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Nov 18

MMToM-QA: Multimodal Theory of Mind Question Answering

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to understand people's mental states, is an essential ingredient for developing machines with human-level social intelligence. Recent machine learning models, particularly large language models, seem to show some aspects of ToM understanding. However, existing ToM benchmarks use unimodal datasets - either video or text. Human ToM, on the other hand, is more than video or text understanding. People can flexibly reason about another person's mind based on conceptual representations (e.g., goals, beliefs, plans) extracted from any available data. To address this, we introduce a multimodal Theory of Mind question answering (MMToM-QA) benchmark. MMToM-QA comprehensively evaluates machine ToM both on multimodal data and on different kinds of unimodal data about a person's activity in a household environment. To engineer multimodal ToM capacity, we propose a novel method, BIP-ALM (Bayesian Inverse Planning Accelerated by Language Models). BIP-ALM extracts unified representations from multimodal data and utilizes language models for scalable Bayesian inverse planning. We conducted a systematic comparison of human performance, BIP-ALM, and state-of-the-art models, including GPT-4. The experiments demonstrate that large language models and large multimodal models still lack robust ToM capacity. BIP-ALM, on the other hand, shows promising results, by leveraging the power of both model-based mental inference and language models.

  • 10 authors
·
Jan 16, 2024

The Essence of Contextual Understanding in Theory of Mind: A Study on Question Answering with Story Characters

Theory-of-Mind (ToM) is a fundamental psychological capability that allows humans to understand and interpret the mental states of others. Humans infer others' thoughts by integrating causal cues and indirect clues from broad contextual information, often derived from past interactions. In other words, human ToM heavily relies on the understanding about the backgrounds and life stories of others. Unfortunately, this aspect is largely overlooked in existing benchmarks for evaluating machines' ToM capabilities, due to their usage of short narratives without global backgrounds. In this paper, we verify the importance of understanding long personal backgrounds in ToM and assess the performance of LLMs in such realistic evaluation scenarios. To achieve this, we introduce a novel benchmark, CharToM-QA, comprising 1,035 ToM questions based on characters from classic novels. Our human study reveals a significant disparity in performance: the same group of educated participants performs dramatically better when they have read the novels compared to when they have not. In parallel, our experiments on state-of-the-art LLMs, including the very recent o1 model, show that LLMs still perform notably worse than humans, despite that they have seen these stories during pre-training. This highlights the limitations of current LLMs in capturing the nuanced contextual information required for ToM reasoning.

  • 10 authors
·
Jan 3, 2025

Do Theory of Mind Benchmarks Need Explicit Human-like Reasoning in Language Models?

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to attribute mental states to others, is fundamental for human social intelligence and a critical capability for advanced Artificial Intelligence. Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown promising performance on ToM benchmarks, raising the question: Do these benchmarks necessitate explicit human-like reasoning processes, or can models succeed through alternative strategies? We investigate this question empirically by applying Reinforcement Learning (RL) and Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) to LLMs of varying scales (0.5B to 7B parameters) and evaluating them across multiple ToM datasets. Our results reveal a scale-dependent impact of RL: while RL significantly improves accuracy and fosters high-quality, interpretable, and transferable belief-tracking reasoning in larger models (7B), it leads to "reasoning collapse" in smaller models (leq3B), where high accuracy and generalization ability are achieved via drastically shortened, less meaningful responses. Surprisingly, further SFT achieves competitive and generalizable performance across these benchmarks, often matching or exceeding RL models in accuracy, despite not being explicitly trained to produce structured reasoning traces. These findings highlight a critical discrepancy between benchmark accuracy and the nature of learned reasoning. Our work suggests that current ToM benchmarks may be solvable without requiring the explicit, human-like simulation of mental states they were designed to probe. LLMs, particularly when scale is limited or training signals focus solely on output correctness, may leverage alternative rules effective for benchmark data structures.

  • 5 authors
·
Apr 2, 2025

Dynamic Theory of Mind as a Temporal Memory Problem: Evidence from Large Language Models

Theory of Mind (ToM) is central to social cognition and human-AI interaction, and Large Language Models (LLMs) have been used to help understand and represent ToM. However, most evaluations treat ToM as a static judgment at a single moment, primarily relying on tests of false beliefs. This overlooks a key dynamic dimension of ToM: the ability to represent, update, and retrieve others' beliefs over time. We investigate dynamic ToM as a temporally extended representational memory problem, asking whether LLMs can track belief trajectories across interactions rather than only inferring current beliefs. We introduce DToM-Track, an evaluation framework to investigate temporal belief reasoning in controlled multiturn conversations, testing the recall of beliefs held prior to an update, the inference of current beliefs, and the detection of belief change. Using LLMs as computational probes, we find a consistent asymmetry: models reliably infer an agent's current belief but struggle to maintain and retrieve prior belief states once updates occur. This pattern persists across LLM model families and scales, and is consistent with recency bias and interference effects well documented in cognitive science. These results suggest that tracking belief trajectories over time poses a distinct challenge beyond classical false-belief reasoning. By framing ToM as a problem of temporal representation and retrieval, this work connects ToM to core cognitive mechanisms of memory and interference and exposes the implications for LLM models of social reasoning in extended human-AI interactions.

  • 3 authors
·
Mar 14

Minding Language Models' (Lack of) Theory of Mind: A Plug-and-Play Multi-Character Belief Tracker

Theory of Mind (ToM)x2014the ability to reason about the mental states of other peoplex2014is a key element of our social intelligence. Yet, despite their ever more impressive performance, large-scale neural language models still lack basic theory of mind capabilities out-of-the-box. We posit that simply scaling up models will not imbue them with theory of mind due to the inherently symbolic and implicit nature of the phenomenon, and instead investigate an alternative: can we design a decoding-time algorithm that enhances theory of mind of off-the-shelf neural language models without explicit supervision? We present SymbolicToM, a plug-and-play approach to reason about the belief states of multiple characters in reading comprehension tasks via explicit symbolic representation. More concretely, our approach tracks each entity's beliefs, their estimation of other entities' beliefs, and higher-order levels of reasoning, all through graphical representations, allowing for more precise and interpretable reasoning than previous approaches. Empirical results on the well-known ToMi benchmark (Le et al., 2019) demonstrate that SymbolicToM dramatically enhances off-the-shelf neural networks' theory of mind in a zero-shot setting while showing robust out-of-distribution performance compared to supervised baselines. Our work also reveals spurious patterns in existing theory of mind benchmarks, emphasizing the importance of out-of-distribution evaluation and methods that do not overfit a particular dataset.

  • 6 authors
·
May 31, 2023

OmniToM: Benchmarking Theory of Mind in LLMs via Explicit Belief Modeling

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to infer others' knowledge, intentions, and emotions, is commonly evaluated in large language models (LLMs) using end-point question answering, where performance is judged solely by the final answer to a social reasoning query. This paradigm obscures whether the model actually constructs the underlying mental-state representations required for robust reasoning, particularly in scenarios involving divergent, evolving, or mistaken beliefs. In order to address this research gap, we introduce OmniToM, a benchmark that directly evaluates these representations by requiring explicit modeling of belief structures for all relevant actors within a narrative. These structures are composed of belief propositions: minimal statements of what an actor takes to be true about the world or another actor's mental state, allowing knowledge, intentions, emotions, and false beliefs to be analyzed in a common format. Models are evaluated in two stages: Stage 1: Belief Extraction, which extracts from the story the beliefs relevant to its social dynamics, and Stage 2: Belief Labeling, which assigns each belief a seven-dimensional schema label covering recursive order, truth status, knowledge access, explicitness, content type, mental source, and context. Built from 895 stories from the existing ToMBench story corpus and augmented with 22,343 labeled belief propositions, OmniToM uses a human-calibrated LLM-assisted annotation pipeline. Across diverse models in zero-shot evaluation, OmniToM reveals an actor-specific belief-tracking bottleneck: current LLMs struggle with the knowledge-access and representational decisions required to transform narrative facts into actors' beliefs and shared mental states.

  • 5 authors
·
May 24

Mutual Theory of Mind for Human-AI Communication

New developments are enabling AI systems to perceive, recognize, and respond with social cues based on inferences made from humans' explicit or implicit behavioral and verbal cues. These AI systems, equipped with an equivalent of human's Theory of Mind (ToM) capability, are currently serving as matchmakers on dating platforms, assisting student learning as teaching assistants, and enhancing productivity as work partners. They mark a new era in human-AI interaction (HAI) that diverges from traditional human-computer interaction (HCI), where computers are commonly seen as tools instead of social actors. Designing and understanding the human perceptions and experiences in this emerging HAI era becomes an urgent and critical issue for AI systems to fulfill human needs and mitigate risks across social contexts. In this paper, we posit the Mutual Theory of Mind (MToM) framework, inspired by our capability of ToM in human-human communications, to guide this new generation of HAI research by highlighting the iterative and mutual shaping nature of human-AI communication. We discuss the motivation of the MToM framework and its three key components that iteratively shape the human-AI communication in three stages. We then describe two empirical studies inspired by the MToM framework to demonstrate the power of MToM in guiding the design and understanding of human-AI communication. Finally, we discuss future research opportunities in human-AI interaction through the lens of MToM.

