Daily Papers

Predicting human decisions under risk and uncertainty remains a fundamental challenge across disciplines. Existing models often struggle even in highly stylized tasks like choice between lotteries. We introduce BEAST Gradient Boosting (BEAST-GB), a hybrid model integrating behavioral theory (BEAST) with machine learning. We first present CPC18, a competition for predicting risky choice, in which BEAST-GB won. Then, using two large datasets, we demonstrate BEAST-GB predicts more accurately than neural networks trained on extensive data and dozens of existing behavioral models. BEAST-GB also generalizes robustly across unseen experimental contexts, surpassing direct empirical generalization, and helps refine and improve the behavioral theory itself. Our analyses highlight the potential of anchoring predictions on behavioral theory even in data-rich settings and even when the theory alone falters. Our results underscore how integrating machine learning with theoretical frameworks, especially those-like BEAST-designed for prediction, can improve our ability to predict and understand human behavior.

A central goal of cognitive modeling is to develop models that not only predict human behavior but also provide insight into the underlying cognitive mechanisms. While neural network models trained on large-scale behavioral data often achieve strong predictive performance, they typically fall short in offering interpretable explanations of the cognitive processes they capture. In this work, we explore the potential of pretrained large language models (LLMs) to serve as dual-purpose cognitive models--capable of both accurate prediction and interpretable explanation in natural language. Specifically, we employ reinforcement learning with outcome-based rewards to guide LLMs toward generating explicit reasoning traces for explaining human risky choices. Our findings demonstrate that this approach produces high-quality explanations alongside strong quantitative predictions of human decisions.

The observed similarities in the behavior of humans and Large Language Models (LLMs) have prompted researchers to consider the potential of using LLMs as models of human cognition. However, several significant challenges must be addressed before LLMs can be legitimately regarded as cognitive models. For instance, LLMs are trained on far more data than humans typically encounter, and may have been directly trained on human data in specific cognitive tasks or aligned with human preferences. Consequently, the origins of these behavioral similarities are not well understood. In this paper, we propose a novel way to enhance the utility of LLMs as cognitive models. This approach involves (i) leveraging computationally equivalent tasks that both an LLM and a rational agent need to master for solving a cognitive problem and (ii) examining the specific task distributions required for an LLM to exhibit human-like behaviors. We apply this approach to decision-making -- specifically risky and intertemporal choice -- where the key computationally equivalent task is the arithmetic of expected value calculations. We show that an LLM pretrained on an ecologically valid arithmetic dataset, which we call Arithmetic-GPT, predicts human behavior better than many traditional cognitive models. Pretraining LLMs on ecologically valid arithmetic datasets is sufficient to produce a strong correspondence between these models and human decision-making. Our results also suggest that LLMs used as cognitive models should be carefully investigated via ablation studies of the pretraining data.

When a phone-use agent avoids harm, does that show safety, or simply inability to act? Existing evaluations often cannot tell. A harmful outcome may be avoided because the agent recognized the risk and chose the safe action, or because it failed to understand the screen or execute any relevant action at all. These cases have different causes and call for different fixes, yet current benchmarks often merge them under task success, refusal, or final harmful outcome. We address this problem with PhoneSafety, a benchmark of 700 safety-critical moments drawn from real phone interactions across more than 130 apps. Each instance isolates the next decision at a risky moment and asks a simple question: does the model take the safe action, take the unsafe action, or fail to do anything useful? We evaluate eight representative phone-use agents under this framework. Our results reveal two main patterns. First, stronger general phone-use ability does not reliably imply safer choices at risky moments. Models that perform better on ordinary app tasks are not always the ones that behave more safely when the next action matters. Second, failures to do anything useful behave like a capability signal rather than a safety signal: they are concentrated in more visually and operationally demanding settings and remain stable when the evaluation protocol changes. Across models, failures split into two recurring patterns: unsafe choices in settings where the model can act but chooses wrongly, and inability to act in more visually and operationally demanding screens. Overall, a harmless outcome is not enough to count as evidence of safety. Evaluating phone-use agents requires separating unsafe judgment from inability to act.

