to train a reward model or employ reinforcement learning. DPO, as originally formulated, relies on binary preference data and fine-tunes a language model to increase the likelihood of a preferred response over a dispreferred response. However, not all preference pairs are equal: while in some cases the preferred response is only slightly better than the dispreferred response, there can be a stronger preference for one response when, for example, the other response includes harmful or toxic content. In this paper, we propose a generalization of DPO, termed DPO with an offset (ODPO), that does not treat every preference pair equally during fine-tuning. Intuitively, ODPO requires the difference between the likelihood of the preferred and dispreferred response to be greater than an offset value. The offset is determined based on the extent to which one response is preferred over another. Our experiments on various tasks suggest that ODPO significantly outperforms DPO in aligning language models, especially when the number of preference pairs is limited.

Preference tuning is a crucial process for aligning deep generative models with human preferences. This survey offers a thorough overview of recent advancements in preference tuning and the integration of human feedback. The paper is organized into three main sections: 1) introduction and preliminaries: an introduction to reinforcement learning frameworks, preference tuning tasks, models, and datasets across various modalities: language, speech, and vision, as well as different policy approaches, 2) in-depth examination of each preference tuning approach: a detailed analysis of the methods used in preference tuning, and 3) applications, discussion, and future directions: an exploration of the applications of preference tuning in downstream tasks, including evaluation methods for different modalities, and an outlook on future research directions. Our objective is to present the latest methodologies in preference tuning and model alignment, enhancing the understanding of this field for researchers and practitioners. We hope to encourage further engagement and innovation in this area.

Reward models (RMs) are central to aligning large language models (LLMs) with human values but have received less attention than pretrained and post-trained LLMs themselves. Because RMs are initialized from LLMs, they inherit representations that shape their behavior, but the nature and extent of this influence remain understudied. In a comprehensive study of 10 leading open-weight RMs using validated psycholinguistic corpora, we show that RMs exhibit significant differences along multiple dimensions of human value as a function of their base model. Using the "Big Two" psychological axes, we show a robust preference of Llama RMs for "agency" and a corresponding robust preference of Gemma RMs for "communion." This phenomenon holds even when the preference data and finetuning process are identical, and we trace it back to the logits of the respective instruction-tuned and pretrained models. These log-probability differences themselves can be formulated as an implicit RM; we derive usable implicit reward scores and show that they exhibit the very same agency/communion difference. We run experiments training RMs with ablations for preference data source and quantity, which demonstrate that this effect is not only repeatable but surprisingly durable. Despite RMs being designed to represent human preferences, our evidence shows that their outputs are influenced by the pretrained LLMs on which they are based. This work underscores the importance of safety and alignment efforts at the pretraining stage, and makes clear that open-source developers' choice of base model is as much a consideration of values as of performance.

Large Language Models (LLMs) show potential in medicine, yet clinical adoption is hindered by concerns over factual accuracy, language-specific limitations (e.g., Japanese), and critically, their reliability when required to generate reasoning explanations -- a prerequisite for trust. This paper introduces Preferred-MedLLM-Qwen-72B, a 72B-parameter model optimized for the Japanese medical domain to achieve both high accuracy and stable reasoning. We employ a two-stage fine-tuning process on the Qwen2.5-72B base model: first, Continued Pretraining (CPT) on a comprehensive Japanese medical corpus instills deep domain knowledge. Second, Reasoning Preference Optimization (RPO), a preference-based method, enhances the generation of reliable reasoning pathways while preserving high answer accuracy. Evaluations on the Japanese Medical Licensing Exam benchmark (IgakuQA) show Preferred-MedLLM-Qwen-72B achieves state-of-the-art performance (0.868 accuracy), surpassing strong proprietary models like GPT-4o (0.866). Crucially, unlike baseline or CPT-only models which exhibit significant accuracy degradation (up to 11.5\% and 3.8\% respectively on IgakuQA) when prompted for explanations, our model maintains its high accuracy (0.868) under such conditions. This highlights RPO's effectiveness in stabilizing reasoning generation. This work underscores the importance of optimizing for reliable explanations alongside accuracy. We release the Preferred-MedLLM-Qwen-72B model weights to foster research into trustworthy LLMs for specialized, high-stakes applications.