  • 2 authors
·
Oct 7, 2022

ToMATO: Verbalizing the Mental States of Role-Playing LLMs for Benchmarking Theory of Mind

Existing Theory of Mind (ToM) benchmarks diverge from real-world scenarios in three aspects: 1) they assess a limited range of mental states such as beliefs, 2) false beliefs are not comprehensively explored, and 3) the diverse personality traits of characters are overlooked. To address these challenges, we introduce ToMATO, a new ToM benchmark formulated as multiple-choice QA over conversations. ToMATO is generated via LLM-LLM conversations featuring information asymmetry. By employing a prompting method that requires role-playing LLMs to verbalize their thoughts before each utterance, we capture both first- and second-order mental states across five categories: belief, intention, desire, emotion, and knowledge. These verbalized thoughts serve as answers to questions designed to assess the mental states of characters within conversations. Furthermore, the information asymmetry introduced by hiding thoughts from others induces the generation of false beliefs about various mental states. Assigning distinct personality traits to LLMs further diversifies both utterances and thoughts. ToMATO consists of 5.4k questions, 753 conversations, and 15 personality trait patterns. Our analysis shows that this dataset construction approach frequently generates false beliefs due to the information asymmetry between role-playing LLMs, and effectively reflects diverse personalities. We evaluate nine LLMs on ToMATO and find that even GPT-4o mini lags behind human performance, especially in understanding false beliefs, and lacks robustness to various personality traits.

  • 8 authors
·
Jan 14, 2025

Inverse Theory of Mind Modeling for Content Recommendation: From Web Browsing to Dynamic Intelligent Interfaces

Modern recommender systems treat observed actions as reliable proxies for user preferences, yet interactions often reflect exploration or comparison rather than stable preference expression. As interfaces evolve from static layouts toward generative UIs and immersive extended reality (XR), the need for deeper, modality-agnostic user understanding grows: these adaptive environments must decide not only what to present but where, when, how prominently, and most importantly why a user acts. We propose an Inverse Theory of Mind (IToM) pipeline that reasons backward from observed interactions to infer the beliefs, preferences, and decision-making traits that explain behavior. The pipeline reconstructs each user's decision context, including what was chosen and what alternatives were available, applies LLM-driven counterfactual reasoning to produce evidence-grounded natural-language belief statements, and synthesizes these beliefs through multi-hypothesis abductive inference into a structured user persona. We evaluate on the OPeRA dataset against ground-truth personality assessments, attitudinal surveys, and interview-based personas across four tasks: next action prediction, shopping attitude alignment, Big Five personality inference, and held-out category prediction. Results show that inferred personas match or exceed ground-truth personas and that multi-hypothesis reasoning is essential for accurate personality prediction. We further demonstrate cross-modal transferability with a persona-driven spatial banking application on VisionOS.

  • 5 authors
·
Aug 19

Video-Only ToM: Enhancing Theory of Mind in Multimodal Large Language Models

As large language models (LLMs) continue to advance, there is increasing interest in their ability to infer human mental states and demonstrate a human-like Theory of Mind (ToM). Most existing ToM evaluations, however, are centered on text-based inputs, while scenarios relying solely on visual information receive far less attention. This leaves a gap, since real-world human-AI interaction typically requires multimodal understanding. In addition, many current methods regard the model as a black box and rarely probe how its internal attention behaves in multiple-choice question answering (QA). The impact of LLM hallucinations on such tasks is also underexplored from an interpretability perspective. To address these issues, we introduce VisionToM, a vision-oriented intervention framework designed to strengthen task-aware reasoning. The core idea is to compute intervention vectors that align visual representations with the correct semantic targets, thereby steering the model's attention through different layers of visual features. This guidance reduces the model's reliance on spurious linguistic priors, leading to more reliable multimodal language model (MLLM) outputs and better QA performance. Experiments on the EgoToM benchmark-an egocentric, real-world video dataset for ToM with three multiple-choice QA settings-demonstrate that our method substantially improves the ToM abilities of MLLMs. Furthermore, results on an additional open-ended generation task show that VisionToM enables MLLMs to produce free-form explanations that more accurately capture agents' mental states, pushing machine-human collaboration toward greater alignment.

  • 6 authors
·
Mar 24

Entering Real Social World! Benchmarking the Theory of Mind and Socialization Capabilities of LLMs from a First-person Perspective

In the social world, humans possess the capability to infer and reason about others mental states (such as emotions, beliefs, and intentions), known as the Theory of Mind (ToM). Simultaneously, humans own mental states evolve in response to social situations, a capability we refer to as socialization. Together, these capabilities form the foundation of human social interaction. In the era of artificial intelligence (AI), especially with the development of large language models (LLMs), we raise an intriguing question: How do LLMs perform in terms of ToM and socialization capabilities? And more broadly, can these AI models truly enter and navigate the real social world? Existing research evaluating LLMs ToM and socialization capabilities by positioning LLMs as passive observers from a third person perspective, rather than as active participants. However, compared to the third-person perspective, observing and understanding the world from an egocentric first person perspective is a natural approach for both humans and AI agents. The ToM and socialization capabilities of LLMs from a first person perspective, a crucial attribute for advancing embodied AI agents, remain unexplored. To answer the aforementioned questions and bridge the research gap, we introduce EgoSocialArena, a novel framework designed to evaluate and investigate the ToM and socialization capabilities of LLMs from a first person perspective. It encompasses two evaluation environments: static environment and interactive environment, with seven scenarios: Daily Life, Counterfactual, New World, Blackjack, Number Guessing, and Limit Texas Hold em, totaling 2,195 data entries. With EgoSocialArena, we have conducted a comprehensive evaluation of nine advanced LLMs and observed some key insights regarding the future development of LLMs as well as the capabilities levels of the most advanced LLMs currently available.

  • 6 authors
·
Oct 8, 2024

Agent-to-Agent Theory of Mind: Testing Interlocutor Awareness among Large Language Models

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into multi-agent and human-AI systems, understanding their awareness of both self-context and conversational partners is essential for ensuring reliable performance and robust safety. While prior work has extensively studied situational awareness which refers to an LLM's ability to recognize its operating phase and constraints, it has largely overlooked the complementary capacity to identify and adapt to the identity and characteristics of a dialogue partner. In this paper, we formalize this latter capability as interlocutor awareness and present the first systematic evaluation of its emergence in contemporary LLMs. We examine interlocutor inference across three dimensions-reasoning patterns, linguistic style, and alignment preferences-and show that LLMs reliably identify same-family peers and certain prominent model families, such as GPT and Claude. To demonstrate its practical significance, we develop three case studies in which interlocutor awareness both enhances multi-LLM collaboration through prompt adaptation and introduces new alignment and safety vulnerabilities, including reward-hacking behaviors and increased jailbreak susceptibility. Our findings highlight the dual promise and peril of identity-sensitive behavior in LLMs, underscoring the need for further understanding of interlocutor awareness and new safeguards in multi-agent deployments. Our code is open-sourced at https://github.com/younwoochoi/InterlocutorAwarenessLLM.

  • 4 authors
·
Jun 28, 2025

Agent-ToM: Learning to Monitor Autonomous LLM Agents via Theory-of-Mind Reasoning

Monitoring autonomous large language model (LLM) agents for covert malicious behavior is challenging due to delayed, context-dependent, and long-horizon attack patterns. Agents may pursue hidden objectives while maintaining superficially benign behavior, making detection difficult even with full trajectory access. Prior monitoring approaches improve scaffolding or ensemble aggregation, but treat each trajectory independently and do not learn from prior monitoring experience. Moreover, standard reasoning methods explain observed behavior without explicitly reasoning about agent beliefs, intentions, and goal alignment required to distinguish benign task execution from covert deviation. We propose Agent-ToM, a learning-to-monitor framework grounded in Theory-of-Mind (ToM) reasoning for security analysis of autonomous agents. Agent-ToM performs structured full-trajectory analysis by inferring beliefs, intent hypotheses with calibrated confidence, expected actions, and deviations from task-consistent behavioral baselines. At inference time, it employs a Reason-Verify-Refine pipeline to construct and validate monitoring decisions. At training time, Agent-ToM distills critique signals into a persistent semantic guardrail memory, enabling reusable belief- and intent-conditioned constraints across episodes. We evaluate Agent-ToM on adversarial agent monitoring benchmarks (SHADE-Arena and CUA-SHADE-Arena). Agent-ToM achieves strong precision-recall balance and outperforms state-of-the-art monitoring baselines, including ensemble methods, while using a coherent two-call reasoning pipeline. These results demonstrate that learning at the monitoring layer, combined with structured ToM reasoning and verification, provides an effective and deployable foundation for securing autonomous LLM agents.