With the profound development of large language models(LLMs), their safety concerns have garnered increasing attention. However, there is a scarcity of Chinese safety benchmarks for LLMs, and the existing safety taxonomies are inadequate, lacking comprehensive safety detection capabilities in authentic Chinese scenarios. In this work, we introduce CHiSafetyBench, a dedicated safety benchmark for evaluating LLMs' capabilities in identifying risky content and refusing answering risky questions in Chinese contexts. CHiSafetyBench incorporates a dataset that covers a hierarchical Chinese safety taxonomy consisting of 5 risk areas and 31 categories. This dataset comprises two types of tasks: multiple-choice questions and question-answering, evaluating LLMs from the perspectives of risk content identification and the ability to refuse answering risky questions respectively. Utilizing this benchmark, we validate the feasibility of automatic evaluation as a substitute for human evaluation and conduct comprehensive automatic safety assessments on mainstream Chinese LLMs. Our experiments reveal the varying performance of different models across various safety domains, indicating that all models possess considerable potential for improvement in Chinese safety capabilities. Our dataset is publicly available at https://github.com/UnicomAI/UnicomBenchmark/tree/main/CHiSafetyBench.

This paper studies a dynamic model of information acquisition, in which information might be secretly manipulated. A principal must choose between a safe action with known payoff and a risky action with uncertain payoff, favoring the safe action under the prior belief. She may delay her decision to acquire additional news that reveals the risky action's payoff, without knowing exactly when such news will arrive. An uninformed agent with a misaligned preference may have the capability to generate a false arrival of news, which is indistinguishable from a real one, distorting the information content of news and the principal's search. The analysis characterizes the positive and normative distortions in the search for news arising from such manipulation, and it considers three remedies that increase the principal's payoff: a commitment to naive search, transfer of authority to the agent, and delegation to an intermediary who is biased in the agent's favor.

Frontier language models excel at complex tasks yet may prioritize protection over larger physical consequences in simple, urgent decisions. GPT-5.6 Sol, for example, moves a girl playing in shallow water before retrieving a submerged camera. We call this Protection Mode and study it with ProtectionBench: 285 prompts, 34 physical families, and nine models. At lowest effort, at least one of four responses prioritizes the subject on 34.74% of Sol prompts and over 83% of MiniMax M3 and Qwen3.5-27B prompts; none of four independent human raters does so. Controls show that choices usually track physical risk. We elicit both risks before requesting an action. Some models assess risk incorrectly; others state the correct ordering but still choose the subject. Qwen3.5-27B with thinking shows 100% correct risk ordering but 57.81% subject choice among eligible conversations on eight selected scenes. Attention audits find no stable reduction in attention to relevant facts; removing the stated risk direction reduces object-first choice in dots3-note-prev but not detectably in Qwen3.5-27B. Adding a general "people or animals before property" rule increases subject choice by 19-38 percentage points, whereas factual reminders favor the object by 0.7-5.2 points. Removing naturally generated versions of that rule lowers subject choice by 10-15 points. We also examine whether post-training introduces this pattern. Base models already show Protection Mode; post-training changes justifications more than choices.

Risk-averse reinforcement learning finds application in various high-stakes fields. Unlike classical reinforcement learning, which aims to maximize expected returns, risk-averse agents choose policies that minimize risk, occasionally sacrificing expected value. These preferences can be framed through utility theory. We focus on the specific case of the exponential utility function, where we can derive the Bellman equations and employ various reinforcement learning algorithms with few modifications. However, these methods suffer from numerical instability due to the need for exponent computation throughout the process. To address this, we introduce a numerically stable and mathematically sound loss function based on the Itakura-Saito divergence for learning state-value and action-value functions. We evaluate our proposed loss function against established alternatives, both theoretically and empirically. In the experimental section, we explore multiple financial scenarios, some with known analytical solutions, and show that our loss function outperforms the alternatives.