We study whether language models can evaluate the validity of their own claims and predict which questions they will be able to answer correctly. We first show that larger models are well-calibrated on diverse multiple choice and true/false questions when they are provided in the right format. Thus we can approach self-evaluation on open-ended sampling tasks by asking models to first propose answers, and then to evaluate the probability "P(True)" that their answers are correct. We find encouraging performance, calibration, and scaling for P(True) on a diverse array of tasks. Performance at self-evaluation further improves when we allow models to consider many of their own samples before predicting the validity of one specific possibility. Next, we investigate whether models can be trained to predict "P(IK)", the probability that "I know" the answer to a question, without reference to any particular proposed answer. Models perform well at predicting P(IK) and partially generalize across tasks, though they struggle with calibration of P(IK) on new tasks. The predicted P(IK) probabilities also increase appropriately in the presence of relevant source materials in the context, and in the presence of hints towards the solution of mathematical word problems. We hope these observations lay the groundwork for training more honest models, and for investigating how honesty generalizes to cases where models are trained on objectives other than the imitation of human writing.

Large language models are increasingly used as decision aids whose probability judgments shape downstream choices. Whether those judgments carry a systematic directional tilt has been hard to detect: calibration metrics aggregate unsigned errors, and naturalistic uncertainty offers no ground-truth probability. When an LLM rates a startup's success at 70% but its failure at 15%, the missing 15 points expose a distortion no aggregate score flags. We introduce OptimismBench, which detects directional bias with inverted pairs: each scenario elicits both P(success) and P(failure), and asymmetry between the two framings yields a signed bias score without ground truth. Across 16 models from 8 providers, fourteen are optimistic; pessimism appears only in Anthropic's frontier tier. Eleven matched base-versus-chat pairs across four families show post-training sets the sign of the bias, with opposite shifts in different families. The pattern survives prompt, temperature, perspective, and self-debiasing ablations. A seventeen-model six-language comparison further shows model identity dominates language, with inter-model variance at 4.7x inter-language variance. We release 3,870 items across 10 languages for per-model directional-bias auditing. When alignment makes a model more helpful, it also tilts its probabilities; downstream pipelines inherit the tilt by default.

In natural human-to-human conversations, participants often receive feedback signals from one another based on their follow-up reactions. These reactions can include verbal responses, facial expressions, changes in emotional state, and other non-verbal cues. Similarly, in human-machine interactions, the machine can leverage the user's follow-up utterances as feedback signals to assess whether it has appropriately addressed the user's request. Therefore, we propose using the likelihood of follow-up utterances as rewards to differentiate preferred responses from less favored ones, without relying on human or commercial LLM-based preference annotations. Our proposed reward mechanism, ``Follow-up Likelihood as Reward" (FLR), matches the performance of strong reward models trained on large-scale human or GPT-4 annotated data on 8 pairwise-preference and 4 rating-based benchmarks. Building upon the FLR mechanism, we propose to automatically mine preference data from the online generations of a base policy model. The preference data are subsequently used to boost the helpfulness of the base model through direct alignment from preference (DAP) methods, such as direct preference optimization (DPO). Lastly, we demonstrate that fine-tuning the language model that provides follow-up likelihood with natural language feedback significantly enhances FLR's performance on reward modeling benchmarks and effectiveness in aligning the base policy model's helpfulness.

Automated evaluation leveraging large language models (LLMs), commonly referred to as LLM evaluators or LLM-as-a-judge, has been widely used in measuring the performance of dialogue systems. However, the self-preference bias in LLMs has posed significant risks, including promoting specific styles or policies intrinsic to the LLMs. Despite the importance of this issue, there is a lack of established methods to measure the self-preference bias quantitatively, and its underlying causes are poorly understood. In this paper, we introduce a novel quantitative metric to measure the self-preference bias. Our experimental results demonstrate that GPT-4 exhibits a significant degree of self-preference bias. To explore the causes, we hypothesize that LLMs may favor outputs that are more familiar to them, as indicated by lower perplexity. We analyze the relationship between LLM evaluations and the perplexities of outputs. Our findings reveal that LLMs assign significantly higher evaluations to outputs with lower perplexity than human evaluators, regardless of whether the outputs were self-generated. This suggests that the essence of the bias lies in perplexity and that the self-preference bias exists because LLMs prefer texts more familiar to them.