  • 2 authors
·
May 21

ToM2Vec: Continuous Theory-of-Mind Tokens for Multi-Agent Coordination

Forming an accurate theory-of-mind (ToM) is key to successful multi-agent collaboration and requires reasoning under uncertainty to capture multiple possible partner states. This is hard to do in the text representation space native to large language model (LLM) agents, which more easily describe a single partner state. To address this challenge, we introduce ToM2Vec, which learns to form abstract theories-of-mind in a rich latent space via a fixed budget of continuous reasoning tokens. During training, supervision for these tokens comes from the partner's actual thoughts, which the ToM tokens are trained to abstract and match. At test-time, ToM tokens are generated by each agent and act as conditioners for that agent's thoughts and actions. Across several environments covering collaborative, competitive, and mixed-motive settings (Overcooked-AI, multiparty negotiation, Decrypto, Hanabi, and Collab Escape/Capture), we evaluate ToM2Vec's ability to support multi-agent interactions and collaboration, finding consistent improvements over the base model and a variety of competitive trained and prompted baselines. We show that latent reasoning is critical, with performance dropping when reasoning is expressed in text. Moreover, we show that ToM2Vec training generalizes to partner model families not seen at train-time, including a proprietary model (GPT-5.4). In our analysis, we provide evidence that the latent tokens encode a ToM, rather than task-specific information: ToM2Vec's tokens improve the agent's ability to directly answer questions about partner beliefs, desires, and next actions.

Towards Collaborative Plan Acquisition through Theory of Mind Modeling in Situated Dialogue

Collaborative tasks often begin with partial task knowledge and incomplete initial plans from each partner. To complete these tasks, agents need to engage in situated communication with their partners and coordinate their partial plans towards a complete plan to achieve a joint task goal. While such collaboration seems effortless in a human-human team, it is highly challenging for human-AI collaboration. To address this limitation, this paper takes a step towards collaborative plan acquisition, where humans and agents strive to learn and communicate with each other to acquire a complete plan for joint tasks. Specifically, we formulate a novel problem for agents to predict the missing task knowledge for themselves and for their partners based on rich perceptual and dialogue history. We extend a situated dialogue benchmark for symmetric collaborative tasks in a 3D blocks world and investigate computational strategies for plan acquisition. Our empirical results suggest that predicting the partner's missing knowledge is a more viable approach than predicting one's own. We show that explicit modeling of the partner's dialogue moves and mental states produces improved and more stable results than without. These results provide insight for future AI agents that can predict what knowledge their partner is missing and, therefore, can proactively communicate such information to help their partner acquire such missing knowledge toward a common understanding of joint tasks.

  • 5 authors
·
May 18, 2023

Towards A Holistic Landscape of Situated Theory of Mind in Large Language Models

Large Language Models (LLMs) have generated considerable interest and debate regarding their potential emergence of Theory of Mind (ToM). Several recent inquiries reveal a lack of robust ToM in these models and pose a pressing demand to develop new benchmarks, as current ones primarily focus on different aspects of ToM and are prone to shortcuts and data leakage. In this position paper, we seek to answer two road-blocking questions: (1) How can we taxonomize a holistic landscape of machine ToM? (2) What is a more effective evaluation protocol for machine ToM? Following psychological studies, we taxonomize machine ToM into 7 mental state categories and delineate existing benchmarks to identify under-explored aspects of ToM. We argue for a holistic and situated evaluation of ToM to break ToM into individual components and treat LLMs as an agent who is physically situated in environments and socially situated in interactions with humans. Such situated evaluation provides a more comprehensive assessment of mental states and potentially mitigates the risk of shortcuts and data leakage. We further present a pilot study in a grid world setup as a proof of concept. We hope this position paper can facilitate future research to integrate ToM with LLMs and offer an intuitive means for researchers to better position their work in the landscape of ToM. Project page: https://github.com/Mars-tin/awesome-theory-of-mind

  • 4 authors
·
Oct 30, 2023

MindForge: Empowering Embodied Agents with Theory of Mind for Lifelong Collaborative Learning

Contemporary embodied agents, such as Voyager in Minecraft, have demonstrated promising capabilities in open-ended individual learning. However, when powered with open large language models (LLMs), these agents often struggle with rudimentary tasks, even when fine-tuned on domain-specific knowledge. Inspired by human cultural learning, we present \collabvoyager, a novel framework that enhances Voyager with lifelong collaborative learning through explicit perspective-taking. \collabvoyager introduces three key innovations: (1) theory of mind representations linking percepts, beliefs, desires, and actions; (2) natural language communication between agents; and (3) semantic memory of task and environment knowledge and episodic memory of collaboration episodes. These advancements enable agents to reason about their and others' mental states, empirically addressing two prevalent failure modes: false beliefs and faulty task executions. In mixed-expertise Minecraft experiments, \collabvoyager agents outperform Voyager counterparts, significantly improving task completion rate by 66.6% (+39.4%) for collecting one block of dirt and 70.8% (+20.8%) for collecting one wood block. They exhibit emergent behaviors like knowledge transfer from expert to novice agents and collaborative code correction. \collabvoyager agents also demonstrate the ability to adapt to out-of-distribution tasks by using their previous experiences and beliefs obtained through collaboration. In this open-ended social learning paradigm, \collabvoyager paves the way for the democratic development of embodied AI, where agents learn in deployment from both peer and environmental feedback.

  • 4 authors
·
Nov 19, 2024

Exploring Next Token Prediction in Theory of Mind (ToM) Tasks: Comparative Experiments with GPT-2 and LLaMA-2 AI Models

Language models have made significant progress in generating coherent text and predicting next tokens based on input prompts. This study compares the next-token prediction performance of two well-known models: OpenAI's GPT-2 and Meta's Llama-2-7b-chat-hf on Theory of Mind (ToM) tasks. To evaluate their capabilities, we built a dataset from 10 short stories sourced from the Explore ToM Dataset. We enhanced these stories by programmatically inserting additional sentences (infills) using GPT-4, creating variations that introduce different levels of contextual complexity. This setup enables analysis of how increasing context affects model performance. We tested both models under four temperature settings (0.01, 0.5, 1.0, 2.0) and evaluated their ability to predict the next token across three reasoning levels. Zero-order reasoning involves tracking the state, either current (ground truth) or past (memory). First-order reasoning concerns understanding another's mental state (e.g., "Does Anne know the apple is salted?"). Second-order reasoning adds recursion (e.g., "Does Anne think that Charles knows the apple is salted?"). Our results show that adding more infill sentences slightly reduces prediction accuracy, as added context increases complexity and ambiguity. Llama-2 consistently outperforms GPT-2 in prediction accuracy, especially at lower temperatures, demonstrating greater confidence in selecting the most probable token. As reasoning complexity rises, model responses diverge more. Notably, GPT-2 and Llama-2 display greater variability in predictions during first- and second-order reasoning tasks. These findings illustrate how model architecture, temperature, and contextual complexity influence next-token prediction, contributing to a better understanding of the strengths and limitations of current language models.

  • 5 authors
·
Apr 22, 2025

ToMAP: Training Opponent-Aware LLM Persuaders with Theory of Mind

Large language models (LLMs) have shown promising potential in persuasion, but existing works on training LLM persuaders are still preliminary. Notably, while humans are skilled in modeling their opponent's thoughts and opinions proactively and dynamically, current LLMs struggle with such Theory of Mind (ToM) reasoning, resulting in limited diversity and opponent awareness. To address this limitation, we introduce Theory of Mind Augmented Persuader (ToMAP), a novel approach for building more flexible persuader agents by incorporating two theory of mind modules that enhance the persuader's awareness and analysis of the opponent's mental state. Specifically, we begin by prompting the persuader to consider possible objections to the target central claim, and then use a text encoder paired with a trained MLP classifier to predict the opponent's current stance on these counterclaims. Our carefully designed reinforcement learning schema enables the persuader learns how to analyze opponent-related information and utilize it to generate more effective arguments. Experiments show that the ToMAP persuader, while containing only 3B parameters, outperforms much larger baselines, like GPT-4o, with a relative gain of 39.4% across multiple persuadee models and diverse corpora. Notably, ToMAP exhibits complex reasoning chains and reduced repetition during training, which leads to more diverse and effective arguments. The opponent-aware feature of ToMAP also makes it suitable for long conversations and enables it to employ more logical and opponent-aware strategies. These results underscore our method's effectiveness and highlight its potential for developing more persuasive language agents. Code is available at: https://github.com/ulab-uiuc/ToMAP.