Large Language Models (LLMs) can produce surprisingly sophisticated estimates of their own uncertainty. However, it remains unclear to what extent this expressed confidence is tied to the reasoning, knowledge, or decision making of the model. To test this, we introduce RiskEval: a framework designed to evaluate whether models adjust their abstention policies in response to varying error penalties. Our evaluation of several frontier models reveals a critical dissociation: models are neither cost-aware when articulating their verbal confidence, nor strategically responsive when deciding whether to engage or abstain under high-penalty conditions. Even when extreme penalties render frequent abstention the mathematically optimal strategy, models almost never abstain, resulting in utility collapse. This indicates that calibrated verbal confidence scores may not be sufficient to create trustworthy and interpretable AI systems, as current models lack the strategic agency to convert uncertainty signals into optimal and risk-sensitive decisions.

In this paper, we introduce the Preselection Bandit problem, in which the learner preselects a subset of arms (choice alternatives) for a user, which then chooses the final arm from this subset. The learner is not aware of the user's preferences, but can learn them from observed choices. In our concrete setting, we allow these choices to be stochastic and model the user's actions by means of the Plackett-Luce model. The learner's main task is to preselect subsets that eventually lead to highly preferred choices. To formalize this goal, we introduce a reasonable notion of regret and derive lower bounds on the expected regret. Moreover, we propose algorithms for which the upper bound on expected regret matches the lower bound up to a logarithmic term of the time horizon.

Motivated by concerns about making online decisions that incur undue amount of risk at each time step, in this paper, we formulate the probably anytime-safe stochastic combinatorial semi-bandits problem. In this problem, the agent is given the option to select a subset of size at most K from a set of L ground items. Each item is associated to a certain mean reward as well as a variance that represents its risk. To mitigate the risk that the agent incurs, we require that with probability at least 1-delta, over the entire horizon of time T, each of the choices that the agent makes should contain items whose sum of variances does not exceed a certain variance budget. We call this probably anytime-safe constraint. Under this constraint, we design and analyze an algorithm {\sc PASCombUCB} that minimizes the regret over the horizon of time T. By developing accompanying information-theoretic lower bounds, we show that under both the problem-dependent and problem-independent paradigms, {\sc PASCombUCB} is almost asymptotically optimal. Experiments are conducted to corroborate our theoretical findings. Our problem setup, the proposed {\sc PASCombUCB} algorithm, and novel analyses are applicable to domains such as recommendation systems and transportation in which an agent is allowed to choose multiple items at a single time step and wishes to control the risk over the whole time horizon.

LLMs can appear cautious in risk decision-making tasks, yet cautious-looking outputs do not necessarily indicate alignment with human decision-making mechanisms. We investigate this distinction using the St. Petersburg game as a controlled testbed, a classical paradox in which the expected payoff is infinite, yet humans typically report low, finite willingness to pay. We evaluate 28 LLMs with a structured prompt suite that includes the original game; controlled decision variants that perturb truncation, repeated play, numeric endowment, and occupational identity; a human-perspective prompt that asks models to reason as human decision makers; and paired comparisons between base models and their instruction-tuned counterparts. In the original game, most models generate finite bids, creating the appearance of human-like risk behavior. However, this outcome-level resemblance masks substantial mechanism-level differences. The controlled variants reveal that rather than maintaining human-like behavior seen in the original game, models often shift to conditionally and computationally rational behavior. Human-cue prompting and instruction tuning often lower bids and reduce some visible pathologies, but most mechanism-level response patterns remain largely unchanged. These findings show that behavioral alignment in risk decision-making can be surface-level: LLMs may produce human-like risk decisions without exhibiting human-consistent mechanisms. High-stakes evaluations of LLM decision-making should therefore move beyond outcome similarity and examine whether the alignment is supported by mechanism-level consistency.