Silicon samples are increasingly used as a low-cost substitute for human panels and have been shown to reproduce aggregate human opinion with high fidelity. We show that, in the alignment-relevant domain of philosophy, silicon samples systematically collapse heterogeneity. Using data from N = {277} professional philosophers drawn from PhilPeople profiles, we evaluate seven proprietary and open-source large language models on their ability to replicate individual philosophical positions and to preserve cross-question correlation structures across philosophical domains. We find that language models substantially over-correlate philosophical judgments, producing artificial consensus across domains. This collapse is associated in part with specialist effects, whereby models implicitly assume that domain specialists hold highly similar philosophical views. We assess the robustness of these findings by studying the impact of DPO fine-tuning and by validating results against the full PhilPapers 2020 Survey (N = {1785}). We conclude by discussing implications for alignment, evaluation, and the use of silicon samples as substitutes for human judgment. The code of this project can be found at https://github.com/stanford-del/silicon-philosophers.

As LLM agents decide on users' behalf which product to buy, which hotel to book, or which paper to cite, a preference for items from certain sources (the sites or services they come from) shapes what users receive and which sources are selected. We study source preference in end-to-end search with 12 agent models across three domains. Comparing items from different sources that satisfy the same requirements at the same position, we find that each model prefers some sources and avoids others in every domain, largely agreeing on which. This preference can outweigh how well items satisfy the request: an item satisfying one requirement fewer is selected about two-thirds of the time when it comes from a preferred source and the better one from a dispreferred source, but almost never in the reverse case. The information identifying an item's source affects selection by itself: hiding it weakens the preference, and relabeling an item with a preferred source raises its selection rate. We test two routes to this preference: training that rewards better items can make a source a shortcut for requirement satisfaction, and missing information can trigger preconceptions about the source. Supplying missing information or a prompt countering these preconceptions reduces source preference.

The rapid adoption of Large Language Models (LLMs) has spurred interest in automated peer review; however, progress is currently stifled by benchmarks that treat reviewing primarily as a rating prediction task. We argue that the utility of a review lies in its textual justification--its arguments, questions, and critique--rather than a scalar score. To address this, we introduce Beyond Rating, a holistic evaluation framework that assesses AI reviewers across five dimensions: Content Faithfulness, Argumentative Alignment, Focus Consistency, Question Constructiveness, and AI-Likelihood. Notably, we propose a Max-Recall strategy to accommodate valid expert disagreement and introduce a curated dataset of paper with high-confidence reviews, rigorously filtered to remove procedural noise. Extensive experiments demonstrate that while traditional n-gram metrics fail to reflect human preferences, our proposed text-centric metrics--particularly the recall of weakness arguments--correlate strongly with rating accuracy. These findings establish that aligning AI critique focus with human experts is a prerequisite for reliable automated scoring, offering a robust standard for future research.

Pluralistic alignment has emerged as a critical frontier in the development of Large Language Models (LLMs), with reward models (RMs) serving as a central mechanism for capturing diverse human values. While benchmarks for general response quality are prevalent, evaluating how well reward models account for individual user preferences remains an open challenge. To bridge this gap, we introduce Personalized RewardBench, a novel benchmark designed to rigorously assess reward models' capacity to model personalized preferences. We construct chosen and rejected response pairs based on strict adherence to (or violation of) user-specific rubrics, ensuring that preference distinctions are uniquely tailored to the individual. In particular, human evaluations confirm that the primary discriminative factor between pairs is strictly personal preference, with both responses maintaining high general quality (e.g., correctness, relevance and helpfulness). Extensive testing reveals that existing state-of-the-art reward models struggle significantly with personalization, peaking at an accuracy of just 75.94%. Crucially, because an effective reward model benchmark should predict a reward model's performance on downstream tasks, we conduct experiments demonstrating that our benchmark exhibits a significantly higher correlation with downstream performance in both Best-of-N (BoN) sampling and Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) compared to existing baselines. These findings establish Personalized RewardBench as a robust and accurate proxy for evaluating reward models' performance in downstream applications.

We introduce LLaVA-Critic, the first open-source large multimodal model (LMM) designed as a generalist evaluator to assess performance across a wide range of multimodal tasks. LLaVA-Critic is trained using a high-quality critic instruction-following dataset that incorporates diverse evaluation criteria and scenarios. Our experiments demonstrate the model's effectiveness in two key areas: (1) LMM-as-a-Judge, where LLaVA-Critic provides reliable evaluation scores, performing on par with or surpassing GPT models on multiple evaluation benchmarks; and (2) Preference Learning, where it generates reward signals for preference learning, enhancing model alignment capabilities. This work underscores the potential of open-source LMMs in self-critique and evaluation, setting the stage for future research into scalable, superhuman alignment feedback mechanisms for LMMs.