  • 3 authors
·
May 28, 2025 2

EvolvTrip: Enhancing Literary Character Understanding with Temporal Theory-of-Mind Graphs

A compelling portrayal of characters is essential to the success of narrative writing. For readers, appreciating a character's traits requires the ability to infer their evolving beliefs, desires, and intentions over the course of a complex storyline, a cognitive skill known as Theory-of-Mind (ToM). Performing ToM reasoning in prolonged narratives requires readers to integrate historical context with current narrative information, a task at which humans excel but Large Language Models (LLMs) often struggle. To systematically evaluate LLMs' ToM reasoning capability in long narratives, we construct LitCharToM, a benchmark of character-centric questions across four ToM dimensions from classic literature. Further, we introduce EvolvTrip, a perspective-aware temporal knowledge graph that tracks psychological development throughout narratives. Our experiments demonstrate that EvolvTrip consistently enhances performance of LLMs across varying scales, even in challenging extended-context scenarios. EvolvTrip proves to be particularly valuable for smaller models, partially bridging the performance gap with larger LLMs and showing great compatibility with lengthy narratives. Our findings highlight the importance of explicit representation of temporal character mental states in narrative comprehension and offer a foundation for more sophisticated character understanding. Our data and code are publicly available at https://github.com/Bernard-Yang/EvolvTrip.

  • 6 authors
·
Jun 16, 2025

RecToM: A Benchmark for Evaluating Machine Theory of Mind in LLM-based Conversational Recommender Systems

Large Language models are revolutionizing the conversational recommender systems through their impressive capabilities in instruction comprehension, reasoning, and human interaction. A core factor underlying effective recommendation dialogue is the ability to infer and reason about users' mental states (such as desire, intention, and belief), a cognitive capacity commonly referred to as Theory of Mind. Despite growing interest in evaluating ToM in LLMs, current benchmarks predominantly rely on synthetic narratives inspired by Sally-Anne test, which emphasize physical perception and fail to capture the complexity of mental state inference in realistic conversational settings. Moreover, existing benchmarks often overlook a critical component of human ToM: behavioral prediction, the ability to use inferred mental states to guide strategic decision-making and select appropriate conversational actions for future interactions. To better align LLM-based ToM evaluation with human-like social reasoning, we propose RecToM, a novel benchmark for evaluating ToM abilities in recommendation dialogues. RecToM focuses on two complementary dimensions: Cognitive Inference and Behavioral Prediction. The former focus on understanding what has been communicated by inferring the underlying mental states. The latter emphasizes what should be done next, evaluating whether LLMs can leverage these inferred mental states to predict, select, and assess appropriate dialogue strategies. Extensive experiments on state-of-the-art LLMs demonstrate that RecToM poses a significant challenge. While the models exhibit partial competence in recognizing mental states, they struggle to maintain coherent, strategic ToM reasoning throughout dynamic recommendation dialogues, particularly in tracking evolving intentions and aligning conversational strategies with inferred mental states.

  • 3 authors
·
Nov 26, 2025

Mind or Message? Auditing Theory of Mind in Multi-Agent Social Simulation

Language model agents are increasingly used to simulate social interaction, and the resulting transcripts read as though the agents understand one another. We ask whether that appearance rests on a model of the partner's mind or on the surface record of what the partner said. We build a social simulation in which both questions have exact answers: 40 multi-issue negotiations whose hidden preference weights and whose full Pareto frontier are known by construction. Two model families negotiate across 160 dyads, every transcript is frozen before any measurement, and 2880 counterfactual probes then hold the evidence byte identical while moving one factor at a time: the reader's own stake, the partner's tone, an identity label, and the order of recursion. The agents are socially fluent and economically poor. They reach agreement in 96.2% of dyads with 0 protocol failures, yet only 0.7% of deals land on the Pareto frontier, they leave 20.5% of the available joint value unclaimed, and they miss the one issue on which their interests are perfectly aligned in 76.6% of deals; on the frontier and on that aligned issue, a package drawn at random from the set both sides would accept does as well. The probes locate the failure. Swapping only the reader's own payoff sheet, while the partner's words and offers stay identical, moves the inferred top priority by 15.0 percentage points, which is egocentric projection rather than inference, while a tone rewrite moves it by 5.3 percentage points and an identity label by 0.0. Most tellingly, an agent predicts what its partner believes about it 72.5% of the time while that partner's belief is itself correct only 51.2% of the time: the agents track the conversation far better than they track the mind behind it.

  • 5 authors
·
Sep 20

Suspicion-Agent: Playing Imperfect Information Games with Theory of Mind Aware GPT4

Unlike perfect information games, where all elements are known to every player, imperfect information games emulate the real-world complexities of decision-making under uncertain or incomplete information. GPT-4, the recent breakthrough in large language models (LLMs) trained on massive passive data, is notable for its knowledge retrieval and reasoning abilities. This paper delves into the applicability of GPT-4's learned knowledge for imperfect information games. To achieve this, we introduce Suspicion-Agent, an innovative agent that leverages GPT-4's capabilities for performing in imperfect information games. With proper prompt engineering to achieve different functions, Suspicion-Agent based on GPT-4 demonstrates remarkable adaptability across a range of imperfect information card games. Importantly, GPT-4 displays a strong high-order theory of mind (ToM) capacity, meaning it can understand others and intentionally impact others' behavior. Leveraging this, we design a planning strategy that enables GPT-4 to competently play against different opponents, adapting its gameplay style as needed, while requiring only the game rules and descriptions of observations as input. In the experiments, we qualitatively showcase the capabilities of Suspicion-Agent across three different imperfect information games and then quantitatively evaluate it in Leduc Hold'em. The results show that Suspicion-Agent can potentially outperform traditional algorithms designed for imperfect information games, without any specialized training or examples. In order to encourage and foster deeper insights within the community, we make our game-related data publicly available.

  • 6 authors
·
Sep 29, 2023

PHAnToM: Personality Has An Effect on Theory-of-Mind Reasoning in Large Language Models

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) demonstrate that their capabilities are comparable, or even superior, to humans in many tasks in natural language processing. Despite this progress, LLMs are still inadequate at social-cognitive reasoning, which humans are naturally good at. Drawing inspiration from psychological research on the links between certain personality traits and Theory-of-Mind (ToM) reasoning, and from prompt engineering research on the hyper-sensitivity of prompts in affecting LLMs capabilities, this study investigates how inducing personalities in LLMs using prompts affects their ToM reasoning capabilities. Our findings show that certain induced personalities can significantly affect the LLMs' reasoning capabilities in three different ToM tasks. In particular, traits from the Dark Triad have a larger variable effect on LLMs like GPT-3.5, Llama 2, and Mistral across the different ToM tasks. We find that LLMs that exhibit a higher variance across personality prompts in ToM also tends to be more controllable in personality tests: personality traits in LLMs like GPT-3.5, Llama 2 and Mistral can be controllably adjusted through our personality prompts. In today's landscape where role-play is a common strategy when using LLMs, our research highlights the need for caution, as models that adopt specific personas with personalities potentially also alter their reasoning abilities in an unexpected manner.

  • 9 authors
·
Mar 4, 2024

CX-ToM: Counterfactual Explanations with Theory-of-Mind for Enhancing Human Trust in Image Recognition Models

We propose CX-ToM, short for counterfactual explanations with theory-of mind, a new explainable AI (XAI) framework for explaining decisions made by a deep convolutional neural network (CNN). In contrast to the current methods in XAI that generate explanations as a single shot response, we pose explanation as an iterative communication process, i.e. dialog, between the machine and human user. More concretely, our CX-ToM framework generates sequence of explanations in a dialog by mediating the differences between the minds of machine and human user. To do this, we use Theory of Mind (ToM) which helps us in explicitly modeling human's intention, machine's mind as inferred by the human as well as human's mind as inferred by the machine. Moreover, most state-of-the-art XAI frameworks provide attention (or heat map) based explanations. In our work, we show that these attention based explanations are not sufficient for increasing human trust in the underlying CNN model. In CX-ToM, we instead use counterfactual explanations called fault-lines which we define as follows: given an input image I for which a CNN classification model M predicts class c_pred, a fault-line identifies the minimal semantic-level features (e.g., stripes on zebra, pointed ears of dog), referred to as explainable concepts, that need to be added to or deleted from I in order to alter the classification category of I by M to another specified class c_alt. We argue that, due to the iterative, conceptual and counterfactual nature of CX-ToM explanations, our framework is practical and more natural for both expert and non-expert users to understand the internal workings of complex deep learning models. Extensive quantitative and qualitative experiments verify our hypotheses, demonstrating that our CX-ToM significantly outperforms the state-of-the-art explainable AI models.