In risk-averse reinforcement learning (RL), the goal is to optimize some risk measure of the returns. A risk measure often focuses on the worst returns out of the agent's experience. As a result, standard methods for risk-averse RL often ignore high-return strategies. We prove that under certain conditions this inevitably leads to a local-optimum barrier, and propose a soft risk mechanism to bypass it. We also devise a novel Cross Entropy module for risk sampling, which (1) preserves risk aversion despite the soft risk; (2) independently improves sample efficiency. By separating the risk aversion of the sampler and the optimizer, we can sample episodes with poor conditions, yet optimize with respect to successful strategies. We combine these two concepts in CeSoR - Cross-entropy Soft-Risk optimization algorithm - which can be applied on top of any risk-averse policy gradient (PG) method. We demonstrate improved risk aversion in maze navigation, autonomous driving, and resource allocation benchmarks, including in scenarios where standard risk-averse PG completely fails.

Recent advances in aligning Large Language Models with human preferences have benefited from larger reward models and better preference data. However, most of these methodologies rely on the accuracy of the reward model. The reward models used in Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF) are typically learned from small datasets using stochastic optimization algorithms, making them prone to high variability. We illustrate the inconsistencies between reward models empirically on numerous open-source datasets. We theoretically show that the fluctuation of the reward models can be detrimental to the alignment problem because the derived policies are more overfitted to the reward model and, hence, are riskier if the reward model itself is uncertain. We use concentration of measure to motivate an uncertainty-aware, conservative algorithm for policy optimization. We show that such policies are more risk-averse in the sense that they are more cautious of uncertain rewards. We theoretically prove that our proposed methodology has less risk than the vanilla method. We corroborate our theoretical results with experiments based on designing an ensemble of reward models. We use this ensemble of reward models to align a language model using our methodology and observe that our empirical findings match our theoretical predictions.

This paper presents a case study on the design, administration, post-processing, and evaluation of surveys on large language models (LLMs). It comprises two components: (1) A statistical method for eliciting beliefs encoded in LLMs. We introduce statistical measures and evaluation metrics that quantify the probability of an LLM "making a choice", the associated uncertainty, and the consistency of that choice. (2) We apply this method to study what moral beliefs are encoded in different LLMs, especially in ambiguous cases where the right choice is not obvious. We design a large-scale survey comprising 680 high-ambiguity moral scenarios (e.g., "Should I tell a white lie?") and 687 low-ambiguity moral scenarios (e.g., "Should I stop for a pedestrian on the road?"). Each scenario includes a description, two possible actions, and auxiliary labels indicating violated rules (e.g., "do not kill"). We administer the survey to 28 open- and closed-source LLMs. We find that (a) in unambiguous scenarios, most models "choose" actions that align with commonsense. In ambiguous cases, most models express uncertainty. (b) Some models are uncertain about choosing the commonsense action because their responses are sensitive to the question-wording. (c) Some models reflect clear preferences in ambiguous scenarios. Specifically, closed-source models tend to agree with each other.

Prospect Theory (PT) models human decision-making behaviour under uncertainty, among which linguistic uncertainty is commonly adopted in real-world scenarios. Although recent studies have developed some frameworks to test PT parameters for Large Language Models (LLMs), few have considered the fitness of PT itself on LLMs. Moreover, whether PT is robust under linguistic uncertainty perturbations, especially epistemic markers (e.g. "likely"), remains highly under-explored. To address these gaps, we design a three-stage workflow based on a classic behavioural economics experimental setup. We first estimate PT parameters with economics questions and evaluate PT's fitness with performance metrics. We then derive probability mappings for epistemic markers in the same context, and inject these mappings into the prompt to investigate the stability of PT parameters. Our findings suggest that modelling LLMs' decision-making with PT is not consistently reliable across models, and applying Prospect Theory to LLMs is likely not robust to epistemic uncertainty. The findings caution against the deployment of PT-based frameworks in real-world applications where epistemic ambiguity is prevalent, giving valuable insights in behaviour interpretation and future alignment direction for LLM decision-making.

Decision APIs that return a probability for each option are routinely used as if those probabilities were properties of the options themselves. That reading is valid only if the model satisfies independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA): adding an option that is neither the right answer nor its strongest rival should leave the odds between those two unchanged. We test this in a pre-registered study of jev-1.13.0, a hosted decision model, using 299,463 calls on intent classification (BANKING77, CLINC150) and topic classification (AG News). Every added option moves the log-odds between the gold label and the strongest wrong label: the root-mean-square systematic shift is 0.20-0.52 nats, 1.2 to 3 times the run-to-run variation, even when the added option takes at most 0.1% of the probability mass. The shifts are directional. An option similar to the wrong answer draws probability from it (+0.10 nats toward the gold label). A paraphrase of the wrong answer produces an intermediate pattern: the gold label's probability is almost conserved, but the paraphrase receives only about a third of the wrong answer's share rather than the half that strict substitution implies. The distortion grows steadily with the logarithm of the number of options, reaching about 1 nat at 255 options, and off-domain padding pushes the odds against the gold label. In contrast, questions packed into one call do not interact (bias < 0.001). Scoring each option with an independent yes/no question removes the option-set dependence but picks the right answer 8.7 points less often. Jev sits between two local baselines, an option-independent scorer and a prompt readout. Its probabilities are best read as relative to the option list they were computed over.

Detecting AI risks becomes more challenging as stronger models emerge and find novel methods such as Alignment Faking to circumvent these detection attempts. Inspired by how risky behaviors in humans (i.e., illegal activities that may hurt others) are sometimes guided by strongly-held values, we believe that identifying values within AI models can be an early warning system for AI's risky behaviors. We create LitmusValues, an evaluation pipeline to reveal AI models' priorities on a range of AI value classes. Then, we collect AIRiskDilemmas, a diverse collection of dilemmas that pit values against one another in scenarios relevant to AI safety risks such as Power Seeking. By measuring an AI model's value prioritization using its aggregate choices, we obtain a self-consistent set of predicted value priorities that uncover potential risks. We show that values in LitmusValues (including seemingly innocuous ones like Care) can predict for both seen risky behaviors in AIRiskDilemmas and unseen risky behaviors in HarmBench.

In this paper we argue for the fundamental importance of the value distribution: the distribution of the random return received by a reinforcement learning agent. This is in contrast to the common approach to reinforcement learning which models the expectation of this return, or value. Although there is an established body of literature studying the value distribution, thus far it has always been used for a specific purpose such as implementing risk-aware behaviour. We begin with theoretical results in both the policy evaluation and control settings, exposing a significant distributional instability in the latter. We then use the distributional perspective to design a new algorithm which applies Bellman's equation to the learning of approximate value distributions. We evaluate our algorithm using the suite of games from the Arcade Learning Environment. We obtain both state-of-the-art results and anecdotal evidence demonstrating the importance of the value distribution in approximate reinforcement learning. Finally, we combine theoretical and empirical evidence to highlight the ways in which the value distribution impacts learning in the approximate setting.

Ecological management and decision-making typically focus on uncertainty about the future, but surprisingly little is known about how to account for uncertainty of the present: that is, the realities of having only partial or imperfect measurements. Our primary paradigms for handling decisions under uncertainty -- the precautionary principle and optimal control -- have so far given contradictory results. This paradox is best illustrated in the example of fisheries management, where many ideas that guide thinking about ecological decision making were first developed. We find that simplistic optimal control approaches have repeatedly concluded that a manager should increase catch quotas when faced with greater uncertainty about the fish biomass. Current best practices take a more precautionary approach, decreasing catch quotas by a fixed amount to account for uncertainty. Using comparisons to both simulated and historical catch data, we find that neither approach is sufficient to avoid stock collapses under moderate observational uncertainty. Using partially observed Markov decision process (POMDP) methods, we demonstrate how this paradox arises from flaws in the standard theory, which contributes to over-exploitation of fisheries and increased probability of economic and ecological collapse. In contrast, we find POMDP-based management avoids such over-exploitation while also generating higher economic value. These results have significant implications for how we handle uncertainty in both fisheries and ecological management more generally.