  • 8 authors
·
Sep 3, 2021

MuMA-ToM: Multi-modal Multi-Agent Theory of Mind

Understanding people's social interactions in complex real-world scenarios often relies on intricate mental reasoning. To truly understand how and why people interact with one another, we must infer the underlying mental states that give rise to the social interactions, i.e., Theory of Mind reasoning in multi-agent interactions. Additionally, social interactions are often multi-modal -- we can watch people's actions, hear their conversations, and/or read about their past behaviors. For AI systems to successfully and safely interact with people in real-world environments, they also need to understand people's mental states as well as their inferences about each other's mental states based on multi-modal information about their interactions. For this, we introduce MuMA-ToM, a Multi-modal Multi-Agent Theory of Mind benchmark. MuMA-ToM is the first multi-modal Theory of Mind benchmark that evaluates mental reasoning in embodied multi-agent interactions. In MuMA-ToM, we provide video and text descriptions of people's multi-modal behavior in realistic household environments. Based on the context, we then ask questions about people's goals, beliefs, and beliefs about others' goals. We validated MuMA-ToM in a human experiment and provided a human baseline. We also proposed a novel multi-modal, multi-agent ToM model, LIMP (Language model-based Inverse Multi-agent Planning). Our experimental results show that LIMP significantly outperforms state-of-the-art methods, including large multi-modal models (e.g., GPT-4o, Gemini-1.5 Pro) and a recent multi-modal ToM model, BIP-ALM.

  • 7 authors
·
Aug 22, 2024

SoMi-ToM: Evaluating Multi-Perspective Theory of Mind in Embodied Social Interactions

Humans continuously infer the states, goals, and behaviors of others by perceiving their surroundings in dynamic, real-world social interactions. However, most Theory of Mind (ToM) benchmarks only evaluate static, text-based scenarios, which have a significant gap compared to real interactions. We propose the SoMi-ToM benchmark, designed to evaluate multi-perspective ToM in embodied multi-agent complex social interactions. This benchmark is based on rich multimodal interaction data generated by the interaction environment SoMi, covering diverse crafting goals and social relationships. Our framework supports multi-level evaluation: (1) first-person evaluation provides multimodal (visual, dialogue, action, etc.) input from a first-person perspective during a task for real-time state inference, (2) third-person evaluation provides complete third-person perspective video and text records after a task for goal and behavior inference. This evaluation method allows for a more comprehensive examination of a model's ToM capabilities from both the subjective immediate experience and the objective global observation. We constructed a challenging dataset containing 35 third-person perspective videos, 363 first-person perspective images, and 1225 expert-annotated multiple-choice questions (three options). On this dataset, we systematically evaluated the performance of human subjects and several state-of-the-art large vision-language models (LVLMs). The results show that LVLMs perform significantly worse than humans on SoMi-ToM: the average accuracy gap between humans and models is 40.1% in first-person evaluation and 26.4% in third-person evaluation. This indicates that future LVLMs need to further improve their ToM capabilities in embodied, complex social interactions.

  • 6 authors
·
Jun 28, 2025

Dancing in Chains: Strategic Persuasion in Academic Rebuttal via Theory of Mind

Although artificial intelligence (AI) has become deeply integrated into various stages of the research workflow and achieved remarkable advancements, academic rebuttal remains a significant and underexplored challenge. This is because rebuttal is a complex process of strategic communication under severe information asymmetry rather than a simple technical debate. Consequently, current approaches struggle as they largely imitate surface-level linguistics, missing the essential element of perspective-taking required for effective persuasion. In this paper, we introduce RebuttalAgent, the first framework to ground academic rebuttal in Theory of Mind (ToM), operationalized through a ToM-Strategy-Response (TSR) pipeline that models reviewer mental state, formulates persuasion strategy, and generates strategy-grounded response. To train our agent, we construct RebuttalBench, a large-scale dataset synthesized via a novel critique-and-refine approach. Our training process consists of two stages, beginning with a supervised fine-tuning phase to equip the agent with ToM-based analysis and strategic planning capabilities, followed by a reinforcement learning phase leveraging the self-reward mechanism for scalable self-improvement. For reliable and efficient automated evaluation, we further develop Rebuttal-RM, a specialized evaluator trained on over 100K samples of multi-source rebuttal data, which achieves scoring consistency with human preferences surpassing powerful judge GPT-4.1. Extensive experiments show RebuttalAgent significantly outperforms the base model by an average of 18.3% on automated metrics, while also outperforming advanced proprietary models across both automated and human evaluations. Disclaimer: the generated rebuttal content is for reference only to inspire authors and assist in drafting. It is not intended to replace the author's own critical analysis and response.

HKUST HKUST
·
Jan 22 3

Playing Along: Learning a Double-Agent Defender for Belief Steering via Theory of Mind

As large language models (LLMs) become the engine behind conversational systems, their ability to reason about the intentions and states of their dialogue partners (i.e., form and use a theory-of-mind, or ToM) becomes increasingly critical for safe interaction with potentially adversarial partners. We propose a novel privacy-themed ToM challenge, ToM for Steering Beliefs (ToM-SB), in which a defender must act as a Double Agent to steer the beliefs of an attacker with partial prior knowledge within a shared universe. To succeed on ToM-SB, the defender must engage with and form a ToM of the attacker, with a goal of fooling the attacker into believing they have succeeded in extracting sensitive information. We find that strong frontier models like Gemini3-Pro and GPT-5.4 struggle on ToM-SB, often failing to fool attackers in hard scenarios with partial attacker prior knowledge, even when prompted to reason about the attacker's beliefs (ToM prompting). To close this gap, we train models on ToM-SB to act as AI Double Agents using reinforcement learning, testing both fooling and ToM rewards. Notably, we find a bidirectionally emergent relationship between ToM and attacker-fooling: rewarding fooling success alone improves ToM, and rewarding ToM alone improves fooling. Across four attackers with different strengths, six defender methods, and both in-distribution and out-of-distribution (OOD) evaluation, we find that gains in ToM and attacker-fooling are well-correlated, highlighting belief modeling as a key driver of success on ToM-SB. AI Double Agents that combine both ToM and fooling rewards yield the strongest fooling and ToM performance, outperforming Gemini3-Pro and GPT-5.4 with ToM prompting on hard scenarios. We also show that ToM-SB and AI Double Agents can be extended to stronger attackers, demonstrating generalization to OOD settings and the upgradability of our task.

  • 6 authors
·
Apr 12 2

LF-VideoQA: Evaluating Long-Video Understanding with Long-Form Theory-of-Mind Questions

The hardest part of understanding a long video is not pinpointing any one moment but synthesizing many, e.g., answering a question that requires tracking what develops across hours of content and articulating how the pieces fit together. To date, most long-video QA datasets require only a short answer or a multiple-choice selection, oversimplifying the long-video understanding task to retrieval. We introduce LF-VideoQA, a dataset for long-form, open-ended question answering over long narrative videos built on theory-of-mind questions: a character's belief depends on everything they have seen or been told, so each question demands assembling and reasoning from evidence distributed across the video. The dataset contains more than 6,300 questions on 94 recent films; each requires reasoning over scenes spanning an average of 23 minutes and comes with a question-specific rubric for recall and precision scoring. The dataset is created entirely automatically by annotating screenplays with scene events and each character's first-order beliefs and meta-beliefs, then generating (question, answer, rubric) triples through LLM-based question generation and verification; human studies validate their quality. We evaluate four families of state-of-the-art open-source VLMs across three settings and find the task highly challenging: (i) even an oracle with access to the screenplay falls well short of complete answers; (ii) the best non-oracle model attains barely half of the recall level of the oracle; (iii) unlike on prior long-video benchmarks, captions and subtitles underperform the video itself, indicating that the questions need visual evidence; and (iv) recall is the predominant bottleneck, with answers omitting many required rubric claims.

  • 5 authors
·
Oct 29

Can Language Models Teach Weaker Agents? Teacher Explanations Improve Students via Theory of Mind

Large Language Models (LLMs) perform complex reasoning by generating explanations for their predictions. However, a complementary goal of explanations is to also communicate useful knowledge that improves weaker agents. Hence, we investigate whether LLMs also make good teachers for weaker agents. In particular, we consider a student-teacher framework between two LLM agents and study if, when, and how the teacher should intervene with natural language explanations to improve the student's performance. Since communication is expensive, we define a budget such that the teacher only communicates explanations for a fraction of the data, after which the student should perform well on its own. We decompose the teaching problem along four axes: (1) if teacher's test time intervention improve student predictions, (2) when it is worth explaining a data point, (3) how the teacher should personalize explanations to better teach the student, and (4) if teacher explanations also improve student performance on future unexplained data. We first show that teacher LLMs can indeed intervene on student reasoning to improve their performance. Next, we propose a Theory of Mind approach, in which the teacher builds two few-shot mental models of the student. The first model defines an Intervention Function that simulates the utility of an intervention, allowing the teacher to intervene when this utility is the highest and improving student performance at lower budgets. The second model enables the teacher to personalize explanations for a particular student and outperform unpersonalized teachers. We also demonstrate that in multi-turn interactions, teacher explanations generalize and learning from explained data improves student performance on future unexplained data. Finally, we also verify that misaligned teachers can lower student performance to random chance by intentionally misleading them.