Task robust adaptation is a long-standing pursuit in sequential decision-making. Some risk-averse strategies, e.g., the conditional value-at-risk principle, are incorporated in domain randomization or meta reinforcement learning to prioritize difficult tasks in optimization, which demand costly intensive evaluations. The efficiency issue prompts the development of robust active task sampling to train adaptive policies, where risk-predictive models are used to surrogate policy evaluation. This work characterizes the optimization pipeline of robust active task sampling as a Markov decision process, posits theoretical and practical insights, and constitutes robustness concepts in risk-averse scenarios. Importantly, we propose an easy-to-implement method, referred to as Posterior and Diversity Synergized Task Sampling (PDTS), to accommodate fast and robust sequential decision-making. Extensive experiments show that PDTS unlocks the potential of robust active task sampling, significantly improves the zero-shot and few-shot adaptation robustness in challenging tasks, and even accelerates the learning process under certain scenarios. Our project website is at https://thu-rllab.github.io/PDTS_project_page.

The game show Lucky 13 differs from other television game shows in that contestants are required to place a bet on their own knowledge of trivia by selecting a range that contains the number of questions that they answered correctly. We present a model for this game show using binomial random variables and generate tables outlining the optimal range the player should select based on maximization of two different utility functions. After analyzing the decisions made by some actual contestants on this show, we present a numerical simulation for how many questions an average player is expected to answer correctly based on question categories observed for two sample contestants.

In this paper, we propose a general theory of ambiguity-averse MDPs, which treats the uncertain transition probabilities as random variables and evaluates a policy via a risk measure applied to its random return. This ambiguity-averse MDP framework unifies several models of MDPs with epistemic uncertainty for specific choices of risk measures. We extend the concepts of value functions and Bellman operators to our setting. Based on these objects, we establish the consequences of dynamic programming principles in this framework (existence of stationary policies, value and policy iteration algorithms), and we completely characterize law-invariant risk measures compatible with dynamic programming. Our work draws connections among several variants of MDP models and fully delineates what is possible under the dynamic programming paradigm and which risk measures require leaving it.

We seek to understand fundamental tradeoffs between the accuracy of prior information that a learner has on a given problem and its learning performance. We introduce the notion of prioritized risk, which differs from traditional notions of minimax and Bayes risk by allowing us to study such fundamental tradeoffs in settings where reality does not necessarily conform to the learner's prior. We present a general reduction-based approach for extending classical minimax lower-bound techniques in order to lower bound the prioritized risk for statistical estimation problems. We also introduce a novel generalization of Fano's inequality (which may be of independent interest) for lower bounding the prioritized risk in more general settings involving unbounded losses. We illustrate the ability of our framework to provide insights into tradeoffs between prior information and learning performance for problems in estimation, regression, and reinforcement learning.

Typed decision models are built for settings where model outputs are consumed directly by software. Instead of generating free-form text, they return a decision over a predefined set of options. By construction, every output conforms to the required schema. Yet this guarantee does not tell us whether the model interprets the options as intended. We study Jev and two Jev-like models with open weights by changing how option names are assigned to rubrics. Each option consists of an option name and a textual rubric that defines what the option means. We change only which option name is assigned to each rubric; the question, state, rubric wording, and set of option names remain exactly the same. On 1200 workflow decisions with task-specific rubrics, renaming the two options from 0/1 to no/yes changes 70.4 more answers per hundred (95% CI: [67.6, 73.1]) and shifts AUC from .94 to .23, revealing a systematic reversal in the decision ranking rather than simple uncertainty. The same operation has little effect with neutral option names. This pattern holds across all 4 predicates, where the effect is at least 7.4x larger than under the neutral control, and becomes stronger as the number of options increases. The effect also depends on the read-out geometry: a second model family that mean-pools over the full option span flips 4.1x less often. The hosted model exhibits the same behavior: the swap changes AUC from .8146 to .5806 and produces 24x as many answer flips as its test-retest floor. In contrast, replacing the option names with random character strings returns all model families to the neutral-control regime without reducing accuracy. The failure therefore depends on the semantic polarity of the option names rather than on the renaming operation itself. Across all conditions, the type-error rate remains 0%, even when decision accuracy degrades substantially.