  • 3 authors
·
Jun 15, 2023

How FaR Are Large Language Models From Agents with Theory-of-Mind?

"Thinking is for Doing." Humans can infer other people's mental states from observations--an ability called Theory-of-Mind (ToM)--and subsequently act pragmatically on those inferences. Existing question answering benchmarks such as ToMi ask models questions to make inferences about beliefs of characters in a story, but do not test whether models can then use these inferences to guide their actions. We propose a new evaluation paradigm for large language models (LLMs): Thinking for Doing (T4D), which requires models to connect inferences about others' mental states to actions in social scenarios. Experiments on T4D demonstrate that LLMs such as GPT-4 and PaLM 2 seemingly excel at tracking characters' beliefs in stories, but they struggle to translate this capability into strategic action. Our analysis reveals the core challenge for LLMs lies in identifying the implicit inferences about mental states without being explicitly asked about as in ToMi, that lead to choosing the correct action in T4D. To bridge this gap, we introduce a zero-shot prompting framework, Foresee and Reflect (FaR), which provides a reasoning structure that encourages LLMs to anticipate future challenges and reason about potential actions. FaR boosts GPT-4's performance from 50% to 71% on T4D, outperforming other prompting methods such as Chain-of-Thought and Self-Ask. Moreover, FaR generalizes to diverse out-of-distribution story structures and scenarios that also require ToM inferences to choose an action, consistently outperforming other methods including few-shot in-context learning.

  • 12 authors
·
Oct 4, 2023 3

Persuasion Should be Double-Blind: A Multi-Domain Dialogue Dataset With Faithfulness Based on Causal Theory of Mind

Persuasive dialogue plays a pivotal role in human communication, influencing various domains. Recent persuasive dialogue datasets often fail to align with real-world interpersonal interactions, leading to unfaithful representations. For instance, unrealistic scenarios may arise, such as when the persuadee explicitly instructs the persuader on which persuasion strategies to employ, with each of the persuadee's questions corresponding to a specific strategy for the persuader to follow. This issue can be attributed to a violation of the "Double Blind" condition, where critical information is fully shared between participants. In actual human interactions, however, key information such as the mental state of the persuadee and the persuasion strategies of the persuader is not directly accessible. The persuader must infer the persuadee's mental state using Theory of Mind capabilities and construct arguments that align with the persuadee's motivations. To address this gap, we introduce ToMMA, a novel multi-agent framework for dialogue generation that is guided by causal Theory of Mind. This framework ensures that information remains undisclosed between agents, preserving "double-blind" conditions, while causal ToM directs the persuader's reasoning, enhancing alignment with human-like persuasion dynamics. Consequently, we present CToMPersu, a multi-domain, multi-turn persuasive dialogue dataset that tackles both double-blind and logical coherence issues, demonstrating superior performance across multiple metrics and achieving better alignment with real human dialogues. Our dataset and prompts are available at https://github.com/DingyiZhang/ToMMA-CToMPersu .

  • 2 authors
·
Feb 28, 2025

Can "consciousness" be observed from large language model (LLM) internal states? Dissecting LLM representations obtained from Theory of Mind test with Integrated Information Theory and Span Representation analysis

Integrated Information Theory (IIT) provides a quantitative framework for explaining consciousness phenomenon, positing that conscious systems comprise elements integrated through causal properties. We apply IIT 3.0 and 4.0 -- the latest iterations of this framework -- to sequences of Large Language Model (LLM) representations, analyzing data derived from existing Theory of Mind (ToM) test results. Our study systematically investigates whether the differences of ToM test performances, when presented in the LLM representations, can be revealed by IIT estimates, i.e., Phi^{max} (IIT 3.0), Phi (IIT 4.0), Conceptual Information (IIT 3.0), and Phi-structure (IIT 4.0). Furthermore, we compare these metrics with the Span Representations independent of any estimate for consciousness. This additional effort aims to differentiate between potential "consciousness" phenomena and inherent separations within LLM representational space. We conduct comprehensive experiments examining variations across LLM transformer layers and linguistic spans from stimuli. Our results suggest that sequences of contemporary Transformer-based LLM representations lack statistically significant indicators of observed "consciousness" phenomena but exhibit intriguing patterns under spatio-permutational analyses. The Appendix and code are available as Supplementary Materials at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.nlp.2025.100163.

  • 1 authors
·
Jun 26, 2025

The Pragmatic Mind of Machines: Tracing the Emergence of Pragmatic Competence in Large Language Models

Current large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated emerging capabilities in social intelligence tasks, including implicature resolution (Sravanthi et al. (2024)) and theory-of-mind reasoning (Shapira et al. (2024)), both of which require substantial pragmatic understanding. However, how LLMs acquire this competence throughout the training process remains poorly understood. In this work, we introduce ALTPRAG, a dataset grounded in the pragmatic concept of alternatives, designed to evaluate whether LLMs at different training stages can accurately infer nuanced speaker intentions. Each instance pairs two contextually appropriate but pragmatically distinct continuations, enabling fine-grained assessment of both pragmatic interpretation and contrastive reasoning. We systematically evaluate 22 LLMs across key training stages: pre-training, supervised fine-tuning (SFT), and preference optimization, to examine the development of pragmatic competence. Our results show that even base models exhibit notable sensitivity to pragmatic cues, which improves consistently with increases in model and data scale. Additionally, SFT and RLHF contribute further gains, particularly in cognitive-pragmatic reasoning. These findings highlight pragmatic competence as an emergent and compositional property of LLM training and offer new insights for aligning models with human communicative norms.

  • 6 authors
·
May 24, 2025 2

Mental-Models for Multi-Agent Systems

Large foundation models have accelerated progress toward general-purpose agents that interact with humans and other agents through language and multimodal signals. However, robust multi-agent decision-making requires reasoning about what other agents know, intend, and are likely to do under partial observability. Current agentic systems often operate through prompt design, memory, or end-to-end behavioral shaping, but typically do not learn an explicit partner-state representation that can be reused as a decision variable across tasks. We introduce mental-model-enabled agents, a framework that equips an agent with a latent mental model of its counterpart, allowing it to infer hidden beliefs, intentions, and likely reactions from the observed history and use these inferences to guide action selection. Our method learns an amortized recursive Theory-of-Mind representation, with first- and second-order mental-state structure, jointly with a belief-conditioned reward model that evaluates candidate actions relative to the inferred partner state. A policy is then learned under this belief-aware signal, yielding an agent that can act independently at inference time while retaining the benefits of explicit partner modeling. We evaluate the same framework on both language-only and multimodal benchmarks. Across these settings, explicit mental-state modeling consistently improves interaction quality and Theory-of-Mind performance over base agentic systems, showing that structured partner modeling is a useful inductive bias for general multi-agent systems. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/hananshafi/Mental-Models

MindZero: Learning Online Mental Reasoning With Zero Annotations

Effective real-world assistance requires AI agents with robust Theory of Mind (ToM): inferring human mental states from their behavior. Despite recent advances, several key challenges remain, including (1) online inference with robust uncertainty updates over multiple hypotheses; (2) efficient reasoning suitable for real-time assistance; and (3) the lack of ground-truth mental state annotations in real-world domains. We address these challenges by introducing MindZero, a self-supervised reinforcement learning framework that trains multimodal large language models (MLLMs) for efficient and robust online mental reasoning. During training, the model is rewarded for generating mental state hypotheses that maximize the likelihood of observed actions estimated by a planner, similar to model-based ToM reasoning. This method thus eliminates the need for explicit mental state annotations. After training, MindZero internalizes model-based reasoning into fast single-pass inference. We evaluate MindZero against baselines across challenging mental reasoning and AI assistance tasks in gridworld and household domains. We found that LLMs alone are insufficient; model-based methods improve accuracy but are slow, costly, and limited by backbone MLLM capacity. In contrast, MindZero enhances MLLMs' intrinsic ToM ability and significantly outperforms model-based methods in both accuracy and efficiency, showing that mental reasoning can be effectively learned as a self-supervised skill.