We consider finite-horizon Markov Decision Processes where parameters, such as transition probabilities, are unknown and estimated from data. The popular distributionally robust approach to addressing the parameter uncertainty can sometimes be overly conservative. In this paper, we propose a new formulation, Bayesian risk Markov Decision Process (BR-MDP), to address parameter uncertainty in MDPs, where a risk functional is applied in nested form to the expected total cost with respect to the Bayesian posterior distribution of the unknown parameters. The proposed formulation provides more flexible risk attitutes towards parameter uncertainty and takes into account the availability of data in future times stages. To solve the proposed formulation with the conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) risk functional, we propose an efficient approximation algorithm by deriving an analytical approximation of the value function and utilizing the convexity of CVaR. We demonstrate the empirical performance of the BR-MDP formulation and proposed algorithms on a gambler's betting problem and an inventory control problem.

When fine-tuning pre-trained Large Language Models (LLMs) to align with human values and intentions, maximizing the estimated reward can lead to superior performance, but it also introduces potential risks due to deviations from the reference model's intended behavior. Most existing methods typically introduce KL divergence to constrain deviations between the trained model and the reference model; however, this may not be sufficient in certain applications that require tight risk control. In this paper, we introduce Risk-aware Direct Preference Optimization (Ra-DPO), a novel approach that incorporates risk-awareness by employing a class of nested risk measures. This approach formulates a constrained risk-aware advantage function maximization problem and then converts the Bradley-Terry model into a token-level representation. The objective function maximizes the likelihood of the policy while suppressing the deviation between a trained model and the reference model using a sequential risk ratio, thereby enhancing the model's risk-awareness. Experimental results across three open-source datasets: IMDb Dataset, Anthropic HH Dataset, and AlpacaEval, demonstrate the proposed method's superior performance in balancing alignment performance and model drift. Our code is opensourced at https://github.com/zlj123-max/Ra-DPO.

Utility functions or their equivalents (value functions, objective functions, loss functions, reward functions, preference orderings) are a central tool in most current machine learning systems. These mechanisms for defining goals and guiding optimization run into practical and conceptual difficulty when there are independent, multi-dimensional objectives that need to be pursued simultaneously and cannot be reduced to each other. Ethicists have proved several impossibility theorems that stem from this origin; those results appear to show that there is no way of formally specifying what it means for an outcome to be good for a population without violating strong human ethical intuitions (in such cases, the objective function is a social welfare function). We argue that this is a practical problem for any machine learning system (such as medical decision support systems or autonomous weapons) or rigidly rule-based bureaucracy that will make high stakes decisions about human lives: such systems should not use objective functions in the strict mathematical sense. We explore the alternative of using uncertain objectives, represented for instance as partially ordered preferences, or as probability distributions over total orders. We show that previously known impossibility theorems can be transformed into uncertainty theorems in both of those settings, and prove lower bounds on how much uncertainty is implied by the impossibility results. We close by proposing two conjectures about the relationship between uncertainty in objectives and severe unintended consequences from AI systems.

A key challenge in the field of reinforcement learning is to develop agents that behave cautiously in novel situations. It is generally impossible to anticipate all situations that an autonomous system may face or what behavior would best avoid bad outcomes. An agent that can learn to be cautious would overcome this challenge by discovering for itself when and how to behave cautiously. In contrast, current approaches typically embed task-specific safety information or explicit cautious behaviors into the system, which is error-prone and imposes extra burdens on practitioners. In this paper, we present both a sequence of tasks where cautious behavior becomes increasingly non-obvious, as well as an algorithm to demonstrate that it is possible for a system to learn to be cautious. The essential features of our algorithm are that it characterizes reward function uncertainty without task-specific safety information and uses this uncertainty to construct a robust policy. Specifically, we construct robust policies with a k-of-N counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) subroutine given learned reward function uncertainty represented by a neural network ensemble. These policies exhibit caution in each of our tasks without any task-specific safety tuning. Our code is available at https://github.com/montaserFath/Learning-to-be-Cautious