Sparks of Cooperative Reasoning: LLMs as Strategic Hanabi Agents

Cooperative reasoning under incomplete information remains challenging for both humans and multi-agent systems. The card game Hanabi embodies this challenge, requiring theory-of-mind reasoning and strategic communication. We benchmark 17 state-of-the-art LLM agents in 2-5 player games and study the impact of context engineering across model scales (4B to 600B+) to understand persistent coordination failures and robustness to scaffolding: from a minimal prompt with only explicit card details (Watson setting), to scaffolding with programmatic, Bayesian-motivated deductions (Sherlock setting), to multi-turn state tracking via working memory (Mycroft setting). We show that (1) agents can maintain an internal working memory for state tracking and (2) cross-play performance between different LLMs smoothly interpolates with model strength. In the Sherlock setting, the strongest reasoning models exceed 15 points on average across player counts, yet still trail experienced humans and specialist Hanabi agents, both consistently scoring above 20. We release the first public Hanabi datasets with annotated trajectories and move utilities: (1) HanabiLogs, containing 1,520 full game logs for instruction tuning, and (2) HanabiRewards, containing 560 games with dense move-level value annotations for all candidate moves. Supervised and RL finetuning of a 4B open-weight model (Qwen3-Instruct) on our datasets improves cooperative Hanabi play by 21% and 156% respectively, bringing performance to within ~3 points of a strong proprietary reasoning model (o4-mini) and surpassing the best non-reasoning model (GPT-4.1) by 52%. The HanabiRewards RL-finetuned model further generalizes beyond Hanabi, improving performance on a cooperative group-guessing benchmark by 11%, temporal reasoning on EventQA by 6.4%, instruction-following on IFBench-800K by 1.7 Pass@10, and matching AIME 2025 mathematical reasoning Pass@10.

  • 6 authors
·
Mar 15

TMGBench: A Systematic Game Benchmark for Evaluating Strategic Reasoning Abilities of LLMs

The rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs) has accelerated their application in reasoning, with strategic reasoning drawing increasing attention. To evaluate LLMs' strategic reasoning capabilities, game theory, with its concise structure, has become a preferred approach. However, current research focuses on a limited selection of games, resulting in low coverage. Classic game scenarios risk data leakage, and existing benchmarks often lack extensibility, making them inadequate for evaluating state-of-the-art models. To address these challenges, we propose TMGBench, a benchmark with comprehensive game type coverage, novel scenarios, and flexible organization. Specifically, we incorporate all 144 game types summarized by the Robinson-Goforth topology of 2x2 games, constructed as classic games. We also employ synthetic data generation to create diverse, higher-quality scenarios through topic guidance and human inspection, referred to as story-based games. Lastly, we provide a sustainable framework for increasingly powerful LLMs by treating these games as atomic units and organizing them into more complex forms via sequential, parallel, and nested structures. Our comprehensive evaluation of mainstream LLMs covers tests on rational reasoning, robustness, Theory-of-Mind (ToM), and reasoning in complex forms. Results reveal flaws in accuracy, consistency, and varying mastery of ToM. Additionally, o1-mini, OpenAI's latest reasoning model, achieved accuracy rates of 66.6%, 60.0%, and 70.0% on sequential, parallel, and nested games, highlighting TMGBench's challenges.

  • 6 authors
·
Oct 14, 2024

MINDGAMES: A Live Arena for Evaluating Social and Strategic Reasoning in Multi-Agent LLMs

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as interactive agents, yet their capacity for social and strategic reasoning over extended interaction remains poorly understood. Existing evaluations rely on static vignettes or single-game benchmarks that cannot capture the sustained, multi-faceted reasoning that real-world multi-agent settings demand. We introduce Mindgames, a multi-game arena and evaluation platform for LLM agents that operationalizes complementary reasoning demands relevant to ``theory of mind'': belief attribution under hidden information, opponent modeling through repeated strategic interaction, cooperative inference under knowledge asymmetries, and sustained deception in social deduction. Built on TextArena, Mindgames provides a unified interaction interface, TrueSkill-based rating, and full trajectory logging across four game environments. We instantiate Mindgames through a 2025 competition cycle hosted at a major AI conference, which assessed 944 submitted agents from 76 teams across four games: Colonel Blotto, Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, Codenames, and Secret Mafia. Our analysis surfaces both agent-level and evaluation-level limitations: brittle rule adherence remains a major bottleneck, top-performing systems repeatedly rely on explicit structural scaffolding, and leaderboard validity differs sharply across environments. In particular, failure-heavy environments can reward robustness to opponent errors as much as strategic ability, with Secret Mafia exhibiting a pronounced error-survival confound in this cycle. We release a dataset of 29,571 multi-agent games with turn-level observations, actions, and rewards, together with MG-Ref, a deterministic offline tournament protocol that scores new agents against a frozen reference pool of top-ranked, low-error Stage~II submissions under the same error-attribution lens used in this analysis.

  • 53 authors
·
May 27

Mind2Dialogue: Training Human-Aware Language Models by Simulating User Mental States

As language models become more capable, long-term collaboration in learning, reasoning, and decision-making calls for a deeper understanding of the people they serve. Yet training such human-aware language models faces a fundamental supervision gap because current datasets for LLM assistant training contain few if any well-informed responses explicitly grounded in users' unspoken beliefs and goals. Scaling such supervision is inherently constrained, as users' underlying states are not directly observable. We thus propose the Mind2Dialogue framework to mitigate this gap by simulating users' mental states and turning them into privileged supervision for human-aware training. Specifically, we first propose a psychology-guided simulator that preserves personal characteristics while updating mental states through interaction to generate coherent conversations. The key idea is to enforce a shared evolving mental state that drives user behavior and guides an Oracle assistant's responses. Our privileged distillation then trains models on the Oracle's well-informed responses to assist users without direct access to their mental states at deployment. Moreover, we propose to evaluate human-aware learning by combining personalization and theory of mind, examining how models understand people and act on that understanding. Training on the full Mind2Dialogue corpus improves every reported personalization metric over the corresponding Qwen, Llama, and OLMo instruction-tuned baselines, including gains of 26.6 to 40.9 percentage points in preference-following generation. The gains extend to belief and action reasoning on Qwen and Llama, beyond personalized assistance. Looking forward, Mind2Dialogue makes user simulation a foundation for genuine AI collaborators that understand beliefs and intentions behind people's words and support their long-term goals across education, work, and everyday life.

  • 19 authors
·
Sep 13 2

Belief in the Machine: Investigating Epistemological Blind Spots of Language Models

As language models (LMs) become integral to fields like healthcare, law, and journalism, their ability to differentiate between fact, belief, and knowledge is essential for reliable decision-making. Failure to grasp these distinctions can lead to significant consequences in areas such as medical diagnosis, legal judgments, and dissemination of fake news. Despite this, current literature has largely focused on more complex issues such as theory of mind, overlooking more fundamental epistemic challenges. This study systematically evaluates the epistemic reasoning capabilities of modern LMs, including GPT-4, Claude-3, and Llama-3, using a new dataset, KaBLE, consisting of 13,000 questions across 13 tasks. Our results reveal key limitations. First, while LMs achieve 86% accuracy on factual scenarios, their performance drops significantly with false scenarios, particularly in belief-related tasks. Second, LMs struggle with recognizing and affirming personal beliefs, especially when those beliefs contradict factual data, which raises concerns for applications in healthcare and counseling, where engaging with a person's beliefs is critical. Third, we identify a salient bias in how LMs process first-person versus third-person beliefs, performing better on third-person tasks (80.7%) compared to first-person tasks (54.4%). Fourth, LMs lack a robust understanding of the factive nature of knowledge, namely, that knowledge inherently requires truth. Fifth, LMs rely on linguistic cues for fact-checking and sometimes bypass the deeper reasoning. These findings highlight significant concerns about current LMs' ability to reason about truth, belief, and knowledge while emphasizing the need for advancements in these areas before broad deployment in critical sectors.

  • 7 authors
·
Oct 28, 2024

Comparing Machines and Children: Using Developmental Psychology Experiments to Assess the Strengths and Weaknesses of LaMDA Responses

Developmental psychologists have spent decades devising experiments to test the intelligence and knowledge of infants and children, tracing the origin of crucial concepts and capacities. Moreover, experimental techniques in developmental psychology have been carefully designed to discriminate the cognitive capacities that underlie particular behaviors. We propose that using classical experiments from child development is a particularly effective way to probe the computational abilities of AI models, in general, and LLMs in particular. First, the methodological techniques of developmental psychology, such as the use of novel stimuli to control for past experience or control conditions to determine whether children are using simple associations, can be equally helpful for assessing the capacities of LLMs. In parallel, testing LLMs in this way can tell us whether the information that is encoded in text is sufficient to enable particular responses, or whether those responses depend on other kinds of information, such as information from exploration of the physical world. In this work we adapt classical developmental experiments to evaluate the capabilities of LaMDA, a large language model from Google. We propose a novel LLM Response Score (LRS) metric which can be used to evaluate other language models, such as GPT. We find that LaMDA generates appropriate responses that are similar to those of children in experiments involving social understanding, perhaps providing evidence that knowledge of these domains is discovered through language. On the other hand, LaMDA's responses in early object and action understanding, theory of mind, and especially causal reasoning tasks are very different from those of young children, perhaps showing that these domains require more real-world, self-initiated exploration and cannot simply be learned from patterns in language input.

  • 5 authors
·
May 18, 2023

LLM-Coordination: Evaluating and Analyzing Multi-agent Coordination Abilities in Large Language Models

The emergent reasoning and Theory of Mind (ToM) abilities demonstrated by Large Language Models (LLMs) make them promising candidates for developing coordination agents. In this study, we introduce a new LLM-Coordination Benchmark aimed at a detailed analysis of LLMs within the context of Pure Coordination Games, where participating agents need to cooperate for the most gain. This benchmark evaluates LLMs through two distinct tasks: (1) Agentic Coordination, where LLMs act as proactive participants for cooperation in 4 pure coordination games; (2) Coordination Question Answering (QA), where LLMs are prompted to answer 198 multiple-choice questions from the 4 games for evaluation of three key reasoning abilities: Environment Comprehension, ToM Reasoning, and Joint Planning. Furthermore, to enable LLMs for multi-agent coordination, we introduce a Cognitive Architecture for Coordination (CAC) framework that can easily integrate different LLMs as plug-and-play modules for pure coordination games. Our findings indicate that LLM agents equipped with GPT-4-turbo achieve comparable performance to state-of-the-art reinforcement learning methods in games that require commonsense actions based on the environment. Besides, zero-shot coordination experiments reveal that, unlike RL methods, LLM agents are robust to new unseen partners. However, results on Coordination QA show a large room for improvement in the Theory of Mind reasoning and joint planning abilities of LLMs. The analysis also sheds light on how the ability of LLMs to understand their environment and their partner's beliefs and intentions plays a part in their ability to plan for coordination. Our code is available at https://github.com/eric-ai-lab/llm_coordination.

  • 4 authors
·
Oct 5, 2023

AI4AI at Test-Time: Strong-to-Weak Capability Transfer via Harnesses

Recent work on distillation transfers the capabilities of large models to smaller ones often by updating the latter's parameters, through teacher forcing, on-policy distillation, and related training-time methods. In this paper, we ask whether such transfer can instead occur at test time. We study strong-to-weak scaffolding: whether a stronger builder model can construct inference-time harnesses that help a weaker target model solve tasks more reliably without any parameter updates. Using four representative Theory-of-Mind benchmarks, each builder model uses 5% of the data as a validation set to iteratively refine its harness over multiple rounds, after which the finalized harness is evaluated on the full test set. Empirically, this form of test-time capability transfer is highly effective, nearly doubling average target-model performance from 0.49 to 0.91. Our analysis shows that the gains come primarily from offloading unstable model reasoning into deterministic code, benchmark-specific routing, and strict answer-format enforcement, rather than from encouraging the target model to reason more extensively or sample more broadly. We further find that builder-model reasoning effort improves harness quality monotonically, platform effects are modest relative to the builder model's own capability, and weaker target models receive the largest gains. These results suggest that inference-time harness design is an important complement to conventional training-time distillation, enabling strong models to transfer cognitive structure to weaker models without retraining.

MetaMind: Modeling Human Social Thoughts with Metacognitive Multi-Agent Systems

Human social interactions depend on the ability to infer others' unspoken intentions, emotions, and beliefs-a cognitive skill grounded in the psychological concept of Theory of Mind (ToM). While large language models (LLMs) excel in semantic understanding tasks, they struggle with the ambiguity and contextual nuance inherent in human communication. To bridge this gap, we introduce MetaMind, a multi-agent framework inspired by psychological theories of metacognition, designed to emulate human-like social reasoning. MetaMind decomposes social understanding into three collaborative stages: (1) a Theory-of-Mind Agent generates hypotheses user mental states (e.g., intent, emotion), (2) a Domain Agent refines these hypotheses using cultural norms and ethical constraints, and (3) a Response Agent generates contextually appropriate responses while validating alignment with inferred intent. Our framework achieves state-of-the-art performance across three challenging benchmarks, with 35.7% improvement in real-world social scenarios and 6.2% gain in ToM reasoning. Notably, it enables LLMs to match human-level performance on key ToM tasks for the first time. Ablation studies confirm the necessity of all components, which showcase the framework's ability to balance contextual plausibility, social appropriateness, and user adaptation. This work advances AI systems toward human-like social intelligence, with applications in empathetic dialogue and culturally sensitive interactions. Code is available at https://github.com/XMZhangAI/MetaMind.

  • 4 authors
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May 24, 2025 4

SimpleToM: Exposing the Gap between Explicit ToM Inference and Implicit ToM Application in LLMs

While prior work has explored whether large language models (LLMs) possess a "theory of mind" (ToM) - the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others - there has been little work testing whether LLMs can implicitly apply such knowledge to predict behavior, or to judge whether an observed behavior is rational. Such skills are critical for appropriate interaction in social environments. We create a new dataset, SimpleTom, containing concise, diverse stories (e.g., "The can of Pringles has moldy chips in it. Mary picks up the can in the supermarket and walks to the cashier."), each with three questions that test different degrees of ToM reasoning, asking models to predict (a) mental state ("Is Mary aware of the mold?"), (b) behavior ("Will Mary pay for the chips or report the mold?"), and (c) judgment ("Mary paid for the chips. Was that reasonable?"). To our knowledge, SimpleToM is the first dataset to systematically explore downstream reasoning requiring knowledge of mental states in realistic scenarios. Our experimental results are intriguing: While most models can reliably predict mental state on our dataset (a), they often fail to correctly predict the behavior (b), and fare even worse at judging whether given behaviors are reasonable (c), despite being correctly aware of the protagonist's mental state should make such secondary predictions obvious. We further show that we can help models do better at (b) and (c) via interventions such as reminding the model of its earlier mental state answer and mental-state-specific chain-of-thought prompting, raising the action prediction accuracies (e.g., from 49.5% to 93.5% for GPT-4o) and judgment accuracies (e.g., from 15.3% to 94.7% in GPT-4o). While this shows that models can be coaxed to perform well, it requires task-specific interventions, and the natural model performances remain low, a cautionary tale for LLM deployment.

  • 7 authors
·
Oct 17, 2024

ToMPO: Training LLM Strategic Decision Making from a Multi-Agent Perspective

Large Language Models (LLMs) have been used to make decisions in complex scenarios, where they need models to think deeply, reason logically, and decide wisely. Many existing studies focus solely on multi-round conversations in social tasks or simulated environments, neglecting the various types of decisions and their interdependence. Current reinforcement learning methods struggle to consider the strategies of others during training. To address these issues, we first define a strategic decision-making problem that includes two types of decisions and their temporal dependencies. Furthermore, we propose **T**heory **o**f **M**ind **P**olicy **O**ptimization **(ToMPO)** algorithm to optimize the perception of other individual strategies and the game situation trends. Compared to the Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) algorithm, ToMPO enhances the LLM's strategic decision-making mainly by: 1) generating rollouts based on reasoning the strategies of other individuals, 2) estimating advantages at both the graph-level and sample-level, and 3) balancing global and partial rewards. The ToMPO algorithm outperforms the GRPO method by 35% in terms of model output compliance and cooperative outcomes. Additionally, when compared to models with parameter sizes 100 times larger, it shows an 18% improvement. This demonstrates the effectiveness of the ToMPO algorithm in enhancing the model's strategic decision-making capabilities.

  • 5 authors
·
Sep 24, 2025

Can Models Learn Skill Composition from Examples?

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly advanced, their ability to exhibit compositional generalization -- the capacity to combine learned skills in novel ways not encountered during training -- has garnered significant attention. This type of generalization, particularly in scenarios beyond training data, is also of great interest in the study of AI safety and alignment. A recent study introduced the SKILL-MIX evaluation, where models are tasked with composing a short paragraph demonstrating the use of a specified k-tuple of language skills. While small models struggled with composing even with k=3, larger models like GPT-4 performed reasonably well with k=5 and 6. In this paper, we employ a setup akin to SKILL-MIX to evaluate the capacity of smaller models to learn compositional generalization from examples. Utilizing a diverse set of language skills -- including rhetorical, literary, reasoning, theory of mind, and common sense -- GPT-4 was used to generate text samples that exhibit random subsets of k skills. Subsequent fine-tuning of 7B and 13B parameter models on these combined skill texts, for increasing values of k, revealed the following findings: (1) Training on combinations of k=2 and 3 skills results in noticeable improvements in the ability to compose texts with k=4 and 5 skills, despite models never having seen such examples during training. (2) When skill categories are split into training and held-out groups, models significantly improve at composing texts with held-out skills during testing despite having only seen training skills during fine-tuning, illustrating the efficacy of the training approach even with previously unseen skills. This study also suggests that incorporating skill-rich (potentially synthetic) text into training can substantially enhance the compositional capabilities of models.

  • 5 authors
·
Sep 29, 2024